Disorder and Regression: COVID-19 in Bolsonaro's Brazil

Source: https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2020/06/19/brazil-one-million-coronavirus-cases-matt-rivers-pkg-intl-vpx.cnn

By: JP Tavares

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Firing Health Ministers, threatening the supreme court and calling for the arming of his supporters; Bolsonaro appears to be flirting with the return of the dictatorship. His erratic and impulsive behaviours seem to be a vile attempt to keep his supporters mobilized, armed and angry. 

In Bolsonaro’s own words, this might just be a “little flu”, but as of now, one Brazilian citizen dies of COVID-19 every minute, as death tolls surpass 1,400 per day. Meanwhile, the WHO has claimed that the country is the new epicentre of the epidemic. Even so, the utter scale of this tragedy was unwarranted, as no country has grossly mismanaged and under reported the pandemic as Brazil has. Likewise, the government’s priority has shifted to discrediting democratic institutions, while advancing with deforestation, and defending hydroxychloroquine as a weak and dangerous solution to re-open the economy.

The executive has politicized science and ignored the epidemic, claiming to be protecting the economy while ridiculing the WHO and insulting the efforts of governors and mayors who fought for social-distancing. One would ask, who in their right mind would actively pursue to worsen and underreport a pandemic? And as no efforts are made, what are they possibly busy or occupied with? Here’s a rundown.

Delegitimizing democratic institutions to protect his allies from persecution

Brazil’s controversial Sérgio Moro, the Judge responsible for the “Lava Jato” corruption trials, quit his job as Bolsonaro’s Minister of Justice. Moro announced his resignation as Bolsonaro sought to make a political interference in the Federal Police, by replacing its superintendent. He appealed to courts, claiming that the interference aimed to control an investigation which targets 29 of Bolsonaro’s allies for the illicit spread of fake news. 

Moro’s evidence of a politicized interference relied on a recording of a closed Ministerial Cabinet meeting, which gathered Bolsonaro’s ministers to discuss their concerns and the pandemic. To assess his claim, Supreme Court Judge Celso de Mello released the footage of the meeting, uncovering far more than what was expected: These include calls for arming the population, imprisoning governors, closing the Supreme Court and making advances on deforestation and environmental deregulation. If anything, this meeting made the government’s attitudes clear, as their priorities lied closer to attacking democratic institutions, rather than solving this health crisis.

Bolsonaro’s rebuttal argued that Moro would have agreed to meddling, so long as he was appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court, further clouding the moral reliability of both political figures. However, Political Analysts like Cleyton Monte, argue that Judge Moro’s inability and failure of maintaining his image as an anti-corruption national hero, has led him to jump ship. 

So how does a Ministerial Meeting, Fake News, and Coronavirus link together?

In the Ministerial Meeting, Bolsonaro claimed “I want the people to be armed! Armed people shall never be enslaved! (...) Why am I arming the people? Because I don’t want a dictatorship! And we can’t hold it any longer! Is that not true?”. Bolsonaro is partly referring to his inability to act independently, given a decision taken by the Supreme Court, which ruled that he could not interfere with State decisions over social distancing and quarantine. Reflecting this same attitude, Bolsonaro has attended rallies calling for the return of the AI-5, a decree from the past dictatorship, which institutionalized torture, closed congress, and gave full autonomy for the executive to interfere where it so pleased. 

It seems that Bolsonaro’s interventions in the federal police, threats to the Supreme Court, and calls for armament, are all tactics to rally and radicalize his loyal supporters, known (jokingly) by the opposition as the “bolsominions”. To this end, it comes as no surprise that Bolsonaro recently transferred 83,9 million reais to his ministry of propaganda, all of which were diverted from crucial cash transfer programs. His image, alleged patriotism and fake news seem to be the only cornerstones that sustain his tightly knit electoral base, supporters which fanatically defend his plea to reopen the economy.

In attending these public events to defend his image and discredit the Supreme Court, he has downplayed the consequences of COVID-19, while convincing his supporters that any opposition to the executive are anti-patriotic, socialist coalitions against Brazil’s growth. The ‘downplaying’ of the pandemic is escalated by the severe under-reporting of COVID-19 deaths, in fact, notary offices have registered an increase of 1,035% in deaths by respiratory diseases, but not of COVID-19 (these values rise as high as 7,000% in states like Pernambuco). Together with the University of São Paulo, Epidemiologist Paulo Lutofo claims that deaths are 168% higher than reported in the city of São Paulo. If anything, these statistics suggest that the pandemic is being severely under-tested and under-reported in Brazil.

Tragically, the Brazilian cities which have suffered the most are dense, with a long history of marginalizing and clustering the poor to precarious living conditions in the hills, serving as a dangerous and unmanageable environment to contain the pandemic. Due to this, under-reporting and under-testing suggests that the pandemic has been far more dangerous than is made visible. What exacerbates this issue is Bolsonaro’s decree that declares civil construction, gyms, beauty salons and other non-essential services as “essential”, meaning that poorer workers from the favelas risk bringing the pandemic back to their communities. Reflecting this same spirit, Bolsonaro had blocked the entry of 68 ventilators into the state of Maranhão, claiming to desire to distribute them (although having left them idle for a month) until the decision was overturned by the Supreme Court.

Hypocrisydroxichloroquine, The Ministry of Health Merry-go-Round and Environmental Mayhem

Not only has the executive disregarded the pandemic, but many of Bolsonaro’s supporters take it a step further and claim that COVID-19 is nothing but a communist hoax (which is also a belief of Ernesto Araújo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs), or a plan to destabilize the Brazilian government. The irony, however, is that the same people which discredit the existence of the virus, argue for its treatment with hydroxychloroquine. This treatment is particularly controversial as there is no evidence that it may cure the virus, yet there are trials which point out that there are dangerous, and even deadly side-effects.

According to Luiz H. Mandetta, one of the former health ministers, Bolsonaro’s support of the controversial treatment is a weak attempt to create confidence and tranquility to re-open the economy. Mandetta further comments that it has become the executive’s habit to politicize science, and claims to have resigned due to his differences with Bolsonaro’s beliefs. Since the start of the Pandemic, Brazil has had 3 Ministers of Health. One was fired and one resigned, as Bolsonaro has actively demanded them to fight against social-distancing, while supporting the use of hydroxychloroquine. 

This desperate attempt to restart the economy falls in line with Bolsonaro’s ultra-liberal rhetoric, backed by his right-hand man Paulo Guedes, and the environmental antichrist Ricardo Salles. The recording of the Ministerial Meeting also revealed that Salles, the minister of the environment, has used COVID-19 to make significant advances in environmental deregulation and deforestation. In fact, deforestation in the Amazon is 55% higher than it was at the same period last year. 

Unsurprisingly, the COVID-19 crisis has been a useful distraction to further develop deforestation while threatening democratic institutions. Meanwhile, Bolsonaro’s faithful support for hydroxychloroquine seems to be a weak attempt to reopen a fragile economy, aiming to please his ‘empresariado’ supporters (business class), who are facing the economic difficulties caused by social distancing.

Bolsonaro’s three pastimes: de-legitimize, rally, repeat.

While the country battles with a pandemic that kills one brazilian per minute, Bolsonaro’s focus lies in protecting his allies, arming and uniting his electoral base, and ensuring a return to the economy. In protecting hydroxychloroquine and attending public events, Bolsonaro is downplaying the effects of COVID-19, while mobilizing a fanatic base to defend his weak plea to reopen the economy.

Seemingly, the priority has become a process of de-legitimizing the supreme court as his allies are investigated, while discrediting the instructions of scientific authorities to downplay the effects of COVID-19. The gross mismanagement of the pandemic has shown Brazil’s blatant commitment to a conservative tradition, claiming to protect the business community, at the clear cost of its health system, its democratic institutions and the Brazilian people.

References

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJETL2NNFXE

https://www.conjur.com.br/2020-abr-30/moro-denunciado-comissao-etica-exigir-cadeira-stf

https://www.uol.com.br/ecoa/ultimas-noticias/2020/06/05/alertas-de-desmatamento-na-amazonia-crescem-em-ritmo-alarmante.htm

https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2020/05/15/mandetta-bolsonaro-quer-cloroquina-para-conseguir-reabrir-a-economia.htm

https://br.noticias.yahoo.com/bolsonaro-solicitou-repasse-dos-r-839-milhoes-do-bolsa-familia-a-secom-diz-ministerio-da-economia-224556362.html

https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/05/22/em-reuniao-ministerial-bolsonaro-diz-eu-nao-vou-esperar-foder-a-minha-familia-toda-assista.ghtml

https://istoe.com.br/bolsonaro-defende-armar-povo-e-diz-ser-facil-dar-golpe/

https://catracalivre.com.br/cidadania/carlos-e-eduardo-bolsonaro-atacam-stf-apos-acao-da-pf-contra-aliados/

https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/politica/2020/05/02/interna_politica,1143824/apoiadores-de-moro-e-manifestantes-pro-bolsonaro-brigam-em-curitiba.shtml

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-05/evangelicals-take-over-while-bolsonaro-s-allies-jump-ship

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/05/brazil-coronavirus-covid-19-virus-doctor

https://g1.globo.com/bemestar/coronavirus/noticia/2020/04/29/subnotificacao-4-indicadores-de-que-ha-mais-casos-de-covid-19-no-brasil-do-que-o-governo-divulga.ghtml

https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/27/americas/coronavirus-brazil-bolsonaro-timeline-intl/index.html

JP is a second year Political Economy Student at King's, who is particularly interested in Brazilian current affairs and economic policy.

Poem: We Are Too

Source: https://feminacida.com.ar/racismo-en-america-latina-relatos-en-primera-persona/

By Daniela Díaz Azcúnaga

We Are Too

Dear Latin American,

we judge the racist actions of the United States

not seeing we’re also the problem

of the very thing we condemn;

if we share the same reality

with a long history of pain

why do we claim diversity

if we also incite to reprehend.

We fought the privilege 

of a crown in our lands,

then, weightily,

say we don’t carry those same scars.

In all our innocent jokes

we wear our best disguise

pretending not to see the colour

on which we later act upon.

How foolish is our pride

rejoicing continental nationalism, 

the irony that Jose Martí’s aspiration 

would hide another caste system.

What kind of mind is odder

than ours who celebrate death,

and then do nothing when

our coloured family ends up there.

Afro descendant, Asian and Indigenous Latin Americans

we all claim to hold equal state,

but if they err, we reprehend

we still punish even if they do us well.

Latin America bleeds mestizaje,

it pumps life to our rich soils,

how can we then label someone too indigenous,

and Afro or Asian descendants not part of us. 

We are always so foolish,

our judging of others unfair;

while we blame one for cruelty

we’re here playing the same game.

Why must melanin 

come at an expense? 

Why must one be outraged

of dehumanising attacks on race?

Who has embraced

the greater blame of our deeds?

Them, who, put down with force, fall,

or their children, who have never been allowed to stand up?

Who is more to blame,

our brothers and sisters who blind 

themselves from their own racist judgment?

Or those who use that same judgment to blind others?

Do not claim to be outraged

at a situation of our own doing;

speak out to the injustice of others

but admit with courage our own coloured scars.

The cries in the United States give wings

to our brothers and sisters:

They have ignited the spark of an anger flame

We now have the opportunity to amend our intolerantmistakes.

We carry a complex and mixed

inherited past.

Learn that we are more a kaleidoscope

than a crystal-clear glass.

We are diverse, complex and culturally rich 

but inherently,

we all should be equal 

to everybody else.

Leave off our embellishment

of a diverse identity, 

and, with greater cause, 

admit we too, are racist

Daniela is a Mexican student, currently in her second year of BA in Liberal Arts with a major in Politics at King’s College. She enjoys writing about environmental and social justice affairs, especially those concerning minority groups such as women, children or indigenous groups.

Football: Enamorados Del Loco

Source: https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/07/12/america/1468276775_480908.html

By: Gianni Di Girolamo

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

In the world of football, Pep Guardiola is considered to be one of the greatest, if not the best, manager of his generation. Having won domestic titles in Spain, Germany and England, as well as two Champions League titles with Barcelona, it came as a shock when he hailed the then unemployed Marcelo Bielsa as ‘the best manager in the world’. (Farrel, 2017).  

Bielsa has won the Argentine top flight three times, twice with Newell’s Old Boys and once with Velez Sarsfield. He won Olympic Gold with Argentina, and has been runner up in the Copa Del Rey and Europa League with Bilbao, and runner up in the Libertadores with Newell’s. Affectionately known as ‘El Loco’, Bielsa is something of a cult hero in the world of football and his influence on the game is far greater than his CV or trophy cabinet would suggest

Perhaps the greatest reflection of his mythos is his apodo - El Loco, or the crazy one. Bielsa’s craziness can be seen on and off the pitch, with his bizarre tactics and obsessive approach to training, as well as his feuds with club owners, and his colourful personality.

Career

Bielsa has had an interesting career in (football) Management. He began in Newell’s Old Boys, a team based in his hometown of Rosario. He then spent the mid 90s at different Mexican clubs before returning to Argentina to coach Velez Sarsfield. After a brief nine game stint with Espanyol (his first foray into European football) he would get the biggest job in the country - coaching the Argentine national team. 

Argentina was the most exciting team going into the 2002 World Cup, with 42 goals in qualification they were favourites to lift the trophy. Despite their successful qualifying campaign and a talented squad, they only managed one win in the group stage and made a premature exit as England and Sweden went onto the next round (Sportskeeda). The effect of the disappointing performance was compounded when Brazil, Argentina’s biggest international rivals went on to lift the trophy for the fifth time. In his final two years he would lose a Copa America final to Brazil in 2003, and win Olympic Gold in 2004 before catching everyone by surprise and quitting because he ‘felt tired’ (CNN). Ultimately his stint with Argentina was not remembered fondly as people thought his side was too attacking, unbalanced and caused his players exert too much physical effort. Another criticism often levelled at him was that his football was so fast paced that it did not allow the more creative players to showcase their talent (Sabbatasso, 2010).  

Having disappointed in his homeland, Bielsa went on to accept a job with the Chilean national team after a three year absence from the game. With Chile he had the opportunity to take complete control of the training setup and achieved a series of historic firsts for what was previously an underachieving footballing nation. These first included a first ever qualifying point in Montevideo against Uruguay and the first ever official win against Argentina in 2008. Bielsa’s side qualified for the 2010 World Cup, their first since 1998, but ultimately bowed out to Brazil in the round of 16 (Sportskeeda). Bielsa once again caught everyone by surprise when he quit the job in 2011 because he had personal issues with the incoming president of the Chilean football association. Bielsa began Chile’s golden generation by launching the international careers of Gary Medel, Arturo Vidal and the now record goal scorer Alexis Sanchez. Chile went on to win back-to-back Copa Americas in 2015 and 2016, the first of which was won by Bielsa’s fiercest disciple, Jorge Sampaoli. 

Following his stint in Chile, Bielsa would go on to coach Bilbao, turning them into one of the most exciting teams in Europe, but once again left the job after falling out with the board and only just falling short of major silverware. Following Bilbao, he would manage a series of upper-mid-level teams including an infamous two day stint with Lazio. He is now earning his wages in England’s second division with Leeds, and seems to be on the verge of promotion into the premier league. At club level, Bielsa has never had a ‘big job’. 

El loco en la cancha

While the way he usually leaves each job certainly helped him earn his nickname, in reality la locura is evidenced in his tactical approach to football, and his obsessive approach to training. Bielsa takes inspiration from dutch total football of the 1970’s. This was a fast paced system based on the idea that players should be able to play in several different positions on the pitch. It is hard to pin down Bielsa’s preferred formation, but we can say his tactical approach is based on a series of ‘fundamentals’ regarding transition from attack to defense, and from defense to attack. His philosophy can be summed up in four words ‘movement, rotation, concentration and improvisation’ (Sportskeeda). When out of possession, Bielsa asks his players to defend as high up the opposition half as possible so as to regain possession close to the other team’s goal. At first he employed a conventional 4-3-3 formation, but his teams were often easy to counter attack against since his fullbacks pushed up and the two centre backs were caught off guard. As a result, the Modern Bielsa lines up defensively with a 3-4-3, or a 3-4-1-2, with a third centre back providing more coverage. To regain possession Bielsa asks all of his players to press intensely, hence the movement, and hence why his style is so physically demanding.

Once possession is won, his team transitions into an unconventional 3-3-1-3, which was best evidenced by his Chile team. This transition requires perfect synchronization on behalf of his players, and oftentimes if the press means a player is out of position, another can easily fill in the spot (Sabbatasso, 2010). The second line of three is unconventional in and of itself, as it is usually composed of two wide players (wingbacks) and a central midfielder. In football, a midfield line of three is usually composed of three central midfielders. Bielsa asks his wingbacks to be wide, but his more offensive wingers begin in more central positions, meaning that the attacking three is more narrow than the midfield three (Sportskeeda). When the wingers drift wide, and wingbacks cut in creating and vice versa. This creates a chaotic offensive maneuver which always has a numerical advantage in the wings. 

An important part of the transition from defense to attack is ball movement, which is why he has often placed a central midfielder in the center of his defensive line.  He did this with Gary Medel in Chile and Javi Martinez at Bilbao to great effect. Medel has almost exclusively played at centre back for Chile since, and Javi Martinez was occasionally used at center backs by both Heynckes and Guardiola at Bayern. Bielsa emphasises rotation in the sense that players are invited to move out of position to confuse opposing defences, and teammates are expected to cover. This is most often seen when wingbacks push forwards and centre mids cover for them. 

This system of organised chaos requires meticulous preparation. Bielsa’s players undergo a great deal of on the ball training as well as fitness preparation. Bielsa devotes much of each training session to teaching tactics. He himself is known to watch thousands of hours of video footage of football matches, and his own training sessions in order to improve his side (Gault 2015). Despite the fact that this system requires incredible athletic prowess, extreme flexibility and above average tactical intelligence on behalf of the players, when in a new job Bielsa makes no alterations to his model based on the players he has (Tighe, 2015).

Influence

Among his disciples, Bielsa boasts not only Guardiola and Sampaoli, but also Diego Simeone, Mauricio Pochettino and Marcelo Gallardo. All of these coaches have borrowed one of Bielsa’s unconventional tactical strategies and combined them with more conventional ones to achieve great success. For example, Guardiola also emphasizes ball movement, and he too has used centre midfielders in the defensive line (Mascherano at Barcelona, Martinez at Bayern and Fernandinho at Man City). That said, while it is possession dominant, Guardiola’s side is slightly more structured and slow paced. While Bielsa’s players often switch positions all over the pitch, Guardiola’s team only do so in specific scenarios (usually the final third). Pochettino also emphasises intense pressing while defending, but he too employs a much more structured system while attacking. Gallardo’s River Plate often employs the strategy of having central midfielders cover for attacking full backs. 

In this sense, Bielsa’s football is pure spectacle and unconventional in every way. Bielsa is an innovator all over the pitch and that is why he draws so much praise from his colleagues, who resorted to convention to win titles. His legend goes beyond pure tactics though. Bielsa reminds us of the more romantic side of football. He never coached any of the Buenos Aires based ‘big teams’ in Argentina, and fell just short of winning South America’s biggest title. With Chile he laid the foundations for the success of his two successors. He led an all-basque, young Bilbao side to a Europa League final, and with Leeds he is on the verge of bringing a once great club back to the English top-flight for the first time in well over a decade. Bielsa is not a legend because of his medals, but because he is probably the only person everyone can agree loves football more than they do.

Gianni is a half Italian, half Chilean incoming third year Political Economy student. He loves his dog, football and politics.

Bibliography

https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1381408-why-marcelo-bielsa-employ-the-most-bizarre-tactics-in-football

https://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/pep-guardiola-hails-marcelo-bielsa-as-best-in-the-world/1ird9awpucie41px3ixlkx81g8

https://www.sportskeeda.com/football/football-tactics-marcelo-bielsa-s-career-football-formations-explained
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/398547-chile-marcelo-bielsa

Latin Americans Are Among the Hardest Hit by the Coronavirus Outbreak in the United States. Here’s why.

Source: https://www.latimes.com/espanol/california/articulo/2020-05-18/el-precio-de-ser-esencial-los-trabajadores-de-servicios-latinos-son-los-mas-afectados-por-el-coronavirus

By: Maria Ascencio and Sebastian Beyenburg

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Note on terminology: Given the nature of this article, we make use of the '“Latinx” neologism to refer to the people from Latin American origin and/or descent in the United States, as opposed to Latino(s) or Latina(s). We also make use of the term Hispanic, used to describe people related to the Spanish language or culture, given that it is often used in official figures and statistics.

The United States currently has the highest number of confirmed coronavirus cases in the world, having recently passed the devastating milestone of 100.000 deaths. Besides its devastating effect on the economy, the healthcare system and human lives, the pandemic has exposed a number of socio-political issues that have been bubbling under the surface for decades. While the virus is affecting everyone's lives, some are much more affected than others. In particular, it seems that Latin Americans, regardless of their citizenship or migratory status, have been among the hardest hit by coronavirus in the U.S. 

With this article, we seek to explore how and why Latin Americans are being affected differently as opposed to other ethnic groups. For this, we consider factors such as the disproportionate number of Latin Americans being classified as ‘essential workers’, as well as a larger incidence of chronic illnesses. We also take a look at the problems relating to the legal status of many Latinx, and how the Trump administration has misused the pandemic to actively disenfranchise them both inside the U.S. and at the southern border.  

How are Latinx people being affected differently as opposed to others in the U.S.?

While it might just be too early to get the statistics that can best answer this question, current figures paint a gloomy picture. Early May studies suggest that Latinx people have constituted an approximate 64.9% of  Covid-19 deaths among patients aged 18 to 49 in the state of California alone [1]. Another preliminary study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that compiled available data from New York City identified death rates among Latinx persons to be 74.3 deaths per 100,000 population, as opposed to 45.2 deaths per 100,000 for white persons [2]. This certainly only offers a glimpse into what is a more complicated reality, but the ultimate  message is that Latin Americans are among the groups most disproportionately affected by this pandemic. 

What factors have contributed to these disparities? 

Latinx people represent a large portion of essential workers 

The majority of U.S. states have issued ‘stay-at-home orders’ and social distancing measures to prevent the spread of the virus. Only workers that are deemed ‘essential’ are allowed to continue frequenting their workplace. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, most Hispanic and Latin American workers work in construction and other services that both the federal government and most states have defined as essential. This includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, cleaning and maintenance [3]. Other racial groups such as Asian or White mostly work in sales, legal, engineering, arts or leisure industries. Because most jobs of Latinx people are deemed essential, they often do not have the option of staying home, making them more likely to have a higher exposure to the virus [4]. 

This is made particularly evident by the effect of coronavirus on California’s farmworkers. Labour contractors estimate that around 75% of America’s harvest workers live in the country illegally [5]. The remaining share is made up by those workers who are in the U.S. under H2A visas, which allow foreign farmhands to perform temporary jobs considered otherwise unfillable [6]. 

In most instances, personal protective equipment (PPE) has not been made sufficiently available to workers and social distancing measures seem impossible to enforce when field labour requires to be in close contact for a prolonged period of time. Farmworkers have been equipped with a letter from the Department of Homeland Security stating that they are ‘considered essential to the food supply chain’ [7], meaning their chances of being deported are lower for now. Crucially, however, this letter does not guarantee any protection from deportation in the future. The recognition that foreign farmworkers have always been essential for America’s food supply is still not forthcoming. 

 Incidence of chronic illnesses 

It is now widely accepted that older people and those with underlying medical conditions are more likely to develop serious illness if infected with Covid-19. Amongst those underlying conditions, the WHO reports cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease, and cancer as the most commonly presented [8]. These illnesses happen to be some of the leading causes of death in the U.S. Hispanic and Latinx groups are 35% less prone to heart disease and 49% less prone to developing cancer when compared to other racial groups in the U.S., but they are also 50% more likely to develop diabetes, kidney and liver disease. At the same time, those Latin Americans who do develop heart disease or cancer are 68% more likely to not have it checked on time [9].

Legal Status and the Trump Administration

In the United States

An estimated 21% of Latinx living in the U.S. have no reported legal status [10]. Indeed, as of 2017, Hispanics/Latinx accounted for 73% of approximately 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S. In the context of the coronavirus pandemic, this is problematic, mostly because those living in the U.S. illegally are excluded from having access to healthcare and federal relief, thus leaving them much more exposed to the virus.  

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), one of the most important legislations in response to the pandemic, was passed by the U.S. Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support and signed into law by President Trump on March 27th, 2020. This $2 trillion economic relief package is quoted to “provide fast and direct economic assistance for American workers, families, and small businesses, and preserve jobs for American industries” [11].

Under the CARES Act, the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) programme provides relief for unemployed workers who are ineligible for their state unemployment insurance or have run out of state benefits. The CARES Act also provides one-time cash payments of $1,200 to individuals earning less than $75,000 and who filed taxes for either 2018 or 2019 using a valid Social Security Number (SSN). 

The vast majority of unauthorized immigrants, except for those with work authorization - such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients - are automatically excluded from such benefits. According to a UCLA report, 56% of Latinx-majority neighborhoods in the Los Angeles County have a high proportion of residents at high risk for not receiving individual relief funds [12]. 

The impossibility of accessing benefits, sick leave or health care and the greater risk of exposure to the virus makes for a deadly cocktail. Unable to protect themselves sufficiently, Latinx people who fall ill face job-loss and subsequent homelessness. 

At the U.S.-Mexico border 

Sadly, being at a higher risk of contracting Covid-19, and suffering from its complications, all while not being able to access quality healthcare, are not the only ways in which the pandemic has impacted Latinx groups. The situation at the southern border highlights how the Trump administration has politicised the virus to push through with what have been long-desired immigration policies. Migrants, who cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally, are being expelled to Mexico at a record-breaking average of 96 minutes under emergency coronavirus measures [13]. The United States Customs and Border Protection policy states that since migrants could be carriers of the virus, they pose a potential health risk to the U.S. and thus must be expelled [14]. Consequently, most asylum-seekers are denied access to humanitarian protection created by Congress [15]. 

Among migrants, those who are unaccompanied minors are suffering the most under the Trump administration’s violation of federal law aimed at protecting this group. While the Trump administration is justifying the above described practices using a 1944 law that grants the president broad power to block foreigners from entering the country in order to prevent the “serious threat” of a dangerous disease [16], U.S. immigration law dictates that once in the U.S., unaccompanied migrant minors cannot be deported through a fast-track system now employed by the Trump administration. Instead, they must be placed in the “least restrictive” shelters and facilities [17]. The 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement underlines this and furthermore states that the government must make a continuing effort to release unaccompanied minors to qualified sponsors [18]. Moreover, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act also affords certain standards of treatment to foreign children who arrive at the American border without an adult guardian [19]. The Trump administration has blatantly violated all of these laws. Gerson, a 10-year old Honduran boy, is one of the many children put on a deportation flight back to his home country, leaving his mother behind at a migrant camp at the U.S.-Mexico border. While Gerson intended to be reunited with immediate family in Texas, the Trump administration refused to make any effort to do so despite its legal obligations. His case is only one example of hundreds of unaccompanied minors who have suffered from the Trump administration’s use of the pandemic to push for illegal, inhumane immigration practices that violate basic human rights. 

Moving forward

The coronavirus outbreak in the U.S. has revealed the tip of the iceberg of a community that has long been disenfranchised, suffering from disadvantageous government policy. The data does not lie. Latinx are among the hardest hit groups by the virus in the U.S. Unfortunately, while individual states carry significant amounts of responsibility, only changes from within the Trump administration could bring real solutions to the many issues highlighted in this article. Supplying appropriate PPE to farmworkers, for example, should go without saying. The solution to bigger, more systemic issues, such as equal protection under the CARES act for DACA and TPS recipients, is also found from within the White House. It is time that the U.S. moves towards thinking about health as a public good, one that must be available to everyone. Only in this way can the country ensure economic sustainability in the long-run. But, to achieve this, the U.S will need a different administration to make serious and concrete changes, one that does not deliberately exclude minority groups in its policy-making, one that acknowledges their humanity and one that cannot claim to have won the election by referring to those bringing the country through the pandemic as drug criminals. 

Maria is a second year International Relations Student at King’s College, the Broadcast Editor for International Relations Today and the Editor in Chief of El Cortao.

Sebastian is a second year International Relations Student at King’s College London and staff writer for International Relations Today: Perspectives.

Bibliography

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-california-black-latinos.html

[2]https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html

[3] https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2015/hispanics-and-latinos-in-industries-and-occupations.htm

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-california-black-latinos.html 

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/us/coronavirus-undocumented-immigrant-farmworkers-agriculture.html

[6] https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/coronavirus-and-farmworkers-food-supply-risk

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/us/coronavirus-undocumented-immigrant-farmworkers-agriculture.html

[8] https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1

[9] https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/pdf/2015-05-vitalsigns.pdf

[10] https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI725218

[11] https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares

[12] https://luskin.ucla.edu/residents-in-l-a-s-latino-neighborhoods-less-likely-to-receive-relief-funds

[13] https://www.texastribune.org/2020/03/30/coronavirus-crisis-hastens-undocumented-immigrants-sent-back-mexico/ 

[14] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-immigration-migrant-children-protections-border/

[15] Ibid.

[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/us/coronavirus-migrant-children-unaccompanied-minors.h

[17]https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-immigration-migrant-children-protections-border/

[18] Ibid. 

[19] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/us/coronavirus-migrant-children-unaccompanied-minors.html?fbclid=IwAR3k-1H6DLMEWlqYU1UqeSs3uS4BE18Xv5biACPHCbKdWMDvZCqzQyxqa4M

Impunity Consolidates Crime: The case of Brazilian Mining

Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/brazil_dam_disaster

By: JP Tavares

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Note: This article was previously published to King’s College London’s The Political Economy Review on January 20, 2020. For similar publications visit; https://medium.com/the-political-economy-review

In November 2015, a Dam Collapse struck  the township of Mariana, Brazil, causing one of the most pressing environmental disasters in Brazilian history. The surreal effect of a dam collapse in Mariana trailed mud and debris for an extension of 660km: the equivalent distance from Edinburgh to London. Four years later, the same form of collapse happened in the township of Brumadinho, raising concerns over current mining regulations.

After 5 years, it raises the question of whether reparations will be achieved, whether the mining firm will be held accountable and what alternatives could prevent similar disasters. 

What has happened, and what has been done?

With over 40 townships damaged by water poisoning, and the livelihood of over 500,000 individuals affected, the crisis in Mariana is being treated as a criminal lawsuit to the mining firm Samarco, a joint venture between Vale and BHP Billiton. 

According to the Brazilian Environmental Agency (Ibama), Brumadinho, with over 300 deaths, and a 250km extension of debris, lost approximately 300 football fields in forestry. In both townships, the resulting disasters led to surges in Zika, Dengue, Mental Illnesses and cardiovascular diseases, due to the precarious conditions following the disaster. 

Guilherme de Sá, a District Attorney, claims that nothing has been done to prevent mines from ramping up production and acting irregularly. This is most likely due to precarious environmental licensing, such that the firms responsible are rarely held accountable for their acts.

Sá claims it would be ideal if the federal government had legislations which guaranteed reparations and safeguarded the civil rights of victims of environmental disasters. Likewise, according to Brazilian law, both Dams were considered to be at low risk of collapse: despite internal company files, which detailed the potential impact of the breakage months in advance of the disaster. The events of 2015 and 2019 bring into question the lack of licensing and environmental law, both of which prevent accountability in the face of environmental crimes. 

The company denies all charges, claiming to have acted within Brazilian law and safety legislations. Likewise, even when security sirens failed to work during the disaster, Vale’s President stated that it would have been purposeless, given that “the sirens were engulfed by the collapse before its programmed signal”. 

Through a program called ‘Renova’, Samarco claims to be paying monthly reparations for thousands of citizens. André Prado (D.A), claims that it is absurd that those responsible have been allowed to decide the terms for reparations. This is largely due to the dependence of mining to these regions, where Brumadinho and Mariana are, respectively, 60% and 80% dependent on mining for township revenue. Ironically, Samarco’s profits funded municipal public services, which were depleted with the collapse of the mine. Hence, with lengthy court cases and depleted public funds, Samarco had the leverage to set the terms for reparations.

Unfortunately, several of these reparations cannot be guaranteed. Leonardo Amarante, whose law office represents over 4,700 registered fishermen, claims that Samarco has offered little repayment for fishermen without legal representation, who accept the terms given the lack of alternatives. 

“It’s been seven months without knowing what it is like to fish. The money paid by Samarco is barely enough to eat” - affirms the fisherman, Valdomiro de Jesus, speaking in regard to river poisoning and Renova’s repayments

Amarante claims that the tragedy goes beyond the material damage, and extends itself into a constant legal struggle, as several fishermen attempt to recover the income for a lost profession. There are over 60,000 legal actions and requests from the population to the judiciary, which have only stunted the possibility of full repayments. 

Moreover, Samarco’s operations have been reopened by BHP and Vale, and no executive or engineer has been arrested: the lack of regulation has made accountability considerably difficult. Meanwhile, victims are still waiting for payments to recover their homes and livelihoods. 

What is to be expected in the coming years?

The rising deforestation of the Amazon and the liberalization of pesticides and rural activities have been signals of environmental negligence, an attitude reflected in Bolsonaro’s latest interaction with a Belgian ambassador. In a 10 point plan, Bolsonaro’s government detailed why increasing mining activities in indigenous lands would be beneficial for the indigenous and foreign investors, which is suggestive to this continued culture of unaccountable mining.

“Brazil does not learn from its lessons in history” - D.A, G. de Sá

The delays from the Public Ministry and the lack of action from the Federal government have given little hope of proper reparations. This delay in Brazilian courts led to a collective $5bn lawsuit against BHP, filed in a court in Liverpool, representing over 235,000 people and institutions. The lawsuit claims that BHP increased production due to the falling price of iron, despite several internal safety warnings. One may also see hope in the expressed discontent and efforts from human rights activists, lawyers and civil organizations: an attitude that could potentially trigger a change in legislation.

In fact, the Senate has begun analysing a law (L2788/19) which specifies the national policy for the rights of populations damaged by dam collapses. This law facilitates repayments by specifying what qualifies as a dam burst ‘victim’. This harmonizes the state financing with legal processes. 

However, guaranteeing the rights of victims for future dam bursts does not prevent the risk from poorly regulated mining, which raises the question of whether issues in mining regulations will be tackled. Nonetheless, as thousands struggle in court battles, this law could potentially ease the legal process for victims. Moreover, it should be hoped that mining will be more transparent in its planning, yet Bolsonaro’s attitudes and actions foreshadow a bleak future for environmental accountability. 

The Public Ministry treats the collapse as a crime, but Samarco denies it, referring to it as a legal accident. The irreversible environmental damages have poisoned rivers and destroyed forestry, while causing long lasting social effects of misery, sickness and loss. After 5 years, the battle for reparations continues, yet lawsuits abroad and new laws have shed hope to victims. 

This lack of regulation with mining is a symptom of a much larger, and recurring issue in Brazilian politics. Without the needed transparency and accountability, Brazil’s relationship with the environment will be no different to its relationship with corruption: impunity has, and will continue to consolidate crime.

JP is a second year Political Economy Student at King's, who is particularly interested in Brazilian current affairs and economic policy.

Fake News in Latin America: The Legacy of Pinochet

Image Source: https://actualidad.rt.com/galerias/194724-amercia-latina-fotos-emblematicos

By: Maximilian Frederik van Oordt

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Election campaigns, climate change, and recently coronavirus have all provided brilliant demonstrations of the pervasiveness of fake news and of its impact on the general public. Latin America has suffered more than most in this area and the sheer magnitude of the pandemic of disinformation here is strongly linked to the region’s Cold War-era military dictatorships. Some of the most impressive disinformation campaigns occurred in Chile under the government of Augusto Pinochet and, with the remarkable social unrest that has erupted across the country since the 18th of October of last year, Chile provides a unique insight into the modern-day social consequences of its military past.

On September 11 1973, the Chilean armed forces deposed the Communist President after three years of economic turmoil. Six days later, the military revealed ‘Plan Zeta’; an alleged plot by the now-deposed government to kill military and opposition leaders and install a Marxist dictatorship. This was used as a justification for the armed overthrow of a constitutional regime until it was discovered that the plan had one flaw: it never actually existed. In an interview in 1986, General Gustavo Leigh Guzman – one of the four military commanders who led the coup of ’73 – admitted the plot was fictitious and CIA documents would later confirm that it had been fabricated by the armed forces.

A headline during the military government that reads: “Sinister Plan ‘Z’ Discovered with which [the Communists] would launch a civil war”

Fast forward to 2019, the consequences of such deceit were immediately evident in the first days of social upheaval of that year. As metro stations were burned and the headquarters of a major electricity company became a tower of fire, articles were shared claiming that soldiers and policemen were behind the violent destruction, with the aim of justifying another military coup or at the very least forcing a military presence on the streets. These were promptly debunked with evidence to the contrary, but many maintained the line of argument that the state is involved in staging vandalism to serve its interests. The impact of these allegations is shown in Termómetro Social, a national survey which asked Chileans to quantify their trust in institutions from one to ten. The national police scored a dismal 3.8 and the armed forces managed only 3.7. The legacy of the Pinochet era on public trust is clearly visible here, with recent conspiracies resorting to the country’s history to prove what the present cannot.

In the almost two decades of military rule after the coup, it was government policy to control the media and to maintain the impression that the country remained at war with Marxism, thereby justifying the violent government repression and ‘suspension’ of political parties. Pinochet’s regime relied on painting itself as an indispensable shield against Marxism and to this end it instructed the media to follow a series of psychological rules: (translated from Spanish) “General struggle against [previous government’s Communist movement]. This campaign aims to create two links: a) Marxism equals Lies. b) Marxism equals Treason. c) Marxism equals Corruption.” Articles were published linking the previous government with drug trafficking and claiming the Communists sought to change the national flag, all under the state campaign to create psychological links in the population’s minds.

A poster from the Pinochet era comparing “Chile Yesterday and Today” (before and after the military takeover

Looking back to October of 2019, it did not take long for posts to appear on social media claiming that the government was pursuing a strategy of sowing chaos and attempting to link the extreme violence and vandalism seen across the country with left wing policy. The media of a now-democratic Chile was alleged to be cooperating with the state in this strategy, with the aim of turning the protestors against themselves and against the left. To say these allegations are fantastical is an understatement, but the powerful disinformation campaigns of the Pinochet dictatorship in the 70s and 80s have allowed these theories to gain more traction than common sense could have deemed possible.

A major aspect of the Pinochet dictatorship’s media campaigns was the coverup of state executions by having press statements declare the victims to have died in vicious gunfights against the authorities or in other ways that cleared the military of wrongdoing. Arguably the most famous of these coverups was Operation Colombo which claimed that 119 members of the MIR guerrilla group had been killed in infighting amongst its different factions. This image of a divided armed opposition group was wildly different to the reality: the guerrilla members had been slaughtered in detention centres by soldiers and policemen. Other state coverups included adding machine gun fire sounds to video footage and even original tapes showing security forces being told when to ‘take cover’ and move forward by the camera crews. This made it seem as though battles with the opposition had been fierce and that Pinochet’s soldiers had acted in self-defence.

The accusations of coverups by the police and armed forces were almost instant when the protests began last year. Only four days after the social unrest began, a post was shared on Twitter which read: (translated from Spanish) “According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) there are up until now 42 dead, 12 women raped, 121 people disappeared and thousands tortured”. These statistics were of course completely fabricated and disproved on several occasions including by Chile’s independent National Human Rights Institute. According to La Tercera, a major Chilean newspaper: “The information reached over half a million interactions on social media, not including instant messaging apps. It even managed to be published by international media.” Horrifyingly, the original source of the claim was an Instagram account with a stunning six followers. The ease with which many Chileans accepted the statement as factual can undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that, for them, coverups are simply all too familiar and therefore a realistic possibility even in democracy.

The Pinochet dictatorship engraved itself firmly into the minds of Chileans and remains, thirty years later, a major scar on the country’s past. The current crisis of trust in Chile has shone a light on the effects of two decades of political disinformation campaigns. Undoubtedly, fake news is a major challenge across the globe, and governments will have to expertly analyse this issue in order to fight it properly. In the case of Latin America, the setups, coverups and psychological strategies do not come from an Orwellian novel; they come from the history books. State deceit is well-known and greatly feared, and these two factors make it easy for conspiracies to be widely accepted today. As a result, the role of the military dictatorships of the 20th century will have to be considered in order to understand the true scale – and depth – of Latin America’s disinformation pandemic.

Maximilian is a first year student at KCL interested in politics, history and law. Originally Chilean, he enjoys focusing especially on Latin American affairs, with an emphasis on these areas.

US-Cuba Relations: "La Revolución" How Cuban-Americans Could Play a Key Role in the 2020 US Election

Image Source: https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/anti-castro-cuban-american-lawmakers-see-a-champion-in-trump/31058/

By: Tommy O’Donnell

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Havana ooh-na-na. It’s not just a cute and quirky Camila Cabello song, but indeed the epicentre of a country which is still a mystery to many: Cuba. Where the U.S. government may be described technically as a ‘federal presidential constitutional republic’ or the British a ‘unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy’, Cuba’s can be described as a ‘unitary Marxist-Leninist one-party socialist republic’. Or, to put it in simpler terms, a socialist dictatorship. But what relation does Cuba and its government have with the 2020 U.S. presidential election? Well, one of the U.S.’s most populous states is Florida: the land of theme parks, swamps and Cuban refugees and migrants. As a result, the votes of Cuban-Americans are essential in securing the state’s imperative 29 electoral college votes.

For those unfamiliar with the electoral system in America , it is a centuries-old concept called the ‘Electoral College’, which instead of valuing the votes of each individual, values the votes of each state. Every state is granted a certain number of ‘electoral votes’ correlating to the number of U.S. Senators (every state has two) and U.S. Representatives (decided based on population). A state could have a 50.1%-49.9% split, but 100% of the state’s electoral votes would go to the candidate with 50.1% (I’m looking at you, 2000 election).

Florida is a traditional ‘swing state’, meaning that in every election no-one really has any idea to whom the state’s valuable and numerous electoral votes will go. In other words, everything is up for play in Florida, and the candidate chosen by each party is very important. This is where we link together Florida, Cuba, and “la revolución”, and the link’s name is Bernie Sanders, the independent Senator from Vermont and candidate for President of the United States.

You all know his name. You all recognise the crazy white wisps atop his head, and his New York-accent tinted rallying cries of revolution. He is a divisive figure amongst the so-called ‘Democratic party establishment’ and although much of this division simply boils down to ideological differences (Sanders is a proud democratic-socialist), much of it may be warranted when looking at the larger picture.

The Democrats have a very simple goal moving into the 2020 general election: to defeat Donald Trump, and as a result much of the discussion around the Democratic primaries have focussed on ‘electability’. Who can really win the votes of battleground states over the President and secure a Democratic victory? All of the candidates have different arguments as to why they are the most electable: Joe Biden believes he can overwhelmingly win the African-American vote after eight years by Barack Obama’s side; Pete Buttigieg and Amy Klobuchar believe their midwestern roots and moderate, centrist policies can win back the traditionally Democratic ‘rustbelt’ states won by Trump in 2016; Elizabeth Warren believes her fleshed out, financed “I’ve got a plan for that” campaign can persuade voters to trust her.

Bernie Sanders, however, has a unique plan: increase voter turnout amongst young people and people of colour in order to overwhelm the older white vote, which traditionally and typically swings towards right-leaning candidates — not excluding those who wear red baseball caps to hide the lining of their toupé. It is a plan we have seen work before; Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez or ‘AOC’, the first-term congresswoman for New York’s 14th congressional district finds herself in this position thanks to her extremely successful 2018 campaign which challenged a very senior D.C. Democrat (white, older, etc.) in a primary upset which saw her rise to overnight stardom and political influence no-one could have ever imagined. But again: what on Earth does this have to do with Cuba!?

The Hispanic population in the United States is the most rapidly growing amongst all ethnicities, and as a result the country is forecast to become majority-minority by the year

2045, meaning the majority of citizens will be any ethnicity other than white. However, it is a mistake to think of Hispanic Americans as all the same, and that their votes are winnable by using one blanket strategy. Due to factors such as historical events and geography, each part of the U.S. is home to Hispanic communities of varying nationalities. For example, the U.S.-Mexico border in California, Texas and New Mexico means that the majority of these states’ Hispanic population are Mexican or of Mexican descent. As a result of the Spanish-American war and the invention of air travel, many Puerto Ricans settled in New York City, specifically boroughs like the Bronx. As mentioned earlier, the Cuban Castro regime caused many Cubans to flee to the U.S., and due to its geographical proximity, specifically Florida.

This is where we finally bring together the random concepts discussed so far in this article. Bernie Sanders consistently calls for ‘revolution’ in the United States, a call which may not be embraced by Cuban-Floridians, many of whom fled from Cuba during and after the Revolution in the 1950’s, or are their direct descendants. Of course there are many more factors which contribute to how Cuban-Americans cast their votes, but it certainly doesn’t help when Senator Sanders compliments aspects of the regime many chose to escape from. In recent weeks, Sanders’s praise of the Castro regime’s literacy projects have come under fire, as education was a tool used by Castro in order to cement his Revolution’s success. Although children did successfully learn how to read and write, this was done using Marxist-Leninist ideology; for example, when remembering letters of the alphabet, C was for Castro, and F for Fidel. Sanders’s comments seem to idealise certain aspects of Cuba’s successes without understanding or explaining the full picture. Cuban artist Tania Bruguera sums it up with this quote: “yes, they taught us to read and write, and then they forbade us to read what we want and write what we think”.

But is there any evidence to suggest that Bernie Sanders’s ideology and comments are actually off-putting to Cuban-Americans in Florida? Unfortunately for the senator, the polling data is not particularly favourable towards him (bearing in mind that polling data is not always

reliable). When looking at both primary polls and general election polls in Florida, Sanders does not fare well. Although amongst Democrats he is the national frontrunner with a fairly wide margin ahead of Joe Biden, in Florida he is far behind the former Vice President, as well as the billionaire former mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg; he is sitting below a 15% average whilst his aforementioned competitors are comfortably above the 20% mark. His poor standing with Florida Democrats is not promising when looking forward to the general election either, and this is reflected in polling data. Whereas in almost all other statewide match-up polling between Sanders and Trump, Sanders comes out comfortably on top, in Florida he is beating the president by just 0.3% on average, which is very much within the margin of error. To be fair to the senator, most of his Democratic primary competitors are polling similarly, with only Bloomberg ahead of Trump by a comfortable 6%, and Biden a less comfortable 1.7%.

In the grand scheme, however, this is less about polling numbers and more about messaging. Yes, 2020 is the year of the general election, but we cannot forget about the essential local congressional elections which will choose who makes up the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives for the next two years. Whichever presidential candidate is elected in November will have their hands tied if they do not also have the support of the two legislative bodies which are in charge of lawmaking. Once again, Florida and the Sanders-factor may play a crucial role, this time in compromising a possible Democratic majority in either or both chambers.

In 2018, when the last congressional elections were held, Florida Democrats won two seats which were previously in Republican hands: the 26th and 27th congressional districts. Representatives Debbie Mucarsel-Powell and Donna Shalala are the two congresswomen who are now worrying about the loss of their seats fewer than two years after their first elections. For context, both of their districts are 70% Hispanic and both women won their 2018 elections with very small margins; Mucarsel-Powell had less than a 2% advantage over her

Republican competitor. To make matters worse, both of their probable competitors in the upcoming race are prominent Cuban-Americans, one of whom, Carlos A. Giménez, is the former mayor of Miami-Dade County.

For these two congresswomen, the cards are already not looking to be in their favour. Now imagine the factors mentioned above combined with Bernie Sanders, along with his controversial rhetorics on Cuba and ‘revolution’, as the face of the Democratic party during these races. To make this clearer, the problem is not Republican vs. Democrat — both congressional districts voted overwhelmingly in favour of Obama in 2012 and Clinton in 2016 — but with a Sanders-stained ballot in the already-close congressional elections, these wide margins and guaranteed victories are far from sight.

To summarise, Democrats are in desperate need of wins in certain states; namely Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan, states that turned red for Donald Trump in 2016. However, they cannot rely on these states switching back to blue due to, for example, controversial anti-fracking policies endorsed by multiple Democratic candidates. As a result, Florida could become imperative in getting whichever Democrat is chosen to pass the all-important 270 electoral vote margin, and win back the presidency. In order to do this, they desperately need the Cuban-American vote, and with Sanders and his revolución at the forefront of the ticket I doubt how truly possible this is.

Tommy is a third year Spanish & Portuguese student from the UK with a keen interest in language learning and global politics. He enjoys writing about current political affairs and turmoil, especially in Latin America.

Petro Cryptocurrency: Revival of Venezuelan Economy?

Image Source: https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14747

By: Lucia Pastrana

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

What is happening? Economic catastrophe 

It is widely known that Venezuela is experiencing a complex and long economic crisis that can be traced back to Hugo Chávez administration. Since Chávez assumed power in 1998, the state has been jeopardizing the economic stability of the country through their polemic policies. During his mandate the former president nationalized foreign assets and significantly reduced public spending. Such as the case of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company. Considering that Venezuelan economy is dependent on 96% oil exports and the PDVSA is now a non-productive nationalized monopoly, it is natural to envisage a shrinking economy. This is one of the main causes of the exponential hyperinflation.

Furthermore, the economic arena is not the only one tumbling. Economic depression goes hand by hand with political tension between Nicolás Maduro supported by China, Russia and Juan Guaidó backed by the United States. It is important to stress how the struggle for political power is underlaying a clash of ideologies between arguably ‘socialist’ ideals coming from Maduro, Russia and China’s political agenda and liberal ‘democratic’ claims on behalf of the Guaidó and the US. Independently of the international forces playing its part in shaping Venezuela’s economic and political future, what is clear is that Maduro is not willing to cooperate with the US. The president’s inflexibility and intransigence has become a challenge for its hegemonic power - but at what cost? A crumbling economy, a migratory exodus of approximately 4 to 5 million refugees, a 150-billion-dollar debt,  a 500 000% inflation rate, shortage in basic food, medicines and a collapsing health system. The list of issues can continue endlessly. Unless there is serious willingness to envisage future cooperation with the international community on behalf of Maduro, Guaidó or anyone who assumes presidency, the status quo will remain. 

Precedent: Anti-US ideology and International Sanctions

Nevertheless, to understand the current situation it is important to draw back on Venezuela’s economic history and how since 2010 the United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) have imposed severe economic sanctions on its economy. On October 2009 Chávez introduced the idea of the Petro by mentioning it would be an ‘international currency' based on the ‘huge oil reserves’ Venezuela possessed. Through his statement, the former president additionally accused the US of its imperialist economic domination on Latin America by calling it the ‘Yankee Imperialism’.

 Although Chávez anti-imperialist statement was following a populist rhetoric, it is important to point out that he was addressing a sensitive issue that does not only concern Venezuela, but many Latin American countries. Economic domination by the US has been historically present, creating division and discord in the whole continent. I will not expand on Chávez ideology and political discourse supporting a socialist utopia free of US intervention. However, I do want to stress the fact that Chávez appropriated this discourse to address popular struggles that were exhausted of economic models that have sponsored inequality, elite domination and exploitation of the working class for centuries. The IMF and multinational corporations are part of a system design to concentrate power on the US hands. I am not saying this is necessarily negative, but it is true that the balance is considerably benefitting more the US and the groups that support its ideals, leaving a number of unrepresented groups in the margins of economic development. What Chávez did was addressing these groups and then using the power they granted him to nationalize and isolate Venezuelan economy. 

Soon after Chávez mentioned the Petro, the US gradually started to impose sanctions. First Obama administration during 2015 sanctioned Venezuela for human rights violations and public corruption. Later, Trump expanded sanctions considerably: 2017 restricted Venezuelan government form accessing US markets, during 2018 the president restricted transactions with any type of digital currency, on 2019 sanctioned Cuban and Russian vessels and companies that were engaged in oil trading with Venezuela and in 2020 sanctions on PDVSA. 

Moreover, the U.S is not the only international actor sanctioning Venezuela’s economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union follow this agenda as well. While the IMF sanctioned Venezuela on 2019 by cutting $400 million for economic aid, the EU accused the Maduro. administration for violating human rights and sanctioned it by restricting trading. These are examples of how the international system is blocking Venezuelan economy as long as a socialist government remains in power. Since several sanctions were applied on the state oil company PDVSA, the effects that started to unfold were alarming: hyperinflation was the consequence of Venezuelan economy pushed to the limit.

Venezuelan State response: Petro cryptocurrency 

Maduro’s desperate response on October 2018 towards the current crisis was the ‘Petro’. Although the idea was previously introduced by Chávez, Maduro’s aim was to institutionalize the Petro as a crypto currency that attempted reviving the economy. This was a serious ambitious strategy since it is the first time a crypto currency is adopted by a state. The price of the Petro is backed according to reserves of natural resources of the country:  50% price of an oil barrel in dollars, 20% gold, 20% iron and 10% diamond. The calculation of these commodities determines the price of the Petro equivalent to 60 USD. The sale and purchase of the Petros can be performed through the Bolivares (Venezuelan currency) and according to the state with any foreign currency that will be regulated by the National Super Intendencies of Crypto actives and Related Activities (SUNACRIP). It aims to incentivize the sale of commodities abroad, facilitating trade, activating the economic capacity of the population and allowing the purchase of state goods such as taxes and public services. 

Roughly, it seems like the perfect escape to unlock Venezuela’s economy, but the question is: Is it going to work? To provide an answer is necessary to dissect all the underlying flaws of the Petro that are not mentioned on the official white papers presented by the state. 

Petro: Its Flaws 

For instance, the Petro shares similar ideological principles with a typical cryptocurrency such as the bitcoin, but the methods it uses are considerably different. Indeed, the bitcoin was created under a libertarian ideology that supported anonymity, decentralization, anti-authority and privacy in the economy. Its main goal was to allow transactions that could not be traced by any means. To allow any user to perform transactions under complete anonymity with no state intervention whatsoever. In the abstract, the bitcoin was a method to escape the power of authority in the economic market. Translating this principle to the case of Venezuela, the country is trying to circumvent the United States authority and control imposed through economic sanctions. The Maduro administration is using the Petro as a desperate attempt to participate in the international economic market by using an alternative system (cryptocurrency) which is not dominated by the US. 

However, another principle of cryptocurrency is the idea of decentralization and anonymity. When Venezuela institutionalized the Petro it violated both: Firstly, because the Petro is a centralized state currency regulated through the SUNACRIP, a state institution is directly engaged with regulating crypto activities. Secondly, because Petros are not anonymous whatsoever, they can immediately be tracked to Venezuelan authority. Thus, this represents a contradiction- Why would the Maduro administration introduce the Petro as a cryptocurrency if it does not work as one? There is wide range of answers that might try to predict what the Venezuelan State strategy was planning. Yet, the need to use an alternative mechanism to escape from the US blockade was a matter of urgency. Thus, Maduro is trying to deviate the discourse to sound resilient in front of the international arena by pretending he has a consistent and coherent plan at the forefront of digital economic development. 

Nevertheless, Maduro’s discourse might sound like an illusion. Even though the US is maintaining its efforts to invigilate and restrain Venezuela’s arguably socialist government, in reality Venezuela does not possess the means to play under the economic international system game. It is ambitiously attempting to create its own cryptocurrency system to alleviate the demands of a country where epidemic poverty is affecting 90% of its population and over two thirds of Venezuelans a severely starving. Considering the current situation: How is the state expecting to digitalize the economy of a country that is under extreme conditions of poverty? How is the state expecting to ‘increase the financial capacity of the population’ if the population barely has access to satisfy their basic needs? 

The international pressures are having a real impact at the domestic level and the Petro is not the answer to alleviate the popular demands of basic products and services for two reasons. These are the main reasons: Firstly, the Petros can only be purchased through three means: (1) with Bolivares, (2) other foreign exchange currencies that have not been publicly declared by the Venezuelan state yet and (3) other Petros. Secondly, the Petros can only be used for state spending. Meaning any commodity or service under the control of the state such as taxes or public services. 

On these terms, the state is not considering the capacities of citizens and their priorities. It is out of context for the state to expect that Venezuelan citizens are going to have the capacity to exchange Bolivares for Petros, considering the Petro is 60 USD and the inflation rate is 500 000%. It is out of context for the state to expect that Venezuelan citizens are going to prioritize ‘reactivating the economy’ by spending their limited resources to download an app to exchange Petros when they are starving to the point of malnutrition.  It would be almost impossible to exchange devaluated Bolivares for a Petro. People have different priorities and urgently need food, medicines, healthcare, jobs not Petros to pay taxes for services from a dysfunctional state that is not taking care of its people.

A window of opportunity  

Despite the domestic limitations, in the international level there is a slight window for the Petro to work successfully as long as the international community is willing to support it. If US and IMF sanctions relax and Maduro or Guaidó are willing to cooperate, the Petro can propose a parallel currency. An alternative strategy for the Petro could be using is as a currency for international trading purposes while maintaining the Bolivares for purposes of domestic currency. This would not be the first time in history two currencies are adopted. Previously a similar strategy was used in 1979 when the European Currency Unit (ECU) was established to stabilize the rate fluctuation across the Euro zone. This currency was not necessarily physical, and it was used solely for trading between European countries. Each country used the ECU for exports and imports while using their national currency for domestic spending. Indeed, this is not the case of Venezuela, but it is a figure of how this strategy could work at the international level. 

However, since Trump banned the Petro last year, foreign investment is scared to suffer sanctions for economic association and questions the legitimacy of the Petro. On one side, Trump can continue imposing sanctions if any corporation or country purchases Venezuelan oil through Petro currency. On the other, its legitimacy is uncertain since currently the list of authorized exchange currencies that can be exchange for Petros has not been published. Clearly, it is important to consider that it was recently introduced and the process to include and settle the Petro as the first crypto currency in the international market economy will take time. Time is necessary, but Trump’s actions are not benefiting the future panorama for the Petro. The country is not yet presenting the conditions and the reliability for foreign investment to feel attracted at the moment. 

Now is a matter of time to wait if the Petro is going to succeed or not. If Maduro remains in power its administration will have to rely on China and Russia’s loans, black market and - what it is currently attempting- play its own game outside the US led economic system with cryptocurrency. However, if Guaidó rises to power serious reforms in the economic structures of the country will be required. More importantly, serious economic aid from the IMF and the International community will be needed to revive Venezuela’s economy.

 The Petro Initiative started as Chávez’s socialist ideological challenge to the US liberal-democratic economic domination and ended being Maduro’s last resource or security exit to escape the economic catastrophe in Venezuela. The crisis that is now being experienced is not about numbers in statistics charts that measure inflation in the world, neither about the demagogic discourses of corrupt leaders performed in the public eye. It is about people, individuals that have lives, families, responsibilities and illusions for the future. Venezuelan people should be the main concern and granting them what is theirs by right – to be protected by the state on which they were born.  If the Venezuelan president does not leave aside past conflicts and disagreements with the international community specially the US and the IMF little will change. What Venezuela needs more than a modern and cutting-edge cryptocurrency, is a consistent and coherent plan to seriously re-structure the domestic institutions. This will open diplomatic conversations that will cooperate to re-open the economy for foreign investment.  The Petro will remain as an illusion, an optimistic plan without substantial action unless Venezuelan leaders are willing to play under the US-dominated economic system.

Lucia is a first year International Relations student. Her main interest is poverty and economic inequalities specially in Latin America.

Gender Violence in Mexico: "Let Me Know When You Reach Home" Raising our Voices

Image Source:  Twitter @Santiago_Arau

By: Ana Herrera

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

“Amiga, compárteme tu ubicación y avísame cuando llegues a casa” (“My friend, share your live location and let me know when you reach home”). In Mexico, this is the message that most women send to another to take care of each other due to the rise of violence against them. Today, eight out of ten Mexican women feel unsafe in the country. Why does making a journey from one place to another have to be worrying and scaring for women? Do only men deserve the privilege to arrive home without fear? 

It is estimated that every day, an average of ten females are killed in the country. All of them have names, dreams, expectations and lives that are taken away. They are daughters, sisters, mothers, friends, students and professionals who are killed just because of their gender.

During January of the current year, 320 women were killed in Mexico, the double than the same period in 2019. But, how do we know whether this is dramatic or not? Well, in the country there are seven municipalities that have exactly the same number of females as part of their population. Therefore, in the first month of 2020, the number of women that were killed in Mexico is equivalent to the whole female population of one of those municipalities. 

Currently, the crisis in Mexico is evident and cannot be hidden. Official records suggest that 2019 was the most violent year in Mexico’s history. Nearly 4,000 women were killed, that represent an increase of 77.7% compared to 2015. Though, 1,010 of those homicides were categorised as feminicides, the highest number since 2015. According to the Wold Health Organisation (WHO), a feminicide is usually perpetrate by men (frequently a partner or ex-partners) and involve ongoing abuse in the home, threats or intimidation, sexual violence or situations where women have less power or fewer resources than their partner. 

However, the reality is more than just statistics and numbers. Sadly, Mexico is full of tragic stories where women are kidnapped, raped, killed, or the three acts. Unfortunately, new tragedies like these come up every day in the country. One of the most shocking and brutal recent feminicide that caused outrage in Mexico was the case of Ingrid Escamilla. She was a young woman who was killed by her partner, she was mutilated, and her organs and skin were removed. Along this atrocity, Mexican authorities were not able to protect Ingrid even when she was already dead. Leaked images of her mutilated body were shared and posted by a Mexican newspaper and social media, assaulting her memory.

A week after, another barbaric killing happened in Mexico. Now, the victim was a seven-years old girl, Fátima Aldrighett. Her innocence, happiness and dreams were taken away by a woman who kidnapped her and a man who committed sexual abused of her. Her body was found dumped in a plastic bag with signs of abuse. 

Those two cases, among many others, show that women’s attackers do not distinguish between age or vulnerability, the atrocity is the same. Mexican women are angry and determined to shift the current situation. We demand equality not only for economic opportunities but also for the access to justice. We are not willing to live with fear anymore for the sexual harassment that we face daily on public transportation and the streets. And, we will never accept the fact that when a woman is killed nothing happens.

Tackling the feminicide crisis concerns the Mexican government, but also society. On the one hand, Mexico has an urgent necessity of having a solid rule of law to fight against impunity. There is not time for good intentions and wishes, because every day 10 more Mexican women are likely to be killed. So, how many more lives have to be taken to start acting? On the other hand, as a society, we need to change the way we treat women and erase the gender stereotypes that rule our behaves. It is time to empower girls, and the only way to do it is through the education and example, which starts at home.

Finally, I would like to say that this article does not aim to demand pity or just empathy with women. On the contrary, it is to illustrate that we are more powerful than ever, but to reach our demands of security and justice we also need the support of the whole society. On 8th March 2020, more than 80,000 people protest against the feminicide crisis in Mexico. The Mexican women showed how resilient and powerful we are. We are commitment to continue promoting the changes that are necessary to obtain justice for all the women that are no longer here, and security for those we still alive. It has been demonstrated that a woman is not alone, there are thousands of other females that are willing to support and take care of her.

Ana Herrera is a postgraduate student of MSc in Public Policy and Management at King’s College London. She is from Mexico, where she mainly has worked on fields such as poverty, gender gap and development. Currently, she is researching about the role of technological tools to alleviate poverty in developing countries like Mexico.  

Gender Violence in Mexico: You want to know why we are protesting? Here is why.

Image Source: https://lopezdoriga.com/nacional/recomendaciones-para-la-marcha-8m-en-mexico/

By Daniela Díaz Azcúnaga

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

*Warning: violent explicit content

Mexico is living a gender violence crisis. In the last five years, the country has faced unprecedented high rates of feminicides – defined as a hate crime based on the intentional act of killing a woman simply because she is a woman. Just in 2019, more than a thousand women were brutally murdered, thousands more have been reported missing and still remain accounted for. Being a woman in Mexico means living with the harsh reality that 10 women are killed each day, knowing that one day that woman might be you. The crimes are poorly investigated and 90% of them go unpunished or unresolved by authorities. 

I was born and raised in Mexico. I am a proud Mexican woman who loves going home every holiday. But when I go back, it is in fear. Being a woman in Mexico means perpetual vulnerability, it means modifying your daily activities, so you are ‘safe’. Stopping your chores or hobbies at a particular hour of the day so you don’t have to go back home alone at night. Sending your friends and family your live location when you are out in the streets, ‘just in case something happens’. Being afraid or not allowed to take any form of transportation because many women don’t make it to their final destination. All these have become banal, a day in the life of a woman in Mexico,  just as brushing your teeth or having dinner. We live in fear and in a prison of its own making. The ongoing gender violence crisis is shameful and even more infuriating because women are speaking, crying, dying and no one is listening.  And still they ask why we are so angry? Why do we protest, perform, shout and take the streets? 

In March 22, 2019 female Mexican writers took Twitter to share incidents of sexual harassment in their workplaces and file complaints under the hashtag #MeTooEscritoresMexicanos (#MeTooMexicanWriters). The outpouring of testimonies rapidly spread to other professions in the creative and media industries and soon hundreds of journalists, academics, artists, writers and filmmakers shared their experiences of being sexually harassed and abused by colleagues and bosses. What answer did they get? None. Their complaints and experiences were disqualified for being anonymous.  

In July and August of that same year, the first complaints against police officers for sexual harassment were filed. The night of August 3, Yolanda, a young girl of only 17 years-old, was walking back home in Azcapotzalco (a district in Mexico City), when she was approached by four police officers who raped her inside their patrol car. Her parents filed a complaint and yet the case went unresolved and the perpetrators unpunished. Hundreds of women took the streets of Mexico City, voicing their anger at the situation –shouting ‘they don’t protect us, they rape us’. What was being asked was simple: justice, punishment, respect.

Instead, women were accused of promoting violence in public spaces. How can a space be turned violent when it is already there, such that not even a young girl can reach her home? 

Claudia Sheibaum, ironically Mexico’s City first female mayor, called it a ‘provocation’. Yes, glitter was thrown, and walls were can-sprayed, but what else could be done for women to be heard and get answers? People showed indignation for the painted walls, streets and doors, but none for the bodies of women that were abused and scarred for life. The government tried to shut women protesters down, they promised a solution, but yet again, rapes, harassment and feminicides continued. On November 25 – International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women– Abril Perez was murdered in front of her children. ‘File a complaint’ the authorities said, do not use anonymity. Abril filed one in January against her husband for family violence and murder attempt. No one listened. 

It seems like in Mexico, the means do not matter. If we file or do not file a complaint does not matter. Only 1% of the cases on sexual abuse are filed, and how can they expect more women to raise their voice when authorities do not give us a reason to trust them, and even worse, when they themselves are the perpetrators. Our surfeit for the exposure and vulnerability of our bodies does not seem to matter. If we keep silent, cry or die does not seem to matter. Days after the death of Abril Perez, thousands of women gathered in el Zócalo (historic centre of Mexico City) to perform Un Violador en tu Camino –a Chilean feminist piece protesting violence against women. The words echoed on the streets, universities, and other public establishments. Women stood up there to say ‘no’ on behalf of every woman –it’s not our fault to be raped, killed or harassed. 

‘And the fault was not mine,

nor where I was,

nor what I wore.

The rapist is you!’

Through social media, protests, complaints, can-sprayed painting, glitter and performances we have demanded justice and an end to gender violence. Ingrid Escamilla was murdered earlier this year in February. It was not enough that her life was taken in a brutal and degrading manner, the photo of her body was leaked by police officers and then published by the media. This shows the lack of respect for the female body, even when it is dead. And then as if nothing could be more shocking, Fatima Quintana, a 7-year-old was tortured, raped, and murdered. She was found inside a plastic bag with signs of violence. No human being–regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or anything– should be treated like beasts. 

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico’s president, still neglects the real problem and blames ‘the neoliberal politics’ for the gender violence crisis consuming the country. He even asks feminists ‘with all due respect, [to] please stop painting doors and walls’. Mr President, do not ask for respect to the institutions if there is no respect to life. The decalogue published by the State, after protests increased, is an empty pointed list of cliched promises with no explicit public policy to approach the crisis. 

Do you still ask why? Why are Mexican women taking the streets? Why are they so angrily shouting and painting walls? It is to ask for justice, for our bodies to be respected and not revictimized. We ask for an end to feminicide, gendered violence, aggressions and normalised misogyny. This why we keep protesting, because we refuse to be part of a system that brings its citizens to its knees, so it grows tall. To stop protesting, painting and performing would be to understand the erasure of ourselves as ordinary, and it is not. It is enough of respectability politics. Why should we protest as our oppressor sees fit? It has been tried and the State still did not listen. Mexican women are exhausted, unhappy, angry, but most of all united. American black feminist writer, Audre Lorde calls it “a symphony of anger”, an orchestration of all disappointments, frustrations and furies to use them as strength, force and insight in our daily fights. 

The aforementioned events that happened this last year have led to exactly this symphony, to come united and speak up, no matter where we are, and scream: IT STOPS HERE! That is why on the 8th of March Mexican women marched again, because the privilege of forgetting does not exist. If we forget we do not give justice to Yolanda, Ingrid, Fatima, Abril, Marisela, Ruby, Mara, Adriana, Marisela, Silvia or any of the 10 women who keep dying every day.  The 8th of march was to remember and demand justice for those who do not have a voice anymore, for those who have been sexually abused but are scared of speaking up. The 9th  of march, the day of the national strike, was show the impact of our labour, economic and social force –to demonstrate that women and girls in Mexico do matter. It is hoped that this was not just a fleeting demonstration, but that it would turn into concrete action. That it would make the situation so real and uncomfortable that it would inspire a national conversation and broader shifts in the future of women’s rights in Mexico.

Daniela is a Mexican student, currently in her second year of BA in Liberal Arts with a major in Politics at King’s College. She enjoys writing about environmental and social justice affairs, especially those concerning minority groups such as women, children or indigenous groups.

Poem: Las Mujeres Somos Fuego (Us Women are Fire)

By: Roberta Woodworth

Las Mujeres Somos Fuego

Era un solsticio de verano,

con la espalda hacia la luna.

Una belleza casi egoísta.

La risa desvergonzada,

dentro de un aula en silencio

con el perfume de las flores

trenzado en los cabellos.

Era mujer, era fuego

flama vibrante de alma ardiente

furia incandescente

esa que fantasea

con quemarlo todo.

Nació tranquila,

entre voces que apaciguan,

que encasillan.

Los hombres le temen,

su miedo compartido y desmontado:

querer jugar con fuego y no morir calcinado.

El fuego deja huellas,

en las pieles y en la arena.

Y las mujeres ardemos,

sin importar cuanto nos extingan.

Un buen día, sin avisar,

volvemos a arder, a quemar, a amar.

Un día volvemos a incendiarlo todo.

English Translation:

Us Women Are Fire

It was summer solstice,

with her back against the moon.

An almost selfish beauty.

An unapologetic laugh,

inside a silent room

with her flowery perfume

braided throughout her hair.

She was a woman, she was fire

a vibrant flame with an ardent soul.

incandescent fury,

one that dreams with burning it all.

She was born tranquil,

amongst appeasing voices.

Men are scared of her,

their shared and unmounted fear:

they want to play with fire and not burn to death.

Fire leaves its traces,

on skin and on sand.

And us women we burn,

no matter how much they try to extinguish us.

One day, without notice,

we will return to burn again, we will love again.

One day we will come back to burn it all.

Roberta Woodworth is a born and raised Mexican writer, fashion lover, poetry addict, sport enthusiast, foodie, and student. Apart from managing and editing her blog, My Vintage Armoire, she has collaborated with various publishers in her country, such ELLE México, Instyle, and Life&Style. She has also been the beauty editor for Finding Ferdinand New York and editorial advisor to the Fashion section for the Mexican newspaper Reforma.

‘A rapist in your path’: Protesting Rape Culture in Latin America

Image Source: https://medium.com/youth-for-global-goals/and-it-was-not-my-fault-nor-where-i-was-nor-what-i-wore-3af872ea5977

By: Maria Ascencio

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Some of them carry posters that read the names of victims, some of them wear what we as a society have come to wrongfully categorize a “provocative outfit”. All of them are different. They come from all sorts of backgrounds and have endured all kinds of different experiences. Still, they all stand outside in the streets, united, fearless, yet vulnerable to the perils of their societies. Blindfolded, they all move in synch to the same melody, “Y la culpa no era mía, ni dónde estaba ni cómo vestía, el violador eres tú”. (“I do not bear the guilt, regardless of where I was or what I was wearing, you are the rapist”). Mostly women, protesters across Latin America became inspired by the Chilean anthem “A Rapist in Your Path”, and took over the streets to demand their governments to take action regarding a number of societal injustices, including institutional neglect in cases of abuse and harassment, the sexist educational curriculum that is imparted in most countries, and overall inequalities in all societal spheres. Unfortunately, the support with which these protests were met was paralleled with criticism and mockery. Protesters were criticized for being “ridiculous”, they were accused of damaging public property and symbolic monuments, and if one goes on twitter, instagram or youtube, it is not hard to see memes and video parodies of them.

First and foremost, I want to make clear that by no means do I agree with the humiliation and harassment that these women have been met with. With this article, my intention is to question the efficacy of their public demonstration in a continent that the UN has long classified as the worst place on earth for women to live in (outside of conflict and war-thorn areas that is). I also intend to shed light on areas that might help the feminist movement moving forward, areas that have long been overshadowed and in which many Latin American women have, unknowingly, played an active role in maintaining patriarchal structures. I must also include a disclaimer. It is both difficult and sometimes dangerous to generalize across countries in a region as diverse as Latin America, even more so when discussing any sociopolitical issue. Due to the limited scope of this article, however, I am forced to make some of these generalizations, and it is important to consider that they might be influenced by the context in which I grew up and my own personal experiences. With this in mind, I invite the reader to consider their own experiences, and conduct wider research in order to challenge or add to my arguments.

I am certain that I am not the only one who has heard that feminism does not, and has actually never existed in Latin America. Whether or not these statements are made with malicious intent or not, the reality is that a lot of men and women remain ignorant (or choose to remain ignorant) to the fact that feminism has a long history in the region. While I would not be able to write much about the pre-hispanic period, there is enough evidence to suggest that feminism in Latin America was well alive during the 19th and 20th centuries. For the sake of brevity, (and because I could not have done a better job), I invite the reader to take a look at Nikhil Kumar’s “The Machismo Paradox: Latin America’s Struggles with Feminism and Patriarchy”, in which she offers a more thorough history. Granted, the women before us have achieved a lot. From the right to vote, to the right to terminate an unwanted or dangerous pregnancy, it would be erroneous and flat-out disrespectful on my part to diminish their efforts and victories. But, I must agree with Kumar. These achievements have not been grass-roots, fast-paced or easy to achieve. And, however groundbreaking, each and every single one of these victories has relied on some sort of support from the male establishment. I would argue that this has been the case because Latin American women and feminists have sought to tackle the patriarchy from above, rather than from below. In other words, for decades now we have politely asked men to give us what we deserve instead of teaching them from an early age that we are entitled to a rightful life, and that we do not need to ask for their permission to do so.

On “Margins, silences and bottom rungs: how to overcome the underestimation of power in the study of international relations” Cynthia Enloe makes an interesting point regarding the interconnectedness of hierarchies and how they might provide each other with respective resilience. She suggests that, the hierarchies in the bedroom and at home are thus not unconnected from the hierarchies in government structures. Understanding these interrelations is thus key in changing the status quo, and it is precisely because this link is still so misunderstood in Latin America that I do not see how the current protests will have any significant impact.

The education of Latin American boys and their socialization at home, and at school has long focused on controlling everything that may make them appear weak, affectionate, caring; and on stimulating precisely expressions of strength, domination and violence, says Nancy Palomino co- author of the book “Behind the Mask: Values and sexual violence in everyday life,” It is through this long educational tradition that finds its ancestry in the composition of ancient indigenous tribes, that Latin Americans have built a culture of violent machismo. And us women have contributed in normalizing this.

Machismo is a cultural analog to patriarchy that refers to a set of hyper-masculine characteristics and their assigned value in traditional Latin American society. Culture on its own does not explain why violence happens, there are obviously many factors at play that facilitate violence against women, including emotional dependency, trauma, adverse childhood experiences, poverty, discrimination, etc. But, in building and maintaining a machista culture, we have unraveled a plethora of problems that go beyond accepting gender roles. We have normalized the hyper-sexualisation of women, we have normalized their objectification, limited men’s ability to embody other, more empathetic and caring kinds of masculinity while justifying and praising their aggressive traits because “boys will be boys”.

The issue I see with the current protests in the continent are thus not based on the fact that I am opposed to their cause. My problem is that I do not see how they separate themselves from previous attempts made by our ancestors at tackling the patriarchy. This, I see it as yet another effort from above, in which we are politely asking men in government for permission to change something that they are unable and unwilling to understand. We have to remember that these men in power are the same who grew up watching their mothers and sisters cook meals and clean the house while their fathers brought bread to the table. The same men who were told in school by their female teachers that they should hold back their tears because real men do not cry. The same who learnt later in life that they had easy on-going access to women among their workplace and families, because we told our girls that they look prettier when they are silent. From sociological and psychological perspectives, changing these cognitive biases in this day and age is almost and impossible task. So protesting is fine and all. I cannot deny that it has a short-term impact. But if we are to rescue Latin American feminism, our real job begins as future mothers, wives, sisters, and girlfriends. Us and no one else, will have to deal with the difficult task of raising a future generation in which gender roles no longer take a prominent place.

Maria is a second year International Relations Student at King’s College, the Broadcast Editor for International Relations Today and the Editor in Chief of El Cortao.

Guaidó in Madrid: The Issue of Venezuelan Political Identity in Spain

Image Source: https://www.madridiario.es/juan-guaido-recibe-llaves-oro-madrid-mano-almeida-villacis

By: Valeria Sinisi García

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Juan Guaidó, acting President of Venezuela, arrived in the Spanish capital the past 25th of January for one of the many stops in his European tour. The intent of the visit was to further his European political agenda which seeks to increase and secure support for his leadership as the opposition government in the South-American nation. Previously, Guaidó has also met with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, as well as with the French President Emmanuel Macron, which signalled a prosperous start to his campaign. However, he encountered a surprising situation when he arrived in Spain, as Pedro Sanchez, the current Prime Minister and president of the socialist party PSOE in Spain, did not receive the self-proclaimed Venezuelan President. 

This was an unexpected action. Just over a year ago, the Spanish leader was one of the firsts to express support for his presidency. Still, a formal invitation to Moncloa, the official residence of the Spanish Prime Minister, was not conveyed. A meeting with the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Arancha Gonzalez Laya, was instead arranged on non-governmental premises for the two parties to converse.  While in Brussels, Guaidó stated that his country has “the best relations with Spain” and that he and his administration hope to develop these relations to form strong ties which can lead to future collaboration, not only with Spain but also with the rest of Europe. 

Juan Gerardo Guaidó Márquez has been the President of the National Assembly of Venezuela since the 5th of January 2019 and the 23rd of the same month he was appointed acting President of the republic, after the presidential crisis which resulted in the Organisation of American States (OAS) declaring Maduro’s presidency illegitimate. Since then, Nicolás Maduro and his government have accused Guaidó of organising a coup to take control of Venezuela, backed by the United States. However, Guaidó has continued to state that his movement and rule are supported by peaceful volunteers. Once a member and co-founder of the social-democratic party Popular Will, Guaidó has since declared himself independent last month. Nonetheless, he is still considered a centrist by his peers and most of the international community. 

As already stated, Pedro Sanchez last year announced his support for Guaidó’s government in response to his self-proclamation. However, the decision to not meet with him during his tour of Europe has created doubts about where the Prime Minister stands with regards to Venezuelan political identity. Some have speculated that his reluctance to have a formal meeting at Moncloa with Guaidó is rooted in Sanchez’s coalition government with the far-left party Unidas Podemos, whose president is Pablo Iglesias. Iglesias has also been recently appointed as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers to Sanchez, thus placing him in one of the most important positions within the Spanish government. 

Iglesias and his party do not recognise Guaidó as the legitimate President of Venezuela, rather they see him as a coupist and have expressed their support for Maduro’s leadership. This raises questions on the strategic coherence of the new Spanish government and how the two politicians, Sanchez and Iglesias, intend to continue their collaboration regarding other foreign affairs with these sort of contrasting views. In fact, further consternation arises from a meeting between Delcy Rodriguez, Maduro’s vice-president, and Jose Luis Abalos, a top minister in Sanchez’s administration, just a few days before Juan Guaidó was to arrive in Madrid. Abalos stated that there was no hidden purpose to the meeting and that he reminded Rodriguez that according to EU sanctions she was not allowed to enter Spanish territory. 

Spanish opposition parties heavily criticised this reunion between a representative of Maduro’s rule and a high-ranking member of Sanchez’s government. A member of the centre Ciudadanos party conveyed his perplexity through this tweet: “Did Abalos meet with the vice-president of the Maduro totalitarian regime? With someone banned from entering the European Union as a high-ranking official of that tyranny?” Instead, Pablo Casado, the president of the centre-right Partido Popular, stated that “If this is confirmed, Abalos cannot continue to lead the ministry for even one more day.” 

Other Spanish political figures also commented on the recent events regarding the socialist party’s stance in Venezuelan politics. José María Aznar Lopez, former Prime Minister of Spain, expressed his disapproval on Facebook of Sanchez’s refusal to see Guaidó in Moncloa. He set forth the view that this was a demonstration of his support for Maduro’s ‘dictatorship’. Also, Inés Arrimadas, the current spokesperson of Ciudadanos, wrote on an Instagram post, below several photographs depicting a discussion with Guaidó, that she had met with the interim President of Venezuela, referring to him as the legitimate president of the South-American nation, and hoping for an end to Maduro’s tyranny through a fight for human rights, democracy, and freedom.

Valeria Sinisi García is a Spanish and Italian student, in her second year of a BA in International Relations. Her main research interest involves climate change and its effects on international security. However, she also enjoys reading on issues regarding feminism and current affairs.

Venezuela: The New Struggle for Venezuelans in Peru

Image Source: https://www.notitarde.com/ddhh-de-venezolanos-peru-defendidos-rigor/

By: Arianna Sanchez

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

In the peak of the Venezuelan crisis, South American countries started to see increments in their influx of immigration; Colombia and Peru received the highest levels of Venezuelan immigrants into their countries. A Peruvian newspaper, ‘El Comercio’, refers to it as one of the most important migratory movements Peru has ever seen, and with good reason: from 2016 to 2019, the number of Venezuelan residents in Peru increased from a mere 6,615 to around 862,000 (LR, 2019). On the 15th of June, however, Peru ended this open-door policy. Martin Vizcarra, the current Peruvian president, voiced concerns about the policies that had been taken and announced his government would restrict entrance only to Venezuelan passport holders, to guarantee a ‘secure and organised migration’ into the country (Fowks, 2019). This came as a shock to Venezuelan immigrants who were quick to highlight the costs of getting a passport and the extremely long bureaucratic process that accompanied it (Fowks, 2019). On the days before the policy was implemented, more than 9,000 Venezuelans crossed the border in an attempt to escape the new restriction. This begs the question, what changed? What drove Peru to close its borders?

The downfall of PPK

To attempt and explain this 180-degree change, let us start from the beginning. Pedro Pablo Kuczinsky (PPK) was the Peruvian president back then. Things were really not looking up either for PPK or his government. The growing level of Venezuelan immigration into the country was largely ignored by the majority of the Peruvian population at the time; there were other issues that appeared much more salient. On Christmas morning of 2017, Peruvians woke up to a surprising and enraging event: president PPK had pardoned the ex-president Alberto Fujimori, who led a very controversial administration to say the least. This was taken more as an insult than as a gift as Peruvians were quick to demonstrate their complete rejection to PPK’s act of forgiveness. Reactions did not wait for after the New Year. Two congressmen from PPK’s political party renounced, one of which was the spokesman for the party. Moreover, a mere day after the pardon was approved, a demonstration of at least 5,000 occupied the streets of Lima, making it clear they rejected the pardon, and with it they now rejected PPK too (Presse, 2017). The level of political disruption brought about police forces using tear gas on protesters. 

The chaos did not stop there. The next step into the free-fall of PPK involves Westfield Capital and Odebrecht. In December 2017, in the midst of the corruption and money laundering trial of the construction company Odebrecht, a declaration incriminating PPK was made public: Odebrecht claimed the company had paid around $4.8 million to two firms directly linked to the President in a period of 10 years (2004-2014), Westfield Capital and First Capital. These payments were made when PPK was working as a Minister of Estate from 2004-2006, and during his presidential campaign in 2011 (LR, 2017). In 2018, the disapproval of his administration in Peruvians was a staggering 82%, while the percentage of people that wanted him actually vacated from his position was 52% (Gestión, 2018). In that same year, a trial for the vacancy of PPK took place, mainly pushed forward by Fuerza Popular, the main political opposition to his government. On the 21st of March 2018 it was announced that PPK had renounced his presidency, leaving the vice-president Martin Vizcarra in charge until the general elections in 2021 (BBC News Mundo, 2018). 

Road to Disaster

PPK was quite known for his welcoming approach to Venezuelan immigration, inviting struggling Venezuelans to migrate to Peru. His reasoning for this approach was not really at fault, as he said himself, in the 1970’s Peru was struggling with a dictatorship and the rise of far-left terrorism, driving many Peruvians to search for refuge in Venezuela (Gestión, 2018). However, his view was bound to have consequences in a medium to long run. It is important to highlight that Peru did not have any type of public policy to help Venezuelans relocate into strategic Peruvian provinces facing an undersupply of labour, such as the highlands or the jungle (Expreso, 2018). Instead, Venezuelans relocated to Lima, an already overly crowded capital given the centralised Peruvian government, making sociocultural tensions imminent.  

Moreover, the influx of Venezuelans into Peru was accelerated by the implementation of the Ecuadorian ‘Corredor Humanitario’, a free means of transport for Venezuelan immigrants at the northern border of Ecuador, leaving them at the Ecuadorian frontier with Peru (Comunicacion.gob.ec, 2018). This meant that the rate of immigration kept accelerating, without a stable or efficient set of Peruvian public policy to be able to absorb this without developing spill-over effects in society. This was worsened by the lack of a census of the immigrants coming into Peru, where no documents of identification such as passports were required for entrance, which would then be used against PPK’s government by both political opposition and Peruvian society – claiming this gave rise to the amount of ‘criminals’ that could walk into Peru without being subject to any regulation.  

As government failures and regional pressures started to accrue, so did the saliency of Venezuelan immigration for Peruvians. Xenophobia levels were skyrocketing, and Venezuelan refugees were being blamed for levels of crime and delinquency and Peruvians demanded action. According to a survey carried out by Ipsos in Peru, 54% of respondents claimed Venezuelan immigration was negative due to ‘increasing crime’, while 67% of these were against Venezuelan immigration in general (Perú, 2019). Of course, this meant that, in the middle of a political battle between President and Congress, political opposition found a key issue to appeal to Peruvians. Looking past this political polarisation, Ricardo Valdés, ex vice Minister of Internal Affairs, pointed out crime levels in the Peruvian capital were not caused by the presence Venezuelans, but the lack of presence of policemen in the streets (América Noticias, 2019). Likewise, Valdés was quick to highlight the dangers of the discourse Peruvian politicians were carrying out with clear populist ends, strengthening negative perceptions towards Venezuelans within the Peruvian population (América Noticias, 2019). 

Closing Borders

After PPK renounced presidency, Martin Vizcarra was left with a clear socio-political disaster. Venezuelan immigration kept increasing and so did pressures from Peruvian society and a political opposition feeding into that societal desperation. Reiterating Peru was not decreasing solidarity towards Venezuelan immigrants, he criticised the previous policies, emphasizing that no personal records or criminal antecedents were checked prior to entrance to the country (Peru21, 2019). He did not fail to mention the saliency of delinquency indexes tormenting Peruvian citizens, stating the government was focusing on making immigration orderly and safe (Peru21, 2019). Moreover, he mentioned around 140 Venezuelans had been expelled from Peru due to crime, a firm approach fit to somewhat appease the rising levels xenophobia in the country (Fowks, 2019). On the 15th of June 2019, policies restricting the influx of Venezuelans into Peru started. From July to August 2019, a reduction of 91% of Venezuelan immigrants was recorded (The Conversation, 2019). 

Conclusion and going forward

In essence, it seems both Venezuelan immigrants and Peruvian society have been victims of a large-scale political turmoil, leading to opportunistic fights in Congress which eventually led to the evident scapegoating of Venezuelans. The failure of PPK to implement efficient immigration policies gave the upper hand to political opposition, which saw an immense opportunity to appeal to the Peruvian community once the ex-President was brought down by his own corruption scandal. Venezuelans in Peru might have indeed been successful in escaping the political turmoil of their own country, but now they face another struggle attempting to face that one of Peru – which is keen in making them blameworthy of the inefficiencies of both Congress and ex-Presidency. 

With xenophobia levels still on the rise, it seems it will be a very tough task for Venezuelans in the Andean country to successfully integrate into society. With the new elections for Congress on January 26th and the general elections taking place in 2021, it seems Venezuelan immigration will be a key aspect of the debate. We have to hope that, for the sake of the social stability of Peruvians themselves and the prospects of this new demographic, the administration in charge will not be using this as an opportunity to win, but as an opportunity to reduce the tensions instigated by the previous government. 

Arianna is a second year BSc Politics student from Peru. She enjoys writing about current affairs, especially those concerning Latin America and domestic or international security issues.

Bolivia: Clean Break or Coup?

Image Source: https://www.lavoz.com.ar/mundo/estiman-millonarias-perdidas-por-protestas-en-bolivia

By: Tommy O’Donnell

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Bolivia is in turmoil. In the final few months of 2019, the small South American nation had faced two constitutional crises; one of which was arguably caused by the ‘resolution’ of the other. There are two key figures involved in these crises whose names you need to have engraved in your mind if you want to have the first (or second) clue about the current state of Bolivia: Evo Morales and Jeanine Áñez, the former and current Presidents of Bolivia respectively. 

To make sense of this conflict, it is crucial to dissect it in two parts. It must be noted that although each section is titled; ’Clean Break’ and ‘Coup’ respectively, this is not an endorsement of the accuracy of those terms. This article aims to discuss and determine the democratic legitimacy of these protests’ outcomes and answer the question: is Bolivia experiencing a clean break or a coup?

PART ONE: CLEAN BREAK

If we really want to go from the very beginning we need to go back to early 2016. Pre-Brexit, pre-Trump and pre-general global chaos, Bolivia had got stuck into its own electoral debate: should the constitutional article limiting presidential terms to two be amended to allow for limitless presidential terms. On 21st February voters narrowly said no with 51.3% of the referendum vote, forbidding the incumbent Evo Morales from seeking a fourth term; his first term began in 2006 before the new 2009 constitution, meaning the two-term limit did not apply. Although voters rejected Morales’s proposal, in December 2017 the courts had a different point of view. They cited Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, ruling that no public office would have term limits, despite what the country’s own constitution says, clearing the way for Morales’s attempt at a fourth term in office.

Fast forward a little under two years. The incumbent President Morales is facing off against former President Carlos Mesa in Bolivia’s 2019 general election, with the public’s trust of the electoral system being chipped away after the overruling of the 2016 referendum. Shortly after the polls closed, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal releases two sets of results; firstly, an exit poll which estimates how many votes each candidate received by asking voters as they leave polling stations, and shortly after, a ‘complete provisional result’ which counts actual votes from the ballot boxes. Bolivian electoral laws state that a candidate needs to be 10% ahead of their opponent in order to avoid a second run-off election, however Morales’s lead over Mesa was less than that in both the exit poll and the provisional result—in fact, the ‘complete provisional result’ showed an even closer result than the exit poll with Morales in front by only 7.1%.

So both candidates conceded and the country went to a second run-off election, right? Wrong! At 7:40pm, the preliminary results were updated for the final time by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, claiming that this was because “official results were beginning to be released”. However, without any evidence of a clear victory, Evo Morales declared at 9:25pm that same evening that he was the winner, and that although he would await final scrutiny, the remaining rural votes would guarantee his victory. He forgot to mention one phrase, however: run-off. 

Almost 24 hours after the final update to the preliminary results, more than 95% of votes had been counted and these results were published; Morales had managed to win 10.14% more votes than his rival Mesa, and thus the need for a second run-off election was nulled. At least that is what Morales and his party said. The opposition were not so convinced and published a 190-page-long report detailing multiple accusations of fraud. And now here’s where things get messy.

Protests. Lots and lots of protests. Much of the Bolivian electorate was as convinced as the opposition of Morales’s outright victory, and news stories of pro-Morales ballots being pictured in the hands of non-electoral officials only stoked the belief that the incumbent’s victory was illegitimate. Of course, the police reaction was not friendly, leading to the deployment of tear gas against residents and protesters, eventually ending up with police-civilian violence and attacks on Morales’s party’s campaign offices. Clashes between pro-Morales and anti-Morales protesters were common and contentious, and the protests in favour of a second run-off election reached fever pitch on 25th October, the day after the final election result was published, showing a Morales victory with a margin upwards of 10%. By this point several of Bolivia’s Latin American neighbours, the United States, and the European Union had all called for the second round of elections to go ahead, regardless of the eventual result, and on the evening of the 25th protesters filled the streets of the Bolivian capital chanting “Bolivia no es Cuba ni Venezuela”: Bolivia is not Cuba, nor Venezuela.

Protesting continued and showed no sign of slowing down, and by 7th November the government had announced the deaths of three people as a result of the protests. Meanwhile, the Organisation of American States (OAS) had been conducting an independent investigation into the electoral conduct of Bolivia’s general election. On 10th November they published their report which had found serious technical irregularities, and stated that Morales crossing the 10% threshold would have been highly unlikely. The OAS recommended another electoral process, echoing the sentiments of the U.S. and the EU, however lines started to blur when the commander-in-chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces, General Williams Kaliman called for Morales’s resignation to “help restore peace and stability”. Morales complied and resigned later that day from a secret location. 

PART TWO: COUP

“Coup”. A big word used by major global politicians, such as Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez to describe the end of Evo Morales’s presidency. With the former President hopping on a plane to accept Mexican President Obrador’s offer of asylum, acting President of the Bolivian Senate, Jeanine Áñez called an extraordinary session of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly in order to ratify the resignation of Morales and declare herself President of the Senate and consequently acting President of Bolivia. As you can imagine, Morales’s party Movement for Socialism (MAS) were not happy. They chose to boycott this gathering of the Assembly and did not recognise Áñez’s new roles as legitimate. Nonetheless, the move by Áñez was upheld by the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal.

This is where the narrative began to change. The protests transitioned from being strongly anti-Morales to strongly pro-Morales, which can be largely be attributed to the increase in indigenous protesters in the ex-President’s favour—and perhaps just as importantly, against the incumbent-President. 

It is important in the context of the conflict to understand the complicated nature of indigenous politics in Bolivia. Indigenous Bolivians make up approximately 20% of the country’s population, with heritage spread amongst 36 ethnic groups—Aymara and Quechua being the largest. Additionally, 68% of the population is mestizo, meaning they have both indigenous and European heritage. Naturally, as a post-colonial state, Bolivia’s indigenous population had faced innumerous injustices at the hands of Western imperialists, however Evo Morales was seen as a symbolic turning point for them, with Morales himself being Aymara. He attempted to establish a ‘plurinational’ state and expand collective indigenous rights, exemplified in the 2009 constitution which recognised the presence of different communities in Bolivia and allowed ancestral indigenous territories to be self-governed. 

But of course, anti-indigenous discrimination did not just disappear overnight after the election of Morales, which acting-President Áñez would know well. She previously made comments on social media calling the Aymara New Year celebration “satanic”, as well as calling indigenous people wearing shoes “inauthentic”. It’s worth mentioning that Áñez has denied making these comments, but independent fact checkers have shown the contrary to be true. 

Snapping back into the present situation, the city of La Paz had become flooded with protesters clashing with police, military and opposition forces. Protesters were able to block roads leading to the airport, but in the very pro-Morales city of El Alto they were prohibited by policemen and military forces from marching to La Paz with the use of tear gas and water cannons. 

Within a few days, the escalation of violence had become deadly, with the death toll by 15th November reaching 23, largely due to armed forces attacking pro-Morales protesters. From Mexico, Morales described the events as a “massacre”, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, described the events as an “extremely dangerous development”. Nevertheless, Áñez issued a statement exempting all armed forces from criminal responsibility when acting in a “legitimate defense or state of necessity”, which was condemned by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Moving further in what seems to reach coup-territory, the interim interior minister Arturo Murillo threatened both journalists and pro-Morales legislators on charges of subversion and/or sedition. The protests continue, with more aggression coming from the new government side; dispersing protesters with tear gas marching towards funerals for their fellow protesters who were killed in the clashes, opening an investigation into Morales for terrorism and sedition, and arresting the vice-president of Morales’s MAS party.

Although Bolivia is still in a state of purgatory, there is a sliver of hope for the country. On 23rd November, both MAS and anti-Morales legislators approved legislation which convocates a new general election, due to take place in May 2020. Compromises were made amongst both camps; the prohibition of Morales’s participation would be accepted by MAS if Áñez’s government agreed to withdraw police officers and armed forces from all protest areas, lift the exemption of criminal responsibility from armed forces, and other measures which would protect politicians and protesters in the lead up to the new election. 

PART THREE: CLEAN BREAK OR COUP?

The only conclusion I can reach is that the current state of Bolivia is both a clean break and a coup, and at the same time, also neither. One could argue that the cloud of Morales’s alleged corruption and obvious desire to stay in office for as long as possible has been stopped, making space for a truer form of democracy in Bolivian politics, exemplified by the fresh election due in 2020. On the other hand, the way in which Morales was ousted from his position, which heavily involved the police, the armed forces and high-ranking military officials is a textbook definition of a coup. Additionally, the repression of protesters with the use of tear gas, water cannons and deadly force can be viewed as an extreme abuse of power by a government lacking a mandate, and in the eyes of a large portion of Bolivians, legitimacy. Hopefully with the upcoming election and a future which is not (at the moment) looking too rocky, Bolivians can return to the energy that is exemplified in their national motto, “La Unión es la fuerza”: Unity is Strength.

Tommy is a third year Spanish & Portuguese student from the UK with a keen interest in language learning and global politics. He enjoys writing about current political affairs and turmoil, especially in Latin America.

Latin American Protests: Not the 'Forgotten' Continent After All

Image Source: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/03/americas/five-keys-latin-america-protests-romo-intl/index.html

By: Paula Arrus

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

A trip down memory lane

Alfonso Quiroz in his book ‘Corrupt Circles’ examines the history of Peruvian corruption dating back to the arrival of the Conquistadors and the subsequent colonial period, creating a microcosm of the history of Latin America. As colonialists took over different territories and established their own conception of ‘states’, they also installed a mindset in the elites that politics was a zero-sum game that favoured the state over the population. Quiroz reveals that corruption has been inherent to Peru’s state institutions, transmitting a lack of public confidence and discontent on how democracy has been implemented. Even though Quiroz contends that corruption has been perpetrated by Peruvians and the international community’s inaction to confront it, recent protests in Latin America demonstrate that change will not be achieved without a fundamental overhaul of the region’s state institutions. Meanwhile, the latter will continue to be tainted by scandals and deceit:  two features Latin Americans have become familiar with over time. Recent protests embody these ‘forgotten populations’ and have resulted in large sections of Latin Americans being continuously spurned by the same state institutions that dishonestly claim to represent them.

Latin America’s current political and economic environment has a taste of its first ‘lost decade’ in the 1980s Debt Crisis. With the rise of neoliberalism in the 1960s and 70s, various Latin American countries borrowed large amounts of money from international financial organisations such as the IMF and World Bank in order to industrialize. These loans were allowed due to rising commodity prices which induced economic growth and increased revenues for Latin American states. However, during the late 1970s and early 80s, the region’s debt to commercial banks soared and a vicious borrowing cycle materialized, with external debt reaching over 50% of the region’s total GDP in 1983 of $315bn, quadruple from the $75bn in 1975.

Latin America had embarked in an economic rollercoaster that started and ended with a vertical drop. Increased oil prices incited countries to borrow more money in order to cover rising costs. However, high interest rates in the US and Europe plus worsening exchange rates with the US dollar reduced Latin American states’ purchasing power: they began to owe more than what they initially borrowed. The numerous sovereign debt defaults that occurred in the following years resulted in the interventionist period by the IMF who created conditional loans to Latin American states in exchange for alterations in their domestic policies. A substantial change was a significant reduction in government spending despite unemployment and inflation rising to high levels, and real wages reducing dramatically. Consequently, the inequality gap extended as poverty increased and countries became more preoccupied with paying what they owed, making it difficult to save turbulent economies.

Latin America’s history for the second half of the 20th century built considerable social discontent that is resounding of the protests we see today. The IMF was increasingly seen as the neo-imperialist power acting on self-interest as their reforms produced large social costs and consolidated Latin America’s dependency on the developed states. In 2014, commodity prices dropped again and Latin America’s economic activity declined. The middle class stopped receiving new members and decreasing social upgrading reduced overall confidence in the economies, driving away investments and growth.

Latin Americans have had enough

2019 has not been the year for Latin American countries. The progressive awareness that Latin America’s failed institutions were not delivering the Western promise of democracy and increased socioeconomic opportunities has afflicted the region with nation-wide social protests. Argentina is back with a Peronist-Kirschner government while Mexico continues to suffer from drug cartel violence and populism. Ecuador has reacted strongly against pro-IMF policies adopted by President Lenin Moreno that effectively got rid of an oil subsidy to receive a loan. Six month-long protests in Haiti erupted from high inflation and general discontent over redundant government corruption. With protests diffusing into Colombia in late November, it is clear to say that populations in Latin America have been emboldened by their neighbouring counterparts, forming their very own domino effect permeated with anger and intolerance against failing governments.

Left and right protests have smeared the region in response to weak economic growths, rising inequalities and overall discontent with states’ ‘democratic’ institutions. GDP per capital and living standards have declined substantially as real GDP growth has been a mere 0.8% over the last 6 years. Latin America remains the most unequal region in the world as their legacy of colonialism built enduring political and economic structures designed to benefit only a few. Monica de Bolle, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, conceptualised social protests in the region as clear reactions to changing tolerances for socioeconomic inequalities. While many Latin Americans see their elite counterparts get richer, they also expect an improvement in their living standards. It is this unfulfilled prospect that has driven them to the streets.

Violent protests, particularly in Chile, are reminiscent of failed promises by governments to enlarge social spending, reinstate public confidence and increase political transparency. Rising inequalities and unsuccessful economic policies enticed Chileans to protest against President Sebastián Piñera’s right-wing government. Moreover, Bolivia’s nation-wide uprising protesting the fraudulent presidential election forced Evo Morales to renounce the presidency after 14 years in power. Despite the contrasting differences in both countries’ economies and political systems, these protests can be traced back to broader discontents that have swamped Latin American populations.

After the end of the commodities’ boom in 2014, Latin American governments could not keep spending on welfare systems, programs to reduce poverty and on redistributing incomes. Rather, all the issues they failed to tackle during their prosperous incumbencies are now the factors that are hampering Latin American development, such as the lack of investment on education and infrastructure to improve long-term economic competitiveness. These protests embody Latin Americans’ dissatisfaction with the social contracts they reluctantly live in. While protests may have emerged by triggering causes such as raising metro fares in Chile, these movements encapsulate everything that is wrong with their societies and political systems.

What’s next?

Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Chile are still on path to achieve growth rates between 2-3%, while Bolsonaro’s economic reform in Brazil gives hope to the country. Nevertheless, Michael Stott from the Financial Times argued that Latin America will face stronger challenges in the nearby future as IMF world economic forecasts showed that the region will only grow 0.2% in the following year. Similarly, James Bosworth, founder of political-risk consultancy Hxagon, claims that ‘governments are trapped and there will be more violent protests in 2020’ (Bosworth, 2019) as new administrations gaining power will face increased pressured to achieve quick positive change while being constrained by a lack of resources.

The near term future looks grim mainly because Latin American countries in the past were able to discourage protests by maintaining stable economic performances thanks to a strong global economy which is not the case anymore. Alberto Ramos, head of Latin American economics at Goldman Sachs, stated that Latin America is nearly missing everything a region would need to prosper in the nearby future: ‘it doesn’t invest enough, save enough nor educate well enough’ (Stott, 2019). The discontent and blatant anger will prevail until change is enacted. The future will likely bring new elections for many countries, yet it can be expected most populations will vote for the party who promises to do exactly the opposite of what current governments are providing. And this is far from reassuring.

However, due to the social unrest and the extraordinary formation of a middle class, there is a strong need for institutional reform and better public infrastructure in terms of transportation, education and basic health services, or the region will face more and more unrest. There is a very good opportunity for a new generation of politicians to take control and restore public confidence by overhauling the existing political structures. Peru will be the first in line with congressional elections in January 2020.

It looks like Latin America won’t be the ‘forgotten continent’ after all and let’s hope that the region can be restored in the years to come.

Paula is a second year IR student from Peru with a strong interest in Latin American politics and economics. She enjoys writing thought-provoking pieces about current affairs and the future of our world.

Chile in Flames: How Soaring Metro Prices Have Led to Social Revolt

Image Source: http://www.diarioeldia.cl/region/actriz-ovallina-captura-marcha-mas-grande-chile-en-emblematica-fotografia

By: Tommy O’Donnell

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Chile is often touted as South America’s most prosperous and stable nation. Its high-income economy, high living standards and leading Latin American figures in human development, economic freedom and low perception of corruption have helped develop Chile’s international reputation into one of repute and distinction. So, this begs the question; why are the streets of Chile currently sullied with political anger, burning buses and military presence? And furthermore, how did this all transpire from a simple hike in metro fares?

For those of us studying at King’s, I’m sure we have once or twice looked at the train timetable in a tube station and groaned at seeing ‘severe delays’ flashing before us, but the fury we may occasionally feel towards the Circle line cannot be compared to the current Chilean reality. So, let’s start with the background: on 1st October, the Panel of Public Transport Experts notified the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications of the adjustment to Santiago’s metro and bus fares, something which is carried out on a monthly basis using an automatic calculation formula. This is done by evaluating multiple circumstances, with October’s adjustments specifically citing the values of fuel, the US dollar and the euro, as well as the consumer price index1 — AKA super complicated stuff that is far too advanced for my economically illiterate brain. The result? An approximate 4% hike in fares. This means that the monthly cost of public transport per person would be 13.8% of the minimum wage, a figure which is much higher than other major Latin American cities such as Buenos Aires, Mexico City and Lima, and a bit of a bank breaker if you’re a consistent metro or bus user.

Some commentators, however, cite other rationale behind the fare hikes. For example, former Minister Paola Tapia has brought up the acquisition of a new fleet of electric buses without tender, as well as the suspension of the new tender for bus services—decisions which were made by the incumbent government, led by President Sebastián Piñera. Tapia implies that the fare hikes are a result of irresponsible money management by the government, and not just the factors cited by the transport experts.

So how did we get to the point where we are seeing burning buses and multiple deaths? Well, it all started on 7th October when a campaign to dodge metro fares in protest of the hikes was started by secondary-school students in the country’s capital. Their message of ¡Evade! caught on with the general public, and a week later stations were being closed off to passengers after reports of violence. As the days went by, the violence continued to escalate, leading to the vandalisation of stations, destruction of public property as well as subsequent arrests and increased station closures.

Tensions reached a boiling point on 18th October when the police responded to barricades formed by protestors in downtown Santiago with water cannons and tear gas. Simultaneously, attacks were taking place at nearly every one of the city’s 164 metro stations, leading to a complete suspension of the metro system. As if these events weren’t enough, the headquarters of Enel Generación Chile, an electric company, was affected by a very substantial fire, leading to severe damages.

Here comes the part that started to get people really angry. During these events, Piñera was not in his presidential offices working hard to resolve the crisis, but instead he was sittin’ back with a slice at the birthday party of one of his grandchildren in one of Santiago’s most expensive pizza parlours. After his tone-deaf luxurious meal, he then addressed the nation and declared a 15-day state of emergency in Santiago, bringing armed forces to the streets of the capital.

This did not deter the people of Santiago, and it in fact sparked a fire under the rest of the country; states of emergency were gradually declared in regions outside of the capital and curfews imposed. And even though Piñera announced the cancellation of the fare hikes and the creation of a representative ‘dialogue panel’, the people of Chile were not satisfied, remaining on the streets past curfew and continuing to protest.

The President clearly had not learned his lesson, as in his next address he added fuel to the fire by saying the country was “at war with a powerful and implacable enemy”. Now, I’m not Chilean, but I know if my Head of State called me a “powerful and implacable enemy” it would only make me even more implacable. The people of Chile seemingly felt the same way as they continued to take to the street day after day and night after night, leading up to the protests’ climax on 25th October when over a million citizens took to the streets to protest against Piñera’s premiership and demand his resignation5. For context, that’s over 5% of the entire population of Chile. However, Piñera and the protesters must have got their wires crossed, because instead of resigning from his own post, the President instead dismissed every single one of his cabinet members. He said this was in order to “restructure [his] cabinet to confront these new demands”.

So now here we are. This is the worst civil unrest in Chile since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship, and with 21 dead, 2,500 injured and 2,840 arrested, the scale of this social revolt cannot be understated. It may have begun with metro fares, but it has led to a much wider discussion about equality and fairness in Chilean society. So, is there an end in sight? At the moment, we don’t know. Although the original goal of reversing the fare hikes has been met, and Piñera has additionally promised higher taxation on the rich and better pensions for the whole population7, there still remain many demands which are yet to be addressed; reforms in education and healthcare; the increasing of the minimum wage and wages in general; his own resignation.

All of the above would be seen as a severe upheaval in any nation, but the elephant which remains in the room is the country’s Constitution. Written by Chile’s former dictator Augusto Pinochet, the Constitution is a huge point of contention for the hundreds of thousands of protesters on the streets of Chile. The Constitution is extremely favourable towards safeguarding private property which has led to situations such as the privatisation of water companies… something which is very problematic for a country experiencing severe droughts — but I digress. Protesters see the document as a roadblock to real and long-lasting social change; how can the rights of everyday Chileans be guaranteed when the Constitution directly contradicts their goals? As you can imagine, abandoning and re-writing a constitution is not simple, especially in a time of such turmoil. Piñera is already severely weakened in his current political state, and the uncertainty of a new, constituent assembly-written Constitution is certainly not in his favour. So… what happens now? I have no idea, and frankly neither does anyone else. Piñera could cave to the protesters’ demands leading to the composition of a new constitution and revolutionary social reform, the likes of which have not been seen since the fall of Pinochet. On the other hand, he could stick to his guns and risk the continuation and escalation of the protests. Or perhaps his new cabinet and their proposals will be enough to appease the Chilean people. Who knows! Much like the rest of global politics at the moment, what happens next is anyone’s guess, and the only certainty is uncertainty.

Transnational Crime: Why Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has not and will not put an end to the War on Drugs

Image Source: https://www.dw.com/en/mexicos-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-marks-first-100-days-in-office/a-47839512

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

By: Maria Ascencio

Mexico appears to be on the brink of change as new leftist president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) announced the end of the country’s 13 year long War on Drugs on January 30th 2019. The reality of the situation, however, is that AMLO has not and will not put an end to the war on drugs. As a matter of fact, there is not a single administration in Mexico that will ever be capable of putting an end to this issue. The reason stems from the fact that Mexico’s war on drugs is only but a result of a much more dangerous and complex security threat that has become imbedded within the country’s state institutions; transnational crime.

Mexico’s Problem with Drugs under the context of Transnational Crime

To understand Mexico’s current problem with drug-related criminal activity, it is imperative to understand the nature of transnational crime. In 2000, the United Nations in its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, came to define the concept as “any criminal activity that is conducted in more than one state, planned in one state but perpetuated in another, or committed in one state where there are spill-over effects.”[1] The majority of cases of transnational crime make reference to organized criminal activities, that is, where there are factual indications that an organized and profit-driven criminal structure is involved. These structures oftentimes become entrenched within a country’s institutions, using corruption to extend their influence into the upper reaches of the state and thus shield themselves from law enforcement. While not all organized crime is transnational, there have always been growing incentives for criminal enterprises to operate across national borders due to differences in the supply and demand of illegal goods and services amongst countries. It is because of this that any effective strategy must be comprised of strong and robust national initiatives, accompanied by increased cooperation efforts amongst all states who are affected.

In Mexico, this definition is followed to the letter. Over time, drug consumption and control policies in the United States have played a large role in the scope and longevity of Mexico’s drug trade. As early as 1920, harsh laws and regulations during the era of Prohibition saw a tremendous spike in demand for alcohol and other narcotics, which lead to the creation of black markets south to the border. These illicit markets provided vast amounts of money to those willing to participate, and continued to incentivize individuals to increase production.[2] Throughout the following decades demand both in Mexico and the US continued to rise, which allowed illicit drug markets to reach epic proportions. Today, there are approximately 6-8 drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that enjoy dominant influence throughout Mexico, all of which are engaged in a battle for supremacy over the illicit trade market.

Why is this a problem? Violence and weak institutions

As outlined, transnational criminal organizations have the ability to become entrenched within a state and its institutions. In Mexico’s DTO’s have earned so much power and influence that it has become easier for politicians and members of the state to collude and negotiate with them, rather than dealing with them, resulting in an culture of impunity and corruption.[3] Equally, observers have noted that the excessive use of violence of some of Mexico’s DTO’s in their battle for supremacy, might be considered exceptional by the typical standards of organized crime.[4] Beheadings, car bombs, extortions, forced disappearances, homicides, rape, mass executions, violent robberies, these are only a few of the many casualties that are seen in Mexico’s headlines every day.

Has there been any past approaches to deal with the issue? Why have they failed?

Previous approaches to deal with Mexico’s DTO’s have failed for a number of reasons. Firstly, because bilateral efforts have been extremely limited. The United States has focused more on strengthening the security of its southern border and re-drafting its immigration policies, rather than on addressing the root issue and reduce the demand of narcotics. Co-operation with Mexico has been limited to the provision of financial assistance and the training of military and police personnel, but nothing has been done to engage in capacity-building processes designed to strengthen Mexico's rule of law. [5] Secondly, Mexico’s government responses have wrongly focused on targeting individuals, when efforts should have been focusing on targeting the drug market itself. Yet again, not much more can be expected given the imbedded corruption, incompetence and weakness of the state.

The New Administration: Why AMLO’s “new” strategy is doomed to fail

Mexico’s new president has surprised everybody by declaring the end of the long War on Drugs and announcing what he has called a new and revolutionary plan to tackle DTO’s, which includes the following promises:
• A strategy to tackle corruption amongst institutions

• Social programs that will keep young people out of the reach of organized crime
• Taking troops off the street
• Amnesty for drug kingpins and other delinquents
To all of this, there are a number of missing pieces and limitations that, unfortunately, set AMLO’s strategy to failure. The undiscriminated and savage character of Mexico’s DTO’s has demonstrated that taking troops off the street as a preliminary measure only facilitates the use of violence, as depicted by the increase in kidnappings and homicides in AMLO’s first months in office.[6] In the end, lawmakers from AMLO’s party, MORENA, have opted to keep soldiers on the frontlines, along with the creation of a national guard that combines military and civilian police under a single military command.[7] This certainly does not seem too far off from what President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) did at the beginning of his term, when he ordered the deployment of troops to carry out the capturing of high-value criminals, a controversial strategy that promoted more instability and violence.

Giving amnesty to drug kingpins and delinquents is, firstly, an unpopular policy amongst the many Mexicans whose lives have been affected by cartel violence. While amnesty does not imply “forgiving and forgetting” but “reconciliation and dialogue”, it is hard to imagine how AMLO might advocate for this giving the deep grievances that exist in society.[8] Additionally, giving amnesty is just another policy that focuses on individuals rather than on the market itself. The only difference is that, unlike Calderon and Peña Nieto, AMLO’s successors, the new president is looking to reconcile rather than isolate drug kingpins from society. The drug market and the rewards that come from it, however, will continue to exist, and different groups will continue to compete, most likely using violent means, over that market.

Social programs for the youth and a strategy to tackle corruption amongst institutions are vital for a long-term strategy to fight drug trafficking and corruption, but six years is simply not enough time for AMLO to make any significant changes.

Lastly, it must be re-emphasized that this is not a security threat that is confined to Mexico’s borders. Not a single of these proposals can prove to be effective if there is nothing done to the drug trade market. There need to be efforts to regulate and decrease demand for narcotics across the northern border. For any of AMLO’s proposals to work, he would have to push President Trump to come up with a comprehensive drug strategy. However, it seems that he is much more concerned with the building of his long-promised wall and the deportation of illegal migrants.

Unfortunately for AMLO, but ultimately for all Mexicans, it seems that the new strategy will not give fruits, and that Mexico is set for yet another period of violence, instability and uncertainty.

Maria is a second year International Relations Student at King’s College, the Latin America Editor for IR Today and the Editor in Chief of El Cortao.