US-Mexico Relations: The Upcoming Challenges of Lopez Obrador with the Biden Administration

Source: https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-went-to-dinner-with-donald-trump

By: Marco García

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao’.

When it comes to Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and former United States’ President Donald Trump, the diplomatic relationship is a bit of a paradox. Throughout his administration, Trump labelled Mexicans as criminals, used the US-Mexico border as a political piñata to pander to his loyal supporters, and conceived detrimental policies for the ‘dreamers’ who flock to the US in hopes of a better life.

 Nevertheless, Mexico’s López Obrador, once a vocal anti-Trumpist, perhaps already misses him.

 Among the many surprises brought about by the Trump presidency, one of the more astonishing ones would be how he got López Obrador – a populist, leftist president who has in the past called Trump a “racist” – to regard him so highly. Said admiration can be attributed to the striking similarities between the two men: both leaders ran for office on a promise to lessen the divide between ordinary citizens and their nation’s elite. Both men are political opportunists, dismantling institutional processes while expressing a complete disregard for foreign policy in favor of placating their domestic base. Both also paint their opponents – usually the media – as enemies of the people. LópezObrador has even taken a queue right from the Trump handbook: just as Trump used Twitter to hog the media spotlight, López Obrador hosts a daily morning news conference in which he is questioned by the media; although these usually consist of Youtubers and mediaoutlets who are sympathetic to him. In short, their populist platforms have allowed for a previously unseen common ground for both men to work together – a sort of emotional understanding between both leaders. The Biden administration, on the other hand, constitutes a challenge to that understanding.

López Obrador was among the last world leaders to congratulate President-Elect Biden on his electoral win, grouping him with the likes of Brazil’s Bolsonaro, Russia’s Putin, and China’s Xi, though the latter congratulated Biden almost three weeks before Obrador. As reported by the New York Times, when Obrador finally brought himself to speak to the President-elect, he did not hesitate to show off his relationship with Trump. “I must mention that we do have a very good relationship with the now president of your country, Mr. Donald Trump”, he said. Obrador sees Biden as a potentially meddlesome President and seeks to push back any American involvement in what he considers Mexican affairs.  To add insult to injury, LópezObrador did not condemn the attack on the US Capitol on January 6th, choosing instead to criticize social media platforms for “censoring” President Trump. He even went as far as offering political asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks. Lopez Obrador has, in a way, set the stage for a strained relationship by repeatedly poking the United States in the eye.

Back in November, the United States’ Justice Department arrested and charged former Mexican Defense Secretary Salvador Cienfuegos with money laundering and distribution of narcotics. After political pressure was applied by the Obrador administration, the American prosecutors dropped the charges and General Cienfuegos was brought back to Mexico to undergo what was promised to be a meticulous investigation by Mexican prosecutors into the Justice Department’s allegations. Alongside this promise, Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, stated that bringing Cienfuegos back to Mexico and not do anything with him would be “suicide”.

Nevertheless, a week before Biden’s inauguration, Cienfuegos was exonerated by the Mexican government.

López Obrador accused American prosecutors of “fabricating” the allegations and acting “irresponsibly”. When met with criticism for his actions, he ordered the release of all classified evidence given to his government by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In just one tweet, Mexican authorities made public 750 pages of classified evidence. Washington expressed “disappointment” over the actions of LópezObrador’s government, with the Mexican President snapping back: “I could also say that I am disappointed in the work of the DEA.”

Regardless of who is right, this case reveals a highly disturbing reality: the future of the US-Mexico bilateral relationship will have an excess of politicking, and a lack of justness. The United States showed this by folding under pressure to give up Cienfuegos, and Mexico showed this by prioritizing political point scoring over the rule of law. An argument could, however, be made for the actions of López Obrador: either exonerating or releasing Cienfuegos presented political costs for the President. On the one hand, Mexico’s military has flourished under López Obrador, and has been given the most responsibility and power in recent memory. By prosecuting Cienfuegos, a man still deeply respected among the Mexican armed forces, the President risked alienating one of his main allies. On the other hand, by exonerating Cienfuegos, López Obrador put into disrepute what is an already fragile relationship with US law enforcement. Considering the President’s lack of interest in those outside his political base, he considered the latter to have a lesser political cost.

Allowing the Cienfuegos investigation to run its course would have given López Obrador the opportunity to prove he is different from his predecessors who he has repeatedly criticized. This was not the case.

Obrador’s striking similarities with President Trump and his unprecedented public showdown with the DEA marks a new era of non-cooperation. The Biden administration has therefore inherited a standoff with the Mexican government. And with Biden more likely to ask more of López Obrador than Trump ever did, it is yet to be seen whether Mexico will cooperate with the new administration or see them as a threat to their sovereignty. With an expected increase in immigration towards the United States from Central America in light of the pandemic and the end of Trump-era policies, immigration will be the first challenge where both leaders will be put to the test. Biden will need LópezObrador to effectively reinforce Mexico’s southern border in order to handle new migrant caravans, especially with the pandemic still battering the Americas. Though it is not expected for President Biden to strongarm López Obrador into action, what remains to be seen is whether Mexico will see Biden’s efforts as meddling in Mexican affairs.  

What López Obrador fears most is Biden’s administration meddling in his ambitious domestic agenda which includes the construction of a new 2 billion USD oil refinery and the revitalization of PEMEX – the state-owned oil company. The US Democratic Party has already called for greater cleaner energy investment and further enforcement of labor rights in Mexico, and these represent a threat to the promises made by Obrador to his political base. What we have seen, then, in López Obrador is perhaps a growing resentment of Americanism. By directly challenging the DEA, defending President Trump in lieu of condemning the Capitol attack, and offering asylum to Assange, LópezObrador has started to push back against any influence the Biden administration might have on his running of the country. If López Obrador can pass that resentment on to his base, then he is further justified in rejecting US influence.

The López Obrador-Trump era was marked by shared sentiments and political opportunism: López Obrador enforced Trumpist immigration policies and, in exchange, Trump did not criticize Obrador’s running of Mexico. This unspoken agreement allowed for both men to please their loyal bases, focus on implementing their respective domestic agendas, and portray a united front in the war on drugs. Biden will now have to walk a thin line between attempting to fix the institutional relationship with Mexico while ensuring that LópezObrador does not see it as interventionism. It is important, however, for both countries to overcome present challenges: if Mexico and the United States do not effectively form a united front against the war on drugs, the winners will be the drug cartels. If Mexico and the United States do not effectively form a united front in tackling immigration, the losers will be the millions of migrants risking their lives in the pursuit of a better life for them and their families. Perhaps what López Obrador will miss the most from Trump is a sentiment President Biden will probably not share with him: a mutual wish to leave each other alone.

Marco is a 3rd Year International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Mexico, he has a keen interest in multilateral organisations, trade, and Latin American affairs.

Nicaragua: Why Its Authoritarian Manual Seems to be Written in Russian and Why This Matters

Image Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute

By: Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro

As an anti-imperialist ideologue in 1979, Daniel Ortega was revered as a champion of the Sandinista Revolution that brought freedom to Nicaragua by overthrowing the authoritarian Somoza regime. Now, in 2021, Ortega has fallen from grace and has impersonated the villainous political character he originally repudiated and ceaselessly fought against in the first place. Weakened rule of law, suppression of the free press, chronic nepotism, brazen violations of the Constitution, and a rhetoric that bifurcates Nicaraguan society amongst ‘loyalists’ and ‘foreign agents’ are the keys closing the return to democracy in the country. It is therefore unsurprising that the US former National Security Advisor, John Bolton, coined Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua as the “troika of tyranny” of Latin America.

 Democratic erosion in Nicaragua is not unprecedented. Ortega has served as the de facto leader of Nicaragua since 2007. In 2011, he secured the approval of the Supreme Court to run for a subsequent presidential term, and again, gained the approval from the Nicaraguan National Assembly to amend the constitution in 2014 so that he could secure the presidency in 2016 for a third time. On top of his institutional iron-grasp on power, his regime also violently suppressed mass protests in 2018 which featured opposition groups decrying the seemingly irreversible truncation of political and social freedoms. His grip on power has undoubtedly continued to ossify as he has gradually come to embody a 21st Century caudillo. 

 Nicaragua’s growing authoritarianism fits into a global trend characterised by the backsliding of democracy and the rise of hybrid and authoritarian regimes. It is when narrated within this context that Nicaragua’s dictatorial politics crescendo to a tangible concern about the future of democracy– particularly in Latin America. Worst of all, however, is that some of Nicaragua’s recently established buttons and levers used to stifle opposition and criticism eerily resemble practices used in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. ​

 The parallels between the two regimes allude to a newly emerging concept within political science known as ‘authoritarian learning’. According to a paper published by Hall and Ambrosio, “authoritarian regimes adopt survival strategies based upon the prior successes and failures of other governments”. The collapse of the USSR, for instance, which was catalysed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, signalled to the Chinese Communist Party at the time that, in order to prevent political downfall at home, media freedom would need to be circumscribed alongside associational life. Similarly, Cuba’s Raúl Castro is reportedly attempting to emulate the Chinese and Vietnamese politico-economic models to open the country’s economy to the global community whilst maintaining political control. 

 Considering the pressures Nicaragua faces from a growing grassroots opposition and a changing US-Latin America agenda driven by the Biden administration, it is reasonable to assume Ortega could be drawing inspiration from successfully entrenched authoritarian regimes like Russia. The most notable instantiation of this was the adoption of a draconian law in December of last year wherebyNGOs and foreign media outlets have to register as ‘foreign agents’ if they receive money from international organizations. At best, violators of the law face shutdown and the confiscation of property – a result which has already been observed with the shutting down of a defender of free press, the Fundación Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. At worst, they face unabated repercussions facilitated by Nicaragua’s weak rule of law. Curiously enough, the bill has been denoted as the ‘Putin’ law due to its uncanny resemblance with a law passed in Russia in 2012. The original Putin law forced organizations engaging in political activity receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents, even if the funding did not pay for any sort of political activities. 

 The objectives in Managua and Moscow are nearly carbon copies of each other – the respective foreign agent laws seek to ostracize civil society and suppress any budding sources of opposition against authoritarianism. As two strongmen who know a thing or two about political longevity, it seems that Ortega can extract lessons from Putin’s successful retention of power. For instance, Ortega is said to be weighing an amendment to Nicaragua’s constitution that would convert the country from a presidential to a parliamentary system in order to circumvent presidential limits by becoming the Prime Minister. Putin exercised a similar move in 2008 by becoming Russia’s Prime Minister, temporarily ceding the presidency to only recuperate it in 2012.

 Of greatest concern, however, are the reforms that have been made to directly undermine free and fair elections. After all, what is a democracy if, at its core, it does not have elections? In Nicaragua, the ‘Law in Defence of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace’ effectively prevents the opposition from running for election later this November. With the authority the law grants Ortega, he essentially has free reign in designating someone as ‘traitor to the homeland’ and hand out prison sentences as a result. On the other side of the same coin, following the Siberian city council election where Ksenia Fadeeva defeated Putin’s handpicked contender, opposition candidates can now be labelled on the ballot as ‘foreign agents’– an awkward label that can directly dissuade voters. 

 It is difficult to concretely discern if Ortega is, in fact, intentionally been taking notes on his Russian counterpart’s authoritarian behaviour. As Hall and Ambrosio admit, the reason why authoritarian learning is such an understudied concept is due to the near impossibility of collecting information about the paper trail that precedes the implementation of certain policies. But perhaps the other underlying reason is that, up until now, democracy had been the dominant political model to follow. The idea that democracy was the inevitable destination for all nations was a reigning dogma up until recently. This sanctification of democracy created a myopic focus on studying and promoting democracy whilst forgetting that democratic backsliding and erosion are symptoms that can sicken all political regimes that are –or were– on a democratizing path. 

 The parallels between Nicaraguan and Russian authoritarianism might indicate that the world has become safer for authoritarian regimes, meaning it is becoming increasingly more likely that they will have opportunities to learn from each other’s failures and successes. The November elections in Nicaragua, therefore, might become a breaking point for democracy in a region already surrounded by hybrid regimes like El Salvador and Honduras. If Ortega’s dictatorial hand continues to be raised victoriously, another chapter will be added to the manual of techniques that can be used by strongmen to further entrench their grip on power.

Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro is a second-year student of Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Originally Mexican, she is passionate about the political history of Latin America, particularly that of her home country. 

Bibliography

Associated Press. “Fractious Nicaraguan Opposition Unites to Challenge Ortega.” WTOP, 25 June 2020, wtop.com/latin-america/2020/06/fractious-nicaraguan-opposition-unites-to-challenge-ortega/.

Bejarano, Por Manuel. “EE.UU.: Ley de Agentes Extranjeros Conduce a Nicaragua Hacia La Dictadura, Silenciando Voces Independientes.” La Prensa, 9 Feb. 2021, www.laprensa.com.ni/2021/02/08/politica/2782210-ee-uu-ley-de-agentes-extranjeros-conduce-a-nicaragua-hacia-la-dictadura-silenciando-voces-independientes.

Berg, Ryan C. “Ortega Is Busy Completing Nicaragua’s Authoritarian Architecture.” American Enterprise Institute - AEI, 9 Nov. 2020, www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/ortega-is-busy-completing-nicaraguas-authoritarian-architecture/.

Berg, Ryan C. “The Case of ‘Authoritarian Learning’ in Nicaragua.” American Enterprise Institute - AEI, 2 Oct. 2020, www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/the-case-of-authoritarian-learning-in-nicaragua-2/.

Cerda, Arlen. “Ortega Classifies ‘True’ Nicaraguans and ‘Foreign Agents.’” Havana Times, 25 Sept. 2020, havanatimes.org/features/ortega-classifies-true-nicaraguans-and-foreign-agents/.

Chivers, C. J. “Putin Is Approved as Prime Minister (Published 2008).” The New York Times, 9 May 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/europe/09russia.html.

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“How to Unseat Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega.” The Economist, 10 Dec. 2020, www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/12/10/how-to-unseat-nicaraguas-daniel-ortega.

Lopez, Ismael. “Nicaraguan Parliament Approves Controversial Hate Crimes Law.” Reuters, 11 Nov. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-human-rights-idUSKBN27R04X.’

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“Nicaragua Essentially Bans Opposition from 2021 Elections.” AP NEWS, 21 Dec. 2020, apnews.com/article/elections-blockades-central-america-daniel-ortega-nicaragua-14d04033e443f6da9bf3d11aec0dae47.

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US-Mexico Relations: An Evaluation

Source: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/01/30/297187/preserving-and-strengthening-the-u-s-mexico-relationship/

By: Marco García

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

The Mexico-US bilateral relationship is one filled with complex multiculturalism, ever-changing challenges, and an occasionally violent history. It can be tempting to judge the content of this history based on films, documentaries, or perhaps what Hollywood deems suitable for the public to see. In Mexico however, one quickly finds a particular take on this bilateral relationship: the United States is a difficult, overbearing, and rarely cooperative neighbour. Nonetheless, Mexico’s unrecognized yet historic diplomatic drive with its northern neighbour has raised the question of whether the US owes its southern neighbour some reconsideration. To answer this question, it is imperative to explore the historical and economic ties that bind these two great nations.

Firstly, to understand the complex dynamics between these countries, it is worth considering the Mexican-American War of the 1840s. It has left a traumatic wound amongst Mexicans that has managed to scar after almost 200 years of bilateral relationship building – a wound that the outgoing American President Donald Trump has torn wide open again. Donald Trump has successfully deranged the United States’ bond with Mexico with unsparing rhetoric to the point where the popularity of his lies seems to supersede the fact that there have been 200 years of relative peace between the two countries – a span that very few countries that share a border can claim. These historical damages are certainly not minor: Mexico lost more than half its territory in a war waged by the United States upon a new, and weaker, nation. It is important to remember that Mexico was arguably the first victim of an American imperialism that many nations would later claim to have fallen victim to.  Indeed, the conflict between Mexico and the United States had all the characteristics of a war fuelled by imperialistic idiosyncrasies and propaganda. The United States, tied to the idea of “Manifest Destiny”, carried out an attack against Mexico when the latter refused to sell or cede what, at that time, were Mexico's northernmost territories.  

Portrayals of an extremely unbalanced bilateral relationship with Mexico – with the United States as the injured party – are fuelled by President Trump and his supporters who passionately decry the damages performed by Mexico upon their nation. In the eyes of much of the wider political community, however, these simply contradict history and political reality. It is important to "reclaim” the facts to demonstrate the political magnitude and contemporary impact of the Mexican-American War, a war launched and promoted by an American President who deemed Mexicans to be “inferior”. Such ideals have unfortunately continued into the present day, represented in Trump’s frequent attacks on Mexican immigrants in the United States.  Over 13,000 American soldiers died in the war while the Mexican government estimates around 25,000 killed and wounded on their side.  To add insult to injury, Mexico – with its capital, customs stations and ports occupied by American soldiers – was forced to sign the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 giving up over half its territory.  The size of this lost territory should not be underestimated: the current Mexican state already occupies almost two million square kilometres - about five Germanies or eight United Kingdoms - but the Northern territories would have made it almost twice as big as this. The war was so traumatic that it became the basis of the Mexican national anthem and launched a firm sentiment of nationalism across the republic which affects the present US-Mexico relationship. Interestingly, upon closer observation it is evident that it is not only Mexicans who hold some degree of indignation over the Mexican American War. It is surprising to observe American historical figures condemning the incident as well. It was Ulysses S. Grant, then a young army officer during the war, who wrote in his memoirs, ‘I do not think there was ever a more wicked war than the one waged by the United States on Mexico.’  He maintained that the bitterness and bloodshed that came with the Civil War was God’s punishment for America’s sins.

It is also worth noting that subsequent American interests in the region arguably postponed democracy in Mexico for about 90 years. Mexico was remarkably conciliatory however, welcoming American investment and supporting the Union in the American Civil War. In 1911, Mexico elected Francisco Madero President in a landmark for democracy in the country. Nonetheless, this democratic experiment would be nipped in the bud by the US as its Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, orchestrated a coup against Madero only two years later. Indeed, one official in Washington wrote apropos Wilson’s conduct; ‘Dearing Mexico needs a good punch and so I think it’s right to soak in a good dose.’ This led to Madero's assassination and plunged Mexico into what would come to be known as the Mexican Revolution.

The flourishing of democracy in Mexico became a dream ever more distant.

It can be quite remarkable to observe the lack of resentment from Mexico after these two serious grievances. Mexico cooperated with Roosevelt on his Good Neighbour Policy, declared war on the Axis powers during the Second World War, and attracted many American artists, writers, and businessmen.  However, many experts still question how directly Mexico should respond when dealing with the United States. Historian Enrique Krauze raises an interesting questionworth discussing: ‘how much of the historic prosperity of the United States of America stems from the development of territories originally inhabited by Mexicans and ripped away from Mexico through an invasion and a war of territorial conquest?’ 

By contrast, Mexico and the United States are now intertwined in virtually every sense. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force, the bilateral trade has increased 556 percent (over a billion dollars’ worth of trade every day).  The largest population of Americans living abroad reside in Mexico – and vice versa – and the day to day relationship with Mexico creates over 6 million jobs in the United States.  Unfortunately, the Trump Administration appears discontent with the current balance of relations with Mexico. While perhaps not directly equal, Mexico’s economic and diplomatic position has grown far beyond its vulnerabilities of 1846. Simply put, what Trump fails to see is that Mexico is not the defenceless country it was in 1846.

How about immigration? Infamously, Trump claimed that when Mexico sends its people, that they are not sending their best – they are bringing crime, they are rapists, and so on. US data shows that this could not be further from the truth. According to the United States Department of Commerce Projections, Mexico became the number one origin of visitors to the United States in 2016, with over 20 million Mexican tourists visiting the US every year and spending over 20 billion USD in the US’s economy.  To signify the importance of this: in 2014 the USA welcomed more Mexican tourists than British, Brazilian, Chinese, German, and French tourists combined.  It is undeniable that there has been a significant amount of Mexican immigration towards the United States – there are over 35 million Mexican-Americans today.  But it is also important to remember that, out of every five Mexicans in the United States, four are legal residents. 

If Trump fears immigration from Mexico, then his fears are arguably groundless, irrational, and contested at best. In 2009, more Mexicans left the United States than entered the country.  Between 2009 and 2014, over one million Mexican immigrants moved back to Mexico from the US voluntarily.  And in present times, out of every two Mexicans that immigrate to the US, one comes back voluntarily.  It is interesting to see the argument from another perspective, and to observe the willingness of the United States to throw their neighbour under the bus for political point-scoring.

In present times, Biden’s recent election is a unique opportunity for a "détente", the establishment of a bilateral relationship that appreciates and understands the historical wounds between the countries. Hollywood and US media could perhaps take a leading role in shaping American historical consciousness on this issue. They should, at the very least, portray an honest reconsideration of the US’s first imperial war. Mexicans seek an atonement for past wrongs - wrongs triggered by racial prejudices and an aggressive approach to territory on the part of the United States.  

Who is the victim of the US-Mexico bilateral relationship? Although it has in many ways been a relatively inequitable relationship, no one necessarily has to be the “victim”. The Mexican-American War taught Mexico a valuable lesson and gave it a strong sense of nationalism, but the country never rose back from that war like Japan or Germany did after WWII. In many senses, Mexico still has not risen from that war. It can be quite tempting to conclude that Mexico has more than enough grounds to turn on its northern neighbour – but the current political landscape shows a more conciliatory Mexican foreign policy approach towards its neighbour. Puzzled American and Mexican thinkers alike have struggled for generations to answer this question, with Walt Whitman addressing it nicely: ‘Mexico, the only one to whom we have ever really done wrong, are now the only one who prays for us and for our triumph, with genuine prayer. Is it not indeed strange?’

Marco is a 3rd Year International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Mexico, he has a keen interest in multilateral organisations, trade, and Latin American affairs.