Latin American Protests: Not the 'Forgotten' Continent After All

Image Source: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/03/americas/five-keys-latin-america-protests-romo-intl/index.html

By: Paula Arrus

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

A trip down memory lane

Alfonso Quiroz in his book ‘Corrupt Circles’ examines the history of Peruvian corruption dating back to the arrival of the Conquistadors and the subsequent colonial period, creating a microcosm of the history of Latin America. As colonialists took over different territories and established their own conception of ‘states’, they also installed a mindset in the elites that politics was a zero-sum game that favoured the state over the population. Quiroz reveals that corruption has been inherent to Peru’s state institutions, transmitting a lack of public confidence and discontent on how democracy has been implemented. Even though Quiroz contends that corruption has been perpetrated by Peruvians and the international community’s inaction to confront it, recent protests in Latin America demonstrate that change will not be achieved without a fundamental overhaul of the region’s state institutions. Meanwhile, the latter will continue to be tainted by scandals and deceit:  two features Latin Americans have become familiar with over time. Recent protests embody these ‘forgotten populations’ and have resulted in large sections of Latin Americans being continuously spurned by the same state institutions that dishonestly claim to represent them.

Latin America’s current political and economic environment has a taste of its first ‘lost decade’ in the 1980s Debt Crisis. With the rise of neoliberalism in the 1960s and 70s, various Latin American countries borrowed large amounts of money from international financial organisations such as the IMF and World Bank in order to industrialize. These loans were allowed due to rising commodity prices which induced economic growth and increased revenues for Latin American states. However, during the late 1970s and early 80s, the region’s debt to commercial banks soared and a vicious borrowing cycle materialized, with external debt reaching over 50% of the region’s total GDP in 1983 of $315bn, quadruple from the $75bn in 1975.

Latin America had embarked in an economic rollercoaster that started and ended with a vertical drop. Increased oil prices incited countries to borrow more money in order to cover rising costs. However, high interest rates in the US and Europe plus worsening exchange rates with the US dollar reduced Latin American states’ purchasing power: they began to owe more than what they initially borrowed. The numerous sovereign debt defaults that occurred in the following years resulted in the interventionist period by the IMF who created conditional loans to Latin American states in exchange for alterations in their domestic policies. A substantial change was a significant reduction in government spending despite unemployment and inflation rising to high levels, and real wages reducing dramatically. Consequently, the inequality gap extended as poverty increased and countries became more preoccupied with paying what they owed, making it difficult to save turbulent economies.

Latin America’s history for the second half of the 20th century built considerable social discontent that is resounding of the protests we see today. The IMF was increasingly seen as the neo-imperialist power acting on self-interest as their reforms produced large social costs and consolidated Latin America’s dependency on the developed states. In 2014, commodity prices dropped again and Latin America’s economic activity declined. The middle class stopped receiving new members and decreasing social upgrading reduced overall confidence in the economies, driving away investments and growth.

Latin Americans have had enough

2019 has not been the year for Latin American countries. The progressive awareness that Latin America’s failed institutions were not delivering the Western promise of democracy and increased socioeconomic opportunities has afflicted the region with nation-wide social protests. Argentina is back with a Peronist-Kirschner government while Mexico continues to suffer from drug cartel violence and populism. Ecuador has reacted strongly against pro-IMF policies adopted by President Lenin Moreno that effectively got rid of an oil subsidy to receive a loan. Six month-long protests in Haiti erupted from high inflation and general discontent over redundant government corruption. With protests diffusing into Colombia in late November, it is clear to say that populations in Latin America have been emboldened by their neighbouring counterparts, forming their very own domino effect permeated with anger and intolerance against failing governments.

Left and right protests have smeared the region in response to weak economic growths, rising inequalities and overall discontent with states’ ‘democratic’ institutions. GDP per capital and living standards have declined substantially as real GDP growth has been a mere 0.8% over the last 6 years. Latin America remains the most unequal region in the world as their legacy of colonialism built enduring political and economic structures designed to benefit only a few. Monica de Bolle, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, conceptualised social protests in the region as clear reactions to changing tolerances for socioeconomic inequalities. While many Latin Americans see their elite counterparts get richer, they also expect an improvement in their living standards. It is this unfulfilled prospect that has driven them to the streets.

Violent protests, particularly in Chile, are reminiscent of failed promises by governments to enlarge social spending, reinstate public confidence and increase political transparency. Rising inequalities and unsuccessful economic policies enticed Chileans to protest against President Sebastián Piñera’s right-wing government. Moreover, Bolivia’s nation-wide uprising protesting the fraudulent presidential election forced Evo Morales to renounce the presidency after 14 years in power. Despite the contrasting differences in both countries’ economies and political systems, these protests can be traced back to broader discontents that have swamped Latin American populations.

After the end of the commodities’ boom in 2014, Latin American governments could not keep spending on welfare systems, programs to reduce poverty and on redistributing incomes. Rather, all the issues they failed to tackle during their prosperous incumbencies are now the factors that are hampering Latin American development, such as the lack of investment on education and infrastructure to improve long-term economic competitiveness. These protests embody Latin Americans’ dissatisfaction with the social contracts they reluctantly live in. While protests may have emerged by triggering causes such as raising metro fares in Chile, these movements encapsulate everything that is wrong with their societies and political systems.

What’s next?

Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Chile are still on path to achieve growth rates between 2-3%, while Bolsonaro’s economic reform in Brazil gives hope to the country. Nevertheless, Michael Stott from the Financial Times argued that Latin America will face stronger challenges in the nearby future as IMF world economic forecasts showed that the region will only grow 0.2% in the following year. Similarly, James Bosworth, founder of political-risk consultancy Hxagon, claims that ‘governments are trapped and there will be more violent protests in 2020’ (Bosworth, 2019) as new administrations gaining power will face increased pressured to achieve quick positive change while being constrained by a lack of resources.

The near term future looks grim mainly because Latin American countries in the past were able to discourage protests by maintaining stable economic performances thanks to a strong global economy which is not the case anymore. Alberto Ramos, head of Latin American economics at Goldman Sachs, stated that Latin America is nearly missing everything a region would need to prosper in the nearby future: ‘it doesn’t invest enough, save enough nor educate well enough’ (Stott, 2019). The discontent and blatant anger will prevail until change is enacted. The future will likely bring new elections for many countries, yet it can be expected most populations will vote for the party who promises to do exactly the opposite of what current governments are providing. And this is far from reassuring.

However, due to the social unrest and the extraordinary formation of a middle class, there is a strong need for institutional reform and better public infrastructure in terms of transportation, education and basic health services, or the region will face more and more unrest. There is a very good opportunity for a new generation of politicians to take control and restore public confidence by overhauling the existing political structures. Peru will be the first in line with congressional elections in January 2020.

It looks like Latin America won’t be the ‘forgotten continent’ after all and let’s hope that the region can be restored in the years to come.

Paula is a second year IR student from Peru with a strong interest in Latin American politics and economics. She enjoys writing thought-provoking pieces about current affairs and the future of our world.

Chile in Flames: How Soaring Metro Prices Have Led to Social Revolt

Image Source: http://www.diarioeldia.cl/region/actriz-ovallina-captura-marcha-mas-grande-chile-en-emblematica-fotografia

By: Tommy O’Donnell

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Chile is often touted as South America’s most prosperous and stable nation. Its high-income economy, high living standards and leading Latin American figures in human development, economic freedom and low perception of corruption have helped develop Chile’s international reputation into one of repute and distinction. So, this begs the question; why are the streets of Chile currently sullied with political anger, burning buses and military presence? And furthermore, how did this all transpire from a simple hike in metro fares?

For those of us studying at King’s, I’m sure we have once or twice looked at the train timetable in a tube station and groaned at seeing ‘severe delays’ flashing before us, but the fury we may occasionally feel towards the Circle line cannot be compared to the current Chilean reality. So, let’s start with the background: on 1st October, the Panel of Public Transport Experts notified the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications of the adjustment to Santiago’s metro and bus fares, something which is carried out on a monthly basis using an automatic calculation formula. This is done by evaluating multiple circumstances, with October’s adjustments specifically citing the values of fuel, the US dollar and the euro, as well as the consumer price index1 — AKA super complicated stuff that is far too advanced for my economically illiterate brain. The result? An approximate 4% hike in fares. This means that the monthly cost of public transport per person would be 13.8% of the minimum wage, a figure which is much higher than other major Latin American cities such as Buenos Aires, Mexico City and Lima, and a bit of a bank breaker if you’re a consistent metro or bus user.

Some commentators, however, cite other rationale behind the fare hikes. For example, former Minister Paola Tapia has brought up the acquisition of a new fleet of electric buses without tender, as well as the suspension of the new tender for bus services—decisions which were made by the incumbent government, led by President Sebastián Piñera. Tapia implies that the fare hikes are a result of irresponsible money management by the government, and not just the factors cited by the transport experts.

So how did we get to the point where we are seeing burning buses and multiple deaths? Well, it all started on 7th October when a campaign to dodge metro fares in protest of the hikes was started by secondary-school students in the country’s capital. Their message of ¡Evade! caught on with the general public, and a week later stations were being closed off to passengers after reports of violence. As the days went by, the violence continued to escalate, leading to the vandalisation of stations, destruction of public property as well as subsequent arrests and increased station closures.

Tensions reached a boiling point on 18th October when the police responded to barricades formed by protestors in downtown Santiago with water cannons and tear gas. Simultaneously, attacks were taking place at nearly every one of the city’s 164 metro stations, leading to a complete suspension of the metro system. As if these events weren’t enough, the headquarters of Enel Generación Chile, an electric company, was affected by a very substantial fire, leading to severe damages.

Here comes the part that started to get people really angry. During these events, Piñera was not in his presidential offices working hard to resolve the crisis, but instead he was sittin’ back with a slice at the birthday party of one of his grandchildren in one of Santiago’s most expensive pizza parlours. After his tone-deaf luxurious meal, he then addressed the nation and declared a 15-day state of emergency in Santiago, bringing armed forces to the streets of the capital.

This did not deter the people of Santiago, and it in fact sparked a fire under the rest of the country; states of emergency were gradually declared in regions outside of the capital and curfews imposed. And even though Piñera announced the cancellation of the fare hikes and the creation of a representative ‘dialogue panel’, the people of Chile were not satisfied, remaining on the streets past curfew and continuing to protest.

The President clearly had not learned his lesson, as in his next address he added fuel to the fire by saying the country was “at war with a powerful and implacable enemy”. Now, I’m not Chilean, but I know if my Head of State called me a “powerful and implacable enemy” it would only make me even more implacable. The people of Chile seemingly felt the same way as they continued to take to the street day after day and night after night, leading up to the protests’ climax on 25th October when over a million citizens took to the streets to protest against Piñera’s premiership and demand his resignation5. For context, that’s over 5% of the entire population of Chile. However, Piñera and the protesters must have got their wires crossed, because instead of resigning from his own post, the President instead dismissed every single one of his cabinet members. He said this was in order to “restructure [his] cabinet to confront these new demands”.

So now here we are. This is the worst civil unrest in Chile since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship, and with 21 dead, 2,500 injured and 2,840 arrested, the scale of this social revolt cannot be understated. It may have begun with metro fares, but it has led to a much wider discussion about equality and fairness in Chilean society. So, is there an end in sight? At the moment, we don’t know. Although the original goal of reversing the fare hikes has been met, and Piñera has additionally promised higher taxation on the rich and better pensions for the whole population7, there still remain many demands which are yet to be addressed; reforms in education and healthcare; the increasing of the minimum wage and wages in general; his own resignation.

All of the above would be seen as a severe upheaval in any nation, but the elephant which remains in the room is the country’s Constitution. Written by Chile’s former dictator Augusto Pinochet, the Constitution is a huge point of contention for the hundreds of thousands of protesters on the streets of Chile. The Constitution is extremely favourable towards safeguarding private property which has led to situations such as the privatisation of water companies… something which is very problematic for a country experiencing severe droughts — but I digress. Protesters see the document as a roadblock to real and long-lasting social change; how can the rights of everyday Chileans be guaranteed when the Constitution directly contradicts their goals? As you can imagine, abandoning and re-writing a constitution is not simple, especially in a time of such turmoil. Piñera is already severely weakened in his current political state, and the uncertainty of a new, constituent assembly-written Constitution is certainly not in his favour. So… what happens now? I have no idea, and frankly neither does anyone else. Piñera could cave to the protesters’ demands leading to the composition of a new constitution and revolutionary social reform, the likes of which have not been seen since the fall of Pinochet. On the other hand, he could stick to his guns and risk the continuation and escalation of the protests. Or perhaps his new cabinet and their proposals will be enough to appease the Chilean people. Who knows! Much like the rest of global politics at the moment, what happens next is anyone’s guess, and the only certainty is uncertainty.

Transnational Crime: Why Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has not and will not put an end to the War on Drugs

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Image Source: https://www.dw.com/en/mexicos-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-marks-first-100-days-in-office/a-47839512

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

By: Maria Ascencio

Mexico appears to be on the brink of change as new leftist president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) announced the end of the country’s 13 year long War on Drugs on January 30th 2019. The reality of the situation, however, is that AMLO has not and will not put an end to the war on drugs. As a matter of fact, there is not a single administration in Mexico that will ever be capable of putting an end to this issue. The reason stems from the fact that Mexico’s war on drugs is only but a result of a much more dangerous and complex security threat that has become imbedded within the country’s state institutions; transnational crime.

Mexico’s Problem with Drugs under the context of Transnational Crime

To understand Mexico’s current problem with drug-related criminal activity, it is imperative to understand the nature of transnational crime. In 2000, the United Nations in its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, came to define the concept as “any criminal activity that is conducted in more than one state, planned in one state but perpetuated in another, or committed in one state where there are spill-over effects.”[1] The majority of cases of transnational crime make reference to organized criminal activities, that is, where there are factual indications that an organized and profit-driven criminal structure is involved. These structures oftentimes become entrenched within a country’s institutions, using corruption to extend their influence into the upper reaches of the state and thus shield themselves from law enforcement. While not all organized crime is transnational, there have always been growing incentives for criminal enterprises to operate across national borders due to differences in the supply and demand of illegal goods and services amongst countries. It is because of this that any effective strategy must be comprised of strong and robust national initiatives, accompanied by increased cooperation efforts amongst all states who are affected.

In Mexico, this definition is followed to the letter. Over time, drug consumption and control policies in the United States have played a large role in the scope and longevity of Mexico’s drug trade. As early as 1920, harsh laws and regulations during the era of Prohibition saw a tremendous spike in demand for alcohol and other narcotics, which lead to the creation of black markets south to the border. These illicit markets provided vast amounts of money to those willing to participate, and continued to incentivize individuals to increase production.[2] Throughout the following decades demand both in Mexico and the US continued to rise, which allowed illicit drug markets to reach epic proportions. Today, there are approximately 6-8 drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that enjoy dominant influence throughout Mexico, all of which are engaged in a battle for supremacy over the illicit trade market.

Why is this a problem? Violence and weak institutions

As outlined, transnational criminal organizations have the ability to become entrenched within a state and its institutions. In Mexico’s DTO’s have earned so much power and influence that it has become easier for politicians and members of the state to collude and negotiate with them, rather than dealing with them, resulting in an culture of impunity and corruption.[3] Equally, observers have noted that the excessive use of violence of some of Mexico’s DTO’s in their battle for supremacy, might be considered exceptional by the typical standards of organized crime.[4] Beheadings, car bombs, extortions, forced disappearances, homicides, rape, mass executions, violent robberies, these are only a few of the many casualties that are seen in Mexico’s headlines every day.

Has there been any past approaches to deal with the issue? Why have they failed?

Previous approaches to deal with Mexico’s DTO’s have failed for a number of reasons. Firstly, because bilateral efforts have been extremely limited. The United States has focused more on strengthening the security of its southern border and re-drafting its immigration policies, rather than on addressing the root issue and reduce the demand of narcotics. Co-operation with Mexico has been limited to the provision of financial assistance and the training of military and police personnel, but nothing has been done to engage in capacity-building processes designed to strengthen Mexico's rule of law. [5] Secondly, Mexico’s government responses have wrongly focused on targeting individuals, when efforts should have been focusing on targeting the drug market itself. Yet again, not much more can be expected given the imbedded corruption, incompetence and weakness of the state.

The New Administration: Why AMLO’s “new” strategy is doomed to fail

Mexico’s new president has surprised everybody by declaring the end of the long War on Drugs and announcing what he has called a new and revolutionary plan to tackle DTO’s, which includes the following promises:
• A strategy to tackle corruption amongst institutions

• Social programs that will keep young people out of the reach of organized crime
• Taking troops off the street
• Amnesty for drug kingpins and other delinquents
To all of this, there are a number of missing pieces and limitations that, unfortunately, set AMLO’s strategy to failure. The undiscriminated and savage character of Mexico’s DTO’s has demonstrated that taking troops off the street as a preliminary measure only facilitates the use of violence, as depicted by the increase in kidnappings and homicides in AMLO’s first months in office.[6] In the end, lawmakers from AMLO’s party, MORENA, have opted to keep soldiers on the frontlines, along with the creation of a national guard that combines military and civilian police under a single military command.[7] This certainly does not seem too far off from what President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) did at the beginning of his term, when he ordered the deployment of troops to carry out the capturing of high-value criminals, a controversial strategy that promoted more instability and violence.

Giving amnesty to drug kingpins and delinquents is, firstly, an unpopular policy amongst the many Mexicans whose lives have been affected by cartel violence. While amnesty does not imply “forgiving and forgetting” but “reconciliation and dialogue”, it is hard to imagine how AMLO might advocate for this giving the deep grievances that exist in society.[8] Additionally, giving amnesty is just another policy that focuses on individuals rather than on the market itself. The only difference is that, unlike Calderon and Peña Nieto, AMLO’s successors, the new president is looking to reconcile rather than isolate drug kingpins from society. The drug market and the rewards that come from it, however, will continue to exist, and different groups will continue to compete, most likely using violent means, over that market.

Social programs for the youth and a strategy to tackle corruption amongst institutions are vital for a long-term strategy to fight drug trafficking and corruption, but six years is simply not enough time for AMLO to make any significant changes.

Lastly, it must be re-emphasized that this is not a security threat that is confined to Mexico’s borders. Not a single of these proposals can prove to be effective if there is nothing done to the drug trade market. There need to be efforts to regulate and decrease demand for narcotics across the northern border. For any of AMLO’s proposals to work, he would have to push President Trump to come up with a comprehensive drug strategy. However, it seems that he is much more concerned with the building of his long-promised wall and the deportation of illegal migrants.

Unfortunately for AMLO, but ultimately for all Mexicans, it seems that the new strategy will not give fruits, and that Mexico is set for yet another period of violence, instability and uncertainty.

Maria is a second year International Relations Student at King’s College, the Latin America Editor for IR Today and the Editor in Chief of El Cortao.