Jair Bolsonaro Explained: How Did Brazil’s Current Far-Right President Ascend to Power?

Source: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/bolsonaro-president-without-party-strategy-depoliticize-brazil/

By: Alice Iscar

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

​It’s been over two years since Jair Bolsonaro –the current president of Brazil– was elected, and the balance sheet of his first two years of ruling Latin America’s largest country is rather grim. The range of examples to illustrate his wrongdoings since his election is large –the peak of Amazonian deforestation, an extremely poor handled sanitary crisis,  and the sharp drop of his popularity among Brazilians just a few months after he took office in January 2019. The big question this article will attempt to answer is how such a radical conservative, misogynistic, homophobic and racist Brazilian political figure was able to ascend to the country’s management. Four main aspects which explain this phenomenon will be presented: antipetismo; the social, economic and political crises Brazil has been undergoing for the past decade; Bolsonaro’s personality-led campaign; and ‘fake news’. 

Antipetismo

 The most evident explanation to Bolsonaro’s rise to power comes from this term: antipetismo. ‘PT’ is the common Brazilian way to call the ‘Partido dos Trabalhadores’, the leftist political party which ruled the country for over a decade from 2003 to 2016. Antipetismo describes the sentiment of being against ‘PT’ –against Brazil’s Workers’ Party. This sentiment exists ever since people started to notice the undergoing economic corruption under the presidency of Luiz Inácio da Silva – or Lula, a former leftist president of Brazil who ruled the country from 2003 to 2011. However, itheightened in 2014, when the corruption scandal officially broke out to the world under the presidency of Dilma Roussefwith the initiation of the Operação Lava Jato (the Car Wash operation). The Car Wash investigation found that the source of the corruption came from the state-owned oil company Petrobras, from which politicians, and more particularly the members of the Workers’ Party, accumulated millions of dollars. After more than thirty people were arrested for corruption –businessmen and politicians included– the scandal reached its peak with Lula’s trial for corruption and Dilma Roussef’s consequent impeachment in 2016 (after she tried to name him her chief of staff in order to shield him from justice). Therefore, during the 2018 elections, not few were the Brazilians who harboured a genuine hate for Brazil’s Workers’ Party and the political class in general. In that context, Jair Bolsonaro, a retired military official, stood as an outsider, and ended up embodying that hatred against PT. A study led by Mark Setzler in the Brazilian Political Science Review found that support for Bolsonaro in the 2018 elections is widely and largely explained by partisanship and antiparty hostility towards PT.

A country in crisis 

 Closely – but not exclusively – related to the previous point, Bolsonaro also found his support in the social, political and economic crises which have been shaking the country for the past two decades. Brazil’s two main problems in the population’s mind are the economic crisis and the worsening of violence in the past decade. After years of steady growth, Brazil experienced a heavy economic crisis in 2014, under Dilma Roussef. Brazil’s real GDP fell by 7,2% from 2014 to 2016, amid the political turmoil occurring at the same time.The economic and political crises combined caused mass popular dissatisfaction in the wake of the 2018 elections, which proved to be a fertile ground for Bolsonaro’s rise to power. Additionally, Brazil has also been suffering from an increasing social crisis with the steady rise of violence in the past years. In 2018, fourteen of the world’s fifty most violent cities were situated in Brazil, the dangerousness being assessed by the number of homicides per 100,000 residents. In 2018, the violence in Rio de Janeiro was so uncontrollable, that Michel Temer, Brazil’s president at the time, signed an emergency security decree which gave the armed forces authorization to replace the police and take over its duties.Once again, in that context and thanks to his singularity, many Brazilians came to see Bolsonaro as the exit gate from those political, economic and social crises.   

A personality-led campaign 

 Similarly to Donald Trump in 2016 and other populist figures who managed to rise to power, Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign was heavily centred on his personality, which surprisingly, in a way, seduced many Brazilians. The list of controversial and offensive remarks delivered by Bolsonaro is long. He often appears as a racist, homophobic and misogynistic man –as he told a colleague that he would not rape her because she did not deserve it’ or as he claims he would rather his son die than be homosexual; or as he stated, when talking about Afro-Brazilian communities, that they ‘don’t do anything’ and that they ‘are not even good for breeding anymore’. If some Brazilians were horrified by those statements coming from a presidential candidate, the more conservative part of the population, who felt put aside by the post-dictatorship cultural and political establishment, identified with Bolsonaro. His rhetoric also gave the impression that he spoke his mind and was not afraid to do so, which significantly contrasted with the sense of deceitfulness and dishonesty coming from the ruling political elite and especially the members of the Workers’ Party.

Fake News 

Once more calling for a parallel with Trump, Bolsonaro declared a war against media’s ‘fake news’ going as far as to accuse a journalist from The Guardian, Bianca Santana, of spreading fake news on him. However, it seems Bolsonaro and his supporters were the ones who heavily shared fake news on Bolsonaro’s rivals during the presidential campaign. In an interview on Vox by Jen Kirby of Benjamin Junge, he explains how important Facebook and especially WhatsApp are in Brazil. Benjamin Junge is an associate professor of Anthropology at the State University of New York at New Paltz and a Fulbright fellow at the Federal University of Pernambuco in Brazil, whose studies focus on Brazilian working-class and middle-class families. In the interview he mentions how the majority of families have a WhatsApp group and how these group chats are created on every occasion whether it is between students in a class or among friends and families. In that way, information is diffused very easily among the population. Junge claims that digital spaces such as Facebook and WhatsApp is where the fake news are.An example of a fake news story spread by Bolsonaro during his campaign is that Fernando Haddad, his leftist rival, was planning on creating a ‘gay kit’ to deliver to children in primary schools in order to encourage them to become gay. Many other absurd stories on his rivals were shared in order to undermine their legitimacy and promote his campaign. 

​Bolsonaro managed to find his support by exacerbating feelings of dissatisfaction, hatred, fear and insecurity whichBrazilians were feeling in the wake of his election. Thesestemmed from the political crisis of the corruption scandal which touched the Workers’ Party, but also the economic and social crises which have witnessed a rise in inequality and violence in Brazil’s largest cities. He also focused on leading a personality-centred campaign, which shocked but also seduced many Brazilians. Finally, he made heavy and coarse use of fake news in order to spread negative misinformation on his rivals, profiting from a general feeling of antipetismo among the Brazilian population. 

Alice is a third-year History and International Relations student at King’s College London seeking to raise awareness about the current politico-environmental situation in Brazil. She is a regular contributor of El Cortao’.

Bibliography

Amaral, Oswaldo E. do. ‘The victory of Jair Bolsonaro According to the Brazilian Electoral Study of 2018.’ Brazilian Political Science Review 14, no. 1 (Spring 2020). https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821202000010004.

Barua, Akrur. ‘Brazil: Yearning for the good times.’ Global Economic Outlook, Q2 2016, April 29, 2016. 

https://web.archive.org/web/20160823114946/http://dupress.com/articles/global-economic-outlook-q2-2016-brazil/.

Boadle, Anthony. ‘Brazil poll shows rising rejection of Bolsonaro.’ Reuters, December 20, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-poll-idUSKBN1YO239.

Bracho-Polanco, Ed. ‘How Jair Bolsonaro used ‘fake news’ to win power.’ The Conversation, January 8, 2019. https://theconversation.com/how-jair-bolsonaro-used-fake-news-to-win-power-109343.

Chagas-Bastos, Fabrício H. ‘Political Realignment in Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro and the Right Turn.’ Revista de EstudiosSociales, no. 69 (2019): 92-100. https://doi.org/10.7440/res69.2019.08.

Cowie, Sam. ‘Michel Temer signs security decree to stem Rio violence.’ Aljazeera, February 16, 2018.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/16/michel-temer-signs-security-decree-to-stem-rio-violence.

Daly, Tom. ‘Populism, Public Law, and Democratic Decay in Brazil: Understanding the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro.’ Social Science Research Network, (Spring 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3350098.

Kirby, Jen. ‘Corruption, fake news, and WhatsApp: how Bolsonaro won Brazil.’ Vox, October 29, 2018.https://www.vox.com/world/2018/10/29/18025066/bolsonaro-brazil-elections-voters-q-a.

Londoño, Ernesto, Andreoni, Manuela. ‘Brazil Election: How Jair Bolsonaro Turned Crisis Into Opportunity.’ The New York Times, October 29, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-profile.html.

Santana, Bianca. ‘Jair Bolsonaro accused me of spreading ‘fake news’. I know why he targeted me.’ The Guardian, June 22, 2020.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/22/jair-bolsonaro-fake-news-accusation-marielle-franco.

Setzler, Mark. ‘Did Brazilians Vote for Jair bolsonaro Because They Share his Most Controversial Views?’ Brazilian Political Science Review 15, no. 1 (Autumn 2020). https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821202100010006.

Sotero, Paulo. ‘Petrobras Scandal.’ Britannica, April 10, 2018.  https://www.britannica.com/event/Petrobras-scandal.

Winter, Brian. ‘System Failure: Behind the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro.’ Americas Quarterly, January 24, 2018.https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/system-failure-behind-the-rise-of-jair-bolsonaro/.

Woody, Christopher. ‘These were the 50 most violent cities in the world in 2018.’ Business Insider, March 12, 2019.https://www.businessinsider.com/most-violent-cities-in-the-world-in-2018-2019-3?IR=T.

Cultural Celebration or Economic Exploitation: Indigenous Identity in Peru

Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/04/peru-indigenous-names-public-records

By: Clarice Benney*

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao'.

Peru’s geographical diversity is typically summarised in three words: sierra (mountainous Andean region), selva (the tropical Amazon rainforest), and costa (coastal cities, towns and villages). Travel companies often capitalise on this diversity, marketing it as an ideal holiday destination for the variety of environments, however this presentation often idealises the situation and fails to nuance how regionalisation can have a negative impact on individual experience. This article will explore how indigenous and Hispanic identities intersect to form Peru, with regard to economic generation, cultural exploitation, linguistic diversity and political representation.

Source: https://portal.andina.pe/edpespeciales/2018/diversidad/index.html

The mountainous Andean region, home to the cities of Cusco and cultural site of Machu Picchu, is also home to many of Peru’s Quechua communities. 60% of land in Peru is in the Amazon basin, and when looking at the demographic makeup of the Amazonas and Loreto provinces, there are a combined 32 indigenous groups. The coastal area is where the majority of Peru’s cities are based, but when looking at Peru’s entire coastline, the presence of indigenous communities decreases, as shown in the map to the right, and aside from some Quechua communities in Ancash there is no presence at all within 50 kilometres of the coast.

Source: https://www.minem.gob.pe/_publicacion.php?idSector=1&idPublicacion=557

Peru’s three largest industries are mining, fishing, and tourism. When considering how these industries ‘map out’, as shown in the map to the left, mining is being undertaken and explored in areas that seem to follow the spread of Quechua communities: in the Andean region from Arequipa to Ancash. For tourism, I would argue that it is more useful to understand why tourists come to Peru than where tourists go. In 2017, a survey found that the top four motives for visiting Per were to see the nature and natural landscape (60.7%), to see Machu Picchu (60.4%), for the Peruvian cuisine (59%), and to visit Cusco (55%). Machu Picchu is an archaeological site of an Incan settlement, built into the mountains and so remote that it survived the destruction of the Spanish conquistadores, and Cusco is its nearest city, and a popular destination for hiking and its impressive landscape. When visiting for gastronomy, the capital city of Lima is home to many good restaurants, but not the only place to take advantage of Peru’s rich culinary culture.

In terms of the residential population distribution in Peru, about 40% lives in the costa, 36% live in the sierra and 12% in the selva. Almost one third of the population lives in the Lima and Callao Metropolitan area. With this in mind, it does make sense that there would be a centralisation of resources in the Lima area, however the extent of the centralisation of resources appears somewhat exploitative, given that the industries which finance it are linked to the sierra and indigenous culture. However, it is not just about economic resources and recognition; when considering the importance of indigenous culture to tourism, Peru’s institutions often exclude and disadvantage indigenous communities.

In 2002, the cultural and linguistic diversity in Peru led to a law being passed that is commonly referred to as Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (EIB), which aims to promote indigenous languages and cultures, keeping the languages ‘alive’ by creating bilingual schools that teach in indigenous languages. In practice, this has led to the development of some schools that offer bilingual primary education. For example, in the Cusco region some primary schools give education in Quechua, the indigenous language in this area, but almost all secondary education is taught in Castilian Spanish. Whilst the motive behind EIB was good, it has created issues. For one, the ‘othering’ of non-Castilian speaking children, as EIB schools are seen as different and separate from non-EIB schools, which make up the majority. Additionally, EIB aside, there is a higher rate of leaving education between primary and secondary in indigenous communities due in part to the increased expense of accessing schools that are further away. This disproportionately affects girls, who are less likely to be given the opportunity if a family can only afford to send one child, and is choosing between a son and a daughter. What EIB can do is to heighten the risk of dropping out of education if a child is uncomfortable or unable to speak Castilian. To improve this situation would either require the development of EIB secondary schools or the inclusion of indigenous language and culture in the mainstream national curriculum in order to address the issue of marginalisation.

With regard to political representation of indigenous culture in Peru, until 1979 voting was only possible for those who could speak and write Castilian, and there have been a number of cultural conflicts in recent years. For example, in 2006, María Sumire had to repeat her ‘swearing-in’ three times, as she insisted on doing it in Quechua, her native language. In 2009, in what is now referred to as el Baguazo, Congress suspended 7 elected members, three of whom identified as indigenous, for supporting protests in favour of demands being made by indigenous communities. The demands came in response to a government move to loosen legislation regarding extraction of resources in the Amazon. The protests came to a head in a confrontation which saw both police and protestor casualties, but only the prosecution of protestors. The significance of removing these members of Congress cannot be overlooked, given that from 2001-2016 only 7 members of Congress identified as indigenous.

Peru’s diversity is part of its identity, and yet sadly this diversity has not yet led to the social equity necessary to avoid economic exploitation of indigenous people. The seeds are there in the form of the EIB and perception of Peru to outsiders, however in their current forms, neither of these potential factors for change are doing their jobs properly. As such, work to help restore this balance falls to individuals offering community services. I would like to highlight the work of three organisations operating in the Cusco area: Casa Mantay, Sacred Valley Project and Mosqoy. 

Casa Mantay provides a home for teenage mothers and their children and gives them the necessary support (both material and psychological) to continue their education, as well as giving them the opportunity to develop skills by working in their social enterprise, Taller Mantay, which produces artisan leather goods. Mantay has recently started having ‘Jueves de Quechua’ (Thursdays in Quechuan) for staff and girls, to recognise the importance of self-expression for those who speak Quechua as their native tongue, and to encourage non-native speakers to learn it. 

Sacred Valley Project provides dormitories in Cusco for girls from indigenous backgrounds to come during term time and receive support and community when they attend secondary school. Similarly, Mosqoy has dormitories for secondary students and they also work with mostly female-run weaving cooperatives in the Sacred Valley as part of the Q’ente Society Textile Revitalization Programme, to give them an outlet to sell to international markets. This connects women’s often unacknowledged labour with a fair income source, fostering financial independence in their families, greater provision for their children, and a central, respected place in the rural economy.

Clarice is a student studying Spanish at Cambridge University. She is currently on her ‘year abroad’ and working with the NGO Latin American Foundation for the Future (LAFF) as Communications Coordinator. LAFF operates in Cusco, Peru and so Clarice is particularly interested in Peruvian current affairs, as well as protest culture in Latin American and grassroots activism. 

*About LAFF:

Latin American Foundation for the Future (LAFF) is a UK registered charity operating in Cusco, Peru to increase access to quality education and personal development opportunities. LAFF believes that one of the best ways to create positive long term change is to support local grassroots organisations so that community leaders drive the change. To find out more about what we do, check out our website.

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/laffcharity/

Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/latin-american-foundation-for-the-future

Plata o Parca: Insights on the Participation and Role of Latin American Women in Drug Trafficking

Mugshot of Griselda Blanco. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griselda_Blanco#/media/File:Griselda_Blanco_Medellin.jpg

by: Thais Ricard

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao'.

When thinking about drug trafficking’s protagonists in Latin America, we automatically visualize stocky, bearded, middle-aged men with a stern look and a deep voice. Indeed, by examining the portrayal of the drug world in popular culture – a portrayal built on media headlines and popularised by well-known series like Narcos, which bases its plot on the story of drug kingpin Pablo Escobar – one perceives this world as exclusively within a man’s domain, where women are relegated to background activities and forced to play a passive, supporting role in the domestic sphere. In general, as crime statistics suggest that delinquency is dominated by men, the notion of crime is associated with masculine stereotypes, such as risk-taking and action. The presence of women in drug trafficking – a high-risk and violent activity –is therefore a paradox for gender stereotypes of criminal conduct. Women who take part in this trade are depicted as pathological or masculine, defying the feminine role that a machista society has imposed on them.  

Over the past few years, however, Latin American women have increasingly participated in the trade of illicit drugs, although this involvement has been absent from research related to the narcotics trade and has routinely been underestimated by state and non-state organisations alike. In Colombia, the number of women prisoners has increased more than fivefold, while that of male prisoners has increased just threefold. Now, nearly five out of every ten women jailed are serving sentences for drug-related crimes. This female participation is arguably the result of a long-lasting ‘war on drugs’ which produced the incarceration of many male criminals and created a labour vacuum that has encouraged women to enlist in the drug businesses of their fathers, partners, or lovers.  

Some women have even assumed high-ranking positions in this male-dominated environment. In this context, it would be a good moment to introduce the individual whose mugshot headlines this article: Griselda Blanco, also known as the ‘Cocaine Godmother’. She was introduced to the cocaine industry by her second husband, Alberto Bravo, and proceeded to progressively replace him in his own line of work until she had become one of the wealthiest and most powerful drug leaders in the world. Her trafficking network spread across the United States, bringing in an estimated $80 million USD a month. Considered a pioneer in drug trafficking and a mentor for Pablo Escobar, she established many of the smuggling techniques and murdering methods that are still used today. Not only was she involved in the trafficking of narcotics, but she also played a major part in the ‘Cocaine Cowboy Wars’ that ravaged Miami in the 70s and 80s. Ruthless against her rivals, she was suspected of having sponsored hundreds of killings in the US and Colombia, making her one of the deadliest women of all time. By the time of her assassination in 2012, Blanco had aroused a great fascination among the general public and her story inspired many books, TV shows, or documentaries such as the Cocaine Cowboys (2006).

Although Blanco shows the deep involvement of women in drug trafficking, her story is misleading as it constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Not all women can attain such levels of authority and wealthiness. In this industry, the roles usually performed by women are, in fact,subordinate ones, which is thus concordant with the feminine stereotypes of subservience and passivity. Women are enlisted to cook for laborers and some, such as the poppy flower and coca leaf pickers (known as raspachines), are involved in the first stages of drug manufacturing. They are also used as chemists, who use chemical substances to extract cocaine, or as mules for the trafficking andsale of illegal substances. The use of women as couriers is particularly interesting for drug lords because they are often perceived as innocent and untouchable which makes their smuggling efforts quite successful, as most police attention is focused on men. Moreover, female mules are trained to flaunt their sexuality, by dressing up attractively and flirting with immigration officers to dispel any suspicion with a seductive look. This further reinforces women’s stereotypical role as objects of physical desire.  

Concentrated at the bottom of the chain, women face greater risks as violence is often most pervasive at this level and the rewards are few. The threats they face are two-fold and are split between the general risks involved in drug trafficking and those specific to their condition as women. Both women and men working in the harvesting of illicit crops, for instance, are particularly at risk of falling into drug abuse. A 2019 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),written in collaboration with the Colombian Ministry of Justice, reported that these women and their relatives saw higher cases of substance and alcohol addiction as well as greater incidences of domestic abuse. Moreover, women who operate as mules are the most vulnerable and exposed actors of this black market and, for this reason, often ended up exploited by their bosses and/or imprisoned with disproportionately long sentences despite only occupying a minor position in the commercialization chain.  

Women who perform these roles normally have a level of education no higher than primary school. They are often unaware of the dangers inherent in the drug trade and the seriousness of the penalty levied if caught. Even when they know the consequences, they may still be willing to accept these risks to make money. Indeed, economic incentives are the main factor pushing women into this environment. Lacking legitimate economic opportunities, being single parents, or desiring financial independence, many of these women are left with no choice but to get involved. They may also be pressured by their families, who may declare their participation to be mandatory. This explains why those women, contrary to their male counterparts, are not willing to attract attention to their activities and rarely seek authority. For them, earning money is more important than having power or prestige.

Nowadays, the legislation to address the drug problem is flawed as it exacerbates sex-based discrimination. Women prisoners are most likely to suffer from exclusion, abandonment, and loss offamily ties. Not only does long-term imprisonment create an economic burden for the taxpayer, but itpromises severe, far-reaching effects for individual prisoners, for their children, and for society as a whole. Indeed, as shown by the story of Rocío Duque – a single Colombian mother jailed for 14 years for carrying a small amount of cocaine paste which she received only a modest fee for – current policies foster harsh cycles of poverty and socio-economic exclusion that leads to recidivism. Her account shows how repeat criminals suffer social and state sigma and how recidivism can be unavoidable when there are no reintegration programs to help women to rebuild their lives after being in jail.  

It is time, therefore, for Latin American governments to redesign drug legislation in order forthe latter to demonstrate gender awareness. This will be achieved partly by meeting the gender-specific needs of women in penitentiary centres, and partly by reducing the imprisonment of women through non-custodial correction measures. Overall, policies should now focus on increasing levels of socio-economic development and on improving access to education, employment, and basic healthcare services to avoid any intensification of women’s involvement in drug trafficking.

Thais is a third year History and International Relations student at KCL. Her main research interests are about human rights and security issues such as drug trafficking and insurgency movements. She is particularly keen in analyzing those matters through a gender-based perspective.

¡Chile Despertó! … ¿Y Ahora Qué? // Chile has Awoken! ... Now what?

Image Courtesy of Ciper Chile

By Maximilian Frederik van Oordt

​A más de un año del estallido social y con un proceso constitucional inédito en marcha, ya va siendo hora de abordar dos preguntas clave producto de este acontecimiento histórico: ¿cuáles han sido los cambios en Chile? y, ¿qué sendero debería seguir el país?

​En relación a la primera pregunta, la lista de respuestas es larga dado que este movimiento ha sido de extrema consecuencia nacional en materia económica, política, y social. En un artículo anterior había hecho alusión a varias causas principales del estallido como la clase política, la desigualdad, las pensiones, y el costo de la vida, entre muchas más. Todos estos ámbitos han ostentado cambios que van de lo superficial – como la destitución del ex Ministro del Interior Andrés Chadwick – a lo formidable – como el proceso constituyente. El 25 de octubre del año pasado, producto directo del estallido social, Chile celebró un plebiscito nacional sobre si se debiera mantener o no la actual Constitución. De forma abrumadora, el electorado despidió a la Carta Magna de la República, aprobando con un 78,28% el inicio de un proceso histórico que redactará un nuevo documento. El 11 de abril de 2021, los chilenos elegirán sus candidatos a la Convención Constituyente, influyendo así de forma directa en el resultado del proceso, y en agosto de 2022 votarán de nuevo en un plebiscito que buscará aprobar la nueva Constitución. Pese a la violencia y a las injusticias delatadas a lo largo del estallido social, este proceso constituyente es un ejemplo brillante de la democracia y uno del cual todo chileno puede sentirse orgulloso.

​Mas allá de los profundos cambios políticos – que, felizmente, han incluido una rebaja a las abusivas dietas parlamentarias – el Chile de hoy cuenta con reformas policiales, educativas, y económicas creadas con el objetivo de responder a las múltiples demandas de la ciudadanía. Carabineros de Chile, la institución policial encargada del orden público, vió su imagen fuertemente deslustrada por la vastedad de los abusos que ejerció contra los manifestantes. Lo que en tiempos pasados se consideraba un modelo a seguir en el contexto regional ahora parecía un instrumento de represión caracterizada por el caos, la tragedia, y la impunidad. El resultado ha sido un importante incremento en las compras y entregas de cámaras corporales por parte del gobierno, aunque las fuerzas policiales siguen contando con menos de mil de éstas a nivel país. También se ha apreciado el inicio de una profunda reforma a Carabineros llevada a cabo por las autoridades civiles en conjunto con la institución, con una mira al refuerzo de los derechos humanos. Según una encuesta Cadem a un año del estallido social, la policía uniformada contaba con sólo un 26% de la confianza popular, y apenas un 19% la consideraba capacitada para cumplir su labor. Cambios son imprescindibles, y los primeros de éstos ya están en marcha.

​A pesar de todas las reformas, al estado le quedan cuantiosas decisiones que tomar e injusticias que resolver. Las pensiones de los chilenos se siguen manteniendo en las famosas Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP);entidades privadas que entregan una jubilación mediana de tan solo $203.883 pesos chilenos, equivalente a poco más de doscientas libras esterlinas mensuales. En el Congreso Nacional, la indignación popular ha producido políticas populistas y de poca visión de futuro. Se ingresaron tres reformas constitucionales que permitieron el retiro por parte del cotizante de hasta el 10% de sus ahorros previsionales en cada instancia, poniendo así en riesgo de colapso total el actual sistema de pensiones sin reemplazo ninguno. Seamos claros: aquí no se arremete contra el retiro previsional en sí; fue una medida necesaria para enfrentar la crisis económica que provocó la pandemia. Tampoco se busca defender el modelo de las AFP – que descanse en paz. Aquí el problema es que aquellos autores del retiro siguen sin presentar ningún proyecto que pueda reemplazar el sistema actual, ni un plan que pueda proteger a los cotizantes a largo plazo. Incluso la diputada opositora Pamela Jiles, rostro de los últimos dos retiros, admitió que su proyecto es populista, agregando que es una “pésima política… pero que más vamos a hacer”. La caída de las AFP sería un gran paso hacia una pensión digna en Chile, pero sólo se podrá festejar cuando el cotizante chileno esté protegido por el sistema de reemplazo. La moraleja en este caso sería que cualquier reforma que se haga se tendrá que hacer responsablemente y con miras hacia el futuro. Chile busca transformarse, no arrancarse de raíz.

​Sin embargo, la secuela más peligrosa del estallido social ha sido el aumento importante de las voces extremistas e ideológicas del país. Desde la derecha, se sienten los fantasmas del viejo Pinochetismo en los partidos Renovación Nacional (RN) y Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), quienes se han abierto a un pacto electoral con el partido Republicano de ultraderecha – un partido que a menudo valora y justifica la dictadura militar de los 80. Incluso el ex presidente de RN denunció haber sido víctima “de los ataques virulentos de miembros o simpatizantes” de aquel partido. Incorporar a partidos de este talante a la corriente principal daña la institucionalidad de la República; una institucionalidad que la misma derecha pretende – y debe – resguardar.

​Mientras tanto, desde la ultraizquierda se levantan voces de semejante percance. El Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh) ha hecho la vista gorda a los desmanes cometidos por antisociales durante las manifestaciones y ha llegado incluso a avalar la violencia contra las fuerzas del orden. El presidente del PCCh señaló desvergonzadamente que “una condena genérica a la violencia no la voy a hacer” y, al preguntarle si condenaría el vandalismo visto durante las protestas, respondió: “¿cómo voy a condenar una cosa tan menor?”. A la apatía comunista se suman cinco congresistas de cinco partidos opositores quienes han presentado nada menos que un indulto general a manifestantes detenidos en el marco del estallido social, buscando sobreseer así las imputaciones en su contra; imputaciones que incluyen graves delitos como el homicidio frustrado y el tráfico de armas. La justicia constituye pilar fundamental de cualquier democracia sana y el escepticismo con el que la ultraizquierda trata al poder judicial, que en Chile es independiente, terminará debilitándola a corto y a largo plazo.

Hoy más que nunca, Chile necesita un gobierno pragmático, centrista, y de consenso. Los desmanes del 18-O han echado leña al fuego del extremismo político. Mientras la ultraizquierda avala la violencia hacia el estado, la ultraderecha atrinchera el extremismo político. El progreso que se ha logrado en materia política, económica, y social ha sido abundante y el país va encaminado hacia una vida digna para sus habitantes. Este progreso se alcanzó a través de los acuerdos mutuos y la atención prestada a la ciudadanía. El extremismo político ni responde a las demandas sociales, ni tiene la posibilidad de solucionarlas. Chile despertó… ¿Y Ahora qué? Ahora tendrá que elegir su sendero. Si triunfa la democracia y el consenso, “la copia feliz del Edén” – que promete el himno nacional – estará al alcance de su pueblo.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

​With over a year having passed since Chile’s mass protests and with an unprecedented constitutional process underway, it is about time to tackle two key questions raised by this historic event: what changes have occurred in Chile, and what path should the country take?

​In terms of the first question, the list of answers is a long one given that this movement has been extremely consequential in the economic, political, and social realms. In a previous article I had alluded to many of the main causes of the social unrest including the political elite, inequality, pensions, and the cost of living, among many other factors.All these areas have seen changes which range from the superficial – such as the impeachment of the former Minister of the Interior Andrés Chadwick – to the formidable – such as the constitutional process. On October 25th of last year, as a direct consequence of the social unrest, Chile held a national referendum on whether or not to keep its current constitution.Overwhelmingly, the electorate fired the republic’s basic charter, approving by 78.28% the commencement of a historic process which would draw up a new document. On the 11th of April of 2021, Chileans will elect their candidates to the Constitutional Convention, thereby directly influencing the result of the process, and in August of 2022 they will once again vote in a plebiscite which will decide whether the new Constitution will replace the old one. Despite the violence and the injustices laid bare throughout the mass demonstrations, this constitutional process is a shining example of democracy and one which all Chileans can be proud of.

​Beyond the far-reaching political changes – which, fortunately, include a reduction in the extortionate congressional salaries – the Chile of today boasts reforms to police, education, and the economy created with the objective of responding to the people’s many demands. The Carabineros de Chile, the police institution in charge of riot control, saw their image badly tarnished by the immensity of abuses they committed against protestors. What had once been considered a role model in the regional context now seemed to be an instrument of repression characterised by chaos, tragedy, and impunity. The result of this has been a significant increase in the purchase and distribution of body cams by the government, although the police forces continue to make do with fewer than a thousand of these nationwide. A deep reform of the Carabineros has also begun, undertaken by the civil authorities in conjunction with the institution and aimed at reinforcing human rights. According to a survey by the national pollster one year on from the beginning of the social unrest, the national police enjoyed only 26% of citizens’ trust, with only 19% of the population considering them to be capable of fulfilling their duties. Changes are necessary, and the first of these are already underway.

​Despite all these reforms, the state is still faced with numerous decisions to make and injustices to resolve. The pensions of Chileans continue to be kept in the infamous Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP); private entities which provide a median pension of only $203,883 Chilean pesos, equivalent to just over two hundred pounds sterling per month. In the National Congress, popular anger has produced populist and short-sighted policies. Three constitutional amendments were introduced which each permitted the withdrawal of up to 10% of one’s pension savings, thereby risking the total collapse of the current pension system with no replacement in sight. To be clear: this article does not attack the pension withdrawal bill in of itself; it was a necessary measure to deal with the economic crisis brought about by the pandemic. Nor does this article attempt to defend the AFP pensions model – may it rest in peace. The problem here is that those who introduced these policies did so without presenting a single proposal which could replace the current system, nor did they announce any plans to protect pensioners in the long term. Even the opposition MP Pamela Jiles, the face of the last two withdrawals, admitted that her proposal is populist, adding that it is “an awful policy… but what else are we going to do”. The fall of the AFPs would be a great step towards dignified pensions in Chile, but one can only begin celebrating once the Chilean pensioner has been protected by a replacement system. The moral of the story in this case would be that whatever reform is made must be made responsibly and with the future in mind. Chile seeks to transform itself, not uproot itself outright.

​Nevertheless, the most dangerous product of the social unrest has been the significant increase in extremist and ideological voices within the country. On the political right, ghosts of Pinochetism are being felt in the Renovación Nacional (RN) and Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) parties, which have opened themselves up to an electoral pact with the hard right Republican party – a party which regularly praises and justifies the military dictatorship of the 80s. Even the former president of RN condemned the fact that he had been victim of “virulent attacks by members or sympathisers” of that party. The incorporation of parties of this nature into the political mainstream damages the institutions of the Republic; institutions that the political right itself claims to – and should – defend.

​Meanwhile, similarly distasteful voices are being heard among the hard left. The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) has turned a blind eye to the destruction committed by delinquents throughout the protests and has on occasions justified violence committed against law enforcement. The president of the PCCh unashamedly commented that he would “not make a generic condemnation of violence” and, when asked whether he would condemn the vandalism seen during the protests, replied with: “why would I condemn something so minor?”. Added to this communist apathy are five MPs from five different opposition parties who have introduced nothing short of a general pardon to those detained during the social unrest, thereby seeking to dismiss the charges against these individuals; charges which include severe crimes such as attempted murder and arms trafficking. Justice forms a fundamental pillar of any healthy democracy and the scepticism with which the hard left treats the judicial system, which in Chile is independent, will end up debilitating it inboth the short and long term.

​Now more than ever, Chile needs a pragmatic and centrist government by consensus. The destruction of the social unrest has poured fuel onto the fire of political extremism. While the hard left promotes violence against the state, the hard right entrenches political extremism. There has been abundant progress in the political, economic, and social realms and the country is on track towards a dignified life for its inhabitants. This progress was achieved by mutual agreements and by listening to the citizenry. Political extremism neither responds to the popular demands, nor does it have the capacity to solve them. Chile has awoken… now what? Now it will have to chart its course. Should democracy and consensus triumph, then the “happy copy of Eden” promised by the national anthem will be at the fingertips of the Chilean people.

Maximilian Frederik van Oordt is a second-year International Relations student at King’s College London. interested in politics, history and law, he enjoys focusing on Latin American affairs, with a particular emphasis on these three areas.

The Absence of Colour and the Colour of Absence: Decolonising Brazilian Education

Source: https://www.revide.com.br/noticias/cultura/fotografa-realiza-exposicao-sobre-poder-da-mulher-negra/

By: Camila Consolmagno

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

 in Brazil, inequality is taken for granted. While equal under the eyes of international law, Brazilian children experience abysmally unequal childhoods. It is imperative to understandthat meaningful social and economic change aiming to reduce inequality and promote justice will not occur if matters of race discrimination and its legacies are not brought to light –thoroughly deconstructed, and equitably remodelled. However, with 53 million poor, and 22 million indigent Brazilians respectively –overrepresented by Afro-Brazilians in all age groups– this would require deep structural and systemic surgery within Brazilian society.

According to the calculations by the United Nations Development Program, no Brazilian state has a higher Human Development Index for Afro-Brazilians than for white populations; and racial inequalities are consistent in every Brazilian state, notwithstanding its stage of development.While there is consensus that Brazil is deeply unjust, and race discrimination has been recognised by the federal government as a human rights issue, there is yet not sufficient understanding and agreement on how to combat its inequality.

Both in the school curriculum and in the classroom, Black people and Afro-Brazilians appear in delimited ways – though often not at all, mirroring a historical subordination. Curricular silences on race and Afro-Brazilian history and identity are institutionalised not only in societal discourse, but also within education sectors, with educators and administrators receiving no university-level education training on race relations, race-based inequality, or Afro-Brazilian history. Rarely will history teachers come across Black people and Afro-Brazilians as active and complex actors within the Brazilian or global narrative.

A Shift Called ‘Decolonisation’

 It must be noted, however, that advances made by the Black social movement have commenced to shift social and political narratives. Afro-Brazilian activists and education researchers, such as the Orùnmilá Cultural Centre’s (‘OCC’) leaders and members, have begun to address the primary and secondary education system, inter alia, by targeting their advocacy and research to the lack of positive representation of Africa, Black people, and Afro-Brazilians in educational textbooks, everyday racism within school spaces, and the shallow treatment of the historical role of Afro-Brazilians. Secondly, they advocate for the incorporation of Afro-Brazilian cultural practices into school curricula to proclaim the diverse origins of knowledge. Finally, activists and cultural organisations like the OCC have established community schools that focus on either or both intercultural and Afro-centric education. These approaches not only mainstream Black history and contextualise it to contemporary times, but they pave the way for schools to challenge racism, ignorance, and stereotypes through the provision of diverse and inclusive teaching that encourages open-mindedness and constructive curiosity. Additionally, this addresses how partial and negative Afro-Brazilian representation correlates to the devaluation or ‘folklorisation’ of Afro-Brazilian culture and knowledge, both outside and inside the classroom, aiming to redress the effect of dismissal of Afro-Brazilians as creators of knowledge and theory, and of their culture as valuable pedagogically. Carving a space in education for Black history allows it to situate itself within one of the main centres where knowledge, opinions, and thought are produced: the school. 

Many are not aware that Brazil has the largest population of African descendants outside of Nigeria. Currently, however, the Brazilian school system reproduces hegemonic perspectives that mould the delimited narrative of Afro-Brazilian history in its society, perpetuating a historical system of power constructed through Eurocentric aesthetic, epistemological and cultural dominance. As Pai Paulo and Silas contend, “the most revolutionary aspect of this process resides in the valorisation of Black Culture as a philosophical and political theoretical field”. One cannot, therefore,envisage the emancipation of a people in the absence of the recognition and valorisation of their culture.

In 2003, then-President Lula signed Law 10,639/03 which gave statutory basis to the inclusion of African and Afro-Brazilian culture and history into the national curriculum. These aims concretised, inter alia, in what was named Projeto Baobá; one of the first – and at the time, possibly only – systemic realisations by a municipal government aiming to implement Law 10,639/03. Projeto Baobá reflected the opinion that decolonising education did not solely mean the inclusion of Black history within the curriculum, but actively thinking with Afro-descendants as producers of knowledge, theory, and philosophy. The project adopted a more sophisticated view of Afro-Brazilian and African histories by challenging narrow associations of Blackness, Black history, and Black identity with slavery, low status, and manual labour. It not only revealed the intricate ways in which Afro-Brazilian history is still tied to the slave ship, but also how race-based discrimination sculpted and continues to influence contemporary inequalities. Consisting of lectures, workshops, teacher training, and the purchase and distribution of revised educational materials to municipal schools, Projeto Baobá shifted teachers’ and students’ perspectives on Afro-Brazilian history, Africa, and Blackness. It emphasised the notable enthusiasm among Afro-descendant pupils who now ‘saw themselves’ and their history in textbooks, storybooks, and classroom activities. Importantly, educators and school administrators, that previously denied racism and discrimination as issues which required attention,came to passionately adopt the project’s cause and recognise the aforementioned as serious issues. Only one round of the Projeto Baobá, however, was implemented.

Struggling to See Colour – A Country in Black or White

Projeto Baobá faced immense implementation difficulties, largely as a consequence of a lack of interest, explicit opposition of many school principals and teachers, and capacity issues. Despite this, the OCC fights for its continuation. The project nonetheless incentivised many school teachers, principals, and students to reassess the knowledge and culture of Brazil’s African ancestors and recognise Afro-Brazilians as important subjects for inclusion in curricula. This, in turn, generated and continues to generate new possibilities to ensure a more holistic educational experience for students, particularly those of African descent. Additionally, the project initiated an exploration of Afro-Brazilian forms of knowledge and pedagogy which remain underdeveloped as educational tools and excluded from institutional legitimacy, despite often present in many Brazilians’ everyday lives (i.e. capoeira).

Over the past few years, a variation of projects has emerged to implement race relations and inequality training for teachers and municipal employees in agreement with Law 10,639/03. However, a myriad of elements indicates their inconsistency and insufficiency, as well as the pre-existing implementation difficulties. Firstly, multiple organisations have created projects; these projects vary in target audience, length, funding, and the degree to which they implement Afro-Brazilian cultural practices. Secondly, the shortfall of standards for project materials, implementation, and pedagogical approaches makes examination difficult, hindering improvement alongside requests for continuity. This is particularly relevant when public officials pragmatically enforce shallow projects claiming to tackle race issues and satisfy Black community demands. A third, final, and core concern raised by Orùnmilá members is the extent to which projects’ academic trainers are skilled practitioners of Afro-Brazilian culture. To wholly value these practitioners as generators of theory and knowledge, they must be involved in project implementations. However, despite these efforts and the rising attention paid to race in public policies, government efforts to address race as an issue continues to waver – a case particularly veracious under the current Bolsonarian government.

In 2009, the centre-right Democratic Party administration almost completely erased ‘race’ from the educational agenda and had all but severed dialogue with the OCC concerning educational and cultural policy. Consequently, making the institutional future of the Projeto Baobá uncertain. Notwithstanding this, Orùnmilá members anticipate further implementation and improvement, refusing to stall their philosophy as a result of public officials’ decisions. With lack of access to education affecting many Brazilians, particularly Afro-Brazilians, the OCC and Projeto Baobá continue to ask fundamental questions: “What kind of education are we aiming to have access to? What are its goals and what kind of society will it shape? How can we go beyond visions of societal inclusion as socioeconomic ascension to question the social formation into which people struggle for inclusion?”. Orùnmilá members and others striving towards educational reform in Brazil suggest thinking with Afro-descendants so as to substantively remodel a core societal institution – the school – and highlight the hierarchies that delimit visions of sociality, knowledge, and development. In this way, the question of fundamentally diversifying curricula as a means of decolonising knowledge is key in the process of bringing culture as an issue for development.

In conclusion, it is fundamental to think with Afro-Brazilian cultural struggles to aggrandise the critical knowledge about how capitalism’s exclusionary and racialised epistemological foundations allow certain visions of sociality to translate into possibility, and others to be unfathomable. Generating and executing alternative visions of development necessitate thinking with these other shapes of knowledge so as to confront, rethink, and remodel the limits that political, economic, and cultural development policies and processes place on societies and individuals. As such, critical scholarship can more substantively contribute to the endeavours of those like the OCC’s, who are involved in the daily struggle to not only live but survive. Therefore, in the aim of decolonising education it is insufficient to solely guarantee the inclusion of Black history into curricula; one must think with Afro-descendants as valuable and active contributors to culture, current affairs, knowledge, and theory. Finally, these efforts to decolonise education should combine into one major national project so as to target wider audiences and ensure better administration, execution, legitimacy, and results.

Camila Consolmagno is a final-year Bachelor of Laws student at SOAS, University of London. She is the first Brazilian President of the SOAS Latin American Society and an aspiring human rights lawyer.

The Disastrous Impact of Covid-19 on Brazilian Indigenous Populations: an Interview with Almir Narayamoga Suruí

Source: https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/10/ovid-19-how-brazil-is-failing-its-indigenous-people

By: Alice Iscar

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

For over a year now, Covid-19 has been an omnipresent subject in our everyday lives. Views on the pandemic’s political, economic, social and societal impact on communities around the world have been continuously and widely shared. However, little has been said in mainstream media about Covid-19’s impact on indigenous populations in Latin America, including Brazil. 

The reality of the situation is not easy to confront. On the 4th of April 2020, the first case of coronavirus in an indigenous community was detected in Brazil. The case was a 15-year-old teenager of Yanomami ethnicity, an indigenous group which lives in the Amazon rainforest, on the border between Venezuela and Brazil. A few days later, on the 8th of April 2020, a 20-year-old Indigenous woman of Kokama ethnicity had contact with a doctor, who, it was later found out, had Covid-19. The woman was herself infected and when she went back to her village, she infected the rest of her community. Since the beginning of 2020, more than 30,000 indigenous people have been infected in Brazil by the virus and almost one thousand have died from it.

In addition to the direct threat the virus poses to these populations, who are losing so many of their members, the biggest worry focuses on the health of ‘the elders’. Indeed, older people are more likely to develop a severe form of the virus and consequently die from it. But the health of older indigenous people and the prevention of their premature death are essential to the preservation of the tribe’s culture and knowledge. As highlighted in an article in The Guardian entitled ‘ “We are facing extermination”: Brazil losing a generation of indigenous leaders to Covid-19’, the teachings of an indigenous’ tribe’s culture and history is passed orally from the elders to the younger members of the tribe. Therefore, the premature death of the older members, due to the virus, represents a great threat to the conservation of their culture and historical and medical knowledge. 

Indigenous tribes in Brazil are particularly vulnerable to the virus as they are removed from public health services and therefore unable to seek adequate treatment early in the development of the disease. According to an article on the Médecins Sans Frontières website, a high proportion of the Brazilian indigenous population suffers from untreated chronic diseases such as diabetes and hypertension, which increase their risk of developing a severe fatal form of the virus.  In addition to lacking immunological defences because they live isolated from other communities, the indigenous tribes’ way of life is incompatible with the social isolation and sanitary measures imposed on populations in most other countries. They often live close together, in small houses, share water and food and usually lack sanitary equipment in order to limit the spread of the disease. If one member of the tribe is infected, it is very likely the disease will quickly spread to the rest of the group.

To make matters even worse, the Brazilian government’s policies regarding the pandemic and the protection of the Amazon and its indigenous populations is alarmingly defective. In his failure to take the pandemic seriously, Jair Bolsonaro, the current president of Brazil, has put in danger his own population and his country’s indigenous people. An Euronews article highlights how Bolsonaro went as far as to place a veto on laws that would have made it compulsory for the government to assist the Brazilian indigenous populations through the provision of clean water access, reserved care beds in hospitals and basic material necessities. Additionally, Bolsonaro openly supports the clearance of vast areas of the critically important Amazon rainforest for the development of agricultural, forestry, mining or industrial activities. According to an article in the New York Times, deforestation in the Amazon hit a 12-year high in 2020 under Bolsonaro and increased by a further 9,5% compared to 2019. Deforestation contributes to the spread of Covid-19 to indigenous people. Indeed, it increases social interaction among indigenous tribes and outsiders, such as illegal miners; and it pressures communities to move to other regions where the virus may be more present. 

In the light of this article, I had the chance to interview Almir Narayamoga Suruí by phone. Almir is the chief of the Paiter Suruí tribe, an indigenous tribe living in the Mato Grosso-Rondônia region of Brazil. In addition to being a tribal chief, Almir is a political activist, dedicated to the protection of his and other indigenous peoples and the Amazon rainforest. He kindly answered a few of my questions on the impact of Covid-19 on indigenous populations in Brazil. Below is the transcript of this interview.

Alice: Hello Almir, thank you for accepting to do this interview with me and for taking the time to answer my questions, I imagine you must be really busy.

Almir: You are welcome; it is a pleasure to do this interview with you. 

Alice: I am writing an article for the journal El Cortao of the Latin American Society of my university King’s College London. My article is on how the Covid-19 pandemic is affecting indigenous populations in Brazil. As the chief of the Paiter Suruí tribe, I have a few questions to ask you on that subject. My first question is: How is the pandemic affecting your tribe? What is happening concretely?

Almir: Our community is rather isolated from the rest of the country, but on some occasions we need contact with the modern world because of material or medical needs. In the context of that contact, a few members of our tribe have been infected by the coronavirus and passed the disease to other members of the Paiter Suruí people. Today, there are 204 members of the tribe who have had coronavirus. This represents 30% to 40% of the entire tribe, it is very worrying. Brazil’s governing system is not adequately prepared to help its indigenous population when facing this type of threat. In the last few months, four Suruís have died from Covid-19. It is an immense challenge for our community and our organisations. Unfortunately, we need those two cultures, the modern Brazilian culture and ours. We need the services provided by the city and by the forest. We need to be in two different places, and this increases the risks of contamination. 

Alice: And how do you think this relates to the deforestation of the Amazon and the current policies of the Brazilian government?

Almir: I believe the government’s policies weaken the forest and our community. The deforestation and the ‘mega-industrialization’ policy, which the president is driving forward, threaten the health of our community.  

Alice: In what ways is the community trying to overcome the challenge posed by the pandemic?

Almir: To face the pandemic, the governance of the Paiter Suruí tribe focused on the social isolation of our people. The Metareilá Paiter Suruí Indigenous People Society, of which I am a member, has done a lot to support social isolation, by looking for economic alternatives, and by seeking support from foundations, businesses and individuals to enable the social isolation of our people. The strategy is to maintain this social isolation and the fight moves forward. 

Alice: How can we help, from our side?

Almir: There are various ways to support us. There is the possibility to donate to the campaign that the Paiter Suruí tribe has created in order to help the community to face the pandemic through financial or medical equipment donations. There is also the possibility to pressure the national administration to have more respect for the Amazon forest. We have some contact with national and international universities – perhaps your university can join this group to articulate support for our community together with our society and our university. We have a project in our university Paiter a Soeitxawe, which is the Paiter Suruí tribe’s university, which aims to created partnerships with other Brazilian or international universities. 

Alice: Do you have one last message you would like to share before we finish this interview?

Almir: I believe us humans can overcome any challenge, like pandemics or others. We need to look for solutions together. Because those who live in the Amazon need Europe, but those living in Europe also need the Amazon. We need to share our experiences of facing the world’s challenges. This is my message.

Alice: Thank you, Almir. Do I have your authorization to use this interview for my article?

Almir: Yes, you do.

Alice: Thank you for your time.

The question of the protection of indigenous people in Brazil and its direct link to the protection of the Amazonian rainforest underlines the interconnections between human health across communities and the importance of the preservation of the environment. As highlighted by the article and by Almir in the interview, the protection of the forest and its human inhabitants go hand in hand. The pandemic sheds light on this interconnectedness and on the need for a holistic approach in regard to the environment and human health.

Alice is a third-year History and International Relations student at King’s College London seeking to raise awareness about the current politico-environmental situation in Brazil. She is a regular contributor of El Cortao’.

Sources:

Charlier, Philippe, Varison Leandro. “Is COVID-19 being used as a weapon against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil?” The Lancet 396, no. 10257 (Autumn 2020): 1069-1070. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32068-7.

Fox, Michael. “Brazil’s Indigenous peoples fight COVID-19 in their territories amid government neglect.” The World, September 4, 2020. https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-09-04/brazil-s-indigenous-peoples-fight-covid-19-their-territories-amid-government.

Graham, Laura R., Krenak Edson, Rabben, Linda. “Brazil’s COVID-19 Response: A Death Knell for Indigenous Peoples.” Cultural Survival, November 12, 2020. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/brazils-covid-19-response-death-knell-indigenous-peoples.

 “Indigenous youth open up about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their communities.” Unicef.org. Accessed December 20, 2020. https://www.unicef.org/brazil/indigenous-youth-open-about-impact-covid-19-pandemic-their-communities.

Krenak Naknanuk, Edson. “How COVID-19 is Impacting Indigenous Peoples in Brazil.” Cultural Survival, May 1, 2020. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/how-covid-19-impacting-indigenous-peoples-brazil.

Phillips, Dom. “ ‘We are facing extermination’: Brazil’ losing a generation of indigenous leaders to Covid-19.” The Guardian, June 21, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jun/21/brazil-losing-generation-indigenous-leaders-covid-19.

Laudares, Humberto. “Deforestation in Brazil is spreading COVID-19 to the Indigenous peoples.” VoxEU, November 3rd, 2020. https://voxeu.org/article/deforestation-spreading-covid-19-brazils-indigenous-peoples. Iscar, Alice. Interview with Almir Narayamoga Surui. Translated from Portuguese. December 23, 2020.

Liubchenkova, Natalia. “COVID-19: how Brazil is failing its indigenous people.” Euronews, July 15, 2020. https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/10/ovid-19-how-brazil-is-failing-its-indigenous-people.

Monclou, Carolina Rodríguez. “How Does COVID-19 Affect Indigenous Communities in Brazil?” Latam, October 2nd, 2020. https://latinamericanpost.com/34547-how-does-covid-19-affect-indigenous-communities-in-brazil.

“MSF works to prevent spread of COVID-19 among indigenous people in Mato Grosso do Sul.” Médecins Sans Frontières, September 17, 2020. https://www.msf.org/preventing-coronavirus-covid-19-among-indigenous-people-brazil.

Reuters. “Brazil Amazon Deforestation Hits 12-Year High under Bolsonaro.” The New York Times, November 30, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/world/americas/brazil-amazon-rainforest-deforestation.html#:~:text=Bolsonaro%20has%20weakened%20the%20environmental,grabbers%20to%20clear%20the%20forest.

Savarese, Mauricio. “Brazil’s Bolsonaro rejects COVID-19 shot, calls masks taboo.” AP, November 27, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/pandemics-brazil-health-coronavirus-pandemic-latin-america-0295d39d3032aa14c6675b8b4080e8cc.

“Self-determination and Indigenous health.” The Lancet 396, no. 10248 (Summer 2020): 361. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31682-2.

Wallace, Scott. “Disaster looms for Indigenous Amazon tribes as COVID-19 cases multiply.” National Geographic, June 12, 2020. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/06/disaster-looms-indigenous-amazon-tribes-covid-19-cases-multiply/.

Vantini, Camila, Palamim, Capasso, Ortega Manoela Marques, Lima Marson, Fernando Augusto. “Covid 19 in the Indigenous Population of Brazil.” Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities 7, (Autumn 2020): 1053-1058. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40615-020-00885-6.

Teen Pregnancy: A Worrying Trend in Latin America

Source: https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-08-17/nicaraguas-teen-pregnancy-rate-soars

By: Katherina Lister

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

There is an ongoing pandemic taking place in Latin America. This is not the pandemic that may currently pop to the forefront of one’s mind, but rather one that has persisted for decades: teen pregnancy, a common occurrence throughout the region. It can be the norm to see teenagers with one, if not several, children. While a young mother with children may not be a cause for concern in isolation, the societal impact of heightened teen pregnancies raises several issues.

Today, many Latinx families are the result of teen pregnancies. Even if it isn’t the case for a family’s latest generation, they can often look back only one or two generations to find a teen pregnancy. Of course, times have changed, and the prevalence is not as high as it once was. A few generations ago, not only were teen pregnancies more common, but it was very much a part of the societal structure of Latin America. This societal structure has transformed as a result of globalization, yet there are still many young mothers bearing children. With Latin America having been dealt a heavy dose of colonialism and the many societal injustices that come with it, the impact that teen pregnancies have on social mobility has been laid bare.

Teen pregnancies are strongly linked to poverty, social exclusion, gender-based violence, and early marriages. These associations facilitate a vicious cycle, in which teenage girls already suffering from societal injustices have these issues compounded if they become pregnant. This can then lead to ramifications throughout a girl’s life as she is at an increased risk of dropping out of school, resulting in decreased employment and financial security. Moreover, children born from a teen pregnancy are at an increased risk of having one themselves. The problem is therefore intergenerational. 

By the Numbers

It is important to understand and quantify teen pregnancy. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the total fertility rate – the number of children per woman – has declined. However, adolescent fertility– in women aged 15 to 19 – colloquially “teen pregnancy”, is declining at a much slower rate. The adolescent fertility rate in LAC is estimated to be the second highest in the world with 60.7 births per 1,000 women, compared to the global average of 44 per 1,000. In addition, there has been a rising trend of pregnancies in females aged under 15 in LAC, the only region in the world where this increase is taking place.

The probability of having an adolescent pregnancy in the region is up to four times higher in girls who are illiterate, only have an elementary education, or are from rural areas. This rate is even higher in the indigenous population.

This trend has been an area of much investigation by the World Health Organisation, Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO), among many others. Nonetheless, progress has been slow and unsteady throughout the decades.

There are identifiable factors that have contributed to this slow progress, namely: the healthcare system in Latin America, government policies regarding pregnancy, and access to contraception. These three areas not only contribute to the high rate of teen pregnancies but can also be used as vehicles for change in decreasing this trend.

Healthcare & Policy 

Healthcare in Latin America varies by country of course. Despite these differences, there are systemic similarities in access to healthcare regardless of the specific country. Monetarily, rising healthcare costs due to technological advances, chronic diseases, and an ageing population have led to problems raising public funds for health coverage. In addition, investment in healthcare is heavily politicised, therefore factors such as economic stability and political ideals provide an uncertain and volatile funding landscape. 

According to a study conducted by the London School of Economics, total health expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product has increased in Latin American countries in the past 15 years. However, there is an inefficient delivery of care and a delayed uptake of healthcare reform. To exacerbate this, the provision of resources to rural areas, where the majority of teen pregnancies occur, also presents inequalities in access to medicine.

A policy affecting teen pregnancy rates that has garnered much attention in Latin America is abortion. Abortion is currently illegal in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. In countries where abortion is legal, specific requirements must be met in order to proceed. This can include a lengthy ordeal of doctor referrals and legal processes, further alienating at risk adolescent pregnant women. Thus, if a teenager becomes pregnant and wants to seek an abortion, she typically pursues illegal avenues to do so. The World Health Organisation estimates that over 4 million illegal abortions take place every year in Latin America and the Caribbean. Often these methods are unsafe and have contributed to the region’s high maternal mortality rate.

Maternal mortality is also increased by the many cases of sexual violence in Latin America. Instances of rape, sexually transmitted infections such as HIV, and domestic violence all contribute to the high number of maternal deaths. More recently, mortality has also been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, where government responses have led to the suspension of many maternal services.

Contraception 

According to PAHO, providing adequate contraceptive access to teens could avoid 2.1 million unplanned births, 3.2 million abortions, and 5,600 maternal deaths each year.Contraception can act as a source of empowerment for young girls to exert autonomy over their bodies and sexual decisions. Unfortunately, there are many barriers in accessing contraception in Latin America. Rural areas, social stigma, and a lack of sexual education are all factors preventing the widespread use of contraception.

A PAHO official, Sonja Caffe, stated that “reducing poverty and increasing access to education and development opportunities would undoubtedly be an important step on the path to reduce unplanned pregnancies in teenagers, but it wouldn’t be enough. It’s also necessary to give teenagers access to effective, high-quality information, and sexual and reproductive health services.” This highlights the importance of a multifactorial approach to preventing teen pregnancies of which sexual education, combined with contraceptive use, is critical.

Looking at the issue on a more individual level, teenage girls often do not want to become pregnant. Many are aware of the availability of contraceptives and have even been taught sexual education in school. Despite this, girls may still be reluctant to use contraception due to the associated social stigma and gossip. While some Latin American countries have set up sexual health clinics to access contraception, in smaller villages where girls can be seen in the waiting room of the clinics, gossip can carry on to families that their daughters are sexually active.

Looking Ahead

Moving forward, to decrease teen pregnancies in Latin America, it is crucial to improve access to healthcare. This would encompass increased expenditure to allow for a more universal coverage and for better access to healthcare in rural and poor income areas where teenage pregnancies are highest. In addition, government policies regarding sexual health, such as abortion laws and the impact of COVID-19 on maternal services, must be addressed to reduce maternal mortalities.

Provision of contraception and reducing the social stigma of its use are also vitally important. Additionally, widespread sexual education is necessary to reduce teen pregnancies. If these improvements are made, there will be fewer adolescent girls dropping out of school, lessening the gender gap in education and increasing social mobility. This would provide teenage girls with a platform to attain higher positions in employment and public life. While teen pregnancy is still rampant throughout Latin America, there have been several recent protests against sexual violence, abortion, and maternal mortality serving to galvanise support and recognition of the issue.

Katherina is a fourth-year Medical student at King’s College London. Half-Colombian, Half-American, she is passionate about access to medicine in Latin America and the Latinx community of the United States.

Bibliography

 Castro, A., 2020. Maternal and child mortality worsens in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

The Lancet, [online] 396(10262). Available at: <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)32142-5/fulltext> [Accessed 10 December 2020].

Pan American Health Organization. 2014. Violence against women in Latin America and the 

Caribbean. [online] paho.org. Available at: <https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2014/Violence1.24-WEB-25-febrero-2014.pdf> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Pan American Health Organization. 2017. Accelerating progress toward the 

reduction of adolescent pregnancy in Latin America and the Caribbean. [online] iris.paho.org. Available at: <https://iris.paho.org/bitstream/handle/10665.2/34493/9789275119761-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Kanavos, P., Parkin, G., Kamphuis, B. and Gill, J., 2019. Latin America Healthcare System 

Overview: A comparative analysis of fiscal space in healthcare. [online] lse.ac.uk. Available at: < https://www.lse.ac.uk/business-and-consultancy/consulting/assets/documents/latin-america-healthcare-system-overview-report-english.pdf> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Salomón, J. and Alford, C., 2020. Latin American Activists Fight For Access To Safe 

Abortion In COVID-19 World. [online] Amnesty.org. Available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/activists-latin-america-access-safe-abortion-covid19/> [Accessed 10 December 2020].

Statista. 2020. Adolescent Birth Rate in Latin America By Country. [online] statista.com.

Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/945546/latin-america-number-births-adolescent-women-country/> [Accessed 6 December 2020].

The World Bank. 2020. Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births Per 1,000 Women Ages 15-19). 

[online] data.worldbank.org. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT> [Accessed 6 December 2020].

Looting of Indigenous Lands: The Impact on the Sawré Muybu

Source: https://assets.survivalinternational.org/pictures/14551/df-img-1246_article_column@2x.jpg

By: Victoria Bujok

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

The Munduruku people are facing yet another challenge after years of resistance and struggle for their land in the state of Pará in northern Brazil. The area of Tapajos, which is home to most of the Munduruku population, is one of the most heavily invaded territories, with illegal gold miners currently occupying the area. The mining conflict brings “violence, prostitution, destruction, pollution, deforestation, death threats and conflict,” as stated in a letter of condemnation sent to the public prosecutor’s office, in addition to causing an uncontrolled malaria outbreak. Nevertheless, the prospects of taking care of the illegal actions and eradicating mining in the region all together is extremely unlikely under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. 

The root of the issue is the demarcation of the land, something which has never been done, and of which there is no intention to do in the near future. As a result of illegal action and lack of border clarity, the Sawré Muybu’s 178,000 hectares have been prevented from being recognised as indigenous land, and lack the normal legal protections associated with indigenous reserves. Mining has not been the only threat to the land, livelihoods, health and traditions; back in 2016 the Munduruku people were facing the prospect of 43 hydraulic plants being built on their territory. Luckily for the indigenous population, after years of protests, government meetings and drawing international attention, they were able to defeat the mega projects, which would have had a detrimental effect on the reserve and on its sacred sites. However, the efforts to build the hydroelectric plants in the Tapajos river basin still exist.

When looking further into the cause of these issues, we are drawn to Brazil's far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro. Not only are the hydraulic plants on the government’s agenda, but also another series of projects such as agribusiness expansion and railroads, all of which are all linked to the interests of the miners. In a democracy, just like in other countries with indigenous lands, minorities should be included in the decision making; however, the government is simply making it look like the indigenous people are supporting the projects, and implying that they are going to hugely benefit from those. For example, on August 5, environment minister, Ricardo Salles, refused to confirm his position on mining in indigenous territories, despite having met with half a dozen indigenous residents who happened to be in favour of these projects. The result of this publicity stunt is that the views of these specific indigenous people could be interpreted as representing the general views of all 140,000 Munduruku people. This, however, is not the representation of the majority of the Sawré Muybu’s population, and their views have been wrongly portrayed in order to push the government’s agenda, a move which has been heavily criticised by the Munduruku leaders. Another example of these falsely represented ideas comes from the vice president, Hamilton Mourão, who seeks to legalise gold mining on protected land. He claims that licensing gold extraction will save the rainforest by enabling the government to enforce eco-friendly regulations. This is a fear that Luísa Molina, an anthropologist working in the area, had about the government intention, and which has finally been confirmed. 

But, could legalising mining in those territories be the answer? The belief behind Mourão’s intention to save the rainforest is that whenever there is gold, men will extract it. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said, “there is a lot of land that is rich in gold, and if companies had the permission to extract it, they would have to comply with environmental laws.” He also mentioned the benefit of taxing gold mining, saying that “today, if there is gold, they extract it, destroy the environment and don’t pay taxes—everybody loses.” This is, however, an unlikely stance from a man who says that his intentions are to save the rainforest, but has failed to focus his efforts instead on stamping out illegal gold mining which, alongside other illegal industries, has had a hugely negative environmental impact. In addition, agencies such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), whose work has been crucial in protecting the Amazon from damaging illegal activities, have seen their budgets cut since Jair Bolsonaro assumed the presidency in January 2019.

The Munduruku people need the recognition of their land in order to protect it from future projects like this one. The government itself needs to reroute its principles regarding the environment and to move to a cleaner energy than mining. It is vital that the Brazilian government acts promptly to protect not only the lives of the indigenous people of Brazil, but also their traditions who have been under threat even before the pandemic.

Victoria is a fourth-year SPLAS student at King’s College London with a passion for making indigeneous voices heard. 

COVID-19: Who is Taking Advantage of the Crisis? The Rising Clout of Criminal Groups in Latin America

Source: https://ciudadanosenred.com.mx/2020/04/18/el-crimen-organizado-durante-la-pandemia/

By: Thais Ricard

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Fragmentation and failure 

The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing inequalities and worsened poverty across the world. This is especially striking in Latin America which was already facing a decade of ‘economic weakness and macroeconomic vulnerability’ according to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2020, poverty may increase by at least 4.4%, bringing the total number of people living in poverty to 214.7 million which represents 34.7% of the region’s population. This dire economic situation has led to a weakening of social cohesion and expressions of social discontent that have been characterized by historic waves of popular demonstrations, with many having taken place months before Covid-19 arrived. 

Protesters criticized the state’s corruption and its incapacity to offer public services such as affordable education and health care. Moreover, they decried the pervading climate of violence and insecurity in deprived areas caused by the presence of criminal groups like drug cartels in Mexico, guerrilla movements in Colombia or maras in El Salvador. Faced with this institutional deficiency, Latin American citizens’ trust in government has declined in the past years, reaching an average trust level of 33.9% in 2018.

Covid-19’s crisis could have bolstered governmental legitimacy through the enforcement of efficient sanitary measures aimed at protecting citizens’ lives. Those measures that comprised border closures and the militarization of public security could have expanded states’ authority as they would have particularly hit the illicit economies of criminal groups, making them more vulnerable than ever. To that extent, Covid-19 would have provided an unexpected opportunity for Latin American states to eventually end cycles of violent delinquency.

Adaptation and Altruism 

However, far from being toppled, criminal groups have progressively adapted their activities to the challenges imposed by the pandemic. Globally deprived of extortion and drug trafficking, which had been their main sources of income, they undertook various strategies to remain economically viable. Firstly, they reduced expenses and relied more on savings. The Central American gangs of MS-13 or Calle 18 have cut financial support to lawyers of jailed gang members while the Mexican cartels have decided to sack some of their members. They have also diversified into retail sales of marijuana and synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine and fentanyl, reaping the benefits of price inflations. Finally, the pandemic has led to the creation of new, lucrative, illicit businesses such as medicine smuggling, cybercrime, or kidnapping.

Apart from being economically resilient, criminal groups have surprisingly demonstrated their interest in the public good, and their effectiveness as legitimate political agents, by enforcing quarantine measures. In Brazil, in the Ciudad de Deus favela of Rio de Janeiro, the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) gang imposed a curfew, threatening residents with ‘corrective’ actions if they left their houses outside of designated hours. In the Santa Marta’s favela, traffickers handed out soap and placed signs at the entrance of the favela to remind residents to wash their hands – despite a lack of running water in this area. In the Colombian Department of Cauca, the FARC dissident groups distributed pamphlets threatening fines and military-grade consequences to those who defied the government’s restrictions. In Venezuela, the colectivos, which are pro-government armed gangs, announced lockdown policies even before government agents. 

Furthermore, not only did informal armed organizations attempt to protect citizens’ health by implementing restrictive sanitary measures, but they also provided welfare services and food supplies. In Mexico, the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Golfos Cartel distributed food and medicine parcels labelled with their leaders’ faces and groups’ insignia. These deliveries must be understood as constituting part of a propaganda campaign aimed at improving their public image as they voluntarily shared pictures of their humanitarian actions on social media. They indeed try to portray themselves as genuine saviours of the people, helping the needy while the state is inefficient or absent.

Latin America under criminal governance? 

Undeniably, criminal groups’ actions have been motivated by a desire to secure and extend their power and influence in the long term. They were aware that their members are part of the territories they control and that they therefore had the duty to protect their health to further their criminal activities. Furthermore, they understood that they could later count on those they helped during this crisis for income and recruits. Those measures have thus allowed gangs to entrench themselves more deeply in the communities and gain popular support. Citizens have begun to perceive them as legitimate governing bodies that outperform the state, especially in times of crisis. According to Juan Pappier, an Americas Researcher at Human Rights Watch, this ‘creates the impression that they’re not just there for the drug trafficking or illegal mining or the crimes and they care about the public interest. It also suggests that they are the ones in charge, and they are the ones whose rules you’ve got to follow.’ Even public officials such as former Brazilian Ministry of Health, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, attested the extent of state failure by formally acknowledging the regal authority of criminal groups in neglected areas. This contributes to the blurring of social boundaries between legality and illegality as the criminal may be deemed legitimate. 

Informal armed groups have therefore been empowered lately. As unemployment will drastically worsen due to a pandemic-induced economic downturn, citizens – especially the youth in poor neighbourhoods – will be more likely to join those criminal groups that they perceive to be more reliable than governments. However, one should be careful when drawing generalised conclusions. In fact, the pandemic has also severely impacted the informal economy, resulting in the increasingly violent competition between criminal organizations for local markets. Thus, the small groups that had not been able to diversify their income streams, vanished.

A context-specific response to informal violence 

It is not too late for Latin American governments to establish authority over areas that they have historically neglected. They must develop region-specific approaches that diagnose the local structural sources and patterns of violence in order to devise tailored policies that will end impunity, deter recruitment by informal groups, deepen official material and technical support to poor communities and create professional alternatives to crime. To elaborate these focused and strategic plans, they should not overlook the importance of intelligence and of data. Plans financed by emergency funds from multilateral lenders will break with the broad failed methods of the past. Undeniably, authorities must show high transparency when implementing these measures to boost people’s trust.

 In addition to reducing criminal groups’ influence, these measures would, overall, contribute to the strengthening of democratic systems as Latin American people would not feel inclined to support extremist, unorthodox political agents as they often do when official incumbents misrule.

 Thais is a third year History and International Relations student at KCL. Her main research interests are about human rights and security issues such as drug trafficking and insurgency movements. She is particularly keen in analyzing those matters through a gender-based perspective. 

Bibliography:

 ACLED (2020), ‘Central America and COVID-19: The Pandemic’s Impact on Gang Violence’, May 29. Available at: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep24683. 

 Angelo J. Paul, (2020), ‘The Pandemic Could Bring Power to Latin America’s Criminal Gangs But Not If Governments Beat Them to the Punch’, Foreign Affairs, April 21. Availiable at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2020-04-21/pandemic-could-bring-power-latin-americas-criminal-gangs. 

 Arnson J. Cynthia (2020), ’What Covid-19 is Revealing About Latin America’s Politics’, Wilson Center,August 26. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what-covid-19-revealing-about-latin-americas-politics. 

 Asmann Parker (2020), ‘What Does Coronavirus Mean for Criminal Governance in Latin America?’,  Insight Crime, March 31. Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/criminal-governance-latin-america-coronavirus/. 

 Brinks, D. M., Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2019). Understanding institutional weakness: power and design in Latin American institutions. Cambridge University Press.

 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2019). ‘ECLAC: the region has underestimated inequality’. 28 November 2019. Available at: www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/ eclac-region-has-underestimated-inequality 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2020b). The Social Challenge in Times of COVID-19. CEPAL. Available at: www.cepal.org/en/publications/ 45544-social-challenge-times-covid-19 

Fajardo Luis (2020), ‘Coronavirus: Latin American crime gangs adapt to pandemic’, BBC News, April 21. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-52367898.

 Gomez Camillo (2020), ‘Coronavirus: narco gangs could see big popularity boost from helping residents in Latin America’ The Conversation, June 22. Available at: https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-narco-gangs-could-see-big-popularity-boost-from-helping-residents-in-latin-america-139613. 

 Grace Leah (2020), ‘Deadly Dynamics: Crime and the Coronavirus in Latin America’, Strife blog, 23 June. Available at: https://www.strifeblog.org/2020/06/03/deadly-dynamics-crime-and-the-coronavirus-in-latin-america/. 

 International Crisis Group (2020) ‘Virus-proof Violence: Crime and COVID-19 in Mexico and the Northern Triangle’, Latin America Report N°83, 13 November. Available at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/083-virus-proof-violence.pdf.

 Isacson Adam (2020) ‘Latin America, COVID-19 Risks Permanently Disturbing Civil-Military Relations’, Wola, July 20. Available at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/latin-america-covid-19-civil-military-relations-policing/.

 Moutaoufik Saloua (2020), ‘Criminal governance under Covid-19: an appealing yet flawed alternative to state failure’, Sciences Po Obsveratoire politique de l’Amériquelatine et des Caraibes’. Avaliable at: https://www.sciencespo.fr/opalc/sites/sciencespo.fr.opalc/files/Criminal%20governnance%20.pdf. 

 Nugent Ciara (2020), ‘Why Armed Groups in Latin America Are Enforcing COVID-19 Lockdowns’, Time, July 22. Available at: https://time.com/5870054/coronavirus-latin-america-armed-groups/. 

 OECD (2020)’ Government at a Glance: Latin American and the Caribbean’. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/50c07fc2-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/50c07fc2-en.

Sanchez R, M. (2006). Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 606, 178-195. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097823.

 Soifer, H. D. (2019). Measuring state capacity in contemporary Latin America. Revista de Ciencia Política, 32(3), 585-598.

US 2020 Election: What Do the Results Mean for Mexico?

Source: https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/378237-protesters-shred-mexican-flag-during-trump-visit-to-border

By: Octavio Augusto Gutiérrez Salcedo

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Mexico and the US have always had a close relationship for almost everything. According to the State Department of the US, Mexico is the second largest trading partner and second-largest export market. When we talk about immigration there are approximately more than 36 million Hispanics from Mexican origin who live in the US. In another sector it has been calculated that more than 20 million Americans visit Mexico every year. When we analyse these facts, it can be said that the outcome of every US election is very important in every sector for Mexico and each outcome can change the landscape of the diplomatic relationship between both countries – this year’s election is not different. 

The US election took place on the 3rd of November, between the Republican candidate and current president of the USA, Donald Trump, and the Democratic party candidate andformer vice-president of the USA, Joe Biden. After a week of re-counts and appeals from Donald Trump, the election was called for Joe Biden by the Associated Press. This is a radical turn in the relations between the US and Mexico as a new style of government will come into office. The new administration brings different ideas on foreign policy and the Mexican Government, under Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador,will have to adjust to the new circumstances and the different agendas that the Biden administration will follow in matters of the economy and also immigration. 

The economic sector will face a complete change that will hopefully have a positive outcome for Mexico. Over the past 4 years there has been a lot of uncertainty on this matter something that hopefully will change in the upcoming years. Mexico is currently experiencing one of the biggest economic slumps in the history of the country. Due to this, the economic imbalance between the two countries (80 percent of Mexico’s exports go the US) was used by Donald Trump to put some pressure on Mexico over migration matters. Mexico also had to have Trump’s twitter notifications on since any day he could announce a new set of tariffs for Mexico. An expectation on Biden’s presidency around the world is the return to a more diplomatic and normal relationship between the US and the whole world. Mexico hopes that Biden will have a more reasonable and measured approach between both countries by stopping the public threats from Trump and changing it for a more normal negotiation as it was back in the last presidency.

A change in the Oval Office will also have an important outcome with other Latin American countries. It has been observed that Latin American countries tend to follow the United States actions and decisions. For instance, this was the case when Donald Trump said that Covid-19 was ‘not a big deal’ and the president of Brazil consequently agreed.Another example is when Trump pulled out of the Paris Agreement and Brazil said that they were analysing whether to follow him. In this light, a change in the Oval Office will be an important shift in the policy and approaches that Latin Americans countries will follow in the economic sector.

When we talk about the Immigration sector, Joe Biden is planning to do a complete shift as he plans to undue everything that Donal Trump did in his presidency –something that Mexico should be encouraged for. Under Donald Trump this sector has become one of the most talked, debated and criticised in the media and by academics. Donald Trump’s first campaign speech targeted Mexican migrants as he said that only “bad people and rapists” are being sent to the US. In addition, he planned for Mexico to pay for a wall in the border – something that was not delivered– as well as separating children from their parents and putting them in cages before being deported. The new administration of Biden will seek to heal the attacks of migrants in the US as it is explained in Biden’s 100 days plan. In his plan, Biden explains that he seeks to reinstate the DACA programme to protect undocumented children (dreamers) who attend school in the US so that they can continue their studies and receive funding. The DACA programme was one of the most successful initiatives in the Obama-Biden administration, but it was cancelled when Trump took office in 2016. Biden is also planning to stop the policies that allow migration officers to separate children from their parents. He wants to change this to a more humanitarian approach of keeping control of the border in accordance with Human Rights. Mexico and the rest of Latin American countries should feel relieved since this was an issue over the last 4 years that exacerbated the tension between Mexico and the US. The new policies and implementations under the upcoming government are promising and although deportations will not stop, this path is the one that must be followed to continue the strong relationship between both countries. 

The US elections is one of the most important events of the year. The outcome of the election will change the landscape of diplomatic relationships between the United States and the rest of the world including Mexico. The return of the “normal politician” to the White House will be something that Mexico will have to adapt and align with so that both countries can have a prosper future in the uncertain times we are living. It will be interesting to see the first year of Biden’s term and the different approaches he will take in the matters of foreign policy. Even more will be how this will sit with President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and his plan to continue the “4ta Transformación” in Mexico. The changes in immigration and in the economic sector will hopefully make the countries resolve their differences so that they cantackle whatever they face in the next years. The pandemic has created a new world in which problems never seen before will urge the United States and Mexico to act in the most competent and efficient way. Both countries will have to work towards a better and closer relationship between them to ensure a better life for its people.

Sources:

 https://amp.elfinanciero.com.mx/elecciones-eu-2020/que-puede-esperar-mexico-si-gana-biden

https://mexicobusiness.news/trade-and-investment/news/biden-vs-trump-what-does-it-mean-mexico

https://joebiden.com/immigration/#

https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/10/28/trump-or-biden-mexicos-struggling-economy-eyes-us-election

https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/u-s-hispanics-facts-on-mexican-origin-latinos/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/214780/number-of-us-tourists-visting-mexico/

 Octavio is a 2nd year English Law and Spanish Law student at King’s College London. He enjoys debating and writing about sports and politics.

Venezuela: Its Gold Held In Britain's Vaults

Source: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-gold/venezuela-gold-holdings-in-bank-of-england-soar-on-deutsche-deal-sources-idUKKCN1PF1Z8

By: Om Nagle

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, thousands of people in Venezuela were already suffering the ravaging effects of armed violence caused by years of political and economic instability. Official statistics indicate that, to date, Venezuela has had just over 110,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and about 880 total deaths. However, these government provided statistics are more a reflection of the country’s testing capabilities than of the true number of cases. The Nicolás Maduro led regime has largely limited testing to a few government-operated institutions which have medical supplies imported from partner nations like Iran and China. It is therefore unsurprising that Venezuela ranks as having the worst testing capacity in Latin America, only being able to perform about 264 tests a week with significant errors and delays in obtaining the results. The pandemic has therefore only served to make matters worse for Venezuelans who already have scarce access to food, water, and healthcare.

Venezuela’s current problems have certainly not been caused solely by COVID-19. Rather, the pandemic has exacerbated an unprecedented humanitarian and economic crisis caused by years of corruption, mismanagement and failed government policies. Recurrent droughts and severe international sanctions have worsened pre-existing food security and fuel shortage problems, adding pressure on the crippling private sector and overburdened humanitarian NGOs. The Maduro government, in light of these stricter sanctions and a desperate need for funds to battle the pandemic, looked abroad to liquidate its assets stored with the Bank of England. Their attempt to secure the 31 tonnes of gold-bullion have been met with significant challenges. The Maduro-led government has claimed that proceeds from the gold will be used to contribute funds to the United Nations Development Fund to help combat the COVID-19 pandemic. But his opponent, Juan Guaidó, believes there is very little merit to these claims and that the funds obtained would be used to further corruption. The litigation between the two highly contested Presidents of Venezuela has resulted in the money being held inside British Vaults far away from where it is truly needed: in Venezuela – to alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan people. 

This article will aim to impartially highlight and analyse the controversial questions raised by the UK Courts in the case of “Maduro Board” of the Central Bank of Venezuela V. “Guaidó Board” of the Central Bank of Venezuela [2020]

Since April of 2013, Nicolás Maduro has held the office of the President of Venezuela. December 2015 saw the dispute over the election of the deputies to the National Assembly for the state of Amazonas. The Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela (STJ), the country’s utmost constitutional court, granted provisional relief suspending the implementation of the election of the four deputies. However, the victorious opposition decided to swear-in the deputies anyway. As a result, the STJ issued a judgement on the 1st of August 2016, declaring all decisions taken by the National Assembly “null and void for so long as it was constituted in breach of the judgments and orders of the STJ”. In May 2017, a rival legislature was established on Maduro’s initiative called the National Constituent Assembly (NCA).  

The presidential election of 2018 witnessed Maduro claiming victory again. A month later, he appointed Mr. C. José Ortega as the president of the NCA and of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). In retaliation, the National Assembly declared the appointment unconstitutional. The STJ, following its 2016 judgement, declared the National Assembly’s resolution unconstitutional. 

January 2019 saw Maduro being sworn-in for a second term as the President of Venezuela. However, the National Assembly and its President, Juan Guaidó, announced, relying upon Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, that Maduro had usurped the office of the President and that Guaidó was the Interim President of Venezuela. Several countries, such as the United States, Colombia, Members of the EU and the UK gave the Maduro-led government 8 days to call elections. After failing to call elections, the Foreign Secretary to the UK reaffirmed the recognition of Juan Guaidó as an interim President “in charge of the transition back to democracy”. Furthermore, the Minister of State for Europe and the Americas justified the UK government’s recognition of Guaidó, based on the National Assembly’s consistency with following the rules set out in the Venezuelan Constitution. Additionally, he highlighted the exceptional nature of the refugee crisis whereby 3.6 million Venezuelans had fled the country in pursuit of a life away from a regime which was “holding onto power though electoral malpractice and harsh repression of dissent” and had been referred to the International Criminal Court by six countries for its human rights abuses. 

Meanwhile, the National Assembly passed the Transition Statute with the aim of “restoring the full force and effect of the Venezuelan Constitution”. It was signed bearing the seal of Guaidó as the President of Venezuela. Using the legal backing provided by the Transition Statute, Guaidó appointed a Special Attorney General, Mr. Jose I. Hernandez, and an ad hoc board of the BCV to defend the “interests of decentralized entities abroad”. The STJ passed judgements holding the Transition Statute, appointment of the special attorney general, andthe creation of the ad hoc board of the BCV as unconstitutional, null and void. 

The Bank of England holds gold reserves valued at about US $1.95 billion for the Banco Central De Venezuela (BCV). Consequently, a gold-swap contract with Deutsche Bank obligates them to pay the BCV a sum of about US $120 million. Currently, the sums are held by court appointed receivers. When the Maduro Board requested access to the gold, the Bank of England rejected their request owing to non-recognition of the Maduro-led government by the United Kingdom. This led to the current litigation at hand, wherein the courts have to decide upon two preliminary issues: firstly, which of the two boards is entitled to give instructions on behalf of the BCV concerning the assets held with the Bank of England and, secondly, who holds the office of the president of Venezuela. 

Initially, the Guaidó Board was successful in securing positive consideration through a judgement in its favour. Wherein the court held that, owing to the UK Foreign Ministry’s statements about the recognition of Juan Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela, the Maduro Board of the BCV wouldn’t be entitled to give instructions in relation to the assets. This was appealed by the lawyers representing the Maduro-led government who argued that, although the UK recognised Guaidó as the interim-president, they in practice continued diplomatic relations with the Maduro-led government through the Ambassador of Venezuela to the UK in London and the UK’s Ambassador to Venezuela in Caracas. While considering this aspect of the appeal, the UK High Court passed its judgement that diplomatic relations were irrelevant considering the UK recognised Juan Guaidó as the President, and it is the President of Venezuela that appoints the board of the BCV. They reaffirmed that “there is no room for recognition of Mr Guaidó as de jure President and of Mr Maduro as de factoPresident”, the “one-voice” principle would dictate that the UK Government no longer recognises Maduro as President of Venezuela in any capacity. 

In reference to the second preliminary issue, the court took into consideration the arguments presented by the Maduro Board as well as the Guaidó Board but reaffirmed that, at this stage, it was not in the UK High Court’s jurisdiction or capacity to pass judgement on the issue of the office of the president of Venezuela. The court in its concluding statements directed the litigating parties to dispute the matter in the Commercial Court. The Special Attorney appointed by Guaidó formally informed the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to set aside any arbitration requests from the Maduro Board, as the Guaidó board is the sole controller of the BCV, thus limiting any chances of this dispute being resolved without judicial proceedings in the UK. Unfortunately, as the litigation between the two offices of presidents in Venezuela gets expensive, complicated and drawn-out, the people of Venezuela have to ultimately bear the cost. 

 Om Nagle is a second-year law student at SOAS, University of London. He is interested in the intersection of law, international affairs and public policy.

Works Cited

"Maduro Board" of the Central Bank of Venezuela v "Guaido Board" of the Central Bank of Venezuela [2020] EWCA Civ 1249.

"Maduro Board" of the Central Bank of Venezuela v "Guaido Board" of the Central Bank of Venezuela [2020] All ER (D) 24 (Oct)

 "Maduro Board" of the Central Bank of Venezuela v "Guaido Board" of the Central Bank of Venezuela [2020] [2020] 10 WLUK 9

Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-11-25/venezuela-has-hit-a-dead-end-with-juan-guaido.

14, October. “High Court Rules on Entitlement of Persons or Bodies to Give Instructions to UK Financial Institutions on Behalf of Venezuelan Central Bank.” Banking Litigation Notes, 9 Sept. 2020, hsfnotes.com/bankinglitigation/2020/09/07/high-court-rules-on-entitlement-of-persons-or-bodies-to-give-instructions-to-uk-financial-institutions-on-behalf-of-venezuelan-central-bank/.

Al Jazeera. “UK Court Denies Venezuela's Maduro Access to Gold in Bank Vault.” Latin America News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 2 July 2020, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/07/02/uk-court-denies-venezuelas-maduro-access-to-gold-in-bank-vault/.

Armas, Mayela, and Corina Pons. “Venezuela Gold Holdings in Bank of England Soar on Deutsche Deal: Sources.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 21 Jan. 2019, uk.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-gold/venezuela-gold-holdings-in-bank-of-england-soar-on-deutsche-deal-sources-idUKKCN1PF1Z8.

“Covid-19 in Venezuela: How the Pandemic Deepened a Humanitarian Crisis.” Covid-19 in Venezuela: How the Pandemic Deepened a Humanitarian Crisis | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 Nov. 2020, www.csis.org/analysis/covid-19-venezuela-how-pandemic-deepened-humanitarian-crisis.

G., Jose I. Hernandez. “As Special Attorney-General of Venezuela, I Notified @Icsid That It Should Not Recognize Any Instruction given by Lawyers Acting on Behalf of Nicolas Maduro in the Arbitrations before That Center Pic.twitter.com/9PZlEvjn09.” Twitter, Twitter, 27 Mar. 2019, twitter.com/ignandez/status/1110989446189645825?lang=en.

Jones, Marc. “UK Court Overturns Venezuela Judgment in $1 Billion Gold Tug-of-War.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 6 Oct. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-gold-boe/uk-court-of-appeal-overturns-judgment-in-venezuela-gold-case-lawyers-idUSKBN26Q1IU.

Office, Foreign &amp; Commonwealth. “UK Recognises Juan Guaido as Interim President of Venezuela.” GOV.UK, GOV.UK, 4 Feb. 2019, www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-recognises-juan-guaido-as-interim-president-of-venezuela.

Peltier, Elian. “Maduro Wins Chance of New Ruling Over Billions in Gold Held in U.K.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 6 Oct. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/world/europe/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-gold.html.

Pons, Corina, and Mayela Armas. “Exclusive: Venezuela Asks Bank of England to Sell Its Gold to U.N. for Coronavirus Relief - Sources.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 29 Apr. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-venezuela-gold-exc-idUSKBN22B30X.

Roache, Madeline. “Venezuela's Maduro Loses Battle Over Gold in London Bank.” Time, Time, 2 July 2020, time.com/5862539/venezuela-maduro-gold-london-bank/.

Smith, Scott. “Control of Venezuelan Gold Held in London Cast into Doubt.” AP NEWS, Associated Press, 5 Oct. 2020, apnews.com/article/london-venezuela-archive-united-kingdom-8aed97a3890f7a2cd7ffe09a71b6b050.

Stott, Michael. “Venezuela's Maduro Wins Appeal over $1bn of Gold at Bank of England.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 5 Oct. 2020, www.ft.com/content/d5e91ab8-f44f-437a-887e-7a5aa402976d.

“UK Court Reverses $1bn Venezuelan Gold Ruling.” Anadolu Ajansı, www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/uk-court-reverses-1bn-venezuelan-gold-ruling/1996739.

“UK Denying Maduro Access to Venezuelan Gold Is Not Only THEFT, It's MURDER of London's Reputation as Trusted Financial Center.” RT International, www.rt.com/op-ed/493718-uk-maduro-venezuela-gold/.

“Venezuela Gold: UK High Court Rules against Nicolás Maduro.” BBC News, BBC, 2 July 2020, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-53262767.

“Venezuela Launches London Appeal in Battle for $1 Billion in Gold.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 22 Sept. 2020, uk.reuters.com/article/uk-venezuela-britain-gold/venezuela-launches-london-appeal-in-battle-for-1-billion-in-gold-idUKKCN26D2SA.

“Venezuela: Drought, Mismanagement and Political Instability.” The Center for Climate &amp; Security, 8 Feb. 2019, climateandsecurity.org/2019/02/drought-mismanagement-and-political-instability-in-venezuela/.

“Venezuela: Lives Turned Upside down by the COVID-19 Pandemic.” International Committee of the Red Cross, 15 Oct. 2020, www.icrc.org/en/document/venezuela-lives-turned-upside-down-covid-19-pandemic.

“Zaiwalla &amp; Co's Statement on the Judgment Released in Banco Central De Venezuela's Claim against the Bank of England.” Zaiwalla, www.zaiwalla.co.uk/en/news/banco-central-de-venezuela-to-appeal-judgment.

“Hemos vuelto a la normalidad”: Peru in Protest

Source: https://ibb.co/pzCrp8Y

By: Clarice Benney*

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

“Hemos vuelto a la normalidad,” (“we have gone back to normal”) was the response of one of Peru’s most famous poets of the 20th century, Martín Adán, when asked about the 1948 coup by Manuel Odría. Adán was well known for his eccentricities, but now, 70 years later, do these words appear more perceptive and far-reaching than he was perhaps given credit for at the time?

2020 has been a tough year for Peru: they have had one of the highest death rates from Covid-19 in the world, and are now watching their political system implode. In September, Peru’s president of the congress, Manuel Merino, was given “leaked” audio files which allegedly revealed a conversation with the then-president, Martín Vizcarra, in which his aides discuss how to cover up a misuse of public funds. 

This might appear, on the surface, to be a clear cut case of right and wrong, but the political context makes it much harder to make this distinction. Vizcarra ran as Pedro Pablo Kuczynski’s running mate in the 2016 elections, when their party, Peruanos Por el Kambio (PPK, ‘Peruvians for Change’) narrowly defeated Keiko Fujimori, the Fuerza Popular party’s nominee. Kuczynski resigned in 2018 due to charges of corruption, and Vizcarra took his place.

Vizcarra enjoyed popular support with his anti-corruption agenda and vowed to not run for re-election at the end of his term in 2021, but he was consistently challenged by Congress, of which opposition parties made up the majority. In September 2019, Vizcarra dissolved the Peruvian Congress and issued a decree for a new election in January 2020, but the result of the new elections once again saw opposition-led parties making up the majority. When Vizcarra dissolved Congress, his popularity rating rose from 49 to 80%, and he was seen by many as being ‘thwarted’ by Congress in his attempts to fight corruption.

With this in mind, Congress voted on whether or not to impeach Vizcarra in September 2020, but the motion failed, with only 32 members voting in favour of impeachment. However, they voted again in November, and this time the result was 105 in favour, 19 against, and 4 abstentions. 

When Congress removed Vizcarra and replaced him with Manuel Merino, President of the Congress and a member of the opposition, Peruvians took to the streets to protest. And it is this detail, the national outcry and action, that challenges the idea of “[un] vuelto a la normalidad.”

This civil unrest shows that the idea of a ‘milagro peruano’ (‘Peruvian miracle’) had not just been put aside, but shattered. Alberto Fujimori’s time as president from 1990 to 2000 saw the introduction of neoliberal policies, as in many other Latin American countries. The impact on Peruvian life was that many informal sectors were legalized, and foreign investment saw China become the country’s largest trading partner. In this period, whilst Peru’s natural resources were exploited for foreign gain, the country experienced high growth rates and the national poverty rate was cut in half between 2002 and 2011.

But by focusing on the positive statistics, issues surrounding political corruption continued. Alberto Fujimori may have generated economic prosperity, but he is now in prison on the grounds of human rights abuses for his role in the Grupo Colina death squad during his battle with leftist guerrillas in the 1990s. Following him was Alejandro Toledo Manrique, who was credited with ‘opening up tourism’, but is currently under house-arrest for corruption charges; then Alan García Pérez who comitted suicide when prosecutors came to his couse to bring him to face corruption charges; and Ollantana Humala Tasso, awaiting a corruption trial.

What we are seeing now on the news is a harrowing awakening: politics in Peru has reached a point where it cannot be ignored. In an already fragile democracy, a president and Congress working against each other was the ultimate destabilizing blow, but at this point a new guiding force has come into play: the people.

On November 16th it was declared that during protests, a violent reaction from the police killed two people, injured 100 and led to the disappearances of other protesters. The hashtag, “Merino no es mi presidente” (“Merino is not my president” that had flooded social media following his appointment was swapped for “El Perú está de luto” (“Peru is in mourning”). Merino resigned the same day.

Peru was faced with the same question once more: ‘whose turn next?’ For the moment it seems that the answer is Francisco Sagasti, a member of Congress from the ‘Partido Morado’. Sagasti was selected, as he was one of the 17 members of Congress who voted against Vizcarra’s impeachment for a second time in November, which acknowledges the people’s unhappiness with Congress’ decision to hold the vote at all, and their discontent towards Congress’ self-indulgent agenda.

When thinking about protest culture and examples in Latin America you might think of students in Chile protesting, triggered by an increase in the subway fare, people in Bolivia challenging political fraud, or women in Argentina demanding the legalisation of abortion. Until now, protests in Peru rarely made headlines. Do they not face the same issues? Are citizens really more satisfied with public spending and government in their country than others in the region?

The answer is no. Protests and strikes in Peru are not uncommon; it’s national protesting that occurs much more rarely. 40% of the newly formed middle class in Peru are in an unstable position. Mining has been a great driver of economic growth in Peru, but it simultaneously endangers the wellbeing of the communities it purports to benefit by contaminating water supplies and destroying environmental balance. The at-risk rural communities that fall into this category report feelings of even higher uncertainty for the future. Combine this with a lack of political representation and ever-changing parties and people, and you create an environment where protests are so constant that they lose their weight: turning up becomes apathetic. In order to restore activism in protesting there needs to be organization, and a sense of purpose. It is this presence in the recent political protests that singles them out and contests the ideal that ‘hemos vuelto a la normalidad’. With elections due in 2021, this could be the beginning of a new political era in Peru.

Note:

Jack Brian Pintado Sánchez, 22, and Jordan Inti Sotelo Camargo, 24, are young men who were tragically killed when participating in protests — my thoughts are with their friends and family.

Clarice is a student studying Spanish at Cambridge University. She is currently on her ‘year abroad’ and working with the NGO Latin American Foundation for the Future (LAFF) as Communications Coordinator. LAFF operates in Cusco, Peru and so Clarice is particularly interested in Peruvian current affairs, as well as protest culture in Latin American and grassroots activism. 

*About LAFF:

Latin American Foundation for the Future (LAFF) is a UK registered charity operating in Cusco, Peru to increase access to quality education and personal development opportunities. LAFF believes that one of the best ways to create positive long term change is to support local grassroots organisations so that community leaders drive the change. To find out more about what we do, check out our website.

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/laffcharity/

Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/latin-american-foundation-for-the-future

Geography: Its Influence in the Development of South America

Source: https://bit.ly/36T3r5u

By: Jack Acrich

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

The territory where a country is located can affect the way in which it is able to build the necessary infrastructure to pave its way to development and prosperity. It is common for states to take advantage of their geographical location in the best way possible –some may even use it to have advantage over other countries. In the case of South America, a lot of this region’s countries have had problems to properly build the necessary infrastructure for development and communication –an important factor for this is their geographical context.

First of all, the presence of rainforests such as the Amazon–which covers great part of the northern part of the continent– is considered to be very difficult to access due to its climatic conditions and density. Because of this, agricultural practices have not been very developed, and in many cases militant or criminal groups take advantage of this conditions to hide from the authorities. This usually results in governments using and sending resources to try and combat them. In this way, even if Venezuela and Brazil have close borders, roads are almost inexistent making their terrestrial communication very difficult due to the thick jungle. Furthermore, the presence of the Tapón de Darien, that is located in the border between Panama and Colombia, serves as a natural barrier. In this sense, the presence of rainforest in the region has also impeded terrestrial communication between Central America and South America.

Secondly, to escape form the conditions of the tropic where diseases can be present, many populations have decided to move and establish cities in elevated areas. The building and maintenance of infrastructure in these areas is very expensive, as well as contributing to the isolation of communities. This can be the case for cities like Quito in Ecuador, La Paz in Bolivia and Caracas in Venezuela. The spaces where most of the population live tends to be small; a lack of space leads to greater density and a poorer urban planification.

In addition, the Andes Mountains – one of the largest continental mountain ranges in the world – complicates the development and construction of roads to communicate different parts of the region. The part of the Andes located between Chile and Argentina consists of very high mountain ranges where snowstorms are very common. The topographical terrain in the region complicate traffic flow and communication between these two countries. This situation is not only between the countries in the region. The South American continent is considered to be far away from other parts of the world. For instance, the southern part of the region where Argentina and Uruguay are located are very distant to Europe. Again, the geographical context of the South American region makes it very challenging and costly to build tunnels and safe transportation, resulting in difficult the communication within the region and the rest of the world. 

Nonetheless, geographical conditions can be used for development advantages. For instance, the United States’developmental success has been in great part because of its geographical context –the presence of a great portion of land proper for agriculture, the existence of navigable rivers that promote the easy transportation of goods, and the availability of great ports. In addition, having coasts on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans has allowed the U.S. to project its power outside of the American continent (Stratfor, 2016 ). Even if the landscape of South America seems to obstruct the possibility for progress and growth, there are other factors that are advantageous. First, the idea that the region does not have to worry about an external war due to the fact that other states outside of the continent could get the resources that the region offers in places that are closer to them or have safer sea routes. Moreover, the zone of Río de la Plata located in the southern part of the continent has arable land and rivers are optimal for navigation benefiting states like Argentina and Uruguay. Additionally, the proximity to the US can be positive to establish commercial ties in sense.  

Taking into account the geographical aspects of states, it is possible to have a better understanding of the challenges they have had to progress. Even if South America has struggled to establish stable economies, there can always be ways to take advantage of the situation, and in many cases the route to instability has been led by certain inefficient government policies. Corruption scandals are present all over the continent making it very difficult to advance and build a prosperous stateregardless of the geographical conditions that they have. Having a lot of obstacles for development can be a great challenge to build a stable and prosperous economy. Nevertheless, this should not be an excuse to drag behind in development and be consumed by corruption that is very present in the region.

Jack is a Venezuelan 3rd year student at the University of Navarra. Besides his deep interest for Latin America, he is passionate about geopolitics and how the dynamics in this field shape the world of International Relations.

Protests in Peru: A Chronicle of a Death Foretold

Source: https://www.clarin.com/fotogalerias/impactantes-fotos-protestas-nuevo-presidente-peru-destitucion-vizcarra_5_ndMABbPBj.html

By: Arianna Sanchez

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

The last piece I wrote for El Cortao’ regarded the socio-political consequences of Venezuelan immigration in Peru. It ended with hope that the 2021 elections would help unite Peruvians rather than separate us. Turns out that the government did help us unite –even prior than expected. However, it was not because of their good politics,  but because of an attempted coup. Our current interim President, Francisco Sagasti, seems to be setting a path towards fair and timely elections in April 2021–he, however, did not get into power effortlessly. It took two dead protesters, dozens missingand more than a hundred injured to reinstate democracy in Peru. These series of events signify, in my opinion, a paradigm shift in Peruvian politics. From the perspective of someone who experienced this from first-hand, this article will attempt to look into the events that drove us to a coup and how Peruvian people managed to take back the power Congress took from us.

Race to the bottom

The issue at hand is one of high complexity and nuance, however I will try my best to summarise the crucial events that led to this point. We could say that the series of events leading to the attempted coup started when Pedro Pablo Kuczinsky (PPK) renounced his presidency in 2017 after an attempted impeachment from Congress against him. Congress justified their move with a collection of allegations tying PPK with corrupt people and firms –Odebrecht being the most important amongst the group. PPK renounced presidency after a seemingly never-ending battle with his main political opposition, Fuerza Popular. Martín Vizcarra, PPK’s Vice-President, assumed presidency right after in 2018. This event was, as García-Marquez would put it, a chronicle of a death foretold.  

 Martin Vizcarra truly did not expect the level of political and economic turmoil he would face in the upcoming years. Fuerza Popular, Keiko Fujimori’s political party and his main political opposition, was quick to use various events to develop antipathy towards Vizcarra amongst Congress and the general Peruvian population. The impeachment was based on the grounds that Vizcarra had been involved in different events concerning corruption, with allegations dating back to 2011. In the long run, however, it seems to me that Vizcarra’sdecision to dissolve Congress in 2019 and call for elections pushed these politicians to decide it was in their best interests to remove Vizcarra from presidency. Once he was gone, they were safe.

Peruvians strike back: The protests 

What the government did not seem to account for in their master plan was the level of protesting against them that would occur in the days following the impeachment. Neither did they expect the levels of police brutality these protests would bring with them. What would happen after Manuel Merino assumed de facto presidency acted as a strong wake up call for Peruvians, and these people in government were now the common enemy for us all. 

Peruvians started taking the streets to protest against Merino’s de facto presidency the day after it occurred –on the 10th of November. From the start, protesters were challenged by a repressive police force; tear gas asphyxiated protesters, whilst rubber bullets left several hurt. A source of anger, that further incentivised protesters to take the streets by the masses, was the lack of exposure of police brutality by the Peruvian media. Given the censoring by national media, Peruvians took the issue to social media, where platforms such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook were flooded with evidence of the levels of police brutality faced during the protests.

However, the turning point had a very specific date: Saturday 14th of November 2020. The day started with tanks on the streets, police disguised as civilians and in every corner. This seemed to signal that Merino’s government was not willing to resign, but rather wanted to silence protesters through intimidation. What started as peaceful protests took an awfully dark turn towards the end of the day. The speed in which things took a turn for the worse led to information all over social media and the news. To say it was overwhelming would be completely undermining the speed and intensity in which events occurred on that night. The levels of police brutality protesters experienced that Saturday were astonishing. My own social media was full of either friends asking for help due to injuries or those documenting the actions of the police. 

Then the official news started flooding in. One protester had been killed. With no time for Peruvians to even attempt to process it, and with thousands still attempting to escape the repressive police on the streets, the second death was announced. Inti Sotelo and Bryan Pintado died at the hands of the Peruvian police that Saturday. Dozens more did not return home that day, with allegations of forceful disappearances carried out by the police. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 

Reinstating democracy

After the events of that Saturday, Ministers assigned by Merino started to quit their posts. It started with the Minister of Women and Vulnerable Populations shortly after the news reported the deaths of two protesters and the disappearance of dozens more. It was clear that they had finally realised the extent to which they had infuriated the general Peruvian population with their ‘constitutional’ impeachment in the middle of a sanitary crisis. The continued protests and massive social media movement indicated that Peruvians were not about to be silenced. Moreover, the deaths of two protesters implied potential judicial investigations to be opened against them –this was not political opportunism for them anymore, it was political suicide. After around twelve Ministers had resigned, large social media platforms and politicians, who had not said a word before, started to heavily criticise the government in an attempt to save themselves from our anger. 

By Sunday morning, it was clear Merino had to resign as soon as possible to avoid further deaths and violence. He did not even have a cabinet anymore –there was virtually no choice. As people took the streets to pay tribute to the victims of the previous night, Manuel Merino finally appeared on our television screens. After a convoluted speech that showed an inability to assume responsibility for those injured and killed by the police, he finally said it: he resigned. On that same day, 15th of November, the attorney general of the nation, Zoraida Ávalos, filed a lawsuit against Manuel Merino, Prime Minister Antero Flores-Aráoz and Minister of the Interior Gastón Rodriguez for violations against human rights.

 With no President and no ministerial cabinet, we found ourselves on a limbo. Congress had to choose a new executive branch –the same government which betrayed us. After one full day of complex political manoeuvres behind the scenes,and the surprising rejection of the first candidate list, Congress allegedly promised to bring some political stability. They finally chose the new members of the executive on the 16th of November. With the families of Inti Sotelo and Bryan Pintado present in the ceremony, new interim-President Francisco Sagasti assumed presidency, giving an emotional speech addressing our fight for democracy and promising justice to those affected. Some hope was restored. 

Concluding thoughts

I want to end this piece on one main note: Peruvians did not take the streets to reinstate ex-President Vizcarra into power. Peruvians did not fight against exceedingly repressive policefor him. Peruvians fought to reinstate democracy and fought the police for ourselves. It has been decades of normalising terrible, exclusionary politics. Of normalising the advantage taken by those who claim to represent us. Of normalising the uncertainty of whether next year we could have anotherpolitical crisis. We learn from our mistakes, yet we have a long road ahead. now that we have finally opened our eyes, I hope we do not close them again.

Arianna is a Peruvian 3rd Year Politics Student at King’s College London with a passion for Latin American politics and political risk-management.