UN Security Council: Opportunities for Mexican Diplomacy
Source: https://www.enlacejudio.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/de_la_fuente.jpg
By: Luis Bosques
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao’.
Mexico has become a member of the United Nations Security Council, and now has the ability to consolidate itself as a force for change, and push its foreign policy in one of the most exclusive forums on the multilateral stage.
In June 2020, the United Nations General Assembly elected five states to serve as non-permanent members of the Security Council for a two-year term. Mexico was elected for the fifth time to represent Latin America and the Caribbean at the UN’s most powerful body, as its mandate and powers to safeguard peace and security through legally binding decisions are exclusive to the Council. It is worth noting that the Security Council is composed of 15 members, ten of which rotate to occupy a non-permanent seat for two years, while the remaining five have permanent status, as well as the right to veto any decision. This privileged group is made up of China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia.
Mexico's election to the major leagues of multilateralism would add one more victory for the nation’s foreign policy, and will add to its diplomatic advantage in the region. The diplomatic activism of the Foreign Secretary, Marcelo Ebrard has been marked by victories at the international level. Such is the case of the resolutions sponsored by Mexico on healthcare access in the context of the pandemic, and successfully electing candidates to multilateral organisations during 2019 and 2020, and more recently the election of Socorro Flores as the first female Mexican judge to the International Criminal Court.
Mexico has flexed its diplomatic muscle by obtaining the support of Latin American and Caribbean countries to occupy the region’s only seat available for this term, which was previously held by Dominican Republic. Trust in multilateralism and Mexican leadership can translate into a more valuable asset: influence.
However, the influence that Mexico has exerted to get to a seat faces a different reality: the Council, its members and the international community are not the same as they were the last time the country held a seat on the Council. The work of the Security Council is complex and turbulent; it requires the sum of political wills, mainly of the permanent members, however, the trust between them has been worn down by the health crisis and their foreign policies. The influence of the Mexican agenda requires meticulous planning, and a degree of manoeuvre must be developed, as well as a risk calculation by the Permanent Mission, taking into consideration the latest reconfiguration and events within the international system.
The change in US foreign policy from isolationist unilateralism to violent multilateralism puts the Mexican delegation in an uncomfortable position, who by tradition and constitutional attachment promotes the diplomatic route, non-intervention, legal equality of the States and self-determination. These foreign policy principles could be marginalised in situations such as those of Syria, Venezuela, Libya and the Sahrawi-Moroccan conflict, to which we add the Mexico-US bilateral relationship that can be put at risk, as happened in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, which Mexico did not support.
On the other hand, Russia and China have insisted that the Council discuss exclusively issues related to armed conflicts, so it will be necessary to outline a strategy that does not exclude Mexico's potential during discussions and ensure that other important issues are addressed, specifically those that the Sino-Russian bloc is reluctant to debate.
Despite these challenges, Mexico has unique opportunities to stand out during its membership. There are several opportunities where the Mexican agenda can be accommodated. At the beginning of this year, the foreign secretary, Marcelo Ebrard, adopted a feminist foreign policy (PEF, by its acronym in Spanish) that seeks to reduce gender inequality and provide a safe space for women in international relations. Countries such as France, Ireland and Norway, which are members of the Council also have a PEF, can promote and strengthen the gender agenda in issues of peace and security, sexual violence in armed conflict, the role of women in international relations and the role of the woman in resolving these issues. Mexico and Ireland are co-chairing the Group on Women, Peace and Security.
Similarly, together with France, a reform has been promoted to limit the exercise of the right of veto in situations of humanitarian crisis that prevent the adequate intervention of the Council, seeking to de-paralyze its work and revitalize its mission. Likewise, the Movement Uniting for Consensus (UfC) or the Coffee Club, of which Mexico is a member, has sought to democratize the practices of the Security Council and maintain the status quo with regard to geographical representation. However, the UfC is also a counterweight to the group of four (G4), who are seeking a permanent seat for themselves. India, which in addition to being part of the G4, won the vacant seat for Asia-Pacific can also promote the reforms it seeks from within the Council.
Finally, the challenges and opportunities that Mexico has ahead require a careful calculation of action, especially regarding the most sensitive issues, where important interests converge. The marginalisation of an important space for dialogue and discussion must be avoided; the scenario of a demilitarised and more debatable Council could be attributed to Mexican influence and its diplomatic tradition. On the other hand, Mexico is free to pursue its reformist and progressive agenda, even with allies. The Mexican membership is a rich opportunity that will serve to nurture, contribute and revitalize the Council. The next two years will define Mexico's foreign policy for the remaining years of Andrés Manuel’s government.
Luis is a Mexican student at Universidad de Monterrey and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in International Relations and Political Science & Public Administration. He enjoys writing about Mexican foreign policy, international politics, identity and government.
Bibliography
Gómez-Robledo Verduzco, A. (2001). La política exterior mexicana: sus principios fundamentales. Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, 1(1), 197-217. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487872e.2001.1.8
Hernández García, J. (2017). El Consejo de Seguridad y la iniciativa franco-mexicana para la restricción del uso del veto en caso de atrocidades en masa. Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, 110, 45-60. https://revistadigital.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/numeros/n110/hernandezgarcia.pdf
Instituto Matías Romero. (2020). Conceptualizando la política exterior feminista: apuntes para México. https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/545369/Nota_6-Poli_tica_exterior_feminista.pdf
Ruíz-Cabañas Izquierdo, M. (2020.). México en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas en el periodo 2021-2022. Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales. http://www.consejomexicano.org/multimedia/1592317479-153.pdf
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. (2020). Durante 2019 México obtuvo el número más alto de candidaturas electas a organismos multilaterales (Comunicado No. 001). https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/durante-2019-mexico-obtuvo-el-numero-mas-alto-de-candidaturas-electas-a-organismos-multilaterales
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. (2020). México cierra invicto en la ONU bienio 2019-2020. Socorro Flores es electa a la Corte Penal Internacional. (Boletín informativo). https://mision.sre.gob.mx/onu/index.php/sdp/boletines-de-prensa/1045-boletin-informativo-21-de-diciembre-de-2020-mexico-cierra-invicto-en-la-onu-bienio-2019-2020-socorro-flores-es-electa-a-la-corte-penal-internacional
Vautravers-Tosca, G. y González-Valencia, A. (2012). La membresía de México en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Convergencia, 19(58), 111-131. http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/conver/v19n58/v19n58a5.pdf
US 2020 Election: What Do the Results Mean for Mexico?
Source: https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/378237-protesters-shred-mexican-flag-during-trump-visit-to-border
By: Octavio Augusto Gutiérrez Salcedo
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao
Mexico and the US have always had a close relationship for almost everything. According to the State Department of the US, Mexico is the second largest trading partner and second-largest export market. When we talk about immigration there are approximately more than 36 million Hispanics from Mexican origin who live in the US. In another sector it has been calculated that more than 20 million Americans visit Mexico every year. When we analyse these facts, it can be said that the outcome of every US election is very important in every sector for Mexico and each outcome can change the landscape of the diplomatic relationship between both countries – this year’s election is not different.
The US election took place on the 3rd of November, between the Republican candidate and current president of the USA, Donald Trump, and the Democratic party candidate andformer vice-president of the USA, Joe Biden. After a week of re-counts and appeals from Donald Trump, the election was called for Joe Biden by the Associated Press. This is a radical turn in the relations between the US and Mexico as a new style of government will come into office. The new administration brings different ideas on foreign policy and the Mexican Government, under Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador,will have to adjust to the new circumstances and the different agendas that the Biden administration will follow in matters of the economy and also immigration.
The economic sector will face a complete change that will hopefully have a positive outcome for Mexico. Over the past 4 years there has been a lot of uncertainty on this matter something that hopefully will change in the upcoming years. Mexico is currently experiencing one of the biggest economic slumps in the history of the country. Due to this, the economic imbalance between the two countries (80 percent of Mexico’s exports go the US) was used by Donald Trump to put some pressure on Mexico over migration matters. Mexico also had to have Trump’s twitter notifications on since any day he could announce a new set of tariffs for Mexico. An expectation on Biden’s presidency around the world is the return to a more diplomatic and normal relationship between the US and the whole world. Mexico hopes that Biden will have a more reasonable and measured approach between both countries by stopping the public threats from Trump and changing it for a more normal negotiation as it was back in the last presidency.
A change in the Oval Office will also have an important outcome with other Latin American countries. It has been observed that Latin American countries tend to follow the United States actions and decisions. For instance, this was the case when Donald Trump said that Covid-19 was ‘not a big deal’ and the president of Brazil consequently agreed.Another example is when Trump pulled out of the Paris Agreement and Brazil said that they were analysing whether to follow him. In this light, a change in the Oval Office will be an important shift in the policy and approaches that Latin Americans countries will follow in the economic sector.
When we talk about the Immigration sector, Joe Biden is planning to do a complete shift as he plans to undue everything that Donal Trump did in his presidency –something that Mexico should be encouraged for. Under Donald Trump this sector has become one of the most talked, debated and criticised in the media and by academics. Donald Trump’s first campaign speech targeted Mexican migrants as he said that only “bad people and rapists” are being sent to the US. In addition, he planned for Mexico to pay for a wall in the border – something that was not delivered– as well as separating children from their parents and putting them in cages before being deported. The new administration of Biden will seek to heal the attacks of migrants in the US as it is explained in Biden’s 100 days plan. In his plan, Biden explains that he seeks to reinstate the DACA programme to protect undocumented children (dreamers) who attend school in the US so that they can continue their studies and receive funding. The DACA programme was one of the most successful initiatives in the Obama-Biden administration, but it was cancelled when Trump took office in 2016. Biden is also planning to stop the policies that allow migration officers to separate children from their parents. He wants to change this to a more humanitarian approach of keeping control of the border in accordance with Human Rights. Mexico and the rest of Latin American countries should feel relieved since this was an issue over the last 4 years that exacerbated the tension between Mexico and the US. The new policies and implementations under the upcoming government are promising and although deportations will not stop, this path is the one that must be followed to continue the strong relationship between both countries.
The US elections is one of the most important events of the year. The outcome of the election will change the landscape of diplomatic relationships between the United States and the rest of the world including Mexico. The return of the “normal politician” to the White House will be something that Mexico will have to adapt and align with so that both countries can have a prosper future in the uncertain times we are living. It will be interesting to see the first year of Biden’s term and the different approaches he will take in the matters of foreign policy. Even more will be how this will sit with President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and his plan to continue the “4ta Transformación” in Mexico. The changes in immigration and in the economic sector will hopefully make the countries resolve their differences so that they cantackle whatever they face in the next years. The pandemic has created a new world in which problems never seen before will urge the United States and Mexico to act in the most competent and efficient way. Both countries will have to work towards a better and closer relationship between them to ensure a better life for its people.
Sources:
https://amp.elfinanciero.com.mx/elecciones-eu-2020/que-puede-esperar-mexico-si-gana-biden
https://mexicobusiness.news/trade-and-investment/news/biden-vs-trump-what-does-it-mean-mexico
https://joebiden.com/immigration/#
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/u-s-hispanics-facts-on-mexican-origin-latinos/
https://www.statista.com/statistics/214780/number-of-us-tourists-visting-mexico/
Octavio is a 2nd year English Law and Spanish Law student at King’s College London. He enjoys debating and writing about sports and politics.
From Tlatelolco to Ayotzinapa: The Continuity of Impunity in Mexico
Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/world/americas/mexico-tlatelolco-massacre.html
By: Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.
Every 2nd of October, the streets of Mexico City reverberate with the echoing chants of indignation of students and alumni who march to commemorate those that were killed in 1968 in the Plaza of Tlatelolco at the hands of the state. The quintessential ‘No Se Olvida!’ is reproduced in a myriad of posters that aim to remind Mexican society of this chilling scar that has not yet scabbed as its perpetrators still have not been brought to justice. The 1968 Tlatelolco massacre was preceded by a summer of peaceful student protests, which saw demands for democratic rights that challenged a paternalistic quasi-dictatorship led by the Revolutionary Institutionalized Party (PRI). These protests worsened the anxiety of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, whose jitteriness stemmed from the impending inauguration of the 1968 Olympics in October. In the midst of the Cold War, Ordaz wanted to not only convince his Northern neighbor that a communist revolution was not festering in the heart and veins of his country, but that Mexico was a modernizing powerhouse that would become an economic role model in Latin America. Demands for democracy, in this context, wrongly became equated with dreams of replicating the Cuban Revolution at home– with disastrous consequences. With the whole world watching, students were silenced with bullets. The next morning, newswires reported on the weather and the tangible euphoria of the upcoming Olympics. Impunity, to this day, continues to permeate the memory of the 2nd of October.
It was with this indignation towards impunity that, in September of 2014, students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers College in Iguala, Guerrero set out to raise funds to organize a trip to Mexico City in time for the 2nd of October marches. It had become a tradition; a means of not only preserving historic memory, but of reminding the incumbent government that impunity does not go unnoticed despite its prevalence in daily political life and discourse in Mexico. As students mounted the buses, they would subsequently be halted by the federal police, and 43 of them would be handed to the Guerreros Unidos drug cartel and forcefully disappeared. Despite the continuing investigations by the attorney general's office and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), there has been no conclusive official verdict. Perhaps the most convincing assessment is by investigative journalist Anabel Hernández who found that the 43 students chose a bus loaded with $2 million worth of heroin, thus becoming a target of the cartels. The chilling connection between Tlatelolco and Ayotzinapa –particularly the fact both instances featured students as victims– creates a sombre forecast of the continued entrenchment of impunity across all state structural levels. Despite both phenomena happening at different times and for different reasons, there is perhaps a deep and inescapable continuity between the two.
Disentangling Impunity in Mexico
It certainly is disheartening and demoralizing to think about the continuity of impunity in Mexico– with resounding concern, the leading authorial figure of the 1968 Movement Elena Poniatowska asks “what is the future of a country that kills its students?”. However, this is not simply a question of an omnipotent, paternalistic, political force silencing the voices of students– this is directly disproven by the case of Ayotzinapa as the 43 had no affiliation with disruptive political activities. The continuity between the two is more nuanced than that– it is a two-fold phenomenon characterized by the stigmatization and disposability of the lives of lower socio-economic classes, and the loss of the state monopoly on violence.
Youth killings are –as has been established by now– not isolated incidents in Mexico. Whether it is 1968, Ayotzinapa, or femicides in Ciudad Juárez it is clear that it is a systemic and frequent social phenomenon. According to Sylvia Meichsner of the Open University, this can be explained by enabling structures that are fundamentally grounded on the stigmatization of certain socio-economic groups, especially lower-class ones. Meichsner posits that simplistic and inaccurate stereotypes are constructed in mass media and cultural industries, essentially creating stigmas that are overtly and covertly reproduced across all levels of society. Due to their material vulnerability and stigmatization, these groups may be victims of a delay in paperwork or a reprehensible refusal to investigate and prosecute crimes of which they are victims. Consequently, when these groups engage in political activism or demand justice, they are automatically labelled as ‘troublemakers’. What this constructs is an idea that their lives are disposable and do not create a dent in the Mexican social fabric.
The perhaps co-dependent explanation is that in recent years the state has lost its monopoly over violence, with Tlatelolco becoming the watershed moment that created a snowball effect wherein the state gradually lost control over its force. Sergio Aguayo, professor and researcher at the Colegio de México, reminds us that the raison d’être of the state according to social contract theory is to guarantee the security of the population and hence why it has a legitimate use of force. In this regard, “Tlatelolco and Ayotzinaparepresent two expressions of the same phenomenon”. In 1968, the purposeful lack of coordination and confusion between the Battalion Olimpia and the police led to a massacre. In Ayotzinapa, the connections between the federal police, the state, and the cartels have created a parallel state of sorts where the central government has no means of halting violence. Aguayo concludes that there is a feeling of helplessness that is derived from this loss of monopoly over violence– “neither the State protects us against criminals, nor does it care for us as victims”.
A Source of Hope
Impunity between 1968 and 2014 has undoubtedly been a continuous trend. However, there have been substantial changes between Tlatelolco and Ayotzinapa. Changes that, perhaps, embody a spark of hope. In an increasingly interdependent, globalized, international system, legitimacy is no longer just a question determined by players housed within sovereign borders. Human rights violations no longer go unnoticed, as they largely did in 1968. The creation of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI) by the IACHR and their investigation of Ayotzinapa in Mexico is something that certainly would not have happened back in 1968. Their refusal to accept the attorney general office’s verdict on the case of the 43 and to stand by their own assessment undermined the legitimacy of the government of President Enrique Peña Nieto. Unlike in 1968, the whole word is not just watching–it is judging.
Whilst Mexican channels of legal accountability are deficient and do not favor the needs of those that are most often victims of state and cartel violence (which could be considered interchangeable), another source of hope is the incredibly admirable resilience and endurance of activists who refuse to let memories of past, unpunished crimes fade into oblivion. Even though the generation that lived through 1968 is rapidly aging, the preservation of historical memory has ensured that the younger generations continue to chant ‘No Se Olvida!’ every 2nd of October and are empowered to take to the streets to demand justice for the 43. The constant protests and demands, alongside the access to international mechanisms of accountability, create a more hopeful forecast for justice.
The final, and possibly most politically contentious, source of hope is the diminishing power of the PRI. Both Tlatelolco and Ayotzinapa happened under the administration of the party and, in both periods, the incumbent refused to accept his responsibility and fault in state crimes. Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s anti-establishment agenda against graft and corruption might succeed in freezing the resources that fuel violence and impunity. He has also promised that “our back will never be turned towards young people anymore”. Perhaps as evidence of that promise is the recent reinstallation of the GIEI on the 6th of May 2020 after ceasing their investigation in 2016 due to substantial obstacles like the refusal of local and federal authorities to cooperate. As promising as this may sound, however, his leftist populism might just mean these are empty words. Regardless of whether he fulfils those promises, the ousting of the PRI in the 2018 election is a stark reminder that democracy has improved since 1968 and that the electorate can and will condemn impunity at the polls.
It would be naïve to say that impunity can be corrected in Mexico in the near future. It certainly will take more than one president’s anti-establishment administration to change that. However, the refusal of Mexican activists to cease protesting, demand justice, and take to the streets proves that these crimes do not go unnoticed. As the chants of ‘No Se Olvida!’are now followed by ‘Todos Somos Ayotzinapa’ there is a sense that grievances are connected, joined, and reinforced, creating powerful social resistance.
Fernanda is a second-year student of Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Originally Mexican, she is passionate about the political history of Latin America, particularly that of her home country.
Bibliography
Diario Oficial de la Federación. “DOF - Diario Oficial de La Federación.” Www.Dof.Gob.Mx, 25 June 2019, www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5564187&fecha=26/06/2019. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.
García Navarro, Lulu. “What Happened To Mexico’s Missing 43 Students In ‘A Massacre In Mexico.’” NPR.org, 21 Oct. 2018, www.npr.org/2018/10/21/658900014/what-happened-to-mexicos-missing-43-students-in-a-massacre-in-mexico.
Malkin, Elisabeth. “50 Years After a Student Massacre, Mexico Reflects on Democracy.” The New York Times, 1 Oct. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/world/americas/mexico-tlatelolco-massacre.html.
Meichsner, Sylvia. “Ayotzinapa Shows How Killings and Disappearances of the Young in Mexico Are Enabled by Precarity, Prejudice, and Impunity | LSE Latin America and Caribbean.” LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog, 26 Sept. 2019, blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2019/09/26/ayotzinapa-shows-how-killings-and-disappearances-of-the-young-in-mexico-are-enabled-by-precarity-prejudice-and-impunity/. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.
OEA. “CIDH Saluda Avances En La Investigación En El Caso Ayotzinapa.” Www.Oas.org, 1 Aug. 2009, www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2020/158.asp. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.
Poniatowska, Elena, and Helen R Lane. Massacre in Mexico. New York, Viking Press, 1975.
The 43. Directed by Paco Ignacio Taibo, Netflix, 2019.
Wright, Melissa W. “Visualizing a Country without a Future: Posters for Ayotzinapa, Mexico and Struggles against State Terror.” Geoforum, vol. 102, June 2019, pp. 235–241, 10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.10.009. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.
Zepeda, José. “Mexico in Helplessness, from Tlatelolco to Ayotzinapa.” OpenDemocracy, 16 Nov. 2016, www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/mexico-in-helplessness-from-tlatelolco-to-ayotzinapa/. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.
Transnational Crime: Why Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has not and will not put an end to the War on Drugs
Image Source: https://www.dw.com/en/mexicos-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-marks-first-100-days-in-office/a-47839512
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.
By: Maria Ascencio
Mexico appears to be on the brink of change as new leftist president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) announced the end of the country’s 13 year long War on Drugs on January 30th 2019. The reality of the situation, however, is that AMLO has not and will not put an end to the war on drugs. As a matter of fact, there is not a single administration in Mexico that will ever be capable of putting an end to this issue. The reason stems from the fact that Mexico’s war on drugs is only but a result of a much more dangerous and complex security threat that has become imbedded within the country’s state institutions; transnational crime.
Mexico’s Problem with Drugs under the context of Transnational Crime
To understand Mexico’s current problem with drug-related criminal activity, it is imperative to understand the nature of transnational crime. In 2000, the United Nations in its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, came to define the concept as “any criminal activity that is conducted in more than one state, planned in one state but perpetuated in another, or committed in one state where there are spill-over effects.”[1] The majority of cases of transnational crime make reference to organized criminal activities, that is, where there are factual indications that an organized and profit-driven criminal structure is involved. These structures oftentimes become entrenched within a country’s institutions, using corruption to extend their influence into the upper reaches of the state and thus shield themselves from law enforcement. While not all organized crime is transnational, there have always been growing incentives for criminal enterprises to operate across national borders due to differences in the supply and demand of illegal goods and services amongst countries. It is because of this that any effective strategy must be comprised of strong and robust national initiatives, accompanied by increased cooperation efforts amongst all states who are affected.
In Mexico, this definition is followed to the letter. Over time, drug consumption and control policies in the United States have played a large role in the scope and longevity of Mexico’s drug trade. As early as 1920, harsh laws and regulations during the era of Prohibition saw a tremendous spike in demand for alcohol and other narcotics, which lead to the creation of black markets south to the border. These illicit markets provided vast amounts of money to those willing to participate, and continued to incentivize individuals to increase production.[2] Throughout the following decades demand both in Mexico and the US continued to rise, which allowed illicit drug markets to reach epic proportions. Today, there are approximately 6-8 drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that enjoy dominant influence throughout Mexico, all of which are engaged in a battle for supremacy over the illicit trade market.
Why is this a problem? Violence and weak institutions
As outlined, transnational criminal organizations have the ability to become entrenched within a state and its institutions. In Mexico’s DTO’s have earned so much power and influence that it has become easier for politicians and members of the state to collude and negotiate with them, rather than dealing with them, resulting in an culture of impunity and corruption.[3] Equally, observers have noted that the excessive use of violence of some of Mexico’s DTO’s in their battle for supremacy, might be considered exceptional by the typical standards of organized crime.[4] Beheadings, car bombs, extortions, forced disappearances, homicides, rape, mass executions, violent robberies, these are only a few of the many casualties that are seen in Mexico’s headlines every day.
Has there been any past approaches to deal with the issue? Why have they failed?
Previous approaches to deal with Mexico’s DTO’s have failed for a number of reasons. Firstly, because bilateral efforts have been extremely limited. The United States has focused more on strengthening the security of its southern border and re-drafting its immigration policies, rather than on addressing the root issue and reduce the demand of narcotics. Co-operation with Mexico has been limited to the provision of financial assistance and the training of military and police personnel, but nothing has been done to engage in capacity-building processes designed to strengthen Mexico's rule of law. [5] Secondly, Mexico’s government responses have wrongly focused on targeting individuals, when efforts should have been focusing on targeting the drug market itself. Yet again, not much more can be expected given the imbedded corruption, incompetence and weakness of the state.
The New Administration: Why AMLO’s “new” strategy is doomed to fail
Mexico’s new president has surprised everybody by declaring the end of the long War on Drugs and announcing what he has called a new and revolutionary plan to tackle DTO’s, which includes the following promises:
• A strategy to tackle corruption amongst institutions
• Social programs that will keep young people out of the reach of organized crime
• Taking troops off the street
• Amnesty for drug kingpins and other delinquents
To all of this, there are a number of missing pieces and limitations that, unfortunately, set AMLO’s strategy to failure. The undiscriminated and savage character of Mexico’s DTO’s has demonstrated that taking troops off the street as a preliminary measure only facilitates the use of violence, as depicted by the increase in kidnappings and homicides in AMLO’s first months in office.[6] In the end, lawmakers from AMLO’s party, MORENA, have opted to keep soldiers on the frontlines, along with the creation of a national guard that combines military and civilian police under a single military command.[7] This certainly does not seem too far off from what President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) did at the beginning of his term, when he ordered the deployment of troops to carry out the capturing of high-value criminals, a controversial strategy that promoted more instability and violence.
Giving amnesty to drug kingpins and delinquents is, firstly, an unpopular policy amongst the many Mexicans whose lives have been affected by cartel violence. While amnesty does not imply “forgiving and forgetting” but “reconciliation and dialogue”, it is hard to imagine how AMLO might advocate for this giving the deep grievances that exist in society.[8] Additionally, giving amnesty is just another policy that focuses on individuals rather than on the market itself. The only difference is that, unlike Calderon and Peña Nieto, AMLO’s successors, the new president is looking to reconcile rather than isolate drug kingpins from society. The drug market and the rewards that come from it, however, will continue to exist, and different groups will continue to compete, most likely using violent means, over that market.
Social programs for the youth and a strategy to tackle corruption amongst institutions are vital for a long-term strategy to fight drug trafficking and corruption, but six years is simply not enough time for AMLO to make any significant changes.
Lastly, it must be re-emphasized that this is not a security threat that is confined to Mexico’s borders. Not a single of these proposals can prove to be effective if there is nothing done to the drug trade market. There need to be efforts to regulate and decrease demand for narcotics across the northern border. For any of AMLO’s proposals to work, he would have to push President Trump to come up with a comprehensive drug strategy. However, it seems that he is much more concerned with the building of his long-promised wall and the deportation of illegal migrants.
Unfortunately for AMLO, but ultimately for all Mexicans, it seems that the new strategy will not give fruits, and that Mexico is set for yet another period of violence, instability and uncertainty.
Maria is a second year International Relations Student at King’s College, the Latin America Editor for IR Today and the Editor in Chief of El Cortao.