The Pinochet Regime Lives on behind the Façade of Democracy
4-Years after the Peace Deal: Lessons of Transitional Justice from Colombia (Part II)
4-Years after the Peace Deal: Lessons of Transitional Justice from Colombia (Part I)
MERCOSUR: How It Stands Today
Plata o Parca: Insights on the Participation and Role of Latin American Women in Drug Trafficking
by: Thais Ricard
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao'.
When thinking about drug trafficking’s protagonists in Latin America, we automatically visualize stocky, bearded, middle-aged men with a stern look and a deep voice. Indeed, by examining the portrayal of the drug world in popular culture – a portrayal built on media headlines and popularised by well-known series like Narcos, which bases its plot on the story of drug kingpin Pablo Escobar – one perceives this world as exclusively within a man’s domain, where women are relegated to background activities and forced to play a passive, supporting role in the domestic sphere. In general, as crime statistics suggest that delinquency is dominated by men, the notion of crime is associated with masculine stereotypes, such as risk-taking and action. The presence of women in drug trafficking – a high-risk and violent activity –is therefore a paradox for gender stereotypes of criminal conduct. Women who take part in this trade are depicted as pathological or masculine, defying the feminine role that a machista society has imposed on them.
Over the past few years, however, Latin American women have increasingly participated in the trade of illicit drugs, although this involvement has been absent from research related to the narcotics trade and has routinely been underestimated by state and non-state organisations alike. In Colombia, the number of women prisoners has increased more than fivefold, while that of male prisoners has increased just threefold. Now, nearly five out of every ten women jailed are serving sentences for drug-related crimes. This female participation is arguably the result of a long-lasting ‘war on drugs’ which produced the incarceration of many male criminals and created a labour vacuum that has encouraged women to enlist in the drug businesses of their fathers, partners, or lovers.
Some women have even assumed high-ranking positions in this male-dominated environment. In this context, it would be a good moment to introduce the individual whose mugshot headlines this article: Griselda Blanco, also known as the ‘Cocaine Godmother’. She was introduced to the cocaine industry by her second husband, Alberto Bravo, and proceeded to progressively replace him in his own line of work until she had become one of the wealthiest and most powerful drug leaders in the world. Her trafficking network spread across the United States, bringing in an estimated $80 million USD a month. Considered a pioneer in drug trafficking and a mentor for Pablo Escobar, she established many of the smuggling techniques and murdering methods that are still used today. Not only was she involved in the trafficking of narcotics, but she also played a major part in the ‘Cocaine Cowboy Wars’ that ravaged Miami in the 70s and 80s. Ruthless against her rivals, she was suspected of having sponsored hundreds of killings in the US and Colombia, making her one of the deadliest women of all time. By the time of her assassination in 2012, Blanco had aroused a great fascination among the general public and her story inspired many books, TV shows, or documentaries such as the Cocaine Cowboys (2006).
Although Blanco shows the deep involvement of women in drug trafficking, her story is misleading as it constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Not all women can attain such levels of authority and wealthiness. In this industry, the roles usually performed by women are, in fact,subordinate ones, which is thus concordant with the feminine stereotypes of subservience and passivity. Women are enlisted to cook for laborers and some, such as the poppy flower and coca leaf pickers (known as raspachines), are involved in the first stages of drug manufacturing. They are also used as chemists, who use chemical substances to extract cocaine, or as mules for the trafficking andsale of illegal substances. The use of women as couriers is particularly interesting for drug lords because they are often perceived as innocent and untouchable which makes their smuggling efforts quite successful, as most police attention is focused on men. Moreover, female mules are trained to flaunt their sexuality, by dressing up attractively and flirting with immigration officers to dispel any suspicion with a seductive look. This further reinforces women’s stereotypical role as objects of physical desire.
Concentrated at the bottom of the chain, women face greater risks as violence is often most pervasive at this level and the rewards are few. The threats they face are two-fold and are split between the general risks involved in drug trafficking and those specific to their condition as women. Both women and men working in the harvesting of illicit crops, for instance, are particularly at risk of falling into drug abuse. A 2019 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),written in collaboration with the Colombian Ministry of Justice, reported that these women and their relatives saw higher cases of substance and alcohol addiction as well as greater incidences of domestic abuse. Moreover, women who operate as mules are the most vulnerable and exposed actors of this black market and, for this reason, often ended up exploited by their bosses and/or imprisoned with disproportionately long sentences despite only occupying a minor position in the commercialization chain.
Women who perform these roles normally have a level of education no higher than primary school. They are often unaware of the dangers inherent in the drug trade and the seriousness of the penalty levied if caught. Even when they know the consequences, they may still be willing to accept these risks to make money. Indeed, economic incentives are the main factor pushing women into this environment. Lacking legitimate economic opportunities, being single parents, or desiring financial independence, many of these women are left with no choice but to get involved. They may also be pressured by their families, who may declare their participation to be mandatory. This explains why those women, contrary to their male counterparts, are not willing to attract attention to their activities and rarely seek authority. For them, earning money is more important than having power or prestige.
Nowadays, the legislation to address the drug problem is flawed as it exacerbates sex-based discrimination. Women prisoners are most likely to suffer from exclusion, abandonment, and loss offamily ties. Not only does long-term imprisonment create an economic burden for the taxpayer, but itpromises severe, far-reaching effects for individual prisoners, for their children, and for society as a whole. Indeed, as shown by the story of Rocío Duque – a single Colombian mother jailed for 14 years for carrying a small amount of cocaine paste which she received only a modest fee for – current policies foster harsh cycles of poverty and socio-economic exclusion that leads to recidivism. Her account shows how repeat criminals suffer social and state sigma and how recidivism can be unavoidable when there are no reintegration programs to help women to rebuild their lives after being in jail.
It is time, therefore, for Latin American governments to redesign drug legislation in order forthe latter to demonstrate gender awareness. This will be achieved partly by meeting the gender-specific needs of women in penitentiary centres, and partly by reducing the imprisonment of women through non-custodial correction measures. Overall, policies should now focus on increasing levels of socio-economic development and on improving access to education, employment, and basic healthcare services to avoid any intensification of women’s involvement in drug trafficking.
Thais is a third year History and International Relations student at KCL. Her main research interests are about human rights and security issues such as drug trafficking and insurgency movements. She is particularly keen in analyzing those matters through a gender-based perspective.
¡Chile Despertó! … ¿Y Ahora Qué? // Chile has Awoken! ... Now what?
By Maximilian Frederik van Oordt
A más de un año del estallido social y con un proceso constitucional inédito en marcha, ya va siendo hora de abordar dos preguntas clave producto de este acontecimiento histórico: ¿cuáles han sido los cambios en Chile? y, ¿qué sendero debería seguir el país?
En relación a la primera pregunta, la lista de respuestas es larga dado que este movimiento ha sido de extrema consecuencia nacional en materia económica, política, y social. En un artículo anterior había hecho alusión a varias causas principales del estallido como la clase política, la desigualdad, las pensiones, y el costo de la vida, entre muchas más. Todos estos ámbitos han ostentado cambios que van de lo superficial – como la destitución del ex Ministro del Interior Andrés Chadwick – a lo formidable – como el proceso constituyente. El 25 de octubre del año pasado, producto directo del estallido social, Chile celebró un plebiscito nacional sobre si se debiera mantener o no la actual Constitución. De forma abrumadora, el electorado despidió a la Carta Magna de la República, aprobando con un 78,28% el inicio de un proceso histórico que redactará un nuevo documento. El 11 de abril de 2021, los chilenos elegirán sus candidatos a la Convención Constituyente, influyendo así de forma directa en el resultado del proceso, y en agosto de 2022 votarán de nuevo en un plebiscito que buscará aprobar la nueva Constitución. Pese a la violencia y a las injusticias delatadas a lo largo del estallido social, este proceso constituyente es un ejemplo brillante de la democracia y uno del cual todo chileno puede sentirse orgulloso.
Mas allá de los profundos cambios políticos – que, felizmente, han incluido una rebaja a las abusivas dietas parlamentarias – el Chile de hoy cuenta con reformas policiales, educativas, y económicas creadas con el objetivo de responder a las múltiples demandas de la ciudadanía. Carabineros de Chile, la institución policial encargada del orden público, vió su imagen fuertemente deslustrada por la vastedad de los abusos que ejerció contra los manifestantes. Lo que en tiempos pasados se consideraba un modelo a seguir en el contexto regional ahora parecía un instrumento de represión caracterizada por el caos, la tragedia, y la impunidad. El resultado ha sido un importante incremento en las compras y entregas de cámaras corporales por parte del gobierno, aunque las fuerzas policiales siguen contando con menos de mil de éstas a nivel país. También se ha apreciado el inicio de una profunda reforma a Carabineros llevada a cabo por las autoridades civiles en conjunto con la institución, con una mira al refuerzo de los derechos humanos. Según una encuesta Cadem a un año del estallido social, la policía uniformada contaba con sólo un 26% de la confianza popular, y apenas un 19% la consideraba capacitada para cumplir su labor. Cambios son imprescindibles, y los primeros de éstos ya están en marcha.
A pesar de todas las reformas, al estado le quedan cuantiosas decisiones que tomar e injusticias que resolver. Las pensiones de los chilenos se siguen manteniendo en las famosas Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP);entidades privadas que entregan una jubilación mediana de tan solo $203.883 pesos chilenos, equivalente a poco más de doscientas libras esterlinas mensuales. En el Congreso Nacional, la indignación popular ha producido políticas populistas y de poca visión de futuro. Se ingresaron tres reformas constitucionales que permitieron el retiro por parte del cotizante de hasta el 10% de sus ahorros previsionales en cada instancia, poniendo así en riesgo de colapso total el actual sistema de pensiones sin reemplazo ninguno. Seamos claros: aquí no se arremete contra el retiro previsional en sí; fue una medida necesaria para enfrentar la crisis económica que provocó la pandemia. Tampoco se busca defender el modelo de las AFP – que descanse en paz. Aquí el problema es que aquellos autores del retiro siguen sin presentar ningún proyecto que pueda reemplazar el sistema actual, ni un plan que pueda proteger a los cotizantes a largo plazo. Incluso la diputada opositora Pamela Jiles, rostro de los últimos dos retiros, admitió que su proyecto es populista, agregando que es una “pésima política… pero que más vamos a hacer”. La caída de las AFP sería un gran paso hacia una pensión digna en Chile, pero sólo se podrá festejar cuando el cotizante chileno esté protegido por el sistema de reemplazo. La moraleja en este caso sería que cualquier reforma que se haga se tendrá que hacer responsablemente y con miras hacia el futuro. Chile busca transformarse, no arrancarse de raíz.
Sin embargo, la secuela más peligrosa del estallido social ha sido el aumento importante de las voces extremistas e ideológicas del país. Desde la derecha, se sienten los fantasmas del viejo Pinochetismo en los partidos Renovación Nacional (RN) y Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), quienes se han abierto a un pacto electoral con el partido Republicano de ultraderecha – un partido que a menudo valora y justifica la dictadura militar de los 80. Incluso el ex presidente de RN denunció haber sido víctima “de los ataques virulentos de miembros o simpatizantes” de aquel partido. Incorporar a partidos de este talante a la corriente principal daña la institucionalidad de la República; una institucionalidad que la misma derecha pretende – y debe – resguardar.
Mientras tanto, desde la ultraizquierda se levantan voces de semejante percance. El Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh) ha hecho la vista gorda a los desmanes cometidos por antisociales durante las manifestaciones y ha llegado incluso a avalar la violencia contra las fuerzas del orden. El presidente del PCCh señaló desvergonzadamente que “una condena genérica a la violencia no la voy a hacer” y, al preguntarle si condenaría el vandalismo visto durante las protestas, respondió: “¿cómo voy a condenar una cosa tan menor?”. A la apatía comunista se suman cinco congresistas de cinco partidos opositores quienes han presentado nada menos que un indulto general a manifestantes detenidos en el marco del estallido social, buscando sobreseer así las imputaciones en su contra; imputaciones que incluyen graves delitos como el homicidio frustrado y el tráfico de armas. La justicia constituye pilar fundamental de cualquier democracia sana y el escepticismo con el que la ultraizquierda trata al poder judicial, que en Chile es independiente, terminará debilitándola a corto y a largo plazo.
Hoy más que nunca, Chile necesita un gobierno pragmático, centrista, y de consenso. Los desmanes del 18-O han echado leña al fuego del extremismo político. Mientras la ultraizquierda avala la violencia hacia el estado, la ultraderecha atrinchera el extremismo político. El progreso que se ha logrado en materia política, económica, y social ha sido abundante y el país va encaminado hacia una vida digna para sus habitantes. Este progreso se alcanzó a través de los acuerdos mutuos y la atención prestada a la ciudadanía. El extremismo político ni responde a las demandas sociales, ni tiene la posibilidad de solucionarlas. Chile despertó… ¿Y Ahora qué? Ahora tendrá que elegir su sendero. Si triunfa la democracia y el consenso, “la copia feliz del Edén” – que promete el himno nacional – estará al alcance de su pueblo.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
With over a year having passed since Chile’s mass protests and with an unprecedented constitutional process underway, it is about time to tackle two key questions raised by this historic event: what changes have occurred in Chile, and what path should the country take?
In terms of the first question, the list of answers is a long one given that this movement has been extremely consequential in the economic, political, and social realms. In a previous article I had alluded to many of the main causes of the social unrest including the political elite, inequality, pensions, and the cost of living, among many other factors.All these areas have seen changes which range from the superficial – such as the impeachment of the former Minister of the Interior Andrés Chadwick – to the formidable – such as the constitutional process. On October 25th of last year, as a direct consequence of the social unrest, Chile held a national referendum on whether or not to keep its current constitution.Overwhelmingly, the electorate fired the republic’s basic charter, approving by 78.28% the commencement of a historic process which would draw up a new document. On the 11th of April of 2021, Chileans will elect their candidates to the Constitutional Convention, thereby directly influencing the result of the process, and in August of 2022 they will once again vote in a plebiscite which will decide whether the new Constitution will replace the old one. Despite the violence and the injustices laid bare throughout the mass demonstrations, this constitutional process is a shining example of democracy and one which all Chileans can be proud of.
Beyond the far-reaching political changes – which, fortunately, include a reduction in the extortionate congressional salaries – the Chile of today boasts reforms to police, education, and the economy created with the objective of responding to the people’s many demands. The Carabineros de Chile, the police institution in charge of riot control, saw their image badly tarnished by the immensity of abuses they committed against protestors. What had once been considered a role model in the regional context now seemed to be an instrument of repression characterised by chaos, tragedy, and impunity. The result of this has been a significant increase in the purchase and distribution of body cams by the government, although the police forces continue to make do with fewer than a thousand of these nationwide. A deep reform of the Carabineros has also begun, undertaken by the civil authorities in conjunction with the institution and aimed at reinforcing human rights. According to a survey by the national pollster one year on from the beginning of the social unrest, the national police enjoyed only 26% of citizens’ trust, with only 19% of the population considering them to be capable of fulfilling their duties. Changes are necessary, and the first of these are already underway.
Despite all these reforms, the state is still faced with numerous decisions to make and injustices to resolve. The pensions of Chileans continue to be kept in the infamous Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP); private entities which provide a median pension of only $203,883 Chilean pesos, equivalent to just over two hundred pounds sterling per month. In the National Congress, popular anger has produced populist and short-sighted policies. Three constitutional amendments were introduced which each permitted the withdrawal of up to 10% of one’s pension savings, thereby risking the total collapse of the current pension system with no replacement in sight. To be clear: this article does not attack the pension withdrawal bill in of itself; it was a necessary measure to deal with the economic crisis brought about by the pandemic. Nor does this article attempt to defend the AFP pensions model – may it rest in peace. The problem here is that those who introduced these policies did so without presenting a single proposal which could replace the current system, nor did they announce any plans to protect pensioners in the long term. Even the opposition MP Pamela Jiles, the face of the last two withdrawals, admitted that her proposal is populist, adding that it is “an awful policy… but what else are we going to do”. The fall of the AFPs would be a great step towards dignified pensions in Chile, but one can only begin celebrating once the Chilean pensioner has been protected by a replacement system. The moral of the story in this case would be that whatever reform is made must be made responsibly and with the future in mind. Chile seeks to transform itself, not uproot itself outright.
Nevertheless, the most dangerous product of the social unrest has been the significant increase in extremist and ideological voices within the country. On the political right, ghosts of Pinochetism are being felt in the Renovación Nacional (RN) and Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) parties, which have opened themselves up to an electoral pact with the hard right Republican party – a party which regularly praises and justifies the military dictatorship of the 80s. Even the former president of RN condemned the fact that he had been victim of “virulent attacks by members or sympathisers” of that party. The incorporation of parties of this nature into the political mainstream damages the institutions of the Republic; institutions that the political right itself claims to – and should – defend.
Meanwhile, similarly distasteful voices are being heard among the hard left. The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) has turned a blind eye to the destruction committed by delinquents throughout the protests and has on occasions justified violence committed against law enforcement. The president of the PCCh unashamedly commented that he would “not make a generic condemnation of violence” and, when asked whether he would condemn the vandalism seen during the protests, replied with: “why would I condemn something so minor?”. Added to this communist apathy are five MPs from five different opposition parties who have introduced nothing short of a general pardon to those detained during the social unrest, thereby seeking to dismiss the charges against these individuals; charges which include severe crimes such as attempted murder and arms trafficking. Justice forms a fundamental pillar of any healthy democracy and the scepticism with which the hard left treats the judicial system, which in Chile is independent, will end up debilitating it inboth the short and long term.
Now more than ever, Chile needs a pragmatic and centrist government by consensus. The destruction of the social unrest has poured fuel onto the fire of political extremism. While the hard left promotes violence against the state, the hard right entrenches political extremism. There has been abundant progress in the political, economic, and social realms and the country is on track towards a dignified life for its inhabitants. This progress was achieved by mutual agreements and by listening to the citizenry. Political extremism neither responds to the popular demands, nor does it have the capacity to solve them. Chile has awoken… now what? Now it will have to chart its course. Should democracy and consensus triumph, then the “happy copy of Eden” promised by the national anthem will be at the fingertips of the Chilean people.
Maximilian Frederik van Oordt is a second-year International Relations student at King’s College London. interested in politics, history and law, he enjoys focusing on Latin American affairs, with a particular emphasis on these three areas.
The Absence of Colour and the Colour of Absence: Decolonising Brazilian Education
By: Camila Consolmagno
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.
in Brazil, inequality is taken for granted. While equal under the eyes of international law, Brazilian children experience abysmally unequal childhoods. It is imperative to understandthat meaningful social and economic change aiming to reduce inequality and promote justice will not occur if matters of race discrimination and its legacies are not brought to light –thoroughly deconstructed, and equitably remodelled. However, with 53 million poor, and 22 million indigent Brazilians respectively –overrepresented by Afro-Brazilians in all age groups– this would require deep structural and systemic surgery within Brazilian society.
According to the calculations by the United Nations Development Program, no Brazilian state has a higher Human Development Index for Afro-Brazilians than for white populations; and racial inequalities are consistent in every Brazilian state, notwithstanding its stage of development.While there is consensus that Brazil is deeply unjust, and race discrimination has been recognised by the federal government as a human rights issue, there is yet not sufficient understanding and agreement on how to combat its inequality.
Both in the school curriculum and in the classroom, Black people and Afro-Brazilians appear in delimited ways – though often not at all, mirroring a historical subordination. Curricular silences on race and Afro-Brazilian history and identity are institutionalised not only in societal discourse, but also within education sectors, with educators and administrators receiving no university-level education training on race relations, race-based inequality, or Afro-Brazilian history. Rarely will history teachers come across Black people and Afro-Brazilians as active and complex actors within the Brazilian or global narrative.
A Shift Called ‘Decolonisation’
It must be noted, however, that advances made by the Black social movement have commenced to shift social and political narratives. Afro-Brazilian activists and education researchers, such as the Orùnmilá Cultural Centre’s (‘OCC’) leaders and members, have begun to address the primary and secondary education system, inter alia, by targeting their advocacy and research to the lack of positive representation of Africa, Black people, and Afro-Brazilians in educational textbooks, everyday racism within school spaces, and the shallow treatment of the historical role of Afro-Brazilians. Secondly, they advocate for the incorporation of Afro-Brazilian cultural practices into school curricula to proclaim the diverse origins of knowledge. Finally, activists and cultural organisations like the OCC have established community schools that focus on either or both intercultural and Afro-centric education. These approaches not only mainstream Black history and contextualise it to contemporary times, but they pave the way for schools to challenge racism, ignorance, and stereotypes through the provision of diverse and inclusive teaching that encourages open-mindedness and constructive curiosity. Additionally, this addresses how partial and negative Afro-Brazilian representation correlates to the devaluation or ‘folklorisation’ of Afro-Brazilian culture and knowledge, both outside and inside the classroom, aiming to redress the effect of dismissal of Afro-Brazilians as creators of knowledge and theory, and of their culture as valuable pedagogically. Carving a space in education for Black history allows it to situate itself within one of the main centres where knowledge, opinions, and thought are produced: the school.
Many are not aware that Brazil has the largest population of African descendants outside of Nigeria. Currently, however, the Brazilian school system reproduces hegemonic perspectives that mould the delimited narrative of Afro-Brazilian history in its society, perpetuating a historical system of power constructed through Eurocentric aesthetic, epistemological and cultural dominance. As Pai Paulo and Silas contend, “the most revolutionary aspect of this process resides in the valorisation of Black Culture as a philosophical and political theoretical field”. One cannot, therefore,envisage the emancipation of a people in the absence of the recognition and valorisation of their culture.
In 2003, then-President Lula signed Law 10,639/03 which gave statutory basis to the inclusion of African and Afro-Brazilian culture and history into the national curriculum. These aims concretised, inter alia, in what was named Projeto Baobá; one of the first – and at the time, possibly only – systemic realisations by a municipal government aiming to implement Law 10,639/03. Projeto Baobá reflected the opinion that decolonising education did not solely mean the inclusion of Black history within the curriculum, but actively thinking with Afro-descendants as producers of knowledge, theory, and philosophy. The project adopted a more sophisticated view of Afro-Brazilian and African histories by challenging narrow associations of Blackness, Black history, and Black identity with slavery, low status, and manual labour. It not only revealed the intricate ways in which Afro-Brazilian history is still tied to the slave ship, but also how race-based discrimination sculpted and continues to influence contemporary inequalities. Consisting of lectures, workshops, teacher training, and the purchase and distribution of revised educational materials to municipal schools, Projeto Baobá shifted teachers’ and students’ perspectives on Afro-Brazilian history, Africa, and Blackness. It emphasised the notable enthusiasm among Afro-descendant pupils who now ‘saw themselves’ and their history in textbooks, storybooks, and classroom activities. Importantly, educators and school administrators, that previously denied racism and discrimination as issues which required attention,came to passionately adopt the project’s cause and recognise the aforementioned as serious issues. Only one round of the Projeto Baobá, however, was implemented.
Struggling to See Colour – A Country in Black or White
Projeto Baobá faced immense implementation difficulties, largely as a consequence of a lack of interest, explicit opposition of many school principals and teachers, and capacity issues. Despite this, the OCC fights for its continuation. The project nonetheless incentivised many school teachers, principals, and students to reassess the knowledge and culture of Brazil’s African ancestors and recognise Afro-Brazilians as important subjects for inclusion in curricula. This, in turn, generated and continues to generate new possibilities to ensure a more holistic educational experience for students, particularly those of African descent. Additionally, the project initiated an exploration of Afro-Brazilian forms of knowledge and pedagogy which remain underdeveloped as educational tools and excluded from institutional legitimacy, despite often present in many Brazilians’ everyday lives (i.e. capoeira).
Over the past few years, a variation of projects has emerged to implement race relations and inequality training for teachers and municipal employees in agreement with Law 10,639/03. However, a myriad of elements indicates their inconsistency and insufficiency, as well as the pre-existing implementation difficulties. Firstly, multiple organisations have created projects; these projects vary in target audience, length, funding, and the degree to which they implement Afro-Brazilian cultural practices. Secondly, the shortfall of standards for project materials, implementation, and pedagogical approaches makes examination difficult, hindering improvement alongside requests for continuity. This is particularly relevant when public officials pragmatically enforce shallow projects claiming to tackle race issues and satisfy Black community demands. A third, final, and core concern raised by Orùnmilá members is the extent to which projects’ academic trainers are skilled practitioners of Afro-Brazilian culture. To wholly value these practitioners as generators of theory and knowledge, they must be involved in project implementations. However, despite these efforts and the rising attention paid to race in public policies, government efforts to address race as an issue continues to waver – a case particularly veracious under the current Bolsonarian government.
In 2009, the centre-right Democratic Party administration almost completely erased ‘race’ from the educational agenda and had all but severed dialogue with the OCC concerning educational and cultural policy. Consequently, making the institutional future of the Projeto Baobá uncertain. Notwithstanding this, Orùnmilá members anticipate further implementation and improvement, refusing to stall their philosophy as a result of public officials’ decisions. With lack of access to education affecting many Brazilians, particularly Afro-Brazilians, the OCC and Projeto Baobá continue to ask fundamental questions: “What kind of education are we aiming to have access to? What are its goals and what kind of society will it shape? How can we go beyond visions of societal inclusion as socioeconomic ascension to question the social formation into which people struggle for inclusion?”. Orùnmilá members and others striving towards educational reform in Brazil suggest thinking with Afro-descendants so as to substantively remodel a core societal institution – the school – and highlight the hierarchies that delimit visions of sociality, knowledge, and development. In this way, the question of fundamentally diversifying curricula as a means of decolonising knowledge is key in the process of bringing culture as an issue for development.
In conclusion, it is fundamental to think with Afro-Brazilian cultural struggles to aggrandise the critical knowledge about how capitalism’s exclusionary and racialised epistemological foundations allow certain visions of sociality to translate into possibility, and others to be unfathomable. Generating and executing alternative visions of development necessitate thinking with these other shapes of knowledge so as to confront, rethink, and remodel the limits that political, economic, and cultural development policies and processes place on societies and individuals. As such, critical scholarship can more substantively contribute to the endeavours of those like the OCC’s, who are involved in the daily struggle to not only live but survive. Therefore, in the aim of decolonising education it is insufficient to solely guarantee the inclusion of Black history into curricula; one must think with Afro-descendants as valuable and active contributors to culture, current affairs, knowledge, and theory. Finally, these efforts to decolonise education should combine into one major national project so as to target wider audiences and ensure better administration, execution, legitimacy, and results.
Camila Consolmagno is a final-year Bachelor of Laws student at SOAS, University of London. She is the first Brazilian President of the SOAS Latin American Society and an aspiring human rights lawyer.
US-Mexico Relations: The Upcoming Challenges of Lopez Obrador with the Biden Administration
By: Marco García
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao’.
When it comes to Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and former United States’ President Donald Trump, the diplomatic relationship is a bit of a paradox. Throughout his administration, Trump labelled Mexicans as criminals, used the US-Mexico border as a political piñata to pander to his loyal supporters, and conceived detrimental policies for the ‘dreamers’ who flock to the US in hopes of a better life.
Nevertheless, Mexico’s López Obrador, once a vocal anti-Trumpist, perhaps already misses him.
Among the many surprises brought about by the Trump presidency, one of the more astonishing ones would be how he got López Obrador – a populist, leftist president who has in the past called Trump a “racist” – to regard him so highly. Said admiration can be attributed to the striking similarities between the two men: both leaders ran for office on a promise to lessen the divide between ordinary citizens and their nation’s elite. Both men are political opportunists, dismantling institutional processes while expressing a complete disregard for foreign policy in favor of placating their domestic base. Both also paint their opponents – usually the media – as enemies of the people. LópezObrador has even taken a queue right from the Trump handbook: just as Trump used Twitter to hog the media spotlight, López Obrador hosts a daily morning news conference in which he is questioned by the media; although these usually consist of Youtubers and mediaoutlets who are sympathetic to him. In short, their populist platforms have allowed for a previously unseen common ground for both men to work together – a sort of emotional understanding between both leaders. The Biden administration, on the other hand, constitutes a challenge to that understanding.
López Obrador was among the last world leaders to congratulate President-Elect Biden on his electoral win, grouping him with the likes of Brazil’s Bolsonaro, Russia’s Putin, and China’s Xi, though the latter congratulated Biden almost three weeks before Obrador. As reported by the New York Times, when Obrador finally brought himself to speak to the President-elect, he did not hesitate to show off his relationship with Trump. “I must mention that we do have a very good relationship with the now president of your country, Mr. Donald Trump”, he said. Obrador sees Biden as a potentially meddlesome President and seeks to push back any American involvement in what he considers Mexican affairs. To add insult to injury, LópezObrador did not condemn the attack on the US Capitol on January 6th, choosing instead to criticize social media platforms for “censoring” President Trump. He even went as far as offering political asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks. Lopez Obrador has, in a way, set the stage for a strained relationship by repeatedly poking the United States in the eye.
Back in November, the United States’ Justice Department arrested and charged former Mexican Defense Secretary Salvador Cienfuegos with money laundering and distribution of narcotics. After political pressure was applied by the Obrador administration, the American prosecutors dropped the charges and General Cienfuegos was brought back to Mexico to undergo what was promised to be a meticulous investigation by Mexican prosecutors into the Justice Department’s allegations. Alongside this promise, Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, stated that bringing Cienfuegos back to Mexico and not do anything with him would be “suicide”.
Nevertheless, a week before Biden’s inauguration, Cienfuegos was exonerated by the Mexican government.
López Obrador accused American prosecutors of “fabricating” the allegations and acting “irresponsibly”. When met with criticism for his actions, he ordered the release of all classified evidence given to his government by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In just one tweet, Mexican authorities made public 750 pages of classified evidence. Washington expressed “disappointment” over the actions of LópezObrador’s government, with the Mexican President snapping back: “I could also say that I am disappointed in the work of the DEA.”
Regardless of who is right, this case reveals a highly disturbing reality: the future of the US-Mexico bilateral relationship will have an excess of politicking, and a lack of justness. The United States showed this by folding under pressure to give up Cienfuegos, and Mexico showed this by prioritizing political point scoring over the rule of law. An argument could, however, be made for the actions of López Obrador: either exonerating or releasing Cienfuegos presented political costs for the President. On the one hand, Mexico’s military has flourished under López Obrador, and has been given the most responsibility and power in recent memory. By prosecuting Cienfuegos, a man still deeply respected among the Mexican armed forces, the President risked alienating one of his main allies. On the other hand, by exonerating Cienfuegos, López Obrador put into disrepute what is an already fragile relationship with US law enforcement. Considering the President’s lack of interest in those outside his political base, he considered the latter to have a lesser political cost.
Allowing the Cienfuegos investigation to run its course would have given López Obrador the opportunity to prove he is different from his predecessors who he has repeatedly criticized. This was not the case.
Obrador’s striking similarities with President Trump and his unprecedented public showdown with the DEA marks a new era of non-cooperation. The Biden administration has therefore inherited a standoff with the Mexican government. And with Biden more likely to ask more of López Obrador than Trump ever did, it is yet to be seen whether Mexico will cooperate with the new administration or see them as a threat to their sovereignty. With an expected increase in immigration towards the United States from Central America in light of the pandemic and the end of Trump-era policies, immigration will be the first challenge where both leaders will be put to the test. Biden will need LópezObrador to effectively reinforce Mexico’s southern border in order to handle new migrant caravans, especially with the pandemic still battering the Americas. Though it is not expected for President Biden to strongarm López Obrador into action, what remains to be seen is whether Mexico will see Biden’s efforts as meddling in Mexican affairs.
What López Obrador fears most is Biden’s administration meddling in his ambitious domestic agenda which includes the construction of a new 2 billion USD oil refinery and the revitalization of PEMEX – the state-owned oil company. The US Democratic Party has already called for greater cleaner energy investment and further enforcement of labor rights in Mexico, and these represent a threat to the promises made by Obrador to his political base. What we have seen, then, in López Obrador is perhaps a growing resentment of Americanism. By directly challenging the DEA, defending President Trump in lieu of condemning the Capitol attack, and offering asylum to Assange, LópezObrador has started to push back against any influence the Biden administration might have on his running of the country. If López Obrador can pass that resentment on to his base, then he is further justified in rejecting US influence.
The López Obrador-Trump era was marked by shared sentiments and political opportunism: López Obrador enforced Trumpist immigration policies and, in exchange, Trump did not criticize Obrador’s running of Mexico. This unspoken agreement allowed for both men to please their loyal bases, focus on implementing their respective domestic agendas, and portray a united front in the war on drugs. Biden will now have to walk a thin line between attempting to fix the institutional relationship with Mexico while ensuring that LópezObrador does not see it as interventionism. It is important, however, for both countries to overcome present challenges: if Mexico and the United States do not effectively form a united front against the war on drugs, the winners will be the drug cartels. If Mexico and the United States do not effectively form a united front in tackling immigration, the losers will be the millions of migrants risking their lives in the pursuit of a better life for them and their families. Perhaps what López Obrador will miss the most from Trump is a sentiment President Biden will probably not share with him: a mutual wish to leave each other alone.
Marco is a 3rd Year International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Mexico, he has a keen interest in multilateral organisations, trade, and Latin American affairs.
UN Security Council: Opportunities for Mexican Diplomacy
By: Luis Bosques
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao’.
Mexico has become a member of the United Nations Security Council, and now has the ability to consolidate itself as a force for change, and push its foreign policy in one of the most exclusive forums on the multilateral stage.
In June 2020, the United Nations General Assembly elected five states to serve as non-permanent members of the Security Council for a two-year term. Mexico was elected for the fifth time to represent Latin America and the Caribbean at the UN’s most powerful body, as its mandate and powers to safeguard peace and security through legally binding decisions are exclusive to the Council. It is worth noting that the Security Council is composed of 15 members, ten of which rotate to occupy a non-permanent seat for two years, while the remaining five have permanent status, as well as the right to veto any decision. This privileged group is made up of China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia.
Mexico's election to the major leagues of multilateralism would add one more victory for the nation’s foreign policy, and will add to its diplomatic advantage in the region. The diplomatic activism of the Foreign Secretary, Marcelo Ebrard has been marked by victories at the international level. Such is the case of the resolutions sponsored by Mexico on healthcare access in the context of the pandemic, and successfully electing candidates to multilateral organisations during 2019 and 2020, and more recently the election of Socorro Flores as the first female Mexican judge to the International Criminal Court.
Mexico has flexed its diplomatic muscle by obtaining the support of Latin American and Caribbean countries to occupy the region’s only seat available for this term, which was previously held by Dominican Republic. Trust in multilateralism and Mexican leadership can translate into a more valuable asset: influence.
However, the influence that Mexico has exerted to get to a seat faces a different reality: the Council, its members and the international community are not the same as they were the last time the country held a seat on the Council. The work of the Security Council is complex and turbulent; it requires the sum of political wills, mainly of the permanent members, however, the trust between them has been worn down by the health crisis and their foreign policies. The influence of the Mexican agenda requires meticulous planning, and a degree of manoeuvre must be developed, as well as a risk calculation by the Permanent Mission, taking into consideration the latest reconfiguration and events within the international system.
The change in US foreign policy from isolationist unilateralism to violent multilateralism puts the Mexican delegation in an uncomfortable position, who by tradition and constitutional attachment promotes the diplomatic route, non-intervention, legal equality of the States and self-determination. These foreign policy principles could be marginalised in situations such as those of Syria, Venezuela, Libya and the Sahrawi-Moroccan conflict, to which we add the Mexico-US bilateral relationship that can be put at risk, as happened in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, which Mexico did not support.
On the other hand, Russia and China have insisted that the Council discuss exclusively issues related to armed conflicts, so it will be necessary to outline a strategy that does not exclude Mexico's potential during discussions and ensure that other important issues are addressed, specifically those that the Sino-Russian bloc is reluctant to debate.
Despite these challenges, Mexico has unique opportunities to stand out during its membership. There are several opportunities where the Mexican agenda can be accommodated. At the beginning of this year, the foreign secretary, Marcelo Ebrard, adopted a feminist foreign policy (PEF, by its acronym in Spanish) that seeks to reduce gender inequality and provide a safe space for women in international relations. Countries such as France, Ireland and Norway, which are members of the Council also have a PEF, can promote and strengthen the gender agenda in issues of peace and security, sexual violence in armed conflict, the role of women in international relations and the role of the woman in resolving these issues. Mexico and Ireland are co-chairing the Group on Women, Peace and Security.
Similarly, together with France, a reform has been promoted to limit the exercise of the right of veto in situations of humanitarian crisis that prevent the adequate intervention of the Council, seeking to de-paralyze its work and revitalize its mission. Likewise, the Movement Uniting for Consensus (UfC) or the Coffee Club, of which Mexico is a member, has sought to democratize the practices of the Security Council and maintain the status quo with regard to geographical representation. However, the UfC is also a counterweight to the group of four (G4), who are seeking a permanent seat for themselves. India, which in addition to being part of the G4, won the vacant seat for Asia-Pacific can also promote the reforms it seeks from within the Council.
Finally, the challenges and opportunities that Mexico has ahead require a careful calculation of action, especially regarding the most sensitive issues, where important interests converge. The marginalisation of an important space for dialogue and discussion must be avoided; the scenario of a demilitarised and more debatable Council could be attributed to Mexican influence and its diplomatic tradition. On the other hand, Mexico is free to pursue its reformist and progressive agenda, even with allies. The Mexican membership is a rich opportunity that will serve to nurture, contribute and revitalize the Council. The next two years will define Mexico's foreign policy for the remaining years of Andrés Manuel’s government.
Luis is a Mexican student at Universidad de Monterrey and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in International Relations and Political Science & Public Administration. He enjoys writing about Mexican foreign policy, international politics, identity and government.
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Hernández García, J. (2017). El Consejo de Seguridad y la iniciativa franco-mexicana para la restricción del uso del veto en caso de atrocidades en masa. Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, 110, 45-60. https://revistadigital.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/numeros/n110/hernandezgarcia.pdf
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Nicaragua: Why Its Authoritarian Manual Seems to be Written in Russian and Why This Matters
By: Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro
As an anti-imperialist ideologue in 1979, Daniel Ortega was revered as a champion of the Sandinista Revolution that brought freedom to Nicaragua by overthrowing the authoritarian Somoza regime. Now, in 2021, Ortega has fallen from grace and has impersonated the villainous political character he originally repudiated and ceaselessly fought against in the first place. Weakened rule of law, suppression of the free press, chronic nepotism, brazen violations of the Constitution, and a rhetoric that bifurcates Nicaraguan society amongst ‘loyalists’ and ‘foreign agents’ are the keys closing the return to democracy in the country. It is therefore unsurprising that the US former National Security Advisor, John Bolton, coined Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua as the “troika of tyranny” of Latin America.
Democratic erosion in Nicaragua is not unprecedented. Ortega has served as the de facto leader of Nicaragua since 2007. In 2011, he secured the approval of the Supreme Court to run for a subsequent presidential term, and again, gained the approval from the Nicaraguan National Assembly to amend the constitution in 2014 so that he could secure the presidency in 2016 for a third time. On top of his institutional iron-grasp on power, his regime also violently suppressed mass protests in 2018 which featured opposition groups decrying the seemingly irreversible truncation of political and social freedoms. His grip on power has undoubtedly continued to ossify as he has gradually come to embody a 21st Century caudillo.
Nicaragua’s growing authoritarianism fits into a global trend characterised by the backsliding of democracy and the rise of hybrid and authoritarian regimes. It is when narrated within this context that Nicaragua’s dictatorial politics crescendo to a tangible concern about the future of democracy– particularly in Latin America. Worst of all, however, is that some of Nicaragua’s recently established buttons and levers used to stifle opposition and criticism eerily resemble practices used in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
The parallels between the two regimes allude to a newly emerging concept within political science known as ‘authoritarian learning’. According to a paper published by Hall and Ambrosio, “authoritarian regimes adopt survival strategies based upon the prior successes and failures of other governments”. The collapse of the USSR, for instance, which was catalysed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, signalled to the Chinese Communist Party at the time that, in order to prevent political downfall at home, media freedom would need to be circumscribed alongside associational life. Similarly, Cuba’s Raúl Castro is reportedly attempting to emulate the Chinese and Vietnamese politico-economic models to open the country’s economy to the global community whilst maintaining political control.
Considering the pressures Nicaragua faces from a growing grassroots opposition and a changing US-Latin America agenda driven by the Biden administration, it is reasonable to assume Ortega could be drawing inspiration from successfully entrenched authoritarian regimes like Russia. The most notable instantiation of this was the adoption of a draconian law in December of last year wherebyNGOs and foreign media outlets have to register as ‘foreign agents’ if they receive money from international organizations. At best, violators of the law face shutdown and the confiscation of property – a result which has already been observed with the shutting down of a defender of free press, the Fundación Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. At worst, they face unabated repercussions facilitated by Nicaragua’s weak rule of law. Curiously enough, the bill has been denoted as the ‘Putin’ law due to its uncanny resemblance with a law passed in Russia in 2012. The original Putin law forced organizations engaging in political activity receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents, even if the funding did not pay for any sort of political activities.
The objectives in Managua and Moscow are nearly carbon copies of each other – the respective foreign agent laws seek to ostracize civil society and suppress any budding sources of opposition against authoritarianism. As two strongmen who know a thing or two about political longevity, it seems that Ortega can extract lessons from Putin’s successful retention of power. For instance, Ortega is said to be weighing an amendment to Nicaragua’s constitution that would convert the country from a presidential to a parliamentary system in order to circumvent presidential limits by becoming the Prime Minister. Putin exercised a similar move in 2008 by becoming Russia’s Prime Minister, temporarily ceding the presidency to only recuperate it in 2012.
Of greatest concern, however, are the reforms that have been made to directly undermine free and fair elections. After all, what is a democracy if, at its core, it does not have elections? In Nicaragua, the ‘Law in Defence of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace’ effectively prevents the opposition from running for election later this November. With the authority the law grants Ortega, he essentially has free reign in designating someone as ‘traitor to the homeland’ and hand out prison sentences as a result. On the other side of the same coin, following the Siberian city council election where Ksenia Fadeeva defeated Putin’s handpicked contender, opposition candidates can now be labelled on the ballot as ‘foreign agents’– an awkward label that can directly dissuade voters.
It is difficult to concretely discern if Ortega is, in fact, intentionally been taking notes on his Russian counterpart’s authoritarian behaviour. As Hall and Ambrosio admit, the reason why authoritarian learning is such an understudied concept is due to the near impossibility of collecting information about the paper trail that precedes the implementation of certain policies. But perhaps the other underlying reason is that, up until now, democracy had been the dominant political model to follow. The idea that democracy was the inevitable destination for all nations was a reigning dogma up until recently. This sanctification of democracy created a myopic focus on studying and promoting democracy whilst forgetting that democratic backsliding and erosion are symptoms that can sicken all political regimes that are –or were– on a democratizing path.
The parallels between Nicaraguan and Russian authoritarianism might indicate that the world has become safer for authoritarian regimes, meaning it is becoming increasingly more likely that they will have opportunities to learn from each other’s failures and successes. The November elections in Nicaragua, therefore, might become a breaking point for democracy in a region already surrounded by hybrid regimes like El Salvador and Honduras. If Ortega’s dictatorial hand continues to be raised victoriously, another chapter will be added to the manual of techniques that can be used by strongmen to further entrench their grip on power.
Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro is a second-year student of Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Originally Mexican, she is passionate about the political history of Latin America, particularly that of her home country.
Bibliography
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Bejarano, Por Manuel. “EE.UU.: Ley de Agentes Extranjeros Conduce a Nicaragua Hacia La Dictadura, Silenciando Voces Independientes.” La Prensa, 9 Feb. 2021, www.laprensa.com.ni/2021/02/08/politica/2782210-ee-uu-ley-de-agentes-extranjeros-conduce-a-nicaragua-hacia-la-dictadura-silenciando-voces-independientes.
Berg, Ryan C. “Ortega Is Busy Completing Nicaragua’s Authoritarian Architecture.” American Enterprise Institute - AEI, 9 Nov. 2020, www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/ortega-is-busy-completing-nicaraguas-authoritarian-architecture/.
Berg, Ryan C. “The Case of ‘Authoritarian Learning’ in Nicaragua.” American Enterprise Institute - AEI, 2 Oct. 2020, www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/the-case-of-authoritarian-learning-in-nicaragua-2/.
Cerda, Arlen. “Ortega Classifies ‘True’ Nicaraguans and ‘Foreign Agents.’” Havana Times, 25 Sept. 2020, havanatimes.org/features/ortega-classifies-true-nicaraguans-and-foreign-agents/.
Chivers, C. J. “Putin Is Approved as Prime Minister (Published 2008).” The New York Times, 9 May 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/europe/09russia.html.
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“How to Unseat Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega.” The Economist, 10 Dec. 2020, www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/12/10/how-to-unseat-nicaraguas-daniel-ortega.
Lopez, Ismael. “Nicaraguan Parliament Approves Controversial Hate Crimes Law.” Reuters, 11 Nov. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-human-rights-idUSKBN27R04X.’
Martí i Puig, Salvador, and Macià Serra. “Nicaragua: De-Democratization and Regime Crisis.” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 62, no. 2, Mar. 2020, pp. 117–36, doi:10.1017/lap.2019.64.
“Nicaragua Essentially Bans Opposition from 2021 Elections.” AP NEWS, 21 Dec. 2020, apnews.com/article/elections-blockades-central-america-daniel-ortega-nicaragua-14d04033e443f6da9bf3d11aec0dae47.
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Looting of Indigenous Lands: The Impact on the Sawré Muybu
By: Victoria Bujok
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao
The Munduruku people are facing yet another challenge after years of resistance and struggle for their land in the state of Pará in northern Brazil. The area of Tapajos, which is home to most of the Munduruku population, is one of the most heavily invaded territories, with illegal gold miners currently occupying the area. The mining conflict brings “violence, prostitution, destruction, pollution, deforestation, death threats and conflict,” as stated in a letter of condemnation sent to the public prosecutor’s office, in addition to causing an uncontrolled malaria outbreak. Nevertheless, the prospects of taking care of the illegal actions and eradicating mining in the region all together is extremely unlikely under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro.
The root of the issue is the demarcation of the land, something which has never been done, and of which there is no intention to do in the near future. As a result of illegal action and lack of border clarity, the Sawré Muybu’s 178,000 hectares have been prevented from being recognised as indigenous land, and lack the normal legal protections associated with indigenous reserves. Mining has not been the only threat to the land, livelihoods, health and traditions; back in 2016 the Munduruku people were facing the prospect of 43 hydraulic plants being built on their territory. Luckily for the indigenous population, after years of protests, government meetings and drawing international attention, they were able to defeat the mega projects, which would have had a detrimental effect on the reserve and on its sacred sites. However, the efforts to build the hydroelectric plants in the Tapajos river basin still exist.
When looking further into the cause of these issues, we are drawn to Brazil's far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro. Not only are the hydraulic plants on the government’s agenda, but also another series of projects such as agribusiness expansion and railroads, all of which are all linked to the interests of the miners. In a democracy, just like in other countries with indigenous lands, minorities should be included in the decision making; however, the government is simply making it look like the indigenous people are supporting the projects, and implying that they are going to hugely benefit from those. For example, on August 5, environment minister, Ricardo Salles, refused to confirm his position on mining in indigenous territories, despite having met with half a dozen indigenous residents who happened to be in favour of these projects. The result of this publicity stunt is that the views of these specific indigenous people could be interpreted as representing the general views of all 140,000 Munduruku people. This, however, is not the representation of the majority of the Sawré Muybu’s population, and their views have been wrongly portrayed in order to push the government’s agenda, a move which has been heavily criticised by the Munduruku leaders. Another example of these falsely represented ideas comes from the vice president, Hamilton Mourão, who seeks to legalise gold mining on protected land. He claims that licensing gold extraction will save the rainforest by enabling the government to enforce eco-friendly regulations. This is a fear that Luísa Molina, an anthropologist working in the area, had about the government intention, and which has finally been confirmed.
But, could legalising mining in those territories be the answer? The belief behind Mourão’s intention to save the rainforest is that whenever there is gold, men will extract it. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said, “there is a lot of land that is rich in gold, and if companies had the permission to extract it, they would have to comply with environmental laws.” He also mentioned the benefit of taxing gold mining, saying that “today, if there is gold, they extract it, destroy the environment and don’t pay taxes—everybody loses.” This is, however, an unlikely stance from a man who says that his intentions are to save the rainforest, but has failed to focus his efforts instead on stamping out illegal gold mining which, alongside other illegal industries, has had a hugely negative environmental impact. In addition, agencies such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), whose work has been crucial in protecting the Amazon from damaging illegal activities, have seen their budgets cut since Jair Bolsonaro assumed the presidency in January 2019.
The Munduruku people need the recognition of their land in order to protect it from future projects like this one. The government itself needs to reroute its principles regarding the environment and to move to a cleaner energy than mining. It is vital that the Brazilian government acts promptly to protect not only the lives of the indigenous people of Brazil, but also their traditions who have been under threat even before the pandemic.
Victoria is a fourth-year SPLAS student at King’s College London with a passion for making indigeneous voices heard.
COVID-19: Who is Taking Advantage of the Crisis? The Rising Clout of Criminal Groups in Latin America
By: Thais Ricard
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao
Fragmentation and failure
The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing inequalities and worsened poverty across the world. This is especially striking in Latin America which was already facing a decade of ‘economic weakness and macroeconomic vulnerability’ according to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2020, poverty may increase by at least 4.4%, bringing the total number of people living in poverty to 214.7 million which represents 34.7% of the region’s population. This dire economic situation has led to a weakening of social cohesion and expressions of social discontent that have been characterized by historic waves of popular demonstrations, with many having taken place months before Covid-19 arrived.
Protesters criticized the state’s corruption and its incapacity to offer public services such as affordable education and health care. Moreover, they decried the pervading climate of violence and insecurity in deprived areas caused by the presence of criminal groups like drug cartels in Mexico, guerrilla movements in Colombia or maras in El Salvador. Faced with this institutional deficiency, Latin American citizens’ trust in government has declined in the past years, reaching an average trust level of 33.9% in 2018.
Covid-19’s crisis could have bolstered governmental legitimacy through the enforcement of efficient sanitary measures aimed at protecting citizens’ lives. Those measures that comprised border closures and the militarization of public security could have expanded states’ authority as they would have particularly hit the illicit economies of criminal groups, making them more vulnerable than ever. To that extent, Covid-19 would have provided an unexpected opportunity for Latin American states to eventually end cycles of violent delinquency.
Adaptation and Altruism
However, far from being toppled, criminal groups have progressively adapted their activities to the challenges imposed by the pandemic. Globally deprived of extortion and drug trafficking, which had been their main sources of income, they undertook various strategies to remain economically viable. Firstly, they reduced expenses and relied more on savings. The Central American gangs of MS-13 or Calle 18 have cut financial support to lawyers of jailed gang members while the Mexican cartels have decided to sack some of their members. They have also diversified into retail sales of marijuana and synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine and fentanyl, reaping the benefits of price inflations. Finally, the pandemic has led to the creation of new, lucrative, illicit businesses such as medicine smuggling, cybercrime, or kidnapping.
Apart from being economically resilient, criminal groups have surprisingly demonstrated their interest in the public good, and their effectiveness as legitimate political agents, by enforcing quarantine measures. In Brazil, in the Ciudad de Deus favela of Rio de Janeiro, the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) gang imposed a curfew, threatening residents with ‘corrective’ actions if they left their houses outside of designated hours. In the Santa Marta’s favela, traffickers handed out soap and placed signs at the entrance of the favela to remind residents to wash their hands – despite a lack of running water in this area. In the Colombian Department of Cauca, the FARC dissident groups distributed pamphlets threatening fines and military-grade consequences to those who defied the government’s restrictions. In Venezuela, the colectivos, which are pro-government armed gangs, announced lockdown policies even before government agents.
Furthermore, not only did informal armed organizations attempt to protect citizens’ health by implementing restrictive sanitary measures, but they also provided welfare services and food supplies. In Mexico, the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Golfos Cartel distributed food and medicine parcels labelled with their leaders’ faces and groups’ insignia. These deliveries must be understood as constituting part of a propaganda campaign aimed at improving their public image as they voluntarily shared pictures of their humanitarian actions on social media. They indeed try to portray themselves as genuine saviours of the people, helping the needy while the state is inefficient or absent.
Latin America under criminal governance?
Undeniably, criminal groups’ actions have been motivated by a desire to secure and extend their power and influence in the long term. They were aware that their members are part of the territories they control and that they therefore had the duty to protect their health to further their criminal activities. Furthermore, they understood that they could later count on those they helped during this crisis for income and recruits. Those measures have thus allowed gangs to entrench themselves more deeply in the communities and gain popular support. Citizens have begun to perceive them as legitimate governing bodies that outperform the state, especially in times of crisis. According to Juan Pappier, an Americas Researcher at Human Rights Watch, this ‘creates the impression that they’re not just there for the drug trafficking or illegal mining or the crimes and they care about the public interest. It also suggests that they are the ones in charge, and they are the ones whose rules you’ve got to follow.’ Even public officials such as former Brazilian Ministry of Health, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, attested the extent of state failure by formally acknowledging the regal authority of criminal groups in neglected areas. This contributes to the blurring of social boundaries between legality and illegality as the criminal may be deemed legitimate.
Informal armed groups have therefore been empowered lately. As unemployment will drastically worsen due to a pandemic-induced economic downturn, citizens – especially the youth in poor neighbourhoods – will be more likely to join those criminal groups that they perceive to be more reliable than governments. However, one should be careful when drawing generalised conclusions. In fact, the pandemic has also severely impacted the informal economy, resulting in the increasingly violent competition between criminal organizations for local markets. Thus, the small groups that had not been able to diversify their income streams, vanished.
A context-specific response to informal violence
It is not too late for Latin American governments to establish authority over areas that they have historically neglected. They must develop region-specific approaches that diagnose the local structural sources and patterns of violence in order to devise tailored policies that will end impunity, deter recruitment by informal groups, deepen official material and technical support to poor communities and create professional alternatives to crime. To elaborate these focused and strategic plans, they should not overlook the importance of intelligence and of data. Plans financed by emergency funds from multilateral lenders will break with the broad failed methods of the past. Undeniably, authorities must show high transparency when implementing these measures to boost people’s trust.
In addition to reducing criminal groups’ influence, these measures would, overall, contribute to the strengthening of democratic systems as Latin American people would not feel inclined to support extremist, unorthodox political agents as they often do when official incumbents misrule.
Thais is a third year History and International Relations student at KCL. Her main research interests are about human rights and security issues such as drug trafficking and insurgency movements. She is particularly keen in analyzing those matters through a gender-based perspective.
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How to Carry out a Surgery on the Lungs of Earth
Latin American Protests: Not the 'Forgotten' Continent After All
Image Source: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/03/americas/five-keys-latin-america-protests-romo-intl/index.html
By: Paula Arrus
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.
A trip down memory lane
Alfonso Quiroz in his book ‘Corrupt Circles’ examines the history of Peruvian corruption dating back to the arrival of the Conquistadors and the subsequent colonial period, creating a microcosm of the history of Latin America. As colonialists took over different territories and established their own conception of ‘states’, they also installed a mindset in the elites that politics was a zero-sum game that favoured the state over the population. Quiroz reveals that corruption has been inherent to Peru’s state institutions, transmitting a lack of public confidence and discontent on how democracy has been implemented. Even though Quiroz contends that corruption has been perpetrated by Peruvians and the international community’s inaction to confront it, recent protests in Latin America demonstrate that change will not be achieved without a fundamental overhaul of the region’s state institutions. Meanwhile, the latter will continue to be tainted by scandals and deceit: two features Latin Americans have become familiar with over time. Recent protests embody these ‘forgotten populations’ and have resulted in large sections of Latin Americans being continuously spurned by the same state institutions that dishonestly claim to represent them.
Latin America’s current political and economic environment has a taste of its first ‘lost decade’ in the 1980s Debt Crisis. With the rise of neoliberalism in the 1960s and 70s, various Latin American countries borrowed large amounts of money from international financial organisations such as the IMF and World Bank in order to industrialize. These loans were allowed due to rising commodity prices which induced economic growth and increased revenues for Latin American states. However, during the late 1970s and early 80s, the region’s debt to commercial banks soared and a vicious borrowing cycle materialized, with external debt reaching over 50% of the region’s total GDP in 1983 of $315bn, quadruple from the $75bn in 1975.
Latin America had embarked in an economic rollercoaster that started and ended with a vertical drop. Increased oil prices incited countries to borrow more money in order to cover rising costs. However, high interest rates in the US and Europe plus worsening exchange rates with the US dollar reduced Latin American states’ purchasing power: they began to owe more than what they initially borrowed. The numerous sovereign debt defaults that occurred in the following years resulted in the interventionist period by the IMF who created conditional loans to Latin American states in exchange for alterations in their domestic policies. A substantial change was a significant reduction in government spending despite unemployment and inflation rising to high levels, and real wages reducing dramatically. Consequently, the inequality gap extended as poverty increased and countries became more preoccupied with paying what they owed, making it difficult to save turbulent economies.
Latin America’s history for the second half of the 20th century built considerable social discontent that is resounding of the protests we see today. The IMF was increasingly seen as the neo-imperialist power acting on self-interest as their reforms produced large social costs and consolidated Latin America’s dependency on the developed states. In 2014, commodity prices dropped again and Latin America’s economic activity declined. The middle class stopped receiving new members and decreasing social upgrading reduced overall confidence in the economies, driving away investments and growth.
Latin Americans have had enough
2019 has not been the year for Latin American countries. The progressive awareness that Latin America’s failed institutions were not delivering the Western promise of democracy and increased socioeconomic opportunities has afflicted the region with nation-wide social protests. Argentina is back with a Peronist-Kirschner government while Mexico continues to suffer from drug cartel violence and populism. Ecuador has reacted strongly against pro-IMF policies adopted by President Lenin Moreno that effectively got rid of an oil subsidy to receive a loan. Six month-long protests in Haiti erupted from high inflation and general discontent over redundant government corruption. With protests diffusing into Colombia in late November, it is clear to say that populations in Latin America have been emboldened by their neighbouring counterparts, forming their very own domino effect permeated with anger and intolerance against failing governments.
Left and right protests have smeared the region in response to weak economic growths, rising inequalities and overall discontent with states’ ‘democratic’ institutions. GDP per capital and living standards have declined substantially as real GDP growth has been a mere 0.8% over the last 6 years. Latin America remains the most unequal region in the world as their legacy of colonialism built enduring political and economic structures designed to benefit only a few. Monica de Bolle, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, conceptualised social protests in the region as clear reactions to changing tolerances for socioeconomic inequalities. While many Latin Americans see their elite counterparts get richer, they also expect an improvement in their living standards. It is this unfulfilled prospect that has driven them to the streets.
Violent protests, particularly in Chile, are reminiscent of failed promises by governments to enlarge social spending, reinstate public confidence and increase political transparency. Rising inequalities and unsuccessful economic policies enticed Chileans to protest against President Sebastián Piñera’s right-wing government. Moreover, Bolivia’s nation-wide uprising protesting the fraudulent presidential election forced Evo Morales to renounce the presidency after 14 years in power. Despite the contrasting differences in both countries’ economies and political systems, these protests can be traced back to broader discontents that have swamped Latin American populations.
After the end of the commodities’ boom in 2014, Latin American governments could not keep spending on welfare systems, programs to reduce poverty and on redistributing incomes. Rather, all the issues they failed to tackle during their prosperous incumbencies are now the factors that are hampering Latin American development, such as the lack of investment on education and infrastructure to improve long-term economic competitiveness. These protests embody Latin Americans’ dissatisfaction with the social contracts they reluctantly live in. While protests may have emerged by triggering causes such as raising metro fares in Chile, these movements encapsulate everything that is wrong with their societies and political systems.
What’s next?
Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Chile are still on path to achieve growth rates between 2-3%, while Bolsonaro’s economic reform in Brazil gives hope to the country. Nevertheless, Michael Stott from the Financial Times argued that Latin America will face stronger challenges in the nearby future as IMF world economic forecasts showed that the region will only grow 0.2% in the following year. Similarly, James Bosworth, founder of political-risk consultancy Hxagon, claims that ‘governments are trapped and there will be more violent protests in 2020’ (Bosworth, 2019) as new administrations gaining power will face increased pressured to achieve quick positive change while being constrained by a lack of resources.
The near term future looks grim mainly because Latin American countries in the past were able to discourage protests by maintaining stable economic performances thanks to a strong global economy which is not the case anymore. Alberto Ramos, head of Latin American economics at Goldman Sachs, stated that Latin America is nearly missing everything a region would need to prosper in the nearby future: ‘it doesn’t invest enough, save enough nor educate well enough’ (Stott, 2019). The discontent and blatant anger will prevail until change is enacted. The future will likely bring new elections for many countries, yet it can be expected most populations will vote for the party who promises to do exactly the opposite of what current governments are providing. And this is far from reassuring.
However, due to the social unrest and the extraordinary formation of a middle class, there is a strong need for institutional reform and better public infrastructure in terms of transportation, education and basic health services, or the region will face more and more unrest. There is a very good opportunity for a new generation of politicians to take control and restore public confidence by overhauling the existing political structures. Peru will be the first in line with congressional elections in January 2020.
It looks like Latin America won’t be the ‘forgotten continent’ after all and let’s hope that the region can be restored in the years to come.
Paula is a second year IR student from Peru with a strong interest in Latin American politics and economics. She enjoys writing thought-provoking pieces about current affairs and the future of our world.