Jair Bolsonaro Explained: How Did Brazil’s Current Far-Right President Ascend to Power?

Source: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/bolsonaro-president-without-party-strategy-depoliticize-brazil/

By: Alice Iscar

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

​It’s been over two years since Jair Bolsonaro –the current president of Brazil– was elected, and the balance sheet of his first two years of ruling Latin America’s largest country is rather grim. The range of examples to illustrate his wrongdoings since his election is large –the peak of Amazonian deforestation, an extremely poor handled sanitary crisis,  and the sharp drop of his popularity among Brazilians just a few months after he took office in January 2019. The big question this article will attempt to answer is how such a radical conservative, misogynistic, homophobic and racist Brazilian political figure was able to ascend to the country’s management. Four main aspects which explain this phenomenon will be presented: antipetismo; the social, economic and political crises Brazil has been undergoing for the past decade; Bolsonaro’s personality-led campaign; and ‘fake news’. 

Antipetismo

 The most evident explanation to Bolsonaro’s rise to power comes from this term: antipetismo. ‘PT’ is the common Brazilian way to call the ‘Partido dos Trabalhadores’, the leftist political party which ruled the country for over a decade from 2003 to 2016. Antipetismo describes the sentiment of being against ‘PT’ –against Brazil’s Workers’ Party. This sentiment exists ever since people started to notice the undergoing economic corruption under the presidency of Luiz Inácio da Silva – or Lula, a former leftist president of Brazil who ruled the country from 2003 to 2011. However, itheightened in 2014, when the corruption scandal officially broke out to the world under the presidency of Dilma Roussefwith the initiation of the Operação Lava Jato (the Car Wash operation). The Car Wash investigation found that the source of the corruption came from the state-owned oil company Petrobras, from which politicians, and more particularly the members of the Workers’ Party, accumulated millions of dollars. After more than thirty people were arrested for corruption –businessmen and politicians included– the scandal reached its peak with Lula’s trial for corruption and Dilma Roussef’s consequent impeachment in 2016 (after she tried to name him her chief of staff in order to shield him from justice). Therefore, during the 2018 elections, not few were the Brazilians who harboured a genuine hate for Brazil’s Workers’ Party and the political class in general. In that context, Jair Bolsonaro, a retired military official, stood as an outsider, and ended up embodying that hatred against PT. A study led by Mark Setzler in the Brazilian Political Science Review found that support for Bolsonaro in the 2018 elections is widely and largely explained by partisanship and antiparty hostility towards PT.

A country in crisis 

 Closely – but not exclusively – related to the previous point, Bolsonaro also found his support in the social, political and economic crises which have been shaking the country for the past two decades. Brazil’s two main problems in the population’s mind are the economic crisis and the worsening of violence in the past decade. After years of steady growth, Brazil experienced a heavy economic crisis in 2014, under Dilma Roussef. Brazil’s real GDP fell by 7,2% from 2014 to 2016, amid the political turmoil occurring at the same time.The economic and political crises combined caused mass popular dissatisfaction in the wake of the 2018 elections, which proved to be a fertile ground for Bolsonaro’s rise to power. Additionally, Brazil has also been suffering from an increasing social crisis with the steady rise of violence in the past years. In 2018, fourteen of the world’s fifty most violent cities were situated in Brazil, the dangerousness being assessed by the number of homicides per 100,000 residents. In 2018, the violence in Rio de Janeiro was so uncontrollable, that Michel Temer, Brazil’s president at the time, signed an emergency security decree which gave the armed forces authorization to replace the police and take over its duties.Once again, in that context and thanks to his singularity, many Brazilians came to see Bolsonaro as the exit gate from those political, economic and social crises.   

A personality-led campaign 

 Similarly to Donald Trump in 2016 and other populist figures who managed to rise to power, Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign was heavily centred on his personality, which surprisingly, in a way, seduced many Brazilians. The list of controversial and offensive remarks delivered by Bolsonaro is long. He often appears as a racist, homophobic and misogynistic man –as he told a colleague that he would not rape her because she did not deserve it’ or as he claims he would rather his son die than be homosexual; or as he stated, when talking about Afro-Brazilian communities, that they ‘don’t do anything’ and that they ‘are not even good for breeding anymore’. If some Brazilians were horrified by those statements coming from a presidential candidate, the more conservative part of the population, who felt put aside by the post-dictatorship cultural and political establishment, identified with Bolsonaro. His rhetoric also gave the impression that he spoke his mind and was not afraid to do so, which significantly contrasted with the sense of deceitfulness and dishonesty coming from the ruling political elite and especially the members of the Workers’ Party.

Fake News 

Once more calling for a parallel with Trump, Bolsonaro declared a war against media’s ‘fake news’ going as far as to accuse a journalist from The Guardian, Bianca Santana, of spreading fake news on him. However, it seems Bolsonaro and his supporters were the ones who heavily shared fake news on Bolsonaro’s rivals during the presidential campaign. In an interview on Vox by Jen Kirby of Benjamin Junge, he explains how important Facebook and especially WhatsApp are in Brazil. Benjamin Junge is an associate professor of Anthropology at the State University of New York at New Paltz and a Fulbright fellow at the Federal University of Pernambuco in Brazil, whose studies focus on Brazilian working-class and middle-class families. In the interview he mentions how the majority of families have a WhatsApp group and how these group chats are created on every occasion whether it is between students in a class or among friends and families. In that way, information is diffused very easily among the population. Junge claims that digital spaces such as Facebook and WhatsApp is where the fake news are.An example of a fake news story spread by Bolsonaro during his campaign is that Fernando Haddad, his leftist rival, was planning on creating a ‘gay kit’ to deliver to children in primary schools in order to encourage them to become gay. Many other absurd stories on his rivals were shared in order to undermine their legitimacy and promote his campaign. 

​Bolsonaro managed to find his support by exacerbating feelings of dissatisfaction, hatred, fear and insecurity whichBrazilians were feeling in the wake of his election. Thesestemmed from the political crisis of the corruption scandal which touched the Workers’ Party, but also the economic and social crises which have witnessed a rise in inequality and violence in Brazil’s largest cities. He also focused on leading a personality-centred campaign, which shocked but also seduced many Brazilians. Finally, he made heavy and coarse use of fake news in order to spread negative misinformation on his rivals, profiting from a general feeling of antipetismo among the Brazilian population. 

Alice is a third-year History and International Relations student at King’s College London seeking to raise awareness about the current politico-environmental situation in Brazil. She is a regular contributor of El Cortao’.

Bibliography

Amaral, Oswaldo E. do. ‘The victory of Jair Bolsonaro According to the Brazilian Electoral Study of 2018.’ Brazilian Political Science Review 14, no. 1 (Spring 2020). https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821202000010004.

Barua, Akrur. ‘Brazil: Yearning for the good times.’ Global Economic Outlook, Q2 2016, April 29, 2016. 

https://web.archive.org/web/20160823114946/http://dupress.com/articles/global-economic-outlook-q2-2016-brazil/.

Boadle, Anthony. ‘Brazil poll shows rising rejection of Bolsonaro.’ Reuters, December 20, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-poll-idUSKBN1YO239.

Bracho-Polanco, Ed. ‘How Jair Bolsonaro used ‘fake news’ to win power.’ The Conversation, January 8, 2019. https://theconversation.com/how-jair-bolsonaro-used-fake-news-to-win-power-109343.

Chagas-Bastos, Fabrício H. ‘Political Realignment in Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro and the Right Turn.’ Revista de EstudiosSociales, no. 69 (2019): 92-100. https://doi.org/10.7440/res69.2019.08.

Cowie, Sam. ‘Michel Temer signs security decree to stem Rio violence.’ Aljazeera, February 16, 2018.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/16/michel-temer-signs-security-decree-to-stem-rio-violence.

Daly, Tom. ‘Populism, Public Law, and Democratic Decay in Brazil: Understanding the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro.’ Social Science Research Network, (Spring 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3350098.

Kirby, Jen. ‘Corruption, fake news, and WhatsApp: how Bolsonaro won Brazil.’ Vox, October 29, 2018.https://www.vox.com/world/2018/10/29/18025066/bolsonaro-brazil-elections-voters-q-a.

Londoño, Ernesto, Andreoni, Manuela. ‘Brazil Election: How Jair Bolsonaro Turned Crisis Into Opportunity.’ The New York Times, October 29, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-profile.html.

Santana, Bianca. ‘Jair Bolsonaro accused me of spreading ‘fake news’. I know why he targeted me.’ The Guardian, June 22, 2020.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/22/jair-bolsonaro-fake-news-accusation-marielle-franco.

Setzler, Mark. ‘Did Brazilians Vote for Jair bolsonaro Because They Share his Most Controversial Views?’ Brazilian Political Science Review 15, no. 1 (Autumn 2020). https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821202100010006.

Sotero, Paulo. ‘Petrobras Scandal.’ Britannica, April 10, 2018.  https://www.britannica.com/event/Petrobras-scandal.

Winter, Brian. ‘System Failure: Behind the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro.’ Americas Quarterly, January 24, 2018.https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/system-failure-behind-the-rise-of-jair-bolsonaro/.

Woody, Christopher. ‘These were the 50 most violent cities in the world in 2018.’ Business Insider, March 12, 2019.https://www.businessinsider.com/most-violent-cities-in-the-world-in-2018-2019-3?IR=T.

Cultural Celebration or Economic Exploitation: Indigenous Identity in Peru

Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/04/peru-indigenous-names-public-records

By: Clarice Benney*

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao'.

Peru’s geographical diversity is typically summarised in three words: sierra (mountainous Andean region), selva (the tropical Amazon rainforest), and costa (coastal cities, towns and villages). Travel companies often capitalise on this diversity, marketing it as an ideal holiday destination for the variety of environments, however this presentation often idealises the situation and fails to nuance how regionalisation can have a negative impact on individual experience. This article will explore how indigenous and Hispanic identities intersect to form Peru, with regard to economic generation, cultural exploitation, linguistic diversity and political representation.

Source: https://portal.andina.pe/edpespeciales/2018/diversidad/index.html

The mountainous Andean region, home to the cities of Cusco and cultural site of Machu Picchu, is also home to many of Peru’s Quechua communities. 60% of land in Peru is in the Amazon basin, and when looking at the demographic makeup of the Amazonas and Loreto provinces, there are a combined 32 indigenous groups. The coastal area is where the majority of Peru’s cities are based, but when looking at Peru’s entire coastline, the presence of indigenous communities decreases, as shown in the map to the right, and aside from some Quechua communities in Ancash there is no presence at all within 50 kilometres of the coast.

Source: https://www.minem.gob.pe/_publicacion.php?idSector=1&idPublicacion=557

Peru’s three largest industries are mining, fishing, and tourism. When considering how these industries ‘map out’, as shown in the map to the left, mining is being undertaken and explored in areas that seem to follow the spread of Quechua communities: in the Andean region from Arequipa to Ancash. For tourism, I would argue that it is more useful to understand why tourists come to Peru than where tourists go. In 2017, a survey found that the top four motives for visiting Per were to see the nature and natural landscape (60.7%), to see Machu Picchu (60.4%), for the Peruvian cuisine (59%), and to visit Cusco (55%). Machu Picchu is an archaeological site of an Incan settlement, built into the mountains and so remote that it survived the destruction of the Spanish conquistadores, and Cusco is its nearest city, and a popular destination for hiking and its impressive landscape. When visiting for gastronomy, the capital city of Lima is home to many good restaurants, but not the only place to take advantage of Peru’s rich culinary culture.

In terms of the residential population distribution in Peru, about 40% lives in the costa, 36% live in the sierra and 12% in the selva. Almost one third of the population lives in the Lima and Callao Metropolitan area. With this in mind, it does make sense that there would be a centralisation of resources in the Lima area, however the extent of the centralisation of resources appears somewhat exploitative, given that the industries which finance it are linked to the sierra and indigenous culture. However, it is not just about economic resources and recognition; when considering the importance of indigenous culture to tourism, Peru’s institutions often exclude and disadvantage indigenous communities.

In 2002, the cultural and linguistic diversity in Peru led to a law being passed that is commonly referred to as Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (EIB), which aims to promote indigenous languages and cultures, keeping the languages ‘alive’ by creating bilingual schools that teach in indigenous languages. In practice, this has led to the development of some schools that offer bilingual primary education. For example, in the Cusco region some primary schools give education in Quechua, the indigenous language in this area, but almost all secondary education is taught in Castilian Spanish. Whilst the motive behind EIB was good, it has created issues. For one, the ‘othering’ of non-Castilian speaking children, as EIB schools are seen as different and separate from non-EIB schools, which make up the majority. Additionally, EIB aside, there is a higher rate of leaving education between primary and secondary in indigenous communities due in part to the increased expense of accessing schools that are further away. This disproportionately affects girls, who are less likely to be given the opportunity if a family can only afford to send one child, and is choosing between a son and a daughter. What EIB can do is to heighten the risk of dropping out of education if a child is uncomfortable or unable to speak Castilian. To improve this situation would either require the development of EIB secondary schools or the inclusion of indigenous language and culture in the mainstream national curriculum in order to address the issue of marginalisation.

With regard to political representation of indigenous culture in Peru, until 1979 voting was only possible for those who could speak and write Castilian, and there have been a number of cultural conflicts in recent years. For example, in 2006, María Sumire had to repeat her ‘swearing-in’ three times, as she insisted on doing it in Quechua, her native language. In 2009, in what is now referred to as el Baguazo, Congress suspended 7 elected members, three of whom identified as indigenous, for supporting protests in favour of demands being made by indigenous communities. The demands came in response to a government move to loosen legislation regarding extraction of resources in the Amazon. The protests came to a head in a confrontation which saw both police and protestor casualties, but only the prosecution of protestors. The significance of removing these members of Congress cannot be overlooked, given that from 2001-2016 only 7 members of Congress identified as indigenous.

Peru’s diversity is part of its identity, and yet sadly this diversity has not yet led to the social equity necessary to avoid economic exploitation of indigenous people. The seeds are there in the form of the EIB and perception of Peru to outsiders, however in their current forms, neither of these potential factors for change are doing their jobs properly. As such, work to help restore this balance falls to individuals offering community services. I would like to highlight the work of three organisations operating in the Cusco area: Casa Mantay, Sacred Valley Project and Mosqoy. 

Casa Mantay provides a home for teenage mothers and their children and gives them the necessary support (both material and psychological) to continue their education, as well as giving them the opportunity to develop skills by working in their social enterprise, Taller Mantay, which produces artisan leather goods. Mantay has recently started having ‘Jueves de Quechua’ (Thursdays in Quechuan) for staff and girls, to recognise the importance of self-expression for those who speak Quechua as their native tongue, and to encourage non-native speakers to learn it. 

Sacred Valley Project provides dormitories in Cusco for girls from indigenous backgrounds to come during term time and receive support and community when they attend secondary school. Similarly, Mosqoy has dormitories for secondary students and they also work with mostly female-run weaving cooperatives in the Sacred Valley as part of the Q’ente Society Textile Revitalization Programme, to give them an outlet to sell to international markets. This connects women’s often unacknowledged labour with a fair income source, fostering financial independence in their families, greater provision for their children, and a central, respected place in the rural economy.

Clarice is a student studying Spanish at Cambridge University. She is currently on her ‘year abroad’ and working with the NGO Latin American Foundation for the Future (LAFF) as Communications Coordinator. LAFF operates in Cusco, Peru and so Clarice is particularly interested in Peruvian current affairs, as well as protest culture in Latin American and grassroots activism. 

*About LAFF:

Latin American Foundation for the Future (LAFF) is a UK registered charity operating in Cusco, Peru to increase access to quality education and personal development opportunities. LAFF believes that one of the best ways to create positive long term change is to support local grassroots organisations so that community leaders drive the change. To find out more about what we do, check out our website.

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/laffcharity/

Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/latin-american-foundation-for-the-future

Plata o Parca: Insights on the Participation and Role of Latin American Women in Drug Trafficking

Mugshot of Griselda Blanco. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griselda_Blanco#/media/File:Griselda_Blanco_Medellin.jpg

by: Thais Ricard

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao'.

When thinking about drug trafficking’s protagonists in Latin America, we automatically visualize stocky, bearded, middle-aged men with a stern look and a deep voice. Indeed, by examining the portrayal of the drug world in popular culture – a portrayal built on media headlines and popularised by well-known series like Narcos, which bases its plot on the story of drug kingpin Pablo Escobar – one perceives this world as exclusively within a man’s domain, where women are relegated to background activities and forced to play a passive, supporting role in the domestic sphere. In general, as crime statistics suggest that delinquency is dominated by men, the notion of crime is associated with masculine stereotypes, such as risk-taking and action. The presence of women in drug trafficking – a high-risk and violent activity –is therefore a paradox for gender stereotypes of criminal conduct. Women who take part in this trade are depicted as pathological or masculine, defying the feminine role that a machista society has imposed on them.  

Over the past few years, however, Latin American women have increasingly participated in the trade of illicit drugs, although this involvement has been absent from research related to the narcotics trade and has routinely been underestimated by state and non-state organisations alike. In Colombia, the number of women prisoners has increased more than fivefold, while that of male prisoners has increased just threefold. Now, nearly five out of every ten women jailed are serving sentences for drug-related crimes. This female participation is arguably the result of a long-lasting ‘war on drugs’ which produced the incarceration of many male criminals and created a labour vacuum that has encouraged women to enlist in the drug businesses of their fathers, partners, or lovers.  

Some women have even assumed high-ranking positions in this male-dominated environment. In this context, it would be a good moment to introduce the individual whose mugshot headlines this article: Griselda Blanco, also known as the ‘Cocaine Godmother’. She was introduced to the cocaine industry by her second husband, Alberto Bravo, and proceeded to progressively replace him in his own line of work until she had become one of the wealthiest and most powerful drug leaders in the world. Her trafficking network spread across the United States, bringing in an estimated $80 million USD a month. Considered a pioneer in drug trafficking and a mentor for Pablo Escobar, she established many of the smuggling techniques and murdering methods that are still used today. Not only was she involved in the trafficking of narcotics, but she also played a major part in the ‘Cocaine Cowboy Wars’ that ravaged Miami in the 70s and 80s. Ruthless against her rivals, she was suspected of having sponsored hundreds of killings in the US and Colombia, making her one of the deadliest women of all time. By the time of her assassination in 2012, Blanco had aroused a great fascination among the general public and her story inspired many books, TV shows, or documentaries such as the Cocaine Cowboys (2006).

Although Blanco shows the deep involvement of women in drug trafficking, her story is misleading as it constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Not all women can attain such levels of authority and wealthiness. In this industry, the roles usually performed by women are, in fact,subordinate ones, which is thus concordant with the feminine stereotypes of subservience and passivity. Women are enlisted to cook for laborers and some, such as the poppy flower and coca leaf pickers (known as raspachines), are involved in the first stages of drug manufacturing. They are also used as chemists, who use chemical substances to extract cocaine, or as mules for the trafficking andsale of illegal substances. The use of women as couriers is particularly interesting for drug lords because they are often perceived as innocent and untouchable which makes their smuggling efforts quite successful, as most police attention is focused on men. Moreover, female mules are trained to flaunt their sexuality, by dressing up attractively and flirting with immigration officers to dispel any suspicion with a seductive look. This further reinforces women’s stereotypical role as objects of physical desire.  

Concentrated at the bottom of the chain, women face greater risks as violence is often most pervasive at this level and the rewards are few. The threats they face are two-fold and are split between the general risks involved in drug trafficking and those specific to their condition as women. Both women and men working in the harvesting of illicit crops, for instance, are particularly at risk of falling into drug abuse. A 2019 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),written in collaboration with the Colombian Ministry of Justice, reported that these women and their relatives saw higher cases of substance and alcohol addiction as well as greater incidences of domestic abuse. Moreover, women who operate as mules are the most vulnerable and exposed actors of this black market and, for this reason, often ended up exploited by their bosses and/or imprisoned with disproportionately long sentences despite only occupying a minor position in the commercialization chain.  

Women who perform these roles normally have a level of education no higher than primary school. They are often unaware of the dangers inherent in the drug trade and the seriousness of the penalty levied if caught. Even when they know the consequences, they may still be willing to accept these risks to make money. Indeed, economic incentives are the main factor pushing women into this environment. Lacking legitimate economic opportunities, being single parents, or desiring financial independence, many of these women are left with no choice but to get involved. They may also be pressured by their families, who may declare their participation to be mandatory. This explains why those women, contrary to their male counterparts, are not willing to attract attention to their activities and rarely seek authority. For them, earning money is more important than having power or prestige.

Nowadays, the legislation to address the drug problem is flawed as it exacerbates sex-based discrimination. Women prisoners are most likely to suffer from exclusion, abandonment, and loss offamily ties. Not only does long-term imprisonment create an economic burden for the taxpayer, but itpromises severe, far-reaching effects for individual prisoners, for their children, and for society as a whole. Indeed, as shown by the story of Rocío Duque – a single Colombian mother jailed for 14 years for carrying a small amount of cocaine paste which she received only a modest fee for – current policies foster harsh cycles of poverty and socio-economic exclusion that leads to recidivism. Her account shows how repeat criminals suffer social and state sigma and how recidivism can be unavoidable when there are no reintegration programs to help women to rebuild their lives after being in jail.  

It is time, therefore, for Latin American governments to redesign drug legislation in order forthe latter to demonstrate gender awareness. This will be achieved partly by meeting the gender-specific needs of women in penitentiary centres, and partly by reducing the imprisonment of women through non-custodial correction measures. Overall, policies should now focus on increasing levels of socio-economic development and on improving access to education, employment, and basic healthcare services to avoid any intensification of women’s involvement in drug trafficking.

Thais is a third year History and International Relations student at KCL. Her main research interests are about human rights and security issues such as drug trafficking and insurgency movements. She is particularly keen in analyzing those matters through a gender-based perspective.

¡Chile Despertó! … ¿Y Ahora Qué? // Chile has Awoken! ... Now what?

Image Courtesy of Ciper Chile

By Maximilian Frederik van Oordt

​A más de un año del estallido social y con un proceso constitucional inédito en marcha, ya va siendo hora de abordar dos preguntas clave producto de este acontecimiento histórico: ¿cuáles han sido los cambios en Chile? y, ¿qué sendero debería seguir el país?

​En relación a la primera pregunta, la lista de respuestas es larga dado que este movimiento ha sido de extrema consecuencia nacional en materia económica, política, y social. En un artículo anterior había hecho alusión a varias causas principales del estallido como la clase política, la desigualdad, las pensiones, y el costo de la vida, entre muchas más. Todos estos ámbitos han ostentado cambios que van de lo superficial – como la destitución del ex Ministro del Interior Andrés Chadwick – a lo formidable – como el proceso constituyente. El 25 de octubre del año pasado, producto directo del estallido social, Chile celebró un plebiscito nacional sobre si se debiera mantener o no la actual Constitución. De forma abrumadora, el electorado despidió a la Carta Magna de la República, aprobando con un 78,28% el inicio de un proceso histórico que redactará un nuevo documento. El 11 de abril de 2021, los chilenos elegirán sus candidatos a la Convención Constituyente, influyendo así de forma directa en el resultado del proceso, y en agosto de 2022 votarán de nuevo en un plebiscito que buscará aprobar la nueva Constitución. Pese a la violencia y a las injusticias delatadas a lo largo del estallido social, este proceso constituyente es un ejemplo brillante de la democracia y uno del cual todo chileno puede sentirse orgulloso.

​Mas allá de los profundos cambios políticos – que, felizmente, han incluido una rebaja a las abusivas dietas parlamentarias – el Chile de hoy cuenta con reformas policiales, educativas, y económicas creadas con el objetivo de responder a las múltiples demandas de la ciudadanía. Carabineros de Chile, la institución policial encargada del orden público, vió su imagen fuertemente deslustrada por la vastedad de los abusos que ejerció contra los manifestantes. Lo que en tiempos pasados se consideraba un modelo a seguir en el contexto regional ahora parecía un instrumento de represión caracterizada por el caos, la tragedia, y la impunidad. El resultado ha sido un importante incremento en las compras y entregas de cámaras corporales por parte del gobierno, aunque las fuerzas policiales siguen contando con menos de mil de éstas a nivel país. También se ha apreciado el inicio de una profunda reforma a Carabineros llevada a cabo por las autoridades civiles en conjunto con la institución, con una mira al refuerzo de los derechos humanos. Según una encuesta Cadem a un año del estallido social, la policía uniformada contaba con sólo un 26% de la confianza popular, y apenas un 19% la consideraba capacitada para cumplir su labor. Cambios son imprescindibles, y los primeros de éstos ya están en marcha.

​A pesar de todas las reformas, al estado le quedan cuantiosas decisiones que tomar e injusticias que resolver. Las pensiones de los chilenos se siguen manteniendo en las famosas Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP);entidades privadas que entregan una jubilación mediana de tan solo $203.883 pesos chilenos, equivalente a poco más de doscientas libras esterlinas mensuales. En el Congreso Nacional, la indignación popular ha producido políticas populistas y de poca visión de futuro. Se ingresaron tres reformas constitucionales que permitieron el retiro por parte del cotizante de hasta el 10% de sus ahorros previsionales en cada instancia, poniendo así en riesgo de colapso total el actual sistema de pensiones sin reemplazo ninguno. Seamos claros: aquí no se arremete contra el retiro previsional en sí; fue una medida necesaria para enfrentar la crisis económica que provocó la pandemia. Tampoco se busca defender el modelo de las AFP – que descanse en paz. Aquí el problema es que aquellos autores del retiro siguen sin presentar ningún proyecto que pueda reemplazar el sistema actual, ni un plan que pueda proteger a los cotizantes a largo plazo. Incluso la diputada opositora Pamela Jiles, rostro de los últimos dos retiros, admitió que su proyecto es populista, agregando que es una “pésima política… pero que más vamos a hacer”. La caída de las AFP sería un gran paso hacia una pensión digna en Chile, pero sólo se podrá festejar cuando el cotizante chileno esté protegido por el sistema de reemplazo. La moraleja en este caso sería que cualquier reforma que se haga se tendrá que hacer responsablemente y con miras hacia el futuro. Chile busca transformarse, no arrancarse de raíz.

​Sin embargo, la secuela más peligrosa del estallido social ha sido el aumento importante de las voces extremistas e ideológicas del país. Desde la derecha, se sienten los fantasmas del viejo Pinochetismo en los partidos Renovación Nacional (RN) y Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), quienes se han abierto a un pacto electoral con el partido Republicano de ultraderecha – un partido que a menudo valora y justifica la dictadura militar de los 80. Incluso el ex presidente de RN denunció haber sido víctima “de los ataques virulentos de miembros o simpatizantes” de aquel partido. Incorporar a partidos de este talante a la corriente principal daña la institucionalidad de la República; una institucionalidad que la misma derecha pretende – y debe – resguardar.

​Mientras tanto, desde la ultraizquierda se levantan voces de semejante percance. El Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh) ha hecho la vista gorda a los desmanes cometidos por antisociales durante las manifestaciones y ha llegado incluso a avalar la violencia contra las fuerzas del orden. El presidente del PCCh señaló desvergonzadamente que “una condena genérica a la violencia no la voy a hacer” y, al preguntarle si condenaría el vandalismo visto durante las protestas, respondió: “¿cómo voy a condenar una cosa tan menor?”. A la apatía comunista se suman cinco congresistas de cinco partidos opositores quienes han presentado nada menos que un indulto general a manifestantes detenidos en el marco del estallido social, buscando sobreseer así las imputaciones en su contra; imputaciones que incluyen graves delitos como el homicidio frustrado y el tráfico de armas. La justicia constituye pilar fundamental de cualquier democracia sana y el escepticismo con el que la ultraizquierda trata al poder judicial, que en Chile es independiente, terminará debilitándola a corto y a largo plazo.

Hoy más que nunca, Chile necesita un gobierno pragmático, centrista, y de consenso. Los desmanes del 18-O han echado leña al fuego del extremismo político. Mientras la ultraizquierda avala la violencia hacia el estado, la ultraderecha atrinchera el extremismo político. El progreso que se ha logrado en materia política, económica, y social ha sido abundante y el país va encaminado hacia una vida digna para sus habitantes. Este progreso se alcanzó a través de los acuerdos mutuos y la atención prestada a la ciudadanía. El extremismo político ni responde a las demandas sociales, ni tiene la posibilidad de solucionarlas. Chile despertó… ¿Y Ahora qué? Ahora tendrá que elegir su sendero. Si triunfa la democracia y el consenso, “la copia feliz del Edén” – que promete el himno nacional – estará al alcance de su pueblo.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

​With over a year having passed since Chile’s mass protests and with an unprecedented constitutional process underway, it is about time to tackle two key questions raised by this historic event: what changes have occurred in Chile, and what path should the country take?

​In terms of the first question, the list of answers is a long one given that this movement has been extremely consequential in the economic, political, and social realms. In a previous article I had alluded to many of the main causes of the social unrest including the political elite, inequality, pensions, and the cost of living, among many other factors.All these areas have seen changes which range from the superficial – such as the impeachment of the former Minister of the Interior Andrés Chadwick – to the formidable – such as the constitutional process. On October 25th of last year, as a direct consequence of the social unrest, Chile held a national referendum on whether or not to keep its current constitution.Overwhelmingly, the electorate fired the republic’s basic charter, approving by 78.28% the commencement of a historic process which would draw up a new document. On the 11th of April of 2021, Chileans will elect their candidates to the Constitutional Convention, thereby directly influencing the result of the process, and in August of 2022 they will once again vote in a plebiscite which will decide whether the new Constitution will replace the old one. Despite the violence and the injustices laid bare throughout the mass demonstrations, this constitutional process is a shining example of democracy and one which all Chileans can be proud of.

​Beyond the far-reaching political changes – which, fortunately, include a reduction in the extortionate congressional salaries – the Chile of today boasts reforms to police, education, and the economy created with the objective of responding to the people’s many demands. The Carabineros de Chile, the police institution in charge of riot control, saw their image badly tarnished by the immensity of abuses they committed against protestors. What had once been considered a role model in the regional context now seemed to be an instrument of repression characterised by chaos, tragedy, and impunity. The result of this has been a significant increase in the purchase and distribution of body cams by the government, although the police forces continue to make do with fewer than a thousand of these nationwide. A deep reform of the Carabineros has also begun, undertaken by the civil authorities in conjunction with the institution and aimed at reinforcing human rights. According to a survey by the national pollster one year on from the beginning of the social unrest, the national police enjoyed only 26% of citizens’ trust, with only 19% of the population considering them to be capable of fulfilling their duties. Changes are necessary, and the first of these are already underway.

​Despite all these reforms, the state is still faced with numerous decisions to make and injustices to resolve. The pensions of Chileans continue to be kept in the infamous Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP); private entities which provide a median pension of only $203,883 Chilean pesos, equivalent to just over two hundred pounds sterling per month. In the National Congress, popular anger has produced populist and short-sighted policies. Three constitutional amendments were introduced which each permitted the withdrawal of up to 10% of one’s pension savings, thereby risking the total collapse of the current pension system with no replacement in sight. To be clear: this article does not attack the pension withdrawal bill in of itself; it was a necessary measure to deal with the economic crisis brought about by the pandemic. Nor does this article attempt to defend the AFP pensions model – may it rest in peace. The problem here is that those who introduced these policies did so without presenting a single proposal which could replace the current system, nor did they announce any plans to protect pensioners in the long term. Even the opposition MP Pamela Jiles, the face of the last two withdrawals, admitted that her proposal is populist, adding that it is “an awful policy… but what else are we going to do”. The fall of the AFPs would be a great step towards dignified pensions in Chile, but one can only begin celebrating once the Chilean pensioner has been protected by a replacement system. The moral of the story in this case would be that whatever reform is made must be made responsibly and with the future in mind. Chile seeks to transform itself, not uproot itself outright.

​Nevertheless, the most dangerous product of the social unrest has been the significant increase in extremist and ideological voices within the country. On the political right, ghosts of Pinochetism are being felt in the Renovación Nacional (RN) and Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) parties, which have opened themselves up to an electoral pact with the hard right Republican party – a party which regularly praises and justifies the military dictatorship of the 80s. Even the former president of RN condemned the fact that he had been victim of “virulent attacks by members or sympathisers” of that party. The incorporation of parties of this nature into the political mainstream damages the institutions of the Republic; institutions that the political right itself claims to – and should – defend.

​Meanwhile, similarly distasteful voices are being heard among the hard left. The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) has turned a blind eye to the destruction committed by delinquents throughout the protests and has on occasions justified violence committed against law enforcement. The president of the PCCh unashamedly commented that he would “not make a generic condemnation of violence” and, when asked whether he would condemn the vandalism seen during the protests, replied with: “why would I condemn something so minor?”. Added to this communist apathy are five MPs from five different opposition parties who have introduced nothing short of a general pardon to those detained during the social unrest, thereby seeking to dismiss the charges against these individuals; charges which include severe crimes such as attempted murder and arms trafficking. Justice forms a fundamental pillar of any healthy democracy and the scepticism with which the hard left treats the judicial system, which in Chile is independent, will end up debilitating it inboth the short and long term.

​Now more than ever, Chile needs a pragmatic and centrist government by consensus. The destruction of the social unrest has poured fuel onto the fire of political extremism. While the hard left promotes violence against the state, the hard right entrenches political extremism. There has been abundant progress in the political, economic, and social realms and the country is on track towards a dignified life for its inhabitants. This progress was achieved by mutual agreements and by listening to the citizenry. Political extremism neither responds to the popular demands, nor does it have the capacity to solve them. Chile has awoken… now what? Now it will have to chart its course. Should democracy and consensus triumph, then the “happy copy of Eden” promised by the national anthem will be at the fingertips of the Chilean people.

Maximilian Frederik van Oordt is a second-year International Relations student at King’s College London. interested in politics, history and law, he enjoys focusing on Latin American affairs, with a particular emphasis on these three areas.

Disappearing Women: The Rise of Gender Violence and Femicide in Latin America

Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-50557784

By: Anonymous

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic has hit populations hard worldwide. Death tolls have skyrocketed, hospitals have been full to the point of maximum capacity, and essential healthcare equipment has been limited. However, whilst this is at the forefront of everybody’s minds, the news, and the papers, the pandemic has devastated communities in other, very different ways. One of these is a fundamental increase in violence against women, and nowhere is this more prevalent than in Latin America.

Women across Latin America are disappearing: they are injured, they are dying, they are calling out for help. Nearly 1,200 women disappeared in Peru between March and June 2020, and in Brazil, 143 women were murdered between March and April — an increase of 22% from this time last year. Phone calls to domestic violence helplines rose 130% in Columbia and 70% in Chile during the first eighteen days and weekend of quarantine respectively. Gender violence reports to the police in São Paulo, Brazil in March 2020 were 45% higher than they were in March 2019. With increased restrictions and locked-down countries, gendered violence and femicide rates are increasing dramatically. 

Whilst locking down countries and restricting movement and daily interactions may be reducing the risk of spreading or catching the virus, it serves to increase the risk of violence, injury and death to those who are trapped with abusive partners or family members. UN Secretary General António Guterres stated in April that, “violence is not confined to the battlefield. For many women and girls, the threat looms largest where they should be safest. In their own homes … We know lockdowns and quarantines are essential to suppressing Covid-19, but they can trap women with abusive partners”. With greater exposure to violent partners and mounting household tensions and economic strain, the pandemic is likely to cause a one-third reduction in progress towards ending gender-based violence by 2030. Whilst there is already limited action being taken, the virus has meant that help has only been minimised further. 

Femicide and domestic violence are still widespread globally, and Latin America has some of the highest rates worldwide; fourteen of the twenty-five countries in the world with the highest femicide rates are in Latin America. Laws and regulations concerning this are beginning to emerge, however they are awfully limited, and somewhat problematic. Simply put, governments are not doing enough. Eighteen countries, including Mexico, have distinguished femicide from homicide, and laws have been created to specifically punish femicide, such as introducing longer prison sentences than are given for intentional homicide. Guatemala has created specific courts for the trial of men accused of gender violence, and statistical reports have highlighted the issue. However, there are still fundamental gaps in these measures. In some regions such as Chile and Costa Rica, laws regarding femicide are only applicable to women killed by current or former intimate partners and investigations are often feeble, not to mention the pressing issue of a linguistic and cultural gap preventing women going to court. These are issues that are not being considered and are harming the progression of reducing gendered violence in these countries. In Latin America, ninety-eight percent of gender-related killings go unprosecuted — this outrageously high figure is proof that current measures are simply not working.

Whilst Latin American countries may be putting formal laws in place, and increasing funding for places of refuge such as women’s shelters, the root of the issue is simply not being addressed. Measures taken thus far are to simply punish the act, not to prevent it from occurring, and this is where governments are going wrong. What is not being taken into account is why women are at much higher risk of violence than men; what is causing the normalisation of violence towards women in the first place? Whilst some may argue that it’s a direct result of the inherent patriarchy and machismo still present in society even today, others stand to believe it is stemming from the treatment of women in religion and war. Rape has been used as a weapon of war in numerous conflicts, and perhaps it is the legacy of raping and mutilating women in a wartime environment that has, to some extent, normalised the concept amongst civilian men today. Religion also has a history of exerting control over women, whether that be controlling a woman’s sexuality, or promotion of the idea that it’s a husband’s right to discipline his wife. These are all historic examples of female oppression, and it would be ignorant to believe that they do not still hold weight and influence in the views that men possess of women in the twenty-first century.

Protests have occurred this year across Latin America, from a large protest in Mexico on International Women’s Day in March, to recent protests on the 9th of November, demanding justice for the death of Bianca Alejandrina Lorenzena. On International Women’s Day, the protest held in Mexico was the largest in the country’s history, displaying the enormity of the issue, and the passion shown by women trying to gain the basic needs of safety and respect. Protesters flocked to capital cities in other countries, such as Chile, on this day in March too, and women in Columbia and Peru took part in demonstrations on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women this November. Women are calling out for reform and for change, so why is so little being done? Why, in 2020, are women still forced to demand such essential, basic rights so as to not be violated and murdered by men?

What is fundamentally missing from any action against gender violence is education reform. As much as countries may try to further punish aggressors, or aid those affected, they need to be steering their efforts towards educating the masses on why treating women this way is vitally unacceptable. This is a worldwide issue; rape culture is still rife, women are being taught how to ‘act safely’ rather than men being taught not to rape, not to assault, not to harm. In Latin America this problem is present on a much larger scale, and needs addressing urgently, with the pandemic and increased levels of violence only adding to this urgency. No woman deserves to die, deserves to experience such awful treatment simply because she is a woman. Further acknowledgement of the issue is needed. Better education is needed. A clear legal framework is needed. Above all, greater respect for women is needed.

Bibliography

The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/latin-american-women-are-disappearing-and-dying-under-lockdown-143791

Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1113975/gender-violence-growth-coronavirus-latin-america/

United Nations: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXxnZKom6sg&feature=emb_title

UNFPA: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/COVID-19_impact_brief_for_UNFPA_24_April_2020_1.pdf

Small Arms Survey: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-14.pdf

UNODC: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet_5.pdf (p. 47)

UN: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/dsgsm1224.doc.htm

World Politics Review: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29278/in-mexico-protests-continue-against-a-historic-spike-in-femicides

The Absence of Colour and the Colour of Absence: Decolonising Brazilian Education

Source: https://www.revide.com.br/noticias/cultura/fotografa-realiza-exposicao-sobre-poder-da-mulher-negra/

By: Camila Consolmagno

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

 in Brazil, inequality is taken for granted. While equal under the eyes of international law, Brazilian children experience abysmally unequal childhoods. It is imperative to understandthat meaningful social and economic change aiming to reduce inequality and promote justice will not occur if matters of race discrimination and its legacies are not brought to light –thoroughly deconstructed, and equitably remodelled. However, with 53 million poor, and 22 million indigent Brazilians respectively –overrepresented by Afro-Brazilians in all age groups– this would require deep structural and systemic surgery within Brazilian society.

According to the calculations by the United Nations Development Program, no Brazilian state has a higher Human Development Index for Afro-Brazilians than for white populations; and racial inequalities are consistent in every Brazilian state, notwithstanding its stage of development.While there is consensus that Brazil is deeply unjust, and race discrimination has been recognised by the federal government as a human rights issue, there is yet not sufficient understanding and agreement on how to combat its inequality.

Both in the school curriculum and in the classroom, Black people and Afro-Brazilians appear in delimited ways – though often not at all, mirroring a historical subordination. Curricular silences on race and Afro-Brazilian history and identity are institutionalised not only in societal discourse, but also within education sectors, with educators and administrators receiving no university-level education training on race relations, race-based inequality, or Afro-Brazilian history. Rarely will history teachers come across Black people and Afro-Brazilians as active and complex actors within the Brazilian or global narrative.

A Shift Called ‘Decolonisation’

 It must be noted, however, that advances made by the Black social movement have commenced to shift social and political narratives. Afro-Brazilian activists and education researchers, such as the Orùnmilá Cultural Centre’s (‘OCC’) leaders and members, have begun to address the primary and secondary education system, inter alia, by targeting their advocacy and research to the lack of positive representation of Africa, Black people, and Afro-Brazilians in educational textbooks, everyday racism within school spaces, and the shallow treatment of the historical role of Afro-Brazilians. Secondly, they advocate for the incorporation of Afro-Brazilian cultural practices into school curricula to proclaim the diverse origins of knowledge. Finally, activists and cultural organisations like the OCC have established community schools that focus on either or both intercultural and Afro-centric education. These approaches not only mainstream Black history and contextualise it to contemporary times, but they pave the way for schools to challenge racism, ignorance, and stereotypes through the provision of diverse and inclusive teaching that encourages open-mindedness and constructive curiosity. Additionally, this addresses how partial and negative Afro-Brazilian representation correlates to the devaluation or ‘folklorisation’ of Afro-Brazilian culture and knowledge, both outside and inside the classroom, aiming to redress the effect of dismissal of Afro-Brazilians as creators of knowledge and theory, and of their culture as valuable pedagogically. Carving a space in education for Black history allows it to situate itself within one of the main centres where knowledge, opinions, and thought are produced: the school. 

Many are not aware that Brazil has the largest population of African descendants outside of Nigeria. Currently, however, the Brazilian school system reproduces hegemonic perspectives that mould the delimited narrative of Afro-Brazilian history in its society, perpetuating a historical system of power constructed through Eurocentric aesthetic, epistemological and cultural dominance. As Pai Paulo and Silas contend, “the most revolutionary aspect of this process resides in the valorisation of Black Culture as a philosophical and political theoretical field”. One cannot, therefore,envisage the emancipation of a people in the absence of the recognition and valorisation of their culture.

In 2003, then-President Lula signed Law 10,639/03 which gave statutory basis to the inclusion of African and Afro-Brazilian culture and history into the national curriculum. These aims concretised, inter alia, in what was named Projeto Baobá; one of the first – and at the time, possibly only – systemic realisations by a municipal government aiming to implement Law 10,639/03. Projeto Baobá reflected the opinion that decolonising education did not solely mean the inclusion of Black history within the curriculum, but actively thinking with Afro-descendants as producers of knowledge, theory, and philosophy. The project adopted a more sophisticated view of Afro-Brazilian and African histories by challenging narrow associations of Blackness, Black history, and Black identity with slavery, low status, and manual labour. It not only revealed the intricate ways in which Afro-Brazilian history is still tied to the slave ship, but also how race-based discrimination sculpted and continues to influence contemporary inequalities. Consisting of lectures, workshops, teacher training, and the purchase and distribution of revised educational materials to municipal schools, Projeto Baobá shifted teachers’ and students’ perspectives on Afro-Brazilian history, Africa, and Blackness. It emphasised the notable enthusiasm among Afro-descendant pupils who now ‘saw themselves’ and their history in textbooks, storybooks, and classroom activities. Importantly, educators and school administrators, that previously denied racism and discrimination as issues which required attention,came to passionately adopt the project’s cause and recognise the aforementioned as serious issues. Only one round of the Projeto Baobá, however, was implemented.

Struggling to See Colour – A Country in Black or White

Projeto Baobá faced immense implementation difficulties, largely as a consequence of a lack of interest, explicit opposition of many school principals and teachers, and capacity issues. Despite this, the OCC fights for its continuation. The project nonetheless incentivised many school teachers, principals, and students to reassess the knowledge and culture of Brazil’s African ancestors and recognise Afro-Brazilians as important subjects for inclusion in curricula. This, in turn, generated and continues to generate new possibilities to ensure a more holistic educational experience for students, particularly those of African descent. Additionally, the project initiated an exploration of Afro-Brazilian forms of knowledge and pedagogy which remain underdeveloped as educational tools and excluded from institutional legitimacy, despite often present in many Brazilians’ everyday lives (i.e. capoeira).

Over the past few years, a variation of projects has emerged to implement race relations and inequality training for teachers and municipal employees in agreement with Law 10,639/03. However, a myriad of elements indicates their inconsistency and insufficiency, as well as the pre-existing implementation difficulties. Firstly, multiple organisations have created projects; these projects vary in target audience, length, funding, and the degree to which they implement Afro-Brazilian cultural practices. Secondly, the shortfall of standards for project materials, implementation, and pedagogical approaches makes examination difficult, hindering improvement alongside requests for continuity. This is particularly relevant when public officials pragmatically enforce shallow projects claiming to tackle race issues and satisfy Black community demands. A third, final, and core concern raised by Orùnmilá members is the extent to which projects’ academic trainers are skilled practitioners of Afro-Brazilian culture. To wholly value these practitioners as generators of theory and knowledge, they must be involved in project implementations. However, despite these efforts and the rising attention paid to race in public policies, government efforts to address race as an issue continues to waver – a case particularly veracious under the current Bolsonarian government.

In 2009, the centre-right Democratic Party administration almost completely erased ‘race’ from the educational agenda and had all but severed dialogue with the OCC concerning educational and cultural policy. Consequently, making the institutional future of the Projeto Baobá uncertain. Notwithstanding this, Orùnmilá members anticipate further implementation and improvement, refusing to stall their philosophy as a result of public officials’ decisions. With lack of access to education affecting many Brazilians, particularly Afro-Brazilians, the OCC and Projeto Baobá continue to ask fundamental questions: “What kind of education are we aiming to have access to? What are its goals and what kind of society will it shape? How can we go beyond visions of societal inclusion as socioeconomic ascension to question the social formation into which people struggle for inclusion?”. Orùnmilá members and others striving towards educational reform in Brazil suggest thinking with Afro-descendants so as to substantively remodel a core societal institution – the school – and highlight the hierarchies that delimit visions of sociality, knowledge, and development. In this way, the question of fundamentally diversifying curricula as a means of decolonising knowledge is key in the process of bringing culture as an issue for development.

In conclusion, it is fundamental to think with Afro-Brazilian cultural struggles to aggrandise the critical knowledge about how capitalism’s exclusionary and racialised epistemological foundations allow certain visions of sociality to translate into possibility, and others to be unfathomable. Generating and executing alternative visions of development necessitate thinking with these other shapes of knowledge so as to confront, rethink, and remodel the limits that political, economic, and cultural development policies and processes place on societies and individuals. As such, critical scholarship can more substantively contribute to the endeavours of those like the OCC’s, who are involved in the daily struggle to not only live but survive. Therefore, in the aim of decolonising education it is insufficient to solely guarantee the inclusion of Black history into curricula; one must think with Afro-descendants as valuable and active contributors to culture, current affairs, knowledge, and theory. Finally, these efforts to decolonise education should combine into one major national project so as to target wider audiences and ensure better administration, execution, legitimacy, and results.

Camila Consolmagno is a final-year Bachelor of Laws student at SOAS, University of London. She is the first Brazilian President of the SOAS Latin American Society and an aspiring human rights lawyer.

The Aftermath of the Escazú Agreement: a Failure, or the Path to Environmental Awareness and the Protection of Environmental Activists in Latin America?

Source: Photo by Isabella Jusková on Unsplash

By: Mathilde Aupetit

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Introduction

Indigenous communities are essential actors against climate change, the disappearance of species, increasing desertification and the decline of ecosystems. They represent 5% of the world's population and protect 80% of the planet's biodiversity in their daily life (Raygorodetsky 2018), yet indigenous communities and their lands have been under threat for centuries (Sierra Praeli 2019). In recent decades, increasing rates of deforestation, infrastructure development and resource extraction have destroyed their lands, threatening the stability of the planet at large.

When community activists try to oppose these tendencies, they are often arrested, attacked, or even killed. The non-profit NGO, Global Witness, documented more than 200 killings of environmental defenders in 2019 (Global Witness 2019), the majority of which took place in Latin America. It is in this context that the Escazú agreement, an innovative treaty on human rights in environmental matters, was signed by 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Context of the Agreement’s signature

September 2020 marked the second anniversary of the opening for signature of the Escazú Agreement at the United Nations. This little-known regional treaty, adopted in 2018 in Costa Rica, aims to strengthen the rights of those in Latin America and the Caribbean who defend the environment (CEPAL 2018). This international treaty is the object of a real campaign of disinformation, which aims to ensure that it is neither signed nor ratified. Indeed, it is since September 2018 that this important regional agreement, adopted in Costa Rica in March of the same year, was officially opened for signature by thirty-three States from the Latin America and the Caribbean (Wilson 2018).

What is the Escazú Agreement?

The Escazú Agreement is the first regional environmental treaty in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the first in the world to include specific provisions on environmental defenders. It aims to guarantee the full and effective implementation of the rights of access to environmental information, of public participation in environmental decision-making processes and of access to justice in environmental matters (Amnesty International 2018). In addition, it seeks international cooperation to protect the right to live in a healthy environment, which is especially important in the Latin American region as, according to the FAO, 49% of the total area of Latin America and the Caribbean is covered by forest, which corresponds to around 20% of the world’s forest area (FAO 2020). This agreement is also important because, as mentioned earlier, Latin America is one of the most dangerous regions for environmental activists, accounting for two thirds of the world assassinations of environmentalists (Greenfield and Watts 2020). The Escazú Accord was developed over a six-year period, with input from civil society and community groups. Based on Principle No. 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the treaty has three main objectives: to provide citizens with full and transparent information on activities affecting the environment; to allow citizens to have more say in how land and marine resources are used; and to ensure full legal rights and protection for environmental defenders (World Resources Institute 2018).

What are the main debates about it today?

Two years after its inception, the treaty has yet to be ratified. September 26th, 2020 was the deadline for at least eleven countries ratifying the agreement, the amount required for it to enter into force, but only ten had done so. Indeed, although negotiations were led by Chile and Costa Rica, neither country ratified the agreement, which is one of the major paradoxes and topics of debate surrounding the Escazú Agreement (Guzmán 2020). Even Chile, who currently holds the presidency of the UN summit on climate change, the COP25, has not even signed the agreement, which calls into question the country's commitment to the environment (Aguilar Córdoba 2020).

The reasons given by the Chilean government are that the text, which Chile assisted in drafting, is too ambiguous and that it would give rise to possible international requests, on the parts of European governments especially, regarding Latin American progress, and reinforce the dependency of the Latin American region to its European counterpart (Aguilar Córdoba 2020). On the other hand, and just a few hours before the ratification deadline, Chile’s president, Sebastián Piñera, assured that Chile is "totally committed" to climate change before the United Nations General Assembly (Ibidem). However, there is no legal reason, from the point of view of international law, not to sign the agreement. Rather, one could point to possible economic interests behind Chile's refusal to sign the Escazú Agreement (Gandara 2020). The treaty therefore remains open for ratification by countries that have not yet signed or ratified it, but it will be necessary to wait for this eleventh signature for it to enter into force.

The failure to ratify the treaty: a reflection about the lack of environmental preoccupations from the Latin American region

The decision from the Chilean government not to ratify the agreement drew harsh criticism from the opposition and environmental organizations. According to Amnesty International, this long waiting time before the ratification of the treaty shows a lack of interest and willingness to put in effort on the part of the governments in the region (Amnesty International 2020). Matías Asun, national director of the Greenpeace organization in Chile, criticized the government's management, accusing it of carrying out "misleading advertising" for making people believe that environmental policies are at the centre of its agenda (AFP and the Tico Times 2020).

Conclusion

Although it is a necessary step to protect environmental leaders and promote sustainable development in the region, the Escazú Agreement is not a magical remedy against environmental damages. Even in the countries that have signed and ratified the agreement, environmental decision-making remains contradictory. In Mexico, for example, the Senate that ratified the treaty also eliminated the funds for the protection mechanism for environmental defenders, which in practice leaves them even less protected (Mexico News Daily 2020). Besides, in Antigua and Barbuda, and many Central American countries, the destruction of natural barriers due to the construction of large infrastructure projects leaves them even more exposed to natural events such as the recent storms Eta and Iota (Sanders 2020).

For now, the double discourse of Latin American governments seems to show that it takes more than eleven signatures for this unprecedented instrument to really work; this change should also operate through a change of mindset and perception about a conception of development in which economic growth should not be opposed to environmental preservation and life, in all its meanings.

Originally from France, Mathilde is currently a MPhil Student in Latin American Studies at Cambridge University. Before her MPhil, she completed a BA in International Relations at King’s College London, with a focus in Latin America, which sharpened her interest in the region. She is especially interested in Latin American identity politics and minorities integration

Bibliography

AFP and the Tico Times. 2020. ‘Chile Rejects Escazú Agreement, Environmental Pact Supported by Costa Rica’. Chile Rejects Escazú Agreement, Environmental Pact Supported by Costa Rica. 23 September 2020. https://theworldnews.net/cr-news/chile-rejects-escazu-agreement-environmental-pact-supported-by-costa-rica.

Aguilar Cordoba, Andrea. 2020. ‘Why Won’t Chile Ratify Escazu Environmental Agreement?’ 25 September 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/environment/why-wont-chile-ratify-escazu-environmental-agreement/1985943.

Amnesty International. 2018. ‘Americas: 12 Countries Sign Historic Environmental and Human Rights Treaty’. 27 September 2018. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/americas-12-countries-sign-historic-environmental-treaty/.

———. 2020. ‘The Americas Must Not Miss Opportunity to Lead on Environmental Protection’. 26 September 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/americas-oportunidad-para-proteccion-medio-ambiente/.

CEPAL, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 2018. ‘El Acuerdo de Escazú: un hito ambiental para América Latina y el Caribe’. Text. CEPAL. 2018. https://www.cepal.org/es/articulos/2018-acuerdo-escazu-un-hito-ambiental-america-latina-caribe.

FAO. 2020. ‘Forest Loss Slows in South America, Protected Areas Rise  | FAO’. 7 May 2020. http://www.fao.org/americas/noticias/ver/en/c/1274254/.

Gandara, Fernanda. 2020. ‘Escazú Treaty: “Human Rights Cannot Be Enjoyed Without a Healthy Environment”’. Chile Today (blog). 24 September 2020. https://chiletoday.cl/chile-rejects-the-escazu-agreement-that-it-originally-spearheaded/.

Global Witness. 2019. ‘Land and Environmental Defenders: Annual Report Archive’. Global Witness. 2019. https:///en/campaigns/environmental-activists/land-and-environmental-defenders-annual-report-archive/.

Greenfield, Patrick, and Jonathan Watts. 2020. ‘Record 212 Land and Environment Activists Killed Last Year’. The Guardian, 29 July 2020, sec. Environment. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jul/29/record-212-land-and-environment-activists-killed-last-year.

Guzmán, Lorena. 2020. ‘Why Chile Promoted the Escazú Agreement Then Rejected It’. Dialogo Chino (blog). 26 November 2020. https://dialogochino.net/en/climate-energy/38525-why-chile-promoted-the-escazu-agreement-then-rejected-it/.

Mexico News Daily. 2020. ‘Mexico Ratifies Treaty That Protects Rights of Environmental Activists’. Mexico News Daily (blog). 14 November 2020. https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/treaty-protects-rights-of-environmental-activists/.

Raygorodetsky, Gleb. 2018. ‘Indigenous Peoples Defend Earth’s Biodiversity—but They’re in Danger’. 16 November 2018. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/11/can-indigenous-land-stewardship-protect-biodiversity-/.

Sanders, Sir Ronald. 2020. ‘WORLD VIEW: We’re in a New Reality and Those Who Control the Purse Strings Need to Realise That - and Help’. 23 November 2020. http://www.tribune242.com/news/2020/nov/23/world-view-were-new-reality-and-those-who-control-/.

Sierra Praeli, Yvette. 2019. ‘Latin America Saw Most Murdered Environmental Defenders in 2018’. Mongabay Environmental News. 29 August 2019. https://news.mongabay.com/2019/08/latin-america-saw-most-murdered-environmental-defenders-in-2018/.

Wilson, Kate. 2018. ‘The Escazu Agreement: A Case for Signature’. 27 August 2018. https://pressroom.oecs.org/the-escazu-agreement-a-case-for-signature.

World Ressources Institute. 2018. ‘RELEASE: 12 Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Sign Historic Agreement to Protect Environmental Defenders’. World Resources Institute. 27 September 2018. https://www.wri.org/news/2018/09/release-12-countries-latin-america-and-caribbean-sign-historic-agreement-protect.

US-Mexico Relations: The Upcoming Challenges of Lopez Obrador with the Biden Administration

Source: https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-went-to-dinner-with-donald-trump

By: Marco García

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao’.

When it comes to Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and former United States’ President Donald Trump, the diplomatic relationship is a bit of a paradox. Throughout his administration, Trump labelled Mexicans as criminals, used the US-Mexico border as a political piñata to pander to his loyal supporters, and conceived detrimental policies for the ‘dreamers’ who flock to the US in hopes of a better life.

 Nevertheless, Mexico’s López Obrador, once a vocal anti-Trumpist, perhaps already misses him.

 Among the many surprises brought about by the Trump presidency, one of the more astonishing ones would be how he got López Obrador – a populist, leftist president who has in the past called Trump a “racist” – to regard him so highly. Said admiration can be attributed to the striking similarities between the two men: both leaders ran for office on a promise to lessen the divide between ordinary citizens and their nation’s elite. Both men are political opportunists, dismantling institutional processes while expressing a complete disregard for foreign policy in favor of placating their domestic base. Both also paint their opponents – usually the media – as enemies of the people. LópezObrador has even taken a queue right from the Trump handbook: just as Trump used Twitter to hog the media spotlight, López Obrador hosts a daily morning news conference in which he is questioned by the media; although these usually consist of Youtubers and mediaoutlets who are sympathetic to him. In short, their populist platforms have allowed for a previously unseen common ground for both men to work together – a sort of emotional understanding between both leaders. The Biden administration, on the other hand, constitutes a challenge to that understanding.

López Obrador was among the last world leaders to congratulate President-Elect Biden on his electoral win, grouping him with the likes of Brazil’s Bolsonaro, Russia’s Putin, and China’s Xi, though the latter congratulated Biden almost three weeks before Obrador. As reported by the New York Times, when Obrador finally brought himself to speak to the President-elect, he did not hesitate to show off his relationship with Trump. “I must mention that we do have a very good relationship with the now president of your country, Mr. Donald Trump”, he said. Obrador sees Biden as a potentially meddlesome President and seeks to push back any American involvement in what he considers Mexican affairs.  To add insult to injury, LópezObrador did not condemn the attack on the US Capitol on January 6th, choosing instead to criticize social media platforms for “censoring” President Trump. He even went as far as offering political asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks. Lopez Obrador has, in a way, set the stage for a strained relationship by repeatedly poking the United States in the eye.

Back in November, the United States’ Justice Department arrested and charged former Mexican Defense Secretary Salvador Cienfuegos with money laundering and distribution of narcotics. After political pressure was applied by the Obrador administration, the American prosecutors dropped the charges and General Cienfuegos was brought back to Mexico to undergo what was promised to be a meticulous investigation by Mexican prosecutors into the Justice Department’s allegations. Alongside this promise, Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, stated that bringing Cienfuegos back to Mexico and not do anything with him would be “suicide”.

Nevertheless, a week before Biden’s inauguration, Cienfuegos was exonerated by the Mexican government.

López Obrador accused American prosecutors of “fabricating” the allegations and acting “irresponsibly”. When met with criticism for his actions, he ordered the release of all classified evidence given to his government by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In just one tweet, Mexican authorities made public 750 pages of classified evidence. Washington expressed “disappointment” over the actions of LópezObrador’s government, with the Mexican President snapping back: “I could also say that I am disappointed in the work of the DEA.”

Regardless of who is right, this case reveals a highly disturbing reality: the future of the US-Mexico bilateral relationship will have an excess of politicking, and a lack of justness. The United States showed this by folding under pressure to give up Cienfuegos, and Mexico showed this by prioritizing political point scoring over the rule of law. An argument could, however, be made for the actions of López Obrador: either exonerating or releasing Cienfuegos presented political costs for the President. On the one hand, Mexico’s military has flourished under López Obrador, and has been given the most responsibility and power in recent memory. By prosecuting Cienfuegos, a man still deeply respected among the Mexican armed forces, the President risked alienating one of his main allies. On the other hand, by exonerating Cienfuegos, López Obrador put into disrepute what is an already fragile relationship with US law enforcement. Considering the President’s lack of interest in those outside his political base, he considered the latter to have a lesser political cost.

Allowing the Cienfuegos investigation to run its course would have given López Obrador the opportunity to prove he is different from his predecessors who he has repeatedly criticized. This was not the case.

Obrador’s striking similarities with President Trump and his unprecedented public showdown with the DEA marks a new era of non-cooperation. The Biden administration has therefore inherited a standoff with the Mexican government. And with Biden more likely to ask more of López Obrador than Trump ever did, it is yet to be seen whether Mexico will cooperate with the new administration or see them as a threat to their sovereignty. With an expected increase in immigration towards the United States from Central America in light of the pandemic and the end of Trump-era policies, immigration will be the first challenge where both leaders will be put to the test. Biden will need LópezObrador to effectively reinforce Mexico’s southern border in order to handle new migrant caravans, especially with the pandemic still battering the Americas. Though it is not expected for President Biden to strongarm López Obrador into action, what remains to be seen is whether Mexico will see Biden’s efforts as meddling in Mexican affairs.  

What López Obrador fears most is Biden’s administration meddling in his ambitious domestic agenda which includes the construction of a new 2 billion USD oil refinery and the revitalization of PEMEX – the state-owned oil company. The US Democratic Party has already called for greater cleaner energy investment and further enforcement of labor rights in Mexico, and these represent a threat to the promises made by Obrador to his political base. What we have seen, then, in López Obrador is perhaps a growing resentment of Americanism. By directly challenging the DEA, defending President Trump in lieu of condemning the Capitol attack, and offering asylum to Assange, LópezObrador has started to push back against any influence the Biden administration might have on his running of the country. If López Obrador can pass that resentment on to his base, then he is further justified in rejecting US influence.

The López Obrador-Trump era was marked by shared sentiments and political opportunism: López Obrador enforced Trumpist immigration policies and, in exchange, Trump did not criticize Obrador’s running of Mexico. This unspoken agreement allowed for both men to please their loyal bases, focus on implementing their respective domestic agendas, and portray a united front in the war on drugs. Biden will now have to walk a thin line between attempting to fix the institutional relationship with Mexico while ensuring that LópezObrador does not see it as interventionism. It is important, however, for both countries to overcome present challenges: if Mexico and the United States do not effectively form a united front against the war on drugs, the winners will be the drug cartels. If Mexico and the United States do not effectively form a united front in tackling immigration, the losers will be the millions of migrants risking their lives in the pursuit of a better life for them and their families. Perhaps what López Obrador will miss the most from Trump is a sentiment President Biden will probably not share with him: a mutual wish to leave each other alone.

Marco is a 3rd Year International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Mexico, he has a keen interest in multilateral organisations, trade, and Latin American affairs.

UN Security Council: Opportunities for Mexican Diplomacy

Source: https://www.enlacejudio.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/de_la_fuente.jpg

By: Luis Bosques

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao’.

Mexico has become a member of the United Nations Security Council, and now has the ability to consolidate itself as a force for change, and push its foreign policy in one of the most exclusive forums on the multilateral stage. 

In June 2020, the United Nations General Assembly elected five states to serve as non-permanent members of the Security Council for a two-year term. Mexico was elected for the fifth time to represent Latin America and the Caribbean at the UN’s most powerful body, as its mandate and powers to safeguard peace and security through legally binding decisions are exclusive to the Council. It is worth noting that the Security Council is composed of 15 members, ten of which rotate to occupy a non-permanent seat for two years, while the remaining five have permanent status, as well as the right to veto any decision. This privileged group is made up of China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia. 

Mexico's election to the major leagues of multilateralism would add one more victory for the nation’s foreign policy, and will add to its diplomatic advantage in the region. The diplomatic activism of the Foreign Secretary, Marcelo Ebrard has been marked by victories at the international level. Such is the case of the resolutions sponsored by Mexico on healthcare access in the context of the pandemic, and successfully electing candidates to multilateral organisations during 2019 and 2020, and more recently the election of Socorro Flores as the first female Mexican judge to the International Criminal Court.

Mexico has flexed its diplomatic muscle by obtaining the support of Latin American and Caribbean countries to occupy the region’s only seat available for this term, which was previously held by Dominican Republic. Trust in multilateralism and Mexican leadership can translate into a more valuable asset: influence. 

However, the influence that Mexico has exerted to get to a seat faces a different reality: the Council, its members and the international community are not the same as they were the last time the country held a seat on the Council. The work of the Security Council is complex and turbulent; it requires the sum of political wills, mainly of the permanent members, however, the trust between them has been worn down by the health crisis and their foreign policies. The influence of the Mexican agenda requires meticulous planning, and a degree of manoeuvre must be developed, as well as a risk calculation by the Permanent Mission, taking into consideration the latest reconfiguration and events within the international system. 

The change in US foreign policy from isolationist unilateralism to violent multilateralism puts the Mexican delegation in an uncomfortable position, who by tradition and constitutional attachment promotes the diplomatic route, non-intervention, legal equality of the States and self-determination. These foreign policy principles could be marginalised in situations such as those of Syria, Venezuela, Libya and the Sahrawi-Moroccan conflict, to which we add the Mexico-US bilateral relationship that can be put at risk, as happened in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, which Mexico did not support.

On the other hand, Russia and China have insisted that the Council discuss exclusively issues related to armed conflicts, so it will be necessary to outline a strategy that does not exclude Mexico's potential during discussions and ensure that other important issues are addressed, specifically those that the Sino-Russian bloc is reluctant to debate.

Despite these challenges, Mexico has unique opportunities to stand out during its membership. There are several opportunities where the Mexican agenda can be accommodated. At the beginning of this year, the foreign secretary, Marcelo Ebrard, adopted a feminist foreign policy (PEF, by its acronym in Spanish) that seeks to reduce gender inequality and provide a safe space for women in international relations. Countries such as France, Ireland and Norway, which are members of the Council also have a PEF, can promote and strengthen the gender agenda in issues of peace and security, sexual violence in armed conflict, the role of women in international relations and the role of the woman in resolving these issues. Mexico and Ireland are co-chairing the Group on Women, Peace and Security. 

Similarly, together with France, a reform has been promoted to limit the exercise of the right of veto in situations of humanitarian crisis that prevent the adequate intervention of the Council, seeking to de-paralyze its work and revitalize its mission. Likewise, the Movement Uniting for Consensus (UfC) or the Coffee Club, of which Mexico is a member, has sought to democratize the practices of the Security Council and maintain the status quo with regard to geographical representation. However, the UfC is also a counterweight to the group of four (G4), who are seeking a permanent seat for themselves. India, which in addition to being part of the G4, won the vacant seat for Asia-Pacific can also promote the reforms it seeks from within the Council.

Finally, the challenges and opportunities that Mexico has ahead require a careful calculation of action, especially regarding the most sensitive issues, where important interests converge. The marginalisation of an important space for dialogue and discussion must be avoided; the scenario of a demilitarised and more debatable Council could be attributed to Mexican influence and its diplomatic tradition.  On the other hand, Mexico is free to pursue its reformist and progressive agenda, even with allies. The Mexican membership is a rich opportunity that will serve to nurture, contribute and revitalize the Council. The next two years will define Mexico's foreign policy for the remaining years of Andrés Manuel’s government.

Luis is a Mexican student at Universidad de Monterrey and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in International Relations and Political Science & Public Administration. He enjoys writing about Mexican foreign policy, international politics, identity and government.

Bibliography

Gómez-Robledo Verduzco, A. (2001). La política exterior mexicana: sus principios fundamentales. Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, 1(1), 197-217. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487872e.2001.1.8

Hernández García, J. (2017). El Consejo de Seguridad y la iniciativa franco-mexicana para la restricción del uso del veto en caso de atrocidades en masa. Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, 110, 45-60. https://revistadigital.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/numeros/n110/hernandezgarcia.pdf

Instituto Matías Romero. (2020). Conceptualizando la política exterior feminista: apuntes para México. https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/545369/Nota_6-Poli_tica_exterior_feminista.pdf

Ruíz-Cabañas Izquierdo, M. (2020.). México en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas en el periodo 2021-2022. Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales. http://www.consejomexicano.org/multimedia/1592317479-153.pdf

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. (2020). Durante 2019 México obtuvo el número más alto de candidaturas electas a organismos multilaterales (Comunicado No. 001). https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/durante-2019-mexico-obtuvo-el-numero-mas-alto-de-candidaturas-electas-a-organismos-multilaterales

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. (2020). México cierra invicto en la ONU bienio 2019-2020. Socorro Flores es electa a la Corte Penal Internacional. (Boletín informativo). https://mision.sre.gob.mx/onu/index.php/sdp/boletines-de-prensa/1045-boletin-informativo-21-de-diciembre-de-2020-mexico-cierra-invicto-en-la-onu-bienio-2019-2020-socorro-flores-es-electa-a-la-corte-penal-internacional 

Vautravers-Tosca, G. y González-Valencia, A. (2012). La membresía de México en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Convergencia, 19(58), 111-131. http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/conver/v19n58/v19n58a5.pdf

Nicaragua: Why Its Authoritarian Manual Seems to be Written in Russian and Why This Matters

Image Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute

By: Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro

As an anti-imperialist ideologue in 1979, Daniel Ortega was revered as a champion of the Sandinista Revolution that brought freedom to Nicaragua by overthrowing the authoritarian Somoza regime. Now, in 2021, Ortega has fallen from grace and has impersonated the villainous political character he originally repudiated and ceaselessly fought against in the first place. Weakened rule of law, suppression of the free press, chronic nepotism, brazen violations of the Constitution, and a rhetoric that bifurcates Nicaraguan society amongst ‘loyalists’ and ‘foreign agents’ are the keys closing the return to democracy in the country. It is therefore unsurprising that the US former National Security Advisor, John Bolton, coined Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua as the “troika of tyranny” of Latin America.

 Democratic erosion in Nicaragua is not unprecedented. Ortega has served as the de facto leader of Nicaragua since 2007. In 2011, he secured the approval of the Supreme Court to run for a subsequent presidential term, and again, gained the approval from the Nicaraguan National Assembly to amend the constitution in 2014 so that he could secure the presidency in 2016 for a third time. On top of his institutional iron-grasp on power, his regime also violently suppressed mass protests in 2018 which featured opposition groups decrying the seemingly irreversible truncation of political and social freedoms. His grip on power has undoubtedly continued to ossify as he has gradually come to embody a 21st Century caudillo. 

 Nicaragua’s growing authoritarianism fits into a global trend characterised by the backsliding of democracy and the rise of hybrid and authoritarian regimes. It is when narrated within this context that Nicaragua’s dictatorial politics crescendo to a tangible concern about the future of democracy– particularly in Latin America. Worst of all, however, is that some of Nicaragua’s recently established buttons and levers used to stifle opposition and criticism eerily resemble practices used in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. ​

 The parallels between the two regimes allude to a newly emerging concept within political science known as ‘authoritarian learning’. According to a paper published by Hall and Ambrosio, “authoritarian regimes adopt survival strategies based upon the prior successes and failures of other governments”. The collapse of the USSR, for instance, which was catalysed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, signalled to the Chinese Communist Party at the time that, in order to prevent political downfall at home, media freedom would need to be circumscribed alongside associational life. Similarly, Cuba’s Raúl Castro is reportedly attempting to emulate the Chinese and Vietnamese politico-economic models to open the country’s economy to the global community whilst maintaining political control. 

 Considering the pressures Nicaragua faces from a growing grassroots opposition and a changing US-Latin America agenda driven by the Biden administration, it is reasonable to assume Ortega could be drawing inspiration from successfully entrenched authoritarian regimes like Russia. The most notable instantiation of this was the adoption of a draconian law in December of last year wherebyNGOs and foreign media outlets have to register as ‘foreign agents’ if they receive money from international organizations. At best, violators of the law face shutdown and the confiscation of property – a result which has already been observed with the shutting down of a defender of free press, the Fundación Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. At worst, they face unabated repercussions facilitated by Nicaragua’s weak rule of law. Curiously enough, the bill has been denoted as the ‘Putin’ law due to its uncanny resemblance with a law passed in Russia in 2012. The original Putin law forced organizations engaging in political activity receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents, even if the funding did not pay for any sort of political activities. 

 The objectives in Managua and Moscow are nearly carbon copies of each other – the respective foreign agent laws seek to ostracize civil society and suppress any budding sources of opposition against authoritarianism. As two strongmen who know a thing or two about political longevity, it seems that Ortega can extract lessons from Putin’s successful retention of power. For instance, Ortega is said to be weighing an amendment to Nicaragua’s constitution that would convert the country from a presidential to a parliamentary system in order to circumvent presidential limits by becoming the Prime Minister. Putin exercised a similar move in 2008 by becoming Russia’s Prime Minister, temporarily ceding the presidency to only recuperate it in 2012.

 Of greatest concern, however, are the reforms that have been made to directly undermine free and fair elections. After all, what is a democracy if, at its core, it does not have elections? In Nicaragua, the ‘Law in Defence of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace’ effectively prevents the opposition from running for election later this November. With the authority the law grants Ortega, he essentially has free reign in designating someone as ‘traitor to the homeland’ and hand out prison sentences as a result. On the other side of the same coin, following the Siberian city council election where Ksenia Fadeeva defeated Putin’s handpicked contender, opposition candidates can now be labelled on the ballot as ‘foreign agents’– an awkward label that can directly dissuade voters. 

 It is difficult to concretely discern if Ortega is, in fact, intentionally been taking notes on his Russian counterpart’s authoritarian behaviour. As Hall and Ambrosio admit, the reason why authoritarian learning is such an understudied concept is due to the near impossibility of collecting information about the paper trail that precedes the implementation of certain policies. But perhaps the other underlying reason is that, up until now, democracy had been the dominant political model to follow. The idea that democracy was the inevitable destination for all nations was a reigning dogma up until recently. This sanctification of democracy created a myopic focus on studying and promoting democracy whilst forgetting that democratic backsliding and erosion are symptoms that can sicken all political regimes that are –or were– on a democratizing path. 

 The parallels between Nicaraguan and Russian authoritarianism might indicate that the world has become safer for authoritarian regimes, meaning it is becoming increasingly more likely that they will have opportunities to learn from each other’s failures and successes. The November elections in Nicaragua, therefore, might become a breaking point for democracy in a region already surrounded by hybrid regimes like El Salvador and Honduras. If Ortega’s dictatorial hand continues to be raised victoriously, another chapter will be added to the manual of techniques that can be used by strongmen to further entrench their grip on power.

Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro is a second-year student of Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Originally Mexican, she is passionate about the political history of Latin America, particularly that of her home country. 

Bibliography

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