Testimony: Lost in the Amazon

Source: https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/11/27/america/1543344243_444001.html

By: Arianna Sánchez

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Olivia was born in a tiny town, hours away from Iquitos, in the Peruvian Amazon. To get there, you need to not only trek but also travel a portion of the way by boat. As Olivia told me, “there was absolutely nothing to do, I had to leave”. During our lunches together, she would tell me about her main dream growing up – she needed to get out of that town. Olivia would take any chance available to travel to Iquitos even to work for free, any excuse to leave her cramped town. Even though she grew up in a loving family, she felt suffocated. In a place where everyone knows everything about everyone. She could not grow. 

Shortly after turning 20, she went to Iquitos to look for jobs to become independent. She knew her town would not provide her with what she wanted. She needed a way out,urgently. She found the best way to get out was to find a job and the closest city was Iquitos. Walking with her head down and ready to give up, Olivia found a brand-new poster stuck to one of the light posts, “Looking for people to work in the jungle, near Iquitos. Will pay 1,000 soles.” Olivia knew what she had to do. Her golden ticket out of her native town. 

Olivia did not hesitate and called the advertised number quickly. A couple picked up. They asked her to meet them at the main plaza where they would discuss the job in more detail. What they told her seemed too good to be true. She would get 500 soles right then, and the rest when she finished the job. If she recruited more people, she would even get a commission. Best of all, the place of work was an hour away from the main plaza, and she would get free transport. Olivia rapidly thanked them, carefully placed those 500 soles in her purse, and ran back to get on a boat before it got dark. 

When she arrived at her town, she decided she would break the news to her cousin first. Her cousin was a young single mother with a teenage son. When Olivia told her about the pay, her cousin quickly came on board. Both Julia and Mateo asked to be recruited too; Julia could pay for house refurbishments, and Mateo could start to save up for his dream of attending university. It was their golden ticket too, and they took it. Olivia’s mother was not on board. She feared her daughter was making an abrupt decision rather than one well-thought. But Olivia would not take it. And so, a few weeks later, the three had packed their favourite belongings and crossed the river towards their big break. They arrived at Iquitos with a bright new glow and headed to the plaza to meet with their new bosses to-be. They greeted each other, and as time went by people started to join them. Suddenly, the man said it was time to go. They got into a huge van and headed into the Amazon. This was when things started to go sour. 

Olivia stared out of her window and into the jungle, ruminating about her next steps. Sure, being inside the jungle for months would not be a vacation, but it was a small sacrifice with a life-changing reward. She drifted off to sleep. She woke up confused and asked her cousin how long it had been since they started driving. Her cousin let out a carefully silent “it’s been like 3 hours”. Olivia pushed away her hunch and decided this would be her ticket out. In just a few months, whatever happened, they would be out and with 1,000 soles in hand. She sat upwards and looked out the window as they went deeper into the Amazon. The bus stopped and demanded everyone to get out quickly. Olivia grabbed her belongings and stepped out of the bus filled with excitement and yet a lingering negative feeling would not allow her to enjoy what she had been waiting for. Julia, Mateo and Olivia followed the bus driver for around half an hour, as they walked through what the bus could not. Finally, they arrived, the bus driver said. Olivia told me she can only describe that moment as bittersweet; she looked up and saw this beautiful plantation, vast enough to make her question if it even stopped somewhere. This ethereal view was heavily contrasted with what she called “incredibly scary men treating you like a piece of meat”, and an arsenal of weapons enough to carry an army. She realised where she was in a moment of both acceptance and deep regret. Mateo, a mere 17-year-old boy, grabbed his mum by the wrist and asked, “They are going to kill us, aren’t they?”

Olivia kept quiet. She knew her nephew could see right through her lies, and, if she did not lie, she could worsen the situation by further scaring him. She told me she still did not have a grasp of the entirety of the situation at that moment, but she knew the job was not the one advertised. Another man showed the new people to their quarters, separated between men and women, as were the jobs. Women were told to meet in the morning by the entrance of the plantation, whilst men were told to meet by the common area. Mateo grabbed his belongings and, trying to seem as confident as possible to build a reputation amongst the mostly older men, walked into his quarters without a goodbye from Julia and Olivia. The two cousins walked into their quarters, where they were assigned a bunkbed, next to a dozen others. 

Around two weeks later, Olivia felt a constant ache in her arms due to carrying coca leaves to the main area and back all day. Her daily routine was almost as if robotic. Men would usually gather around to drink at night, so Olivia and her cousin tended to eat in their room. They would barely see Mateo, who was in charge of processing coca paste, and was dragged every night to the men’s nightly drinking-binges. They were tired but could not let anyone see, deciding to let their bodies run on autopilot and get it over with. Until the third week. Olivia and Julia were having dinner with some of their workmates in their room when they heard shouting outside. They dismissed it as it was extremely common to see drunk men making a fuss and starting fights every night. However, they stopped eating when they heard a loud gunshot. Julia did not even think twice and sprinted out of the room in an attempt to find her son. Olivia stared at her not knowing what to do – she froze. Julia came running with Mateo on her hand, trying to explain something to Olivia but unable to talk. Mateo told his aunt someone had been shot. With time not on their side, they decided to do what most were doing in a frenzy – escape into the jungle. 

Olivia told me the eight days she spent in the Amazon were the worst days of her life. The lack of clean water and safe food compounded with the constant paranoia of the drug traffickers finding them made these days a nightmare come true. They were following a stream of water trying to find a town, walking all day with an excruciating level of heat making them extremely dehydrated. However, the fear of being caught kept pushing them forward. At night, all types of insects would make sleeping impossible, and, by the morning, the three would wake up with wounds due to infected insect bites. But they had to keep going. 

Around day five, Mateo came running back from his daily food search to tell them he had heard people talking close by. What seemed like a golden opportunity to be saved, turned sour really quickly. Julia recognised the voices – it was a group of the drug traffickers. They realised walking would probably not be enough to lose them. They were severely dehydrated, and the other group did not seem so. If they tried to escape through land, they would get caught. Running out of options, the three decided their safest bet was swimming away. So, reluctantly, the three stepped into the cold river hoping it would lead them to safety. Olivia remembers the excruciating pain she would feel when she stepped out of the river. Leeches would be all over their bodies and taking them off by force was not an option. The only way to get them offwas urinating on them. 

A few days after, they felt overwhelming feelings of happiness when they found a small town. They were alive. Walking around the town, they recognised one of their fellow co-workers sitting on a bench alone. Mateo went running towards him, as the two had worked together for months. He told them he had escaped too and arrived at the town a few days prior to them. When he arrived, he found out the person that had been shot back in the plantation had told everything to the police for some money and legal immunity in return, and the traffickers had found out. The police and army raided the site during the night, and everyone who had not escaped was arrested on the spot. Most of the people that escaped were not seen again.

A few months later, the three were back in their small town, grateful to be there for the first time in years. However, their happiness was short-lived. Someone had given the police Mateo’s name, potentially in an attempt to reduce their own prison time. Mateo was arrested under charges of drug trafficking at 17 years old. He was sent to the capital, Lima, to become imprisoned in “Maranguita”, the only prison for young boys in Peru at the time. This meant his family could not even visit him, and the thought of hiring a lawyer from a capital was simply irrational. They could not afford it. Mateo spent 20 years in prison, without saying a word about Julia and Olivia, despite constant intimidation tactics by the police. Mateo was released last year, at 37 years old. 

Olivia has been diagnosed with PTSD. When she finished telling me her story, I cleared my throat and told her I did not know what to say. I did not know whether to tell her I was incredibly sorry or whether I admired her. She looked up at me and started laughing, and I thought she could see in my face my desperate attempt to find something to tell her. I asked what she was laughing at, to which she just replied, “I never even got paid the other 500 soles”

Arianna is a Peruvian 3rd Year Politics Student at King’s College London with a passion for Latin American politics and political risk-management.

Plata o Parca: Insights on the Participation and Role of Latin American Women in Drug Trafficking

Mugshot of Griselda Blanco. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griselda_Blanco#/media/File:Griselda_Blanco_Medellin.jpg

by: Thais Ricard

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao'.

When thinking about drug trafficking’s protagonists in Latin America, we automatically visualize stocky, bearded, middle-aged men with a stern look and a deep voice. Indeed, by examining the portrayal of the drug world in popular culture – a portrayal built on media headlines and popularised by well-known series like Narcos, which bases its plot on the story of drug kingpin Pablo Escobar – one perceives this world as exclusively within a man’s domain, where women are relegated to background activities and forced to play a passive, supporting role in the domestic sphere. In general, as crime statistics suggest that delinquency is dominated by men, the notion of crime is associated with masculine stereotypes, such as risk-taking and action. The presence of women in drug trafficking – a high-risk and violent activity –is therefore a paradox for gender stereotypes of criminal conduct. Women who take part in this trade are depicted as pathological or masculine, defying the feminine role that a machista society has imposed on them.  

Over the past few years, however, Latin American women have increasingly participated in the trade of illicit drugs, although this involvement has been absent from research related to the narcotics trade and has routinely been underestimated by state and non-state organisations alike. In Colombia, the number of women prisoners has increased more than fivefold, while that of male prisoners has increased just threefold. Now, nearly five out of every ten women jailed are serving sentences for drug-related crimes. This female participation is arguably the result of a long-lasting ‘war on drugs’ which produced the incarceration of many male criminals and created a labour vacuum that has encouraged women to enlist in the drug businesses of their fathers, partners, or lovers.  

Some women have even assumed high-ranking positions in this male-dominated environment. In this context, it would be a good moment to introduce the individual whose mugshot headlines this article: Griselda Blanco, also known as the ‘Cocaine Godmother’. She was introduced to the cocaine industry by her second husband, Alberto Bravo, and proceeded to progressively replace him in his own line of work until she had become one of the wealthiest and most powerful drug leaders in the world. Her trafficking network spread across the United States, bringing in an estimated $80 million USD a month. Considered a pioneer in drug trafficking and a mentor for Pablo Escobar, she established many of the smuggling techniques and murdering methods that are still used today. Not only was she involved in the trafficking of narcotics, but she also played a major part in the ‘Cocaine Cowboy Wars’ that ravaged Miami in the 70s and 80s. Ruthless against her rivals, she was suspected of having sponsored hundreds of killings in the US and Colombia, making her one of the deadliest women of all time. By the time of her assassination in 2012, Blanco had aroused a great fascination among the general public and her story inspired many books, TV shows, or documentaries such as the Cocaine Cowboys (2006).

Although Blanco shows the deep involvement of women in drug trafficking, her story is misleading as it constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Not all women can attain such levels of authority and wealthiness. In this industry, the roles usually performed by women are, in fact,subordinate ones, which is thus concordant with the feminine stereotypes of subservience and passivity. Women are enlisted to cook for laborers and some, such as the poppy flower and coca leaf pickers (known as raspachines), are involved in the first stages of drug manufacturing. They are also used as chemists, who use chemical substances to extract cocaine, or as mules for the trafficking andsale of illegal substances. The use of women as couriers is particularly interesting for drug lords because they are often perceived as innocent and untouchable which makes their smuggling efforts quite successful, as most police attention is focused on men. Moreover, female mules are trained to flaunt their sexuality, by dressing up attractively and flirting with immigration officers to dispel any suspicion with a seductive look. This further reinforces women’s stereotypical role as objects of physical desire.  

Concentrated at the bottom of the chain, women face greater risks as violence is often most pervasive at this level and the rewards are few. The threats they face are two-fold and are split between the general risks involved in drug trafficking and those specific to their condition as women. Both women and men working in the harvesting of illicit crops, for instance, are particularly at risk of falling into drug abuse. A 2019 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),written in collaboration with the Colombian Ministry of Justice, reported that these women and their relatives saw higher cases of substance and alcohol addiction as well as greater incidences of domestic abuse. Moreover, women who operate as mules are the most vulnerable and exposed actors of this black market and, for this reason, often ended up exploited by their bosses and/or imprisoned with disproportionately long sentences despite only occupying a minor position in the commercialization chain.  

Women who perform these roles normally have a level of education no higher than primary school. They are often unaware of the dangers inherent in the drug trade and the seriousness of the penalty levied if caught. Even when they know the consequences, they may still be willing to accept these risks to make money. Indeed, economic incentives are the main factor pushing women into this environment. Lacking legitimate economic opportunities, being single parents, or desiring financial independence, many of these women are left with no choice but to get involved. They may also be pressured by their families, who may declare their participation to be mandatory. This explains why those women, contrary to their male counterparts, are not willing to attract attention to their activities and rarely seek authority. For them, earning money is more important than having power or prestige.

Nowadays, the legislation to address the drug problem is flawed as it exacerbates sex-based discrimination. Women prisoners are most likely to suffer from exclusion, abandonment, and loss offamily ties. Not only does long-term imprisonment create an economic burden for the taxpayer, but itpromises severe, far-reaching effects for individual prisoners, for their children, and for society as a whole. Indeed, as shown by the story of Rocío Duque – a single Colombian mother jailed for 14 years for carrying a small amount of cocaine paste which she received only a modest fee for – current policies foster harsh cycles of poverty and socio-economic exclusion that leads to recidivism. Her account shows how repeat criminals suffer social and state sigma and how recidivism can be unavoidable when there are no reintegration programs to help women to rebuild their lives after being in jail.  

It is time, therefore, for Latin American governments to redesign drug legislation in order forthe latter to demonstrate gender awareness. This will be achieved partly by meeting the gender-specific needs of women in penitentiary centres, and partly by reducing the imprisonment of women through non-custodial correction measures. Overall, policies should now focus on increasing levels of socio-economic development and on improving access to education, employment, and basic healthcare services to avoid any intensification of women’s involvement in drug trafficking.

Thais is a third year History and International Relations student at KCL. Her main research interests are about human rights and security issues such as drug trafficking and insurgency movements. She is particularly keen in analyzing those matters through a gender-based perspective.

¡Chile Despertó! … ¿Y Ahora Qué? // Chile has Awoken! ... Now what?

Image Courtesy of Ciper Chile

By Maximilian Frederik van Oordt

​A más de un año del estallido social y con un proceso constitucional inédito en marcha, ya va siendo hora de abordar dos preguntas clave producto de este acontecimiento histórico: ¿cuáles han sido los cambios en Chile? y, ¿qué sendero debería seguir el país?

​En relación a la primera pregunta, la lista de respuestas es larga dado que este movimiento ha sido de extrema consecuencia nacional en materia económica, política, y social. En un artículo anterior había hecho alusión a varias causas principales del estallido como la clase política, la desigualdad, las pensiones, y el costo de la vida, entre muchas más. Todos estos ámbitos han ostentado cambios que van de lo superficial – como la destitución del ex Ministro del Interior Andrés Chadwick – a lo formidable – como el proceso constituyente. El 25 de octubre del año pasado, producto directo del estallido social, Chile celebró un plebiscito nacional sobre si se debiera mantener o no la actual Constitución. De forma abrumadora, el electorado despidió a la Carta Magna de la República, aprobando con un 78,28% el inicio de un proceso histórico que redactará un nuevo documento. El 11 de abril de 2021, los chilenos elegirán sus candidatos a la Convención Constituyente, influyendo así de forma directa en el resultado del proceso, y en agosto de 2022 votarán de nuevo en un plebiscito que buscará aprobar la nueva Constitución. Pese a la violencia y a las injusticias delatadas a lo largo del estallido social, este proceso constituyente es un ejemplo brillante de la democracia y uno del cual todo chileno puede sentirse orgulloso.

​Mas allá de los profundos cambios políticos – que, felizmente, han incluido una rebaja a las abusivas dietas parlamentarias – el Chile de hoy cuenta con reformas policiales, educativas, y económicas creadas con el objetivo de responder a las múltiples demandas de la ciudadanía. Carabineros de Chile, la institución policial encargada del orden público, vió su imagen fuertemente deslustrada por la vastedad de los abusos que ejerció contra los manifestantes. Lo que en tiempos pasados se consideraba un modelo a seguir en el contexto regional ahora parecía un instrumento de represión caracterizada por el caos, la tragedia, y la impunidad. El resultado ha sido un importante incremento en las compras y entregas de cámaras corporales por parte del gobierno, aunque las fuerzas policiales siguen contando con menos de mil de éstas a nivel país. También se ha apreciado el inicio de una profunda reforma a Carabineros llevada a cabo por las autoridades civiles en conjunto con la institución, con una mira al refuerzo de los derechos humanos. Según una encuesta Cadem a un año del estallido social, la policía uniformada contaba con sólo un 26% de la confianza popular, y apenas un 19% la consideraba capacitada para cumplir su labor. Cambios son imprescindibles, y los primeros de éstos ya están en marcha.

​A pesar de todas las reformas, al estado le quedan cuantiosas decisiones que tomar e injusticias que resolver. Las pensiones de los chilenos se siguen manteniendo en las famosas Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP);entidades privadas que entregan una jubilación mediana de tan solo $203.883 pesos chilenos, equivalente a poco más de doscientas libras esterlinas mensuales. En el Congreso Nacional, la indignación popular ha producido políticas populistas y de poca visión de futuro. Se ingresaron tres reformas constitucionales que permitieron el retiro por parte del cotizante de hasta el 10% de sus ahorros previsionales en cada instancia, poniendo así en riesgo de colapso total el actual sistema de pensiones sin reemplazo ninguno. Seamos claros: aquí no se arremete contra el retiro previsional en sí; fue una medida necesaria para enfrentar la crisis económica que provocó la pandemia. Tampoco se busca defender el modelo de las AFP – que descanse en paz. Aquí el problema es que aquellos autores del retiro siguen sin presentar ningún proyecto que pueda reemplazar el sistema actual, ni un plan que pueda proteger a los cotizantes a largo plazo. Incluso la diputada opositora Pamela Jiles, rostro de los últimos dos retiros, admitió que su proyecto es populista, agregando que es una “pésima política… pero que más vamos a hacer”. La caída de las AFP sería un gran paso hacia una pensión digna en Chile, pero sólo se podrá festejar cuando el cotizante chileno esté protegido por el sistema de reemplazo. La moraleja en este caso sería que cualquier reforma que se haga se tendrá que hacer responsablemente y con miras hacia el futuro. Chile busca transformarse, no arrancarse de raíz.

​Sin embargo, la secuela más peligrosa del estallido social ha sido el aumento importante de las voces extremistas e ideológicas del país. Desde la derecha, se sienten los fantasmas del viejo Pinochetismo en los partidos Renovación Nacional (RN) y Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), quienes se han abierto a un pacto electoral con el partido Republicano de ultraderecha – un partido que a menudo valora y justifica la dictadura militar de los 80. Incluso el ex presidente de RN denunció haber sido víctima “de los ataques virulentos de miembros o simpatizantes” de aquel partido. Incorporar a partidos de este talante a la corriente principal daña la institucionalidad de la República; una institucionalidad que la misma derecha pretende – y debe – resguardar.

​Mientras tanto, desde la ultraizquierda se levantan voces de semejante percance. El Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh) ha hecho la vista gorda a los desmanes cometidos por antisociales durante las manifestaciones y ha llegado incluso a avalar la violencia contra las fuerzas del orden. El presidente del PCCh señaló desvergonzadamente que “una condena genérica a la violencia no la voy a hacer” y, al preguntarle si condenaría el vandalismo visto durante las protestas, respondió: “¿cómo voy a condenar una cosa tan menor?”. A la apatía comunista se suman cinco congresistas de cinco partidos opositores quienes han presentado nada menos que un indulto general a manifestantes detenidos en el marco del estallido social, buscando sobreseer así las imputaciones en su contra; imputaciones que incluyen graves delitos como el homicidio frustrado y el tráfico de armas. La justicia constituye pilar fundamental de cualquier democracia sana y el escepticismo con el que la ultraizquierda trata al poder judicial, que en Chile es independiente, terminará debilitándola a corto y a largo plazo.

Hoy más que nunca, Chile necesita un gobierno pragmático, centrista, y de consenso. Los desmanes del 18-O han echado leña al fuego del extremismo político. Mientras la ultraizquierda avala la violencia hacia el estado, la ultraderecha atrinchera el extremismo político. El progreso que se ha logrado en materia política, económica, y social ha sido abundante y el país va encaminado hacia una vida digna para sus habitantes. Este progreso se alcanzó a través de los acuerdos mutuos y la atención prestada a la ciudadanía. El extremismo político ni responde a las demandas sociales, ni tiene la posibilidad de solucionarlas. Chile despertó… ¿Y Ahora qué? Ahora tendrá que elegir su sendero. Si triunfa la democracia y el consenso, “la copia feliz del Edén” – que promete el himno nacional – estará al alcance de su pueblo.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

​With over a year having passed since Chile’s mass protests and with an unprecedented constitutional process underway, it is about time to tackle two key questions raised by this historic event: what changes have occurred in Chile, and what path should the country take?

​In terms of the first question, the list of answers is a long one given that this movement has been extremely consequential in the economic, political, and social realms. In a previous article I had alluded to many of the main causes of the social unrest including the political elite, inequality, pensions, and the cost of living, among many other factors.All these areas have seen changes which range from the superficial – such as the impeachment of the former Minister of the Interior Andrés Chadwick – to the formidable – such as the constitutional process. On October 25th of last year, as a direct consequence of the social unrest, Chile held a national referendum on whether or not to keep its current constitution.Overwhelmingly, the electorate fired the republic’s basic charter, approving by 78.28% the commencement of a historic process which would draw up a new document. On the 11th of April of 2021, Chileans will elect their candidates to the Constitutional Convention, thereby directly influencing the result of the process, and in August of 2022 they will once again vote in a plebiscite which will decide whether the new Constitution will replace the old one. Despite the violence and the injustices laid bare throughout the mass demonstrations, this constitutional process is a shining example of democracy and one which all Chileans can be proud of.

​Beyond the far-reaching political changes – which, fortunately, include a reduction in the extortionate congressional salaries – the Chile of today boasts reforms to police, education, and the economy created with the objective of responding to the people’s many demands. The Carabineros de Chile, the police institution in charge of riot control, saw their image badly tarnished by the immensity of abuses they committed against protestors. What had once been considered a role model in the regional context now seemed to be an instrument of repression characterised by chaos, tragedy, and impunity. The result of this has been a significant increase in the purchase and distribution of body cams by the government, although the police forces continue to make do with fewer than a thousand of these nationwide. A deep reform of the Carabineros has also begun, undertaken by the civil authorities in conjunction with the institution and aimed at reinforcing human rights. According to a survey by the national pollster one year on from the beginning of the social unrest, the national police enjoyed only 26% of citizens’ trust, with only 19% of the population considering them to be capable of fulfilling their duties. Changes are necessary, and the first of these are already underway.

​Despite all these reforms, the state is still faced with numerous decisions to make and injustices to resolve. The pensions of Chileans continue to be kept in the infamous Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP); private entities which provide a median pension of only $203,883 Chilean pesos, equivalent to just over two hundred pounds sterling per month. In the National Congress, popular anger has produced populist and short-sighted policies. Three constitutional amendments were introduced which each permitted the withdrawal of up to 10% of one’s pension savings, thereby risking the total collapse of the current pension system with no replacement in sight. To be clear: this article does not attack the pension withdrawal bill in of itself; it was a necessary measure to deal with the economic crisis brought about by the pandemic. Nor does this article attempt to defend the AFP pensions model – may it rest in peace. The problem here is that those who introduced these policies did so without presenting a single proposal which could replace the current system, nor did they announce any plans to protect pensioners in the long term. Even the opposition MP Pamela Jiles, the face of the last two withdrawals, admitted that her proposal is populist, adding that it is “an awful policy… but what else are we going to do”. The fall of the AFPs would be a great step towards dignified pensions in Chile, but one can only begin celebrating once the Chilean pensioner has been protected by a replacement system. The moral of the story in this case would be that whatever reform is made must be made responsibly and with the future in mind. Chile seeks to transform itself, not uproot itself outright.

​Nevertheless, the most dangerous product of the social unrest has been the significant increase in extremist and ideological voices within the country. On the political right, ghosts of Pinochetism are being felt in the Renovación Nacional (RN) and Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) parties, which have opened themselves up to an electoral pact with the hard right Republican party – a party which regularly praises and justifies the military dictatorship of the 80s. Even the former president of RN condemned the fact that he had been victim of “virulent attacks by members or sympathisers” of that party. The incorporation of parties of this nature into the political mainstream damages the institutions of the Republic; institutions that the political right itself claims to – and should – defend.

​Meanwhile, similarly distasteful voices are being heard among the hard left. The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) has turned a blind eye to the destruction committed by delinquents throughout the protests and has on occasions justified violence committed against law enforcement. The president of the PCCh unashamedly commented that he would “not make a generic condemnation of violence” and, when asked whether he would condemn the vandalism seen during the protests, replied with: “why would I condemn something so minor?”. Added to this communist apathy are five MPs from five different opposition parties who have introduced nothing short of a general pardon to those detained during the social unrest, thereby seeking to dismiss the charges against these individuals; charges which include severe crimes such as attempted murder and arms trafficking. Justice forms a fundamental pillar of any healthy democracy and the scepticism with which the hard left treats the judicial system, which in Chile is independent, will end up debilitating it inboth the short and long term.

​Now more than ever, Chile needs a pragmatic and centrist government by consensus. The destruction of the social unrest has poured fuel onto the fire of political extremism. While the hard left promotes violence against the state, the hard right entrenches political extremism. There has been abundant progress in the political, economic, and social realms and the country is on track towards a dignified life for its inhabitants. This progress was achieved by mutual agreements and by listening to the citizenry. Political extremism neither responds to the popular demands, nor does it have the capacity to solve them. Chile has awoken… now what? Now it will have to chart its course. Should democracy and consensus triumph, then the “happy copy of Eden” promised by the national anthem will be at the fingertips of the Chilean people.

Maximilian Frederik van Oordt is a second-year International Relations student at King’s College London. interested in politics, history and law, he enjoys focusing on Latin American affairs, with a particular emphasis on these three areas.

Disappearing Women: The Rise of Gender Violence and Femicide in Latin America

Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-50557784

By: Anonymous

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic has hit populations hard worldwide. Death tolls have skyrocketed, hospitals have been full to the point of maximum capacity, and essential healthcare equipment has been limited. However, whilst this is at the forefront of everybody’s minds, the news, and the papers, the pandemic has devastated communities in other, very different ways. One of these is a fundamental increase in violence against women, and nowhere is this more prevalent than in Latin America.

Women across Latin America are disappearing: they are injured, they are dying, they are calling out for help. Nearly 1,200 women disappeared in Peru between March and June 2020, and in Brazil, 143 women were murdered between March and April — an increase of 22% from this time last year. Phone calls to domestic violence helplines rose 130% in Columbia and 70% in Chile during the first eighteen days and weekend of quarantine respectively. Gender violence reports to the police in São Paulo, Brazil in March 2020 were 45% higher than they were in March 2019. With increased restrictions and locked-down countries, gendered violence and femicide rates are increasing dramatically. 

Whilst locking down countries and restricting movement and daily interactions may be reducing the risk of spreading or catching the virus, it serves to increase the risk of violence, injury and death to those who are trapped with abusive partners or family members. UN Secretary General António Guterres stated in April that, “violence is not confined to the battlefield. For many women and girls, the threat looms largest where they should be safest. In their own homes … We know lockdowns and quarantines are essential to suppressing Covid-19, but they can trap women with abusive partners”. With greater exposure to violent partners and mounting household tensions and economic strain, the pandemic is likely to cause a one-third reduction in progress towards ending gender-based violence by 2030. Whilst there is already limited action being taken, the virus has meant that help has only been minimised further. 

Femicide and domestic violence are still widespread globally, and Latin America has some of the highest rates worldwide; fourteen of the twenty-five countries in the world with the highest femicide rates are in Latin America. Laws and regulations concerning this are beginning to emerge, however they are awfully limited, and somewhat problematic. Simply put, governments are not doing enough. Eighteen countries, including Mexico, have distinguished femicide from homicide, and laws have been created to specifically punish femicide, such as introducing longer prison sentences than are given for intentional homicide. Guatemala has created specific courts for the trial of men accused of gender violence, and statistical reports have highlighted the issue. However, there are still fundamental gaps in these measures. In some regions such as Chile and Costa Rica, laws regarding femicide are only applicable to women killed by current or former intimate partners and investigations are often feeble, not to mention the pressing issue of a linguistic and cultural gap preventing women going to court. These are issues that are not being considered and are harming the progression of reducing gendered violence in these countries. In Latin America, ninety-eight percent of gender-related killings go unprosecuted — this outrageously high figure is proof that current measures are simply not working.

Whilst Latin American countries may be putting formal laws in place, and increasing funding for places of refuge such as women’s shelters, the root of the issue is simply not being addressed. Measures taken thus far are to simply punish the act, not to prevent it from occurring, and this is where governments are going wrong. What is not being taken into account is why women are at much higher risk of violence than men; what is causing the normalisation of violence towards women in the first place? Whilst some may argue that it’s a direct result of the inherent patriarchy and machismo still present in society even today, others stand to believe it is stemming from the treatment of women in religion and war. Rape has been used as a weapon of war in numerous conflicts, and perhaps it is the legacy of raping and mutilating women in a wartime environment that has, to some extent, normalised the concept amongst civilian men today. Religion also has a history of exerting control over women, whether that be controlling a woman’s sexuality, or promotion of the idea that it’s a husband’s right to discipline his wife. These are all historic examples of female oppression, and it would be ignorant to believe that they do not still hold weight and influence in the views that men possess of women in the twenty-first century.

Protests have occurred this year across Latin America, from a large protest in Mexico on International Women’s Day in March, to recent protests on the 9th of November, demanding justice for the death of Bianca Alejandrina Lorenzena. On International Women’s Day, the protest held in Mexico was the largest in the country’s history, displaying the enormity of the issue, and the passion shown by women trying to gain the basic needs of safety and respect. Protesters flocked to capital cities in other countries, such as Chile, on this day in March too, and women in Columbia and Peru took part in demonstrations on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women this November. Women are calling out for reform and for change, so why is so little being done? Why, in 2020, are women still forced to demand such essential, basic rights so as to not be violated and murdered by men?

What is fundamentally missing from any action against gender violence is education reform. As much as countries may try to further punish aggressors, or aid those affected, they need to be steering their efforts towards educating the masses on why treating women this way is vitally unacceptable. This is a worldwide issue; rape culture is still rife, women are being taught how to ‘act safely’ rather than men being taught not to rape, not to assault, not to harm. In Latin America this problem is present on a much larger scale, and needs addressing urgently, with the pandemic and increased levels of violence only adding to this urgency. No woman deserves to die, deserves to experience such awful treatment simply because she is a woman. Further acknowledgement of the issue is needed. Better education is needed. A clear legal framework is needed. Above all, greater respect for women is needed.

Bibliography

The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/latin-american-women-are-disappearing-and-dying-under-lockdown-143791

Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1113975/gender-violence-growth-coronavirus-latin-america/

United Nations: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXxnZKom6sg&feature=emb_title

UNFPA: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/COVID-19_impact_brief_for_UNFPA_24_April_2020_1.pdf

Small Arms Survey: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-14.pdf

UNODC: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet_5.pdf (p. 47)

UN: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/dsgsm1224.doc.htm

World Politics Review: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29278/in-mexico-protests-continue-against-a-historic-spike-in-femicides

The Absence of Colour and the Colour of Absence: Decolonising Brazilian Education

Source: https://www.revide.com.br/noticias/cultura/fotografa-realiza-exposicao-sobre-poder-da-mulher-negra/

By: Camila Consolmagno

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

 in Brazil, inequality is taken for granted. While equal under the eyes of international law, Brazilian children experience abysmally unequal childhoods. It is imperative to understandthat meaningful social and economic change aiming to reduce inequality and promote justice will not occur if matters of race discrimination and its legacies are not brought to light –thoroughly deconstructed, and equitably remodelled. However, with 53 million poor, and 22 million indigent Brazilians respectively –overrepresented by Afro-Brazilians in all age groups– this would require deep structural and systemic surgery within Brazilian society.

According to the calculations by the United Nations Development Program, no Brazilian state has a higher Human Development Index for Afro-Brazilians than for white populations; and racial inequalities are consistent in every Brazilian state, notwithstanding its stage of development.While there is consensus that Brazil is deeply unjust, and race discrimination has been recognised by the federal government as a human rights issue, there is yet not sufficient understanding and agreement on how to combat its inequality.

Both in the school curriculum and in the classroom, Black people and Afro-Brazilians appear in delimited ways – though often not at all, mirroring a historical subordination. Curricular silences on race and Afro-Brazilian history and identity are institutionalised not only in societal discourse, but also within education sectors, with educators and administrators receiving no university-level education training on race relations, race-based inequality, or Afro-Brazilian history. Rarely will history teachers come across Black people and Afro-Brazilians as active and complex actors within the Brazilian or global narrative.

A Shift Called ‘Decolonisation’

 It must be noted, however, that advances made by the Black social movement have commenced to shift social and political narratives. Afro-Brazilian activists and education researchers, such as the Orùnmilá Cultural Centre’s (‘OCC’) leaders and members, have begun to address the primary and secondary education system, inter alia, by targeting their advocacy and research to the lack of positive representation of Africa, Black people, and Afro-Brazilians in educational textbooks, everyday racism within school spaces, and the shallow treatment of the historical role of Afro-Brazilians. Secondly, they advocate for the incorporation of Afro-Brazilian cultural practices into school curricula to proclaim the diverse origins of knowledge. Finally, activists and cultural organisations like the OCC have established community schools that focus on either or both intercultural and Afro-centric education. These approaches not only mainstream Black history and contextualise it to contemporary times, but they pave the way for schools to challenge racism, ignorance, and stereotypes through the provision of diverse and inclusive teaching that encourages open-mindedness and constructive curiosity. Additionally, this addresses how partial and negative Afro-Brazilian representation correlates to the devaluation or ‘folklorisation’ of Afro-Brazilian culture and knowledge, both outside and inside the classroom, aiming to redress the effect of dismissal of Afro-Brazilians as creators of knowledge and theory, and of their culture as valuable pedagogically. Carving a space in education for Black history allows it to situate itself within one of the main centres where knowledge, opinions, and thought are produced: the school. 

Many are not aware that Brazil has the largest population of African descendants outside of Nigeria. Currently, however, the Brazilian school system reproduces hegemonic perspectives that mould the delimited narrative of Afro-Brazilian history in its society, perpetuating a historical system of power constructed through Eurocentric aesthetic, epistemological and cultural dominance. As Pai Paulo and Silas contend, “the most revolutionary aspect of this process resides in the valorisation of Black Culture as a philosophical and political theoretical field”. One cannot, therefore,envisage the emancipation of a people in the absence of the recognition and valorisation of their culture.

In 2003, then-President Lula signed Law 10,639/03 which gave statutory basis to the inclusion of African and Afro-Brazilian culture and history into the national curriculum. These aims concretised, inter alia, in what was named Projeto Baobá; one of the first – and at the time, possibly only – systemic realisations by a municipal government aiming to implement Law 10,639/03. Projeto Baobá reflected the opinion that decolonising education did not solely mean the inclusion of Black history within the curriculum, but actively thinking with Afro-descendants as producers of knowledge, theory, and philosophy. The project adopted a more sophisticated view of Afro-Brazilian and African histories by challenging narrow associations of Blackness, Black history, and Black identity with slavery, low status, and manual labour. It not only revealed the intricate ways in which Afro-Brazilian history is still tied to the slave ship, but also how race-based discrimination sculpted and continues to influence contemporary inequalities. Consisting of lectures, workshops, teacher training, and the purchase and distribution of revised educational materials to municipal schools, Projeto Baobá shifted teachers’ and students’ perspectives on Afro-Brazilian history, Africa, and Blackness. It emphasised the notable enthusiasm among Afro-descendant pupils who now ‘saw themselves’ and their history in textbooks, storybooks, and classroom activities. Importantly, educators and school administrators, that previously denied racism and discrimination as issues which required attention,came to passionately adopt the project’s cause and recognise the aforementioned as serious issues. Only one round of the Projeto Baobá, however, was implemented.

Struggling to See Colour – A Country in Black or White

Projeto Baobá faced immense implementation difficulties, largely as a consequence of a lack of interest, explicit opposition of many school principals and teachers, and capacity issues. Despite this, the OCC fights for its continuation. The project nonetheless incentivised many school teachers, principals, and students to reassess the knowledge and culture of Brazil’s African ancestors and recognise Afro-Brazilians as important subjects for inclusion in curricula. This, in turn, generated and continues to generate new possibilities to ensure a more holistic educational experience for students, particularly those of African descent. Additionally, the project initiated an exploration of Afro-Brazilian forms of knowledge and pedagogy which remain underdeveloped as educational tools and excluded from institutional legitimacy, despite often present in many Brazilians’ everyday lives (i.e. capoeira).

Over the past few years, a variation of projects has emerged to implement race relations and inequality training for teachers and municipal employees in agreement with Law 10,639/03. However, a myriad of elements indicates their inconsistency and insufficiency, as well as the pre-existing implementation difficulties. Firstly, multiple organisations have created projects; these projects vary in target audience, length, funding, and the degree to which they implement Afro-Brazilian cultural practices. Secondly, the shortfall of standards for project materials, implementation, and pedagogical approaches makes examination difficult, hindering improvement alongside requests for continuity. This is particularly relevant when public officials pragmatically enforce shallow projects claiming to tackle race issues and satisfy Black community demands. A third, final, and core concern raised by Orùnmilá members is the extent to which projects’ academic trainers are skilled practitioners of Afro-Brazilian culture. To wholly value these practitioners as generators of theory and knowledge, they must be involved in project implementations. However, despite these efforts and the rising attention paid to race in public policies, government efforts to address race as an issue continues to waver – a case particularly veracious under the current Bolsonarian government.

In 2009, the centre-right Democratic Party administration almost completely erased ‘race’ from the educational agenda and had all but severed dialogue with the OCC concerning educational and cultural policy. Consequently, making the institutional future of the Projeto Baobá uncertain. Notwithstanding this, Orùnmilá members anticipate further implementation and improvement, refusing to stall their philosophy as a result of public officials’ decisions. With lack of access to education affecting many Brazilians, particularly Afro-Brazilians, the OCC and Projeto Baobá continue to ask fundamental questions: “What kind of education are we aiming to have access to? What are its goals and what kind of society will it shape? How can we go beyond visions of societal inclusion as socioeconomic ascension to question the social formation into which people struggle for inclusion?”. Orùnmilá members and others striving towards educational reform in Brazil suggest thinking with Afro-descendants so as to substantively remodel a core societal institution – the school – and highlight the hierarchies that delimit visions of sociality, knowledge, and development. In this way, the question of fundamentally diversifying curricula as a means of decolonising knowledge is key in the process of bringing culture as an issue for development.

In conclusion, it is fundamental to think with Afro-Brazilian cultural struggles to aggrandise the critical knowledge about how capitalism’s exclusionary and racialised epistemological foundations allow certain visions of sociality to translate into possibility, and others to be unfathomable. Generating and executing alternative visions of development necessitate thinking with these other shapes of knowledge so as to confront, rethink, and remodel the limits that political, economic, and cultural development policies and processes place on societies and individuals. As such, critical scholarship can more substantively contribute to the endeavours of those like the OCC’s, who are involved in the daily struggle to not only live but survive. Therefore, in the aim of decolonising education it is insufficient to solely guarantee the inclusion of Black history into curricula; one must think with Afro-descendants as valuable and active contributors to culture, current affairs, knowledge, and theory. Finally, these efforts to decolonise education should combine into one major national project so as to target wider audiences and ensure better administration, execution, legitimacy, and results.

Camila Consolmagno is a final-year Bachelor of Laws student at SOAS, University of London. She is the first Brazilian President of the SOAS Latin American Society and an aspiring human rights lawyer.

The Aftermath of the Escazú Agreement: a Failure, or the Path to Environmental Awareness and the Protection of Environmental Activists in Latin America?

Source: Photo by Isabella Jusková on Unsplash

By: Mathilde Aupetit

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Introduction

Indigenous communities are essential actors against climate change, the disappearance of species, increasing desertification and the decline of ecosystems. They represent 5% of the world's population and protect 80% of the planet's biodiversity in their daily life (Raygorodetsky 2018), yet indigenous communities and their lands have been under threat for centuries (Sierra Praeli 2019). In recent decades, increasing rates of deforestation, infrastructure development and resource extraction have destroyed their lands, threatening the stability of the planet at large.

When community activists try to oppose these tendencies, they are often arrested, attacked, or even killed. The non-profit NGO, Global Witness, documented more than 200 killings of environmental defenders in 2019 (Global Witness 2019), the majority of which took place in Latin America. It is in this context that the Escazú agreement, an innovative treaty on human rights in environmental matters, was signed by 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Context of the Agreement’s signature

September 2020 marked the second anniversary of the opening for signature of the Escazú Agreement at the United Nations. This little-known regional treaty, adopted in 2018 in Costa Rica, aims to strengthen the rights of those in Latin America and the Caribbean who defend the environment (CEPAL 2018). This international treaty is the object of a real campaign of disinformation, which aims to ensure that it is neither signed nor ratified. Indeed, it is since September 2018 that this important regional agreement, adopted in Costa Rica in March of the same year, was officially opened for signature by thirty-three States from the Latin America and the Caribbean (Wilson 2018).

What is the Escazú Agreement?

The Escazú Agreement is the first regional environmental treaty in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the first in the world to include specific provisions on environmental defenders. It aims to guarantee the full and effective implementation of the rights of access to environmental information, of public participation in environmental decision-making processes and of access to justice in environmental matters (Amnesty International 2018). In addition, it seeks international cooperation to protect the right to live in a healthy environment, which is especially important in the Latin American region as, according to the FAO, 49% of the total area of Latin America and the Caribbean is covered by forest, which corresponds to around 20% of the world’s forest area (FAO 2020). This agreement is also important because, as mentioned earlier, Latin America is one of the most dangerous regions for environmental activists, accounting for two thirds of the world assassinations of environmentalists (Greenfield and Watts 2020). The Escazú Accord was developed over a six-year period, with input from civil society and community groups. Based on Principle No. 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the treaty has three main objectives: to provide citizens with full and transparent information on activities affecting the environment; to allow citizens to have more say in how land and marine resources are used; and to ensure full legal rights and protection for environmental defenders (World Resources Institute 2018).

What are the main debates about it today?

Two years after its inception, the treaty has yet to be ratified. September 26th, 2020 was the deadline for at least eleven countries ratifying the agreement, the amount required for it to enter into force, but only ten had done so. Indeed, although negotiations were led by Chile and Costa Rica, neither country ratified the agreement, which is one of the major paradoxes and topics of debate surrounding the Escazú Agreement (Guzmán 2020). Even Chile, who currently holds the presidency of the UN summit on climate change, the COP25, has not even signed the agreement, which calls into question the country's commitment to the environment (Aguilar Córdoba 2020).

The reasons given by the Chilean government are that the text, which Chile assisted in drafting, is too ambiguous and that it would give rise to possible international requests, on the parts of European governments especially, regarding Latin American progress, and reinforce the dependency of the Latin American region to its European counterpart (Aguilar Córdoba 2020). On the other hand, and just a few hours before the ratification deadline, Chile’s president, Sebastián Piñera, assured that Chile is "totally committed" to climate change before the United Nations General Assembly (Ibidem). However, there is no legal reason, from the point of view of international law, not to sign the agreement. Rather, one could point to possible economic interests behind Chile's refusal to sign the Escazú Agreement (Gandara 2020). The treaty therefore remains open for ratification by countries that have not yet signed or ratified it, but it will be necessary to wait for this eleventh signature for it to enter into force.

The failure to ratify the treaty: a reflection about the lack of environmental preoccupations from the Latin American region

The decision from the Chilean government not to ratify the agreement drew harsh criticism from the opposition and environmental organizations. According to Amnesty International, this long waiting time before the ratification of the treaty shows a lack of interest and willingness to put in effort on the part of the governments in the region (Amnesty International 2020). Matías Asun, national director of the Greenpeace organization in Chile, criticized the government's management, accusing it of carrying out "misleading advertising" for making people believe that environmental policies are at the centre of its agenda (AFP and the Tico Times 2020).

Conclusion

Although it is a necessary step to protect environmental leaders and promote sustainable development in the region, the Escazú Agreement is not a magical remedy against environmental damages. Even in the countries that have signed and ratified the agreement, environmental decision-making remains contradictory. In Mexico, for example, the Senate that ratified the treaty also eliminated the funds for the protection mechanism for environmental defenders, which in practice leaves them even less protected (Mexico News Daily 2020). Besides, in Antigua and Barbuda, and many Central American countries, the destruction of natural barriers due to the construction of large infrastructure projects leaves them even more exposed to natural events such as the recent storms Eta and Iota (Sanders 2020).

For now, the double discourse of Latin American governments seems to show that it takes more than eleven signatures for this unprecedented instrument to really work; this change should also operate through a change of mindset and perception about a conception of development in which economic growth should not be opposed to environmental preservation and life, in all its meanings.

Originally from France, Mathilde is currently a MPhil Student in Latin American Studies at Cambridge University. Before her MPhil, she completed a BA in International Relations at King’s College London, with a focus in Latin America, which sharpened her interest in the region. She is especially interested in Latin American identity politics and minorities integration

Bibliography

AFP and the Tico Times. 2020. ‘Chile Rejects Escazú Agreement, Environmental Pact Supported by Costa Rica’. Chile Rejects Escazú Agreement, Environmental Pact Supported by Costa Rica. 23 September 2020. https://theworldnews.net/cr-news/chile-rejects-escazu-agreement-environmental-pact-supported-by-costa-rica.

Aguilar Cordoba, Andrea. 2020. ‘Why Won’t Chile Ratify Escazu Environmental Agreement?’ 25 September 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/environment/why-wont-chile-ratify-escazu-environmental-agreement/1985943.

Amnesty International. 2018. ‘Americas: 12 Countries Sign Historic Environmental and Human Rights Treaty’. 27 September 2018. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/americas-12-countries-sign-historic-environmental-treaty/.

———. 2020. ‘The Americas Must Not Miss Opportunity to Lead on Environmental Protection’. 26 September 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/americas-oportunidad-para-proteccion-medio-ambiente/.

CEPAL, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 2018. ‘El Acuerdo de Escazú: un hito ambiental para América Latina y el Caribe’. Text. CEPAL. 2018. https://www.cepal.org/es/articulos/2018-acuerdo-escazu-un-hito-ambiental-america-latina-caribe.

FAO. 2020. ‘Forest Loss Slows in South America, Protected Areas Rise  | FAO’. 7 May 2020. http://www.fao.org/americas/noticias/ver/en/c/1274254/.

Gandara, Fernanda. 2020. ‘Escazú Treaty: “Human Rights Cannot Be Enjoyed Without a Healthy Environment”’. Chile Today (blog). 24 September 2020. https://chiletoday.cl/chile-rejects-the-escazu-agreement-that-it-originally-spearheaded/.

Global Witness. 2019. ‘Land and Environmental Defenders: Annual Report Archive’. Global Witness. 2019. https:///en/campaigns/environmental-activists/land-and-environmental-defenders-annual-report-archive/.

Greenfield, Patrick, and Jonathan Watts. 2020. ‘Record 212 Land and Environment Activists Killed Last Year’. The Guardian, 29 July 2020, sec. Environment. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jul/29/record-212-land-and-environment-activists-killed-last-year.

Guzmán, Lorena. 2020. ‘Why Chile Promoted the Escazú Agreement Then Rejected It’. Dialogo Chino (blog). 26 November 2020. https://dialogochino.net/en/climate-energy/38525-why-chile-promoted-the-escazu-agreement-then-rejected-it/.

Mexico News Daily. 2020. ‘Mexico Ratifies Treaty That Protects Rights of Environmental Activists’. Mexico News Daily (blog). 14 November 2020. https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/treaty-protects-rights-of-environmental-activists/.

Raygorodetsky, Gleb. 2018. ‘Indigenous Peoples Defend Earth’s Biodiversity—but They’re in Danger’. 16 November 2018. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/11/can-indigenous-land-stewardship-protect-biodiversity-/.

Sanders, Sir Ronald. 2020. ‘WORLD VIEW: We’re in a New Reality and Those Who Control the Purse Strings Need to Realise That - and Help’. 23 November 2020. http://www.tribune242.com/news/2020/nov/23/world-view-were-new-reality-and-those-who-control-/.

Sierra Praeli, Yvette. 2019. ‘Latin America Saw Most Murdered Environmental Defenders in 2018’. Mongabay Environmental News. 29 August 2019. https://news.mongabay.com/2019/08/latin-america-saw-most-murdered-environmental-defenders-in-2018/.

Wilson, Kate. 2018. ‘The Escazu Agreement: A Case for Signature’. 27 August 2018. https://pressroom.oecs.org/the-escazu-agreement-a-case-for-signature.

World Ressources Institute. 2018. ‘RELEASE: 12 Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Sign Historic Agreement to Protect Environmental Defenders’. World Resources Institute. 27 September 2018. https://www.wri.org/news/2018/09/release-12-countries-latin-america-and-caribbean-sign-historic-agreement-protect.

US-Mexico Relations: The Upcoming Challenges of Lopez Obrador with the Biden Administration

Source: https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-went-to-dinner-with-donald-trump

By: Marco García

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao’.

When it comes to Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and former United States’ President Donald Trump, the diplomatic relationship is a bit of a paradox. Throughout his administration, Trump labelled Mexicans as criminals, used the US-Mexico border as a political piñata to pander to his loyal supporters, and conceived detrimental policies for the ‘dreamers’ who flock to the US in hopes of a better life.

 Nevertheless, Mexico’s López Obrador, once a vocal anti-Trumpist, perhaps already misses him.

 Among the many surprises brought about by the Trump presidency, one of the more astonishing ones would be how he got López Obrador – a populist, leftist president who has in the past called Trump a “racist” – to regard him so highly. Said admiration can be attributed to the striking similarities between the two men: both leaders ran for office on a promise to lessen the divide between ordinary citizens and their nation’s elite. Both men are political opportunists, dismantling institutional processes while expressing a complete disregard for foreign policy in favor of placating their domestic base. Both also paint their opponents – usually the media – as enemies of the people. LópezObrador has even taken a queue right from the Trump handbook: just as Trump used Twitter to hog the media spotlight, López Obrador hosts a daily morning news conference in which he is questioned by the media; although these usually consist of Youtubers and mediaoutlets who are sympathetic to him. In short, their populist platforms have allowed for a previously unseen common ground for both men to work together – a sort of emotional understanding between both leaders. The Biden administration, on the other hand, constitutes a challenge to that understanding.

López Obrador was among the last world leaders to congratulate President-Elect Biden on his electoral win, grouping him with the likes of Brazil’s Bolsonaro, Russia’s Putin, and China’s Xi, though the latter congratulated Biden almost three weeks before Obrador. As reported by the New York Times, when Obrador finally brought himself to speak to the President-elect, he did not hesitate to show off his relationship with Trump. “I must mention that we do have a very good relationship with the now president of your country, Mr. Donald Trump”, he said. Obrador sees Biden as a potentially meddlesome President and seeks to push back any American involvement in what he considers Mexican affairs.  To add insult to injury, LópezObrador did not condemn the attack on the US Capitol on January 6th, choosing instead to criticize social media platforms for “censoring” President Trump. He even went as far as offering political asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks. Lopez Obrador has, in a way, set the stage for a strained relationship by repeatedly poking the United States in the eye.

Back in November, the United States’ Justice Department arrested and charged former Mexican Defense Secretary Salvador Cienfuegos with money laundering and distribution of narcotics. After political pressure was applied by the Obrador administration, the American prosecutors dropped the charges and General Cienfuegos was brought back to Mexico to undergo what was promised to be a meticulous investigation by Mexican prosecutors into the Justice Department’s allegations. Alongside this promise, Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, stated that bringing Cienfuegos back to Mexico and not do anything with him would be “suicide”.

Nevertheless, a week before Biden’s inauguration, Cienfuegos was exonerated by the Mexican government.

López Obrador accused American prosecutors of “fabricating” the allegations and acting “irresponsibly”. When met with criticism for his actions, he ordered the release of all classified evidence given to his government by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In just one tweet, Mexican authorities made public 750 pages of classified evidence. Washington expressed “disappointment” over the actions of LópezObrador’s government, with the Mexican President snapping back: “I could also say that I am disappointed in the work of the DEA.”

Regardless of who is right, this case reveals a highly disturbing reality: the future of the US-Mexico bilateral relationship will have an excess of politicking, and a lack of justness. The United States showed this by folding under pressure to give up Cienfuegos, and Mexico showed this by prioritizing political point scoring over the rule of law. An argument could, however, be made for the actions of López Obrador: either exonerating or releasing Cienfuegos presented political costs for the President. On the one hand, Mexico’s military has flourished under López Obrador, and has been given the most responsibility and power in recent memory. By prosecuting Cienfuegos, a man still deeply respected among the Mexican armed forces, the President risked alienating one of his main allies. On the other hand, by exonerating Cienfuegos, López Obrador put into disrepute what is an already fragile relationship with US law enforcement. Considering the President’s lack of interest in those outside his political base, he considered the latter to have a lesser political cost.

Allowing the Cienfuegos investigation to run its course would have given López Obrador the opportunity to prove he is different from his predecessors who he has repeatedly criticized. This was not the case.

Obrador’s striking similarities with President Trump and his unprecedented public showdown with the DEA marks a new era of non-cooperation. The Biden administration has therefore inherited a standoff with the Mexican government. And with Biden more likely to ask more of López Obrador than Trump ever did, it is yet to be seen whether Mexico will cooperate with the new administration or see them as a threat to their sovereignty. With an expected increase in immigration towards the United States from Central America in light of the pandemic and the end of Trump-era policies, immigration will be the first challenge where both leaders will be put to the test. Biden will need LópezObrador to effectively reinforce Mexico’s southern border in order to handle new migrant caravans, especially with the pandemic still battering the Americas. Though it is not expected for President Biden to strongarm López Obrador into action, what remains to be seen is whether Mexico will see Biden’s efforts as meddling in Mexican affairs.  

What López Obrador fears most is Biden’s administration meddling in his ambitious domestic agenda which includes the construction of a new 2 billion USD oil refinery and the revitalization of PEMEX – the state-owned oil company. The US Democratic Party has already called for greater cleaner energy investment and further enforcement of labor rights in Mexico, and these represent a threat to the promises made by Obrador to his political base. What we have seen, then, in López Obrador is perhaps a growing resentment of Americanism. By directly challenging the DEA, defending President Trump in lieu of condemning the Capitol attack, and offering asylum to Assange, LópezObrador has started to push back against any influence the Biden administration might have on his running of the country. If López Obrador can pass that resentment on to his base, then he is further justified in rejecting US influence.

The López Obrador-Trump era was marked by shared sentiments and political opportunism: López Obrador enforced Trumpist immigration policies and, in exchange, Trump did not criticize Obrador’s running of Mexico. This unspoken agreement allowed for both men to please their loyal bases, focus on implementing their respective domestic agendas, and portray a united front in the war on drugs. Biden will now have to walk a thin line between attempting to fix the institutional relationship with Mexico while ensuring that LópezObrador does not see it as interventionism. It is important, however, for both countries to overcome present challenges: if Mexico and the United States do not effectively form a united front against the war on drugs, the winners will be the drug cartels. If Mexico and the United States do not effectively form a united front in tackling immigration, the losers will be the millions of migrants risking their lives in the pursuit of a better life for them and their families. Perhaps what López Obrador will miss the most from Trump is a sentiment President Biden will probably not share with him: a mutual wish to leave each other alone.

Marco is a 3rd Year International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Mexico, he has a keen interest in multilateral organisations, trade, and Latin American affairs.

UN Security Council: Opportunities for Mexican Diplomacy

Source: https://www.enlacejudio.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/de_la_fuente.jpg

By: Luis Bosques

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao’.

Mexico has become a member of the United Nations Security Council, and now has the ability to consolidate itself as a force for change, and push its foreign policy in one of the most exclusive forums on the multilateral stage. 

In June 2020, the United Nations General Assembly elected five states to serve as non-permanent members of the Security Council for a two-year term. Mexico was elected for the fifth time to represent Latin America and the Caribbean at the UN’s most powerful body, as its mandate and powers to safeguard peace and security through legally binding decisions are exclusive to the Council. It is worth noting that the Security Council is composed of 15 members, ten of which rotate to occupy a non-permanent seat for two years, while the remaining five have permanent status, as well as the right to veto any decision. This privileged group is made up of China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia. 

Mexico's election to the major leagues of multilateralism would add one more victory for the nation’s foreign policy, and will add to its diplomatic advantage in the region. The diplomatic activism of the Foreign Secretary, Marcelo Ebrard has been marked by victories at the international level. Such is the case of the resolutions sponsored by Mexico on healthcare access in the context of the pandemic, and successfully electing candidates to multilateral organisations during 2019 and 2020, and more recently the election of Socorro Flores as the first female Mexican judge to the International Criminal Court.

Mexico has flexed its diplomatic muscle by obtaining the support of Latin American and Caribbean countries to occupy the region’s only seat available for this term, which was previously held by Dominican Republic. Trust in multilateralism and Mexican leadership can translate into a more valuable asset: influence. 

However, the influence that Mexico has exerted to get to a seat faces a different reality: the Council, its members and the international community are not the same as they were the last time the country held a seat on the Council. The work of the Security Council is complex and turbulent; it requires the sum of political wills, mainly of the permanent members, however, the trust between them has been worn down by the health crisis and their foreign policies. The influence of the Mexican agenda requires meticulous planning, and a degree of manoeuvre must be developed, as well as a risk calculation by the Permanent Mission, taking into consideration the latest reconfiguration and events within the international system. 

The change in US foreign policy from isolationist unilateralism to violent multilateralism puts the Mexican delegation in an uncomfortable position, who by tradition and constitutional attachment promotes the diplomatic route, non-intervention, legal equality of the States and self-determination. These foreign policy principles could be marginalised in situations such as those of Syria, Venezuela, Libya and the Sahrawi-Moroccan conflict, to which we add the Mexico-US bilateral relationship that can be put at risk, as happened in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, which Mexico did not support.

On the other hand, Russia and China have insisted that the Council discuss exclusively issues related to armed conflicts, so it will be necessary to outline a strategy that does not exclude Mexico's potential during discussions and ensure that other important issues are addressed, specifically those that the Sino-Russian bloc is reluctant to debate.

Despite these challenges, Mexico has unique opportunities to stand out during its membership. There are several opportunities where the Mexican agenda can be accommodated. At the beginning of this year, the foreign secretary, Marcelo Ebrard, adopted a feminist foreign policy (PEF, by its acronym in Spanish) that seeks to reduce gender inequality and provide a safe space for women in international relations. Countries such as France, Ireland and Norway, which are members of the Council also have a PEF, can promote and strengthen the gender agenda in issues of peace and security, sexual violence in armed conflict, the role of women in international relations and the role of the woman in resolving these issues. Mexico and Ireland are co-chairing the Group on Women, Peace and Security. 

Similarly, together with France, a reform has been promoted to limit the exercise of the right of veto in situations of humanitarian crisis that prevent the adequate intervention of the Council, seeking to de-paralyze its work and revitalize its mission. Likewise, the Movement Uniting for Consensus (UfC) or the Coffee Club, of which Mexico is a member, has sought to democratize the practices of the Security Council and maintain the status quo with regard to geographical representation. However, the UfC is also a counterweight to the group of four (G4), who are seeking a permanent seat for themselves. India, which in addition to being part of the G4, won the vacant seat for Asia-Pacific can also promote the reforms it seeks from within the Council.

Finally, the challenges and opportunities that Mexico has ahead require a careful calculation of action, especially regarding the most sensitive issues, where important interests converge. The marginalisation of an important space for dialogue and discussion must be avoided; the scenario of a demilitarised and more debatable Council could be attributed to Mexican influence and its diplomatic tradition.  On the other hand, Mexico is free to pursue its reformist and progressive agenda, even with allies. The Mexican membership is a rich opportunity that will serve to nurture, contribute and revitalize the Council. The next two years will define Mexico's foreign policy for the remaining years of Andrés Manuel’s government.

Luis is a Mexican student at Universidad de Monterrey and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in International Relations and Political Science & Public Administration. He enjoys writing about Mexican foreign policy, international politics, identity and government.

Bibliography

Gómez-Robledo Verduzco, A. (2001). La política exterior mexicana: sus principios fundamentales. Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, 1(1), 197-217. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487872e.2001.1.8

Hernández García, J. (2017). El Consejo de Seguridad y la iniciativa franco-mexicana para la restricción del uso del veto en caso de atrocidades en masa. Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, 110, 45-60. https://revistadigital.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/numeros/n110/hernandezgarcia.pdf

Instituto Matías Romero. (2020). Conceptualizando la política exterior feminista: apuntes para México. https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/545369/Nota_6-Poli_tica_exterior_feminista.pdf

Ruíz-Cabañas Izquierdo, M. (2020.). México en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas en el periodo 2021-2022. Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales. http://www.consejomexicano.org/multimedia/1592317479-153.pdf

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. (2020). Durante 2019 México obtuvo el número más alto de candidaturas electas a organismos multilaterales (Comunicado No. 001). https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/durante-2019-mexico-obtuvo-el-numero-mas-alto-de-candidaturas-electas-a-organismos-multilaterales

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. (2020). México cierra invicto en la ONU bienio 2019-2020. Socorro Flores es electa a la Corte Penal Internacional. (Boletín informativo). https://mision.sre.gob.mx/onu/index.php/sdp/boletines-de-prensa/1045-boletin-informativo-21-de-diciembre-de-2020-mexico-cierra-invicto-en-la-onu-bienio-2019-2020-socorro-flores-es-electa-a-la-corte-penal-internacional 

Vautravers-Tosca, G. y González-Valencia, A. (2012). La membresía de México en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Convergencia, 19(58), 111-131. http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/conver/v19n58/v19n58a5.pdf

Literature: Alienation and Decentering in Borges’ “El Aleph

Source: https://www.bookdepository.com/es/Aleph-Other-Stories-Jorge-Luis-Borges/9780142437889

By: Nazreen Shivlani

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Common, I hope, is the feeling of detachedness from daily chores that taints everything with grotesque oddness. While brushing my hair, I may stare at myself in the mirror and see that body as so strange, those arms as so alien. At a stranger time, I decided the touch of the soil under my feet to be a most captivating feeling. Each time the enchanted moments pass, I recall having been thinking about something greatly important, though I am unable to identify even the character of such great thoughts and so resume my day with an aftertaste of strangeness. Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges talks about similar moments in some of his short stories. This text picks up on small sections from Borges’ “El Aleph” about experiencing things from outside of ourselves, resulting in a form of alienation and decentering.

“El Aleph” is the last short story in Borges’ book of the same title. Aleph is a Hebrew letter written “א”, used in set theory to denote “the size of infinite sets that can be well-ordered” – take this definition, retrieved from Wikipedia and by someone who knows little maths, lightly. The short story tells the tale of a man, Borges, who goes to visit Carlos Argentino Danieri, the cousin of his deceased love interest. Danieri, a snobby aspiring poet, is about to be kicked out of his house. While pleading with a nostalgic Borges for help, Danieri says he doesn’t want to lose his house because it has the Aleph, a point in space which contains every point in space. When a reluctant Borges goes to see this mysterious object, he ends up astounded as he is indeed able to see every point in the universe:

“Cada cosa (la luna del espejo, digamos) era infinitas cosas, porque yo claramente la veía desde todos los puntos del universo” (Borges, 8).

“Everything (the surface of the mirror, for instance) was an infinite number of things, because I could clearly see it from every point in the universe”.

This remarkable experience took place when the fictional Borges lay down, as instructed by his friend, in the darkness of Danieri’s basement while staring at the nineteenth step of the staircase. In the middle of an entrancing description of all of the Aleph’s sights, Danieri interrupts our protagonist, humouring the reader at the realization of our own annoyance at Borges’ friend:

“– ¡Qué observatorio formidable, che Borges! 

(...) En la brusca penumbra, acerté a levantarme y a balbucear: 

–Formidable. Sí, formidable. 

La indiferencia de mi voz me extrañó. Ansioso, Carlos Argentino insistía: 

–¿Lo viste todo bien, en colores?” (Borges, 9).

“‘What a formidable observatory, hey Borges!’

(...) In the abrupt gloom, I was able to get up and mumble, ‘Formidable. Yes, formidable.’ The indifference of my voice surprised me. Anxious, Carlos Argentino insisted, ‘You saw it all well, in colour?’”.

Borges, the author, takes us through the perfect journey. First, a fast-paced multiplicity of descriptions of the Aleph which makes us feel as though we are ourselves experiencing all the points of the universe at once. The fact that we are reading a description, which reminds us that we are not actually experiencing the Aleph, is now mixed with the feeling of experiencing it through the eyes of character-Borges, itself a further point of view encapsulated by this mythical Aleph. This self-awareness of the reader as distinct from the protagonist enables us to notice that the transcendence of character-Borges happens in part because he is able to see reality outside of himself. He finds himself so detached that the world he sees cannot even see him:

“Vi todos los espejosdel planeta y ninguno me reflejó” (Borges, 9) / “I saw all the mirrors of the world and none of them reflected me”.

The viewpoint from the Aleph “corresponds therefore to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world which undermines the centralization which (we are) simultaneously effecting” (Sartre, 255). We get a feeling that at this point, indeed, in his alienation, character-Borges transcends himself. Could it be that when the point of view shifts and the world becomes decentralized, we can realize some eternal truths? Could it be that when we are so alienated that we don’t recognize our bodies as our own and seem to be discovering some external vague truth, the self transcends?

Such a transcendence from the self is something we will never experience– not only because we cannot possibly see first-hand the parts of the world that we do not go to or because we will not experience feelings from the perspective of another person, but because we may never get to know if there is something out there and if it is as we see it. When we stare at nature and absent-mindedly believe to have found a truth about it, could we really have experienced it as it truly, pristinely is? And could the Aleph finally free character-Borges of the fixed point of view that so excruciatingly traps us? Author-Borges expertly escalates our claustrophobia when alluding to other limits of our experience such as language. Only when he is interrupted by Danieri is the protagonist forced to descend back inside of himself, dazedly stepping into his encapsulating point of view to utter a response. This interruption marks the end of Borges’ reverie, as he is called back to reality.

Next in this expedition, the author humours us with hindsight. If author-Borges tried, as I implied, to show that character-Borges (or more broadly perhaps, the subject) transcends himself by annulling the “I” as the starting point, it seems nothing remarkable after the description-induced hypnosis. Naturally, the subject should transcend their subjectivity in order to experience objectivity – which was framed in the present text as the absolute freedom of experiencing a pristine world. Re-reading the previous paragraph, we realize that what to me felt as epiphanies when reading, were quite obvious all along. Of course, there are points in Borges’ writing that draw us into the story and points where we get distracted and realize that we are distinct from character-Borges; surely, not pondering over how we can only see reality from our own point of view for the best part of our lives reflects that this is a plainly obvious fact and not that our minds have not reached the grand depths. Still, in the context of “El Aleph”, Borges’ writing is incredibly ingenious because it is able to take us through the loopiest of thoughts only to drag us back to our living rooms, making us feel like the snobby Danieri that so annoyed us.

Finally, we reach the last stage of Borges’ trip: forgetting. Because character-Borges is fully immersed at every step of his journey, unable to think himself at any step other than the present one, his life after the Aleph feels absolutely normal. This is much like our feelings as we accompany the protagonist in his journey, aided by the author’s magical realism which makes everything appear wholly natural. Natural, yes, but it appears absurd too, from the outside, that such a mind-blowing event should be followed by the same good old daily chores as always. At the end, character-Borges forgets the specificity of what he recalled when looking at the Aleph, remaining only with the memory of an indescribable intensity. This touches upon the possibility that reality is limited and that it is created in its totality by language and memories.

Borges’ “El Aleph” takes us through a journey similar to what we feel during those moments of detachedness from what surrounds us. We may personally relate to character-Borges when we enter those strange and somewhat happy feelings of alienation that come to us under peculiar circumstances, the short minutes when we feel that we experience things from outside of ourselves, as if some thoughts feel awkward when experienced from our own point of view and they would rather be outside of us. When our eyes, perplexed, must begin to understand every part of what they are seeing, getting us bewildered at the novelty of normal views because we truly see things as if for the first time, it seems to me that we may experience something like Borges’ Aleph.

Nazreen is a KCL student interested in development, philosophy, and literature, focused on Latin America.

Nicaragua: Why Its Authoritarian Manual Seems to be Written in Russian and Why This Matters

Image Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute

By: Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro

As an anti-imperialist ideologue in 1979, Daniel Ortega was revered as a champion of the Sandinista Revolution that brought freedom to Nicaragua by overthrowing the authoritarian Somoza regime. Now, in 2021, Ortega has fallen from grace and has impersonated the villainous political character he originally repudiated and ceaselessly fought against in the first place. Weakened rule of law, suppression of the free press, chronic nepotism, brazen violations of the Constitution, and a rhetoric that bifurcates Nicaraguan society amongst ‘loyalists’ and ‘foreign agents’ are the keys closing the return to democracy in the country. It is therefore unsurprising that the US former National Security Advisor, John Bolton, coined Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua as the “troika of tyranny” of Latin America.

 Democratic erosion in Nicaragua is not unprecedented. Ortega has served as the de facto leader of Nicaragua since 2007. In 2011, he secured the approval of the Supreme Court to run for a subsequent presidential term, and again, gained the approval from the Nicaraguan National Assembly to amend the constitution in 2014 so that he could secure the presidency in 2016 for a third time. On top of his institutional iron-grasp on power, his regime also violently suppressed mass protests in 2018 which featured opposition groups decrying the seemingly irreversible truncation of political and social freedoms. His grip on power has undoubtedly continued to ossify as he has gradually come to embody a 21st Century caudillo. 

 Nicaragua’s growing authoritarianism fits into a global trend characterised by the backsliding of democracy and the rise of hybrid and authoritarian regimes. It is when narrated within this context that Nicaragua’s dictatorial politics crescendo to a tangible concern about the future of democracy– particularly in Latin America. Worst of all, however, is that some of Nicaragua’s recently established buttons and levers used to stifle opposition and criticism eerily resemble practices used in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. ​

 The parallels between the two regimes allude to a newly emerging concept within political science known as ‘authoritarian learning’. According to a paper published by Hall and Ambrosio, “authoritarian regimes adopt survival strategies based upon the prior successes and failures of other governments”. The collapse of the USSR, for instance, which was catalysed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, signalled to the Chinese Communist Party at the time that, in order to prevent political downfall at home, media freedom would need to be circumscribed alongside associational life. Similarly, Cuba’s Raúl Castro is reportedly attempting to emulate the Chinese and Vietnamese politico-economic models to open the country’s economy to the global community whilst maintaining political control. 

 Considering the pressures Nicaragua faces from a growing grassroots opposition and a changing US-Latin America agenda driven by the Biden administration, it is reasonable to assume Ortega could be drawing inspiration from successfully entrenched authoritarian regimes like Russia. The most notable instantiation of this was the adoption of a draconian law in December of last year wherebyNGOs and foreign media outlets have to register as ‘foreign agents’ if they receive money from international organizations. At best, violators of the law face shutdown and the confiscation of property – a result which has already been observed with the shutting down of a defender of free press, the Fundación Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. At worst, they face unabated repercussions facilitated by Nicaragua’s weak rule of law. Curiously enough, the bill has been denoted as the ‘Putin’ law due to its uncanny resemblance with a law passed in Russia in 2012. The original Putin law forced organizations engaging in political activity receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents, even if the funding did not pay for any sort of political activities. 

 The objectives in Managua and Moscow are nearly carbon copies of each other – the respective foreign agent laws seek to ostracize civil society and suppress any budding sources of opposition against authoritarianism. As two strongmen who know a thing or two about political longevity, it seems that Ortega can extract lessons from Putin’s successful retention of power. For instance, Ortega is said to be weighing an amendment to Nicaragua’s constitution that would convert the country from a presidential to a parliamentary system in order to circumvent presidential limits by becoming the Prime Minister. Putin exercised a similar move in 2008 by becoming Russia’s Prime Minister, temporarily ceding the presidency to only recuperate it in 2012.

 Of greatest concern, however, are the reforms that have been made to directly undermine free and fair elections. After all, what is a democracy if, at its core, it does not have elections? In Nicaragua, the ‘Law in Defence of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace’ effectively prevents the opposition from running for election later this November. With the authority the law grants Ortega, he essentially has free reign in designating someone as ‘traitor to the homeland’ and hand out prison sentences as a result. On the other side of the same coin, following the Siberian city council election where Ksenia Fadeeva defeated Putin’s handpicked contender, opposition candidates can now be labelled on the ballot as ‘foreign agents’– an awkward label that can directly dissuade voters. 

 It is difficult to concretely discern if Ortega is, in fact, intentionally been taking notes on his Russian counterpart’s authoritarian behaviour. As Hall and Ambrosio admit, the reason why authoritarian learning is such an understudied concept is due to the near impossibility of collecting information about the paper trail that precedes the implementation of certain policies. But perhaps the other underlying reason is that, up until now, democracy had been the dominant political model to follow. The idea that democracy was the inevitable destination for all nations was a reigning dogma up until recently. This sanctification of democracy created a myopic focus on studying and promoting democracy whilst forgetting that democratic backsliding and erosion are symptoms that can sicken all political regimes that are –or were– on a democratizing path. 

 The parallels between Nicaraguan and Russian authoritarianism might indicate that the world has become safer for authoritarian regimes, meaning it is becoming increasingly more likely that they will have opportunities to learn from each other’s failures and successes. The November elections in Nicaragua, therefore, might become a breaking point for democracy in a region already surrounded by hybrid regimes like El Salvador and Honduras. If Ortega’s dictatorial hand continues to be raised victoriously, another chapter will be added to the manual of techniques that can be used by strongmen to further entrench their grip on power.

Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro is a second-year student of Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Originally Mexican, she is passionate about the political history of Latin America, particularly that of her home country. 

Bibliography

Associated Press. “Fractious Nicaraguan Opposition Unites to Challenge Ortega.” WTOP, 25 June 2020, wtop.com/latin-america/2020/06/fractious-nicaraguan-opposition-unites-to-challenge-ortega/.

Bejarano, Por Manuel. “EE.UU.: Ley de Agentes Extranjeros Conduce a Nicaragua Hacia La Dictadura, Silenciando Voces Independientes.” La Prensa, 9 Feb. 2021, www.laprensa.com.ni/2021/02/08/politica/2782210-ee-uu-ley-de-agentes-extranjeros-conduce-a-nicaragua-hacia-la-dictadura-silenciando-voces-independientes.

Berg, Ryan C. “Ortega Is Busy Completing Nicaragua’s Authoritarian Architecture.” American Enterprise Institute - AEI, 9 Nov. 2020, www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/ortega-is-busy-completing-nicaraguas-authoritarian-architecture/.

Berg, Ryan C. “The Case of ‘Authoritarian Learning’ in Nicaragua.” American Enterprise Institute - AEI, 2 Oct. 2020, www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/the-case-of-authoritarian-learning-in-nicaragua-2/.

Cerda, Arlen. “Ortega Classifies ‘True’ Nicaraguans and ‘Foreign Agents.’” Havana Times, 25 Sept. 2020, havanatimes.org/features/ortega-classifies-true-nicaraguans-and-foreign-agents/.

Chivers, C. J. “Putin Is Approved as Prime Minister (Published 2008).” The New York Times, 9 May 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/europe/09russia.html.

“Downward Spiral: Nicaragua’s Worsening Crisis.” BBC News, 16 July 2018, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-44398673.

Hall, Stephen G. F., and Thomas Ambrosio. “Authoritarian Learning: A Conceptual Overview.” East European Politics, vol. 33, no. 2, Apr. 2017, pp. 143–61, doi:10.1080/21599165.2017.1307826.

“How to Unseat Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega.” The Economist, 10 Dec. 2020, www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/12/10/how-to-unseat-nicaraguas-daniel-ortega.

Lopez, Ismael. “Nicaraguan Parliament Approves Controversial Hate Crimes Law.” Reuters, 11 Nov. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-human-rights-idUSKBN27R04X.’

Martí i Puig, Salvador, and Macià Serra. “Nicaragua: De-Democratization and Regime Crisis.” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 62, no. 2, Mar. 2020, pp. 117–36, doi:10.1017/lap.2019.64.

“Nicaragua Essentially Bans Opposition from 2021 Elections.” AP NEWS, 21 Dec. 2020, apnews.com/article/elections-blockades-central-america-daniel-ortega-nicaragua-14d04033e443f6da9bf3d11aec0dae47.

“Nicaragua: Ortega Allowed to Run for Third Successive Term.” BBC News, 29 Jan. 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-25937292.

The Disastrous Impact of Covid-19 on Brazilian Indigenous Populations: an Interview with Almir Narayamoga Suruí

Source: https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/10/ovid-19-how-brazil-is-failing-its-indigenous-people

By: Alice Iscar

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

For over a year now, Covid-19 has been an omnipresent subject in our everyday lives. Views on the pandemic’s political, economic, social and societal impact on communities around the world have been continuously and widely shared. However, little has been said in mainstream media about Covid-19’s impact on indigenous populations in Latin America, including Brazil. 

The reality of the situation is not easy to confront. On the 4th of April 2020, the first case of coronavirus in an indigenous community was detected in Brazil. The case was a 15-year-old teenager of Yanomami ethnicity, an indigenous group which lives in the Amazon rainforest, on the border between Venezuela and Brazil. A few days later, on the 8th of April 2020, a 20-year-old Indigenous woman of Kokama ethnicity had contact with a doctor, who, it was later found out, had Covid-19. The woman was herself infected and when she went back to her village, she infected the rest of her community. Since the beginning of 2020, more than 30,000 indigenous people have been infected in Brazil by the virus and almost one thousand have died from it.

In addition to the direct threat the virus poses to these populations, who are losing so many of their members, the biggest worry focuses on the health of ‘the elders’. Indeed, older people are more likely to develop a severe form of the virus and consequently die from it. But the health of older indigenous people and the prevention of their premature death are essential to the preservation of the tribe’s culture and knowledge. As highlighted in an article in The Guardian entitled ‘ “We are facing extermination”: Brazil losing a generation of indigenous leaders to Covid-19’, the teachings of an indigenous’ tribe’s culture and history is passed orally from the elders to the younger members of the tribe. Therefore, the premature death of the older members, due to the virus, represents a great threat to the conservation of their culture and historical and medical knowledge. 

Indigenous tribes in Brazil are particularly vulnerable to the virus as they are removed from public health services and therefore unable to seek adequate treatment early in the development of the disease. According to an article on the Médecins Sans Frontières website, a high proportion of the Brazilian indigenous population suffers from untreated chronic diseases such as diabetes and hypertension, which increase their risk of developing a severe fatal form of the virus.  In addition to lacking immunological defences because they live isolated from other communities, the indigenous tribes’ way of life is incompatible with the social isolation and sanitary measures imposed on populations in most other countries. They often live close together, in small houses, share water and food and usually lack sanitary equipment in order to limit the spread of the disease. If one member of the tribe is infected, it is very likely the disease will quickly spread to the rest of the group.

To make matters even worse, the Brazilian government’s policies regarding the pandemic and the protection of the Amazon and its indigenous populations is alarmingly defective. In his failure to take the pandemic seriously, Jair Bolsonaro, the current president of Brazil, has put in danger his own population and his country’s indigenous people. An Euronews article highlights how Bolsonaro went as far as to place a veto on laws that would have made it compulsory for the government to assist the Brazilian indigenous populations through the provision of clean water access, reserved care beds in hospitals and basic material necessities. Additionally, Bolsonaro openly supports the clearance of vast areas of the critically important Amazon rainforest for the development of agricultural, forestry, mining or industrial activities. According to an article in the New York Times, deforestation in the Amazon hit a 12-year high in 2020 under Bolsonaro and increased by a further 9,5% compared to 2019. Deforestation contributes to the spread of Covid-19 to indigenous people. Indeed, it increases social interaction among indigenous tribes and outsiders, such as illegal miners; and it pressures communities to move to other regions where the virus may be more present. 

In the light of this article, I had the chance to interview Almir Narayamoga Suruí by phone. Almir is the chief of the Paiter Suruí tribe, an indigenous tribe living in the Mato Grosso-Rondônia region of Brazil. In addition to being a tribal chief, Almir is a political activist, dedicated to the protection of his and other indigenous peoples and the Amazon rainforest. He kindly answered a few of my questions on the impact of Covid-19 on indigenous populations in Brazil. Below is the transcript of this interview.

Alice: Hello Almir, thank you for accepting to do this interview with me and for taking the time to answer my questions, I imagine you must be really busy.

Almir: You are welcome; it is a pleasure to do this interview with you. 

Alice: I am writing an article for the journal El Cortao of the Latin American Society of my university King’s College London. My article is on how the Covid-19 pandemic is affecting indigenous populations in Brazil. As the chief of the Paiter Suruí tribe, I have a few questions to ask you on that subject. My first question is: How is the pandemic affecting your tribe? What is happening concretely?

Almir: Our community is rather isolated from the rest of the country, but on some occasions we need contact with the modern world because of material or medical needs. In the context of that contact, a few members of our tribe have been infected by the coronavirus and passed the disease to other members of the Paiter Suruí people. Today, there are 204 members of the tribe who have had coronavirus. This represents 30% to 40% of the entire tribe, it is very worrying. Brazil’s governing system is not adequately prepared to help its indigenous population when facing this type of threat. In the last few months, four Suruís have died from Covid-19. It is an immense challenge for our community and our organisations. Unfortunately, we need those two cultures, the modern Brazilian culture and ours. We need the services provided by the city and by the forest. We need to be in two different places, and this increases the risks of contamination. 

Alice: And how do you think this relates to the deforestation of the Amazon and the current policies of the Brazilian government?

Almir: I believe the government’s policies weaken the forest and our community. The deforestation and the ‘mega-industrialization’ policy, which the president is driving forward, threaten the health of our community.  

Alice: In what ways is the community trying to overcome the challenge posed by the pandemic?

Almir: To face the pandemic, the governance of the Paiter Suruí tribe focused on the social isolation of our people. The Metareilá Paiter Suruí Indigenous People Society, of which I am a member, has done a lot to support social isolation, by looking for economic alternatives, and by seeking support from foundations, businesses and individuals to enable the social isolation of our people. The strategy is to maintain this social isolation and the fight moves forward. 

Alice: How can we help, from our side?

Almir: There are various ways to support us. There is the possibility to donate to the campaign that the Paiter Suruí tribe has created in order to help the community to face the pandemic through financial or medical equipment donations. There is also the possibility to pressure the national administration to have more respect for the Amazon forest. We have some contact with national and international universities – perhaps your university can join this group to articulate support for our community together with our society and our university. We have a project in our university Paiter a Soeitxawe, which is the Paiter Suruí tribe’s university, which aims to created partnerships with other Brazilian or international universities. 

Alice: Do you have one last message you would like to share before we finish this interview?

Almir: I believe us humans can overcome any challenge, like pandemics or others. We need to look for solutions together. Because those who live in the Amazon need Europe, but those living in Europe also need the Amazon. We need to share our experiences of facing the world’s challenges. This is my message.

Alice: Thank you, Almir. Do I have your authorization to use this interview for my article?

Almir: Yes, you do.

Alice: Thank you for your time.

The question of the protection of indigenous people in Brazil and its direct link to the protection of the Amazonian rainforest underlines the interconnections between human health across communities and the importance of the preservation of the environment. As highlighted by the article and by Almir in the interview, the protection of the forest and its human inhabitants go hand in hand. The pandemic sheds light on this interconnectedness and on the need for a holistic approach in regard to the environment and human health.

Alice is a third-year History and International Relations student at King’s College London seeking to raise awareness about the current politico-environmental situation in Brazil. She is a regular contributor of El Cortao’.

Sources:

Charlier, Philippe, Varison Leandro. “Is COVID-19 being used as a weapon against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil?” The Lancet 396, no. 10257 (Autumn 2020): 1069-1070. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32068-7.

Fox, Michael. “Brazil’s Indigenous peoples fight COVID-19 in their territories amid government neglect.” The World, September 4, 2020. https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-09-04/brazil-s-indigenous-peoples-fight-covid-19-their-territories-amid-government.

Graham, Laura R., Krenak Edson, Rabben, Linda. “Brazil’s COVID-19 Response: A Death Knell for Indigenous Peoples.” Cultural Survival, November 12, 2020. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/brazils-covid-19-response-death-knell-indigenous-peoples.

 “Indigenous youth open up about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their communities.” Unicef.org. Accessed December 20, 2020. https://www.unicef.org/brazil/indigenous-youth-open-about-impact-covid-19-pandemic-their-communities.

Krenak Naknanuk, Edson. “How COVID-19 is Impacting Indigenous Peoples in Brazil.” Cultural Survival, May 1, 2020. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/how-covid-19-impacting-indigenous-peoples-brazil.

Phillips, Dom. “ ‘We are facing extermination’: Brazil’ losing a generation of indigenous leaders to Covid-19.” The Guardian, June 21, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jun/21/brazil-losing-generation-indigenous-leaders-covid-19.

Laudares, Humberto. “Deforestation in Brazil is spreading COVID-19 to the Indigenous peoples.” VoxEU, November 3rd, 2020. https://voxeu.org/article/deforestation-spreading-covid-19-brazils-indigenous-peoples. Iscar, Alice. Interview with Almir Narayamoga Surui. Translated from Portuguese. December 23, 2020.

Liubchenkova, Natalia. “COVID-19: how Brazil is failing its indigenous people.” Euronews, July 15, 2020. https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/10/ovid-19-how-brazil-is-failing-its-indigenous-people.

Monclou, Carolina Rodríguez. “How Does COVID-19 Affect Indigenous Communities in Brazil?” Latam, October 2nd, 2020. https://latinamericanpost.com/34547-how-does-covid-19-affect-indigenous-communities-in-brazil.

“MSF works to prevent spread of COVID-19 among indigenous people in Mato Grosso do Sul.” Médecins Sans Frontières, September 17, 2020. https://www.msf.org/preventing-coronavirus-covid-19-among-indigenous-people-brazil.

Reuters. “Brazil Amazon Deforestation Hits 12-Year High under Bolsonaro.” The New York Times, November 30, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/world/americas/brazil-amazon-rainforest-deforestation.html#:~:text=Bolsonaro%20has%20weakened%20the%20environmental,grabbers%20to%20clear%20the%20forest.

Savarese, Mauricio. “Brazil’s Bolsonaro rejects COVID-19 shot, calls masks taboo.” AP, November 27, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/pandemics-brazil-health-coronavirus-pandemic-latin-america-0295d39d3032aa14c6675b8b4080e8cc.

“Self-determination and Indigenous health.” The Lancet 396, no. 10248 (Summer 2020): 361. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31682-2.

Wallace, Scott. “Disaster looms for Indigenous Amazon tribes as COVID-19 cases multiply.” National Geographic, June 12, 2020. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/06/disaster-looms-indigenous-amazon-tribes-covid-19-cases-multiply/.

Vantini, Camila, Palamim, Capasso, Ortega Manoela Marques, Lima Marson, Fernando Augusto. “Covid 19 in the Indigenous Population of Brazil.” Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities 7, (Autumn 2020): 1053-1058. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40615-020-00885-6.

Four Pillars of New Latin American Narrative (part II): Macedonio Fernández and Roberto Arlt

By: Luisa Ripoll Alberola

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Note: This is the final portion of a two-part piece on the pillars of Latin American Literature. To read the first part, please refer to: Four Pillars of New Latin American Narrative (part I):  Felisberto Hernández y Horacio Quiroga

Where does Latin American literature come from? What gave birth to its voice? The modern Latin American literature is genuine and differs notably from the occidental tradition. This was first globally manifested with the Latin American Boom–the literary movement that united many young Latin American novelists in the 60s and spread their work around the globe. The Latin American Boom seems to be the beginning of the assertion of this new voice in the literary world. And thiscould be the reason why Gabriel García Márquez, Mario Vargas Llosa, Juan Rulfo, Carlos Fuentes, Jorge Luis Borges and Julio Cortázar – among others – are so popular. 

I wondered if these authors had been some kind of geniuses to create such a new and original form of written expression unexpectedly. What did they read? What was their inspiration? What features were picked up from other literary movements? One day, I found the answers to these questions hiding in a prologue in the words of Carlos Fuentes. His opinion shows these influences in four essential Latin American authors. According to Fuentes; Felisberto Hernández, Roberto Arlt, Horacio Quiroga and Macedonio Fernández are the four fundamental pillars to the renewal of the 20th century narrative. 

To satisfy my curiosity, I started reading one important book per each author –these were written around the 1920s. Hereafter, I will tackle my reading experience with these not-widely-known classics of the Latin American literature.

Macedonio Fernández

The other day I was asked which was the strangest book I have ever read; my answer was Museo de la Novela de la Eterna (The Museum of Eterna’s Novel) by MacedonioFernández (1874-1952). Macedonio Fernández is an Argentinian author–known for being quite eccentric. In all his life, he never stood foot outside of his beloved Buenos Aires. Fernández collaborated with Jorge Luis Borges in many magazines and had a good friendship with Borges’ father. 

The influence of Fernández in Borges is irrefutable. As it is pointed in the summary of Museo de la Novela de la Eterna, “Two intuitions sufficed: the obsession for the work inside the work itself, and the dreamlike conception of reality.” A basic recurrence in all of Fernández’s work,also taken by Borges, is the idea that ‘the true nature of the literary condition of the writer is the reader itself.

Macedonio Fernández was an avant-garde writer. He took part in the Argentinian ultraist group  of writers, who continued dadaism and other avant-garde movements. Una novela que comienza (A Novel that Starts) is part of this experimentation. Ironically, this is precisely a novel that doesn’t start–it is an aggrupation of prologues about a story and some characters that will never be real in any novel. The vanguard naughtiness, that provocative spirit, stayed in later literature. The avant-garde is the total rupture of stablished rules. Authors of the next generation, such as Cortázar, made this ‘game’ their main source of inspiration. The game is focused precisely on this: the invention of new rules. The destructive vanguardist aspect was necessary to wake up the destructive impulse of the game. 

Museo de la Novela de la Eterna torn its readers in two. In my opinion, Fernández’s book was dull. But it is this same boredom that marvels me the most. At the same time, Fernández achieves to give us both dull repetition and intrigue. This book, however, is very important for its influence in Cortázar’s Rayuela: a short chapters structure with no lineal connection between them, fragmented so it looks like a collection of pieces of text. The main difference is that Cortázar was concise, he invented concrete brilliant characters and worlds. Fernández, on the other hand, is more abstract. Other similarities are the pretentiousness of Fernández, comparable to Morelli’s style in “De otros lados” chapters of Rayuela; the metaphysic awareness; the structural experimentation of concatenating footnotes and parenthesis inside parenthesis. 

‘It is nowadays common to recognise in the fragmentarism of Rayuela, the print and presence of Fernández; but it is this fragmenting that transforms in into the rhetorical instrument that best adapts to the inherited attitude inherited in historical avant-gardes, being Dadaists, surrealists… regarding the old desire that emerged in the romanticism of presenting the writer as a provocative agent of the collective drowsiness, a rebel without more cause than himself or the mysticism.’ 1

The legacy of Macedonio Fernández, I believe, is the importance of the reader. He gets this argument to the absurd: writing a novel with insubstantial characters, with a radically abstract discourse, so it is not eclipsed by the limelight of the reader in the act of reading. Museo de la Novela de la Eterna is a mirror of four hundred pages: it is as boring as staring to oneself in a mirror for four hours. He himself affirms it in the words of one of his characters: ‘what occupies me is the reader: you are my topic, your fading existence; the rest is an excuse to have at reach from my process.

In the new Latin American narrative, although not in such a drastic way, the relation between author and reader wins importance. It becomes more dynamic, a true exchange. The author will want to move the reader in new, undiscovered ways. Consequently, the interpretation of the reader in the facts of the novel starts to be more interestingin the reading experience. 

Roberto Arlt

My favourite of the four authors, Roberto Arlt was anArgentinian author, porteño (born in Buenos Aires) frombirth to death (1900-1942). According to Ricardo Piglia, Arlt inaugurated the modern Argentinian novel with his new style. Many fellow-native writers still recognise in Arlt his mastery and consider themselves followers of his school.

His novels Los siete locos (The Seven Madmen) and the follow-up Los lanzallamas (The Flamethrowers), were in my opinion, like reading Quentin Tarantino. Although I would have loved to, I didn’t get to read the next book El amor brujo (The Wicked Love). Hence, I will share my feelings with the first two novels aforementioned. If I compare Arlt with Tarantino it is because of their similarities: the presence of the sleaze and the street, the importance of dialogues that touch on any imaginable topic, and the banalization of death–all covered in profound sarcasm, and an existential irony. Arlt drives the reader to a very entertaining universe, in which it reins the contrast in the personalities of the characters, the insanity and a sincere nonsense. 

I don’t need to read more of his novels to know that Arlt dominates literary styling, which is characterised by the orality expressed in the spirit of the Latin American conversation. He masters it with such a naturality, avoiding all the time literary rigidity, that he is told to ‘write badly’. In that moment, he coexisted in Argentinawith a current of literary academicism, whose memberscriticised Arlt sharply. Arlt even addresses this criticism: ‘…it is said about me that I write badly. It is possible.”2And it is more than possible, as he makes grammatical and orthographical mistakes constantly, however he proves that not all the literary enchantment is in an impeccable style.

....

To sum up,  these four authors are all very interesting. I would like to encourage all readers, literature enthusiasts or beginners, to start their own literary investigations. Ask questions and dig deeper about any topic that interests you, any genre that connects with that specific moment you are living, or any group of authors you want to know more about.

Latin American literature plays, in my opinion, in another league in the panorama of world literature. For me, the feeling it transmits is not comparable to any other written thing. If you start reading these authors I–or any other great Latin American authors–I welcome you to aNew World. 

Luisa is a Spanish 3rd Year Industrial Engineering student at the Technical University of Madrid. She is passionate about literature and philosophy.

Bibliography

1 Fernando Rodríguez Lafuente, “Prólogo” a Museo de la Novela de la Eterna, p. 65-66. Editorial Cátedra, Madrid, 1995.

2 Roberto Arlt, “Prólogo” a Los lanzallamas, ArchivosALLCA XX, Barcelona, 2000. 

Teen Pregnancy: A Worrying Trend in Latin America

Source: https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-08-17/nicaraguas-teen-pregnancy-rate-soars

By: Katherina Lister

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

There is an ongoing pandemic taking place in Latin America. This is not the pandemic that may currently pop to the forefront of one’s mind, but rather one that has persisted for decades: teen pregnancy, a common occurrence throughout the region. It can be the norm to see teenagers with one, if not several, children. While a young mother with children may not be a cause for concern in isolation, the societal impact of heightened teen pregnancies raises several issues.

Today, many Latinx families are the result of teen pregnancies. Even if it isn’t the case for a family’s latest generation, they can often look back only one or two generations to find a teen pregnancy. Of course, times have changed, and the prevalence is not as high as it once was. A few generations ago, not only were teen pregnancies more common, but it was very much a part of the societal structure of Latin America. This societal structure has transformed as a result of globalization, yet there are still many young mothers bearing children. With Latin America having been dealt a heavy dose of colonialism and the many societal injustices that come with it, the impact that teen pregnancies have on social mobility has been laid bare.

Teen pregnancies are strongly linked to poverty, social exclusion, gender-based violence, and early marriages. These associations facilitate a vicious cycle, in which teenage girls already suffering from societal injustices have these issues compounded if they become pregnant. This can then lead to ramifications throughout a girl’s life as she is at an increased risk of dropping out of school, resulting in decreased employment and financial security. Moreover, children born from a teen pregnancy are at an increased risk of having one themselves. The problem is therefore intergenerational. 

By the Numbers

It is important to understand and quantify teen pregnancy. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the total fertility rate – the number of children per woman – has declined. However, adolescent fertility– in women aged 15 to 19 – colloquially “teen pregnancy”, is declining at a much slower rate. The adolescent fertility rate in LAC is estimated to be the second highest in the world with 60.7 births per 1,000 women, compared to the global average of 44 per 1,000. In addition, there has been a rising trend of pregnancies in females aged under 15 in LAC, the only region in the world where this increase is taking place.

The probability of having an adolescent pregnancy in the region is up to four times higher in girls who are illiterate, only have an elementary education, or are from rural areas. This rate is even higher in the indigenous population.

This trend has been an area of much investigation by the World Health Organisation, Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO), among many others. Nonetheless, progress has been slow and unsteady throughout the decades.

There are identifiable factors that have contributed to this slow progress, namely: the healthcare system in Latin America, government policies regarding pregnancy, and access to contraception. These three areas not only contribute to the high rate of teen pregnancies but can also be used as vehicles for change in decreasing this trend.

Healthcare & Policy 

Healthcare in Latin America varies by country of course. Despite these differences, there are systemic similarities in access to healthcare regardless of the specific country. Monetarily, rising healthcare costs due to technological advances, chronic diseases, and an ageing population have led to problems raising public funds for health coverage. In addition, investment in healthcare is heavily politicised, therefore factors such as economic stability and political ideals provide an uncertain and volatile funding landscape. 

According to a study conducted by the London School of Economics, total health expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product has increased in Latin American countries in the past 15 years. However, there is an inefficient delivery of care and a delayed uptake of healthcare reform. To exacerbate this, the provision of resources to rural areas, where the majority of teen pregnancies occur, also presents inequalities in access to medicine.

A policy affecting teen pregnancy rates that has garnered much attention in Latin America is abortion. Abortion is currently illegal in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. In countries where abortion is legal, specific requirements must be met in order to proceed. This can include a lengthy ordeal of doctor referrals and legal processes, further alienating at risk adolescent pregnant women. Thus, if a teenager becomes pregnant and wants to seek an abortion, she typically pursues illegal avenues to do so. The World Health Organisation estimates that over 4 million illegal abortions take place every year in Latin America and the Caribbean. Often these methods are unsafe and have contributed to the region’s high maternal mortality rate.

Maternal mortality is also increased by the many cases of sexual violence in Latin America. Instances of rape, sexually transmitted infections such as HIV, and domestic violence all contribute to the high number of maternal deaths. More recently, mortality has also been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, where government responses have led to the suspension of many maternal services.

Contraception 

According to PAHO, providing adequate contraceptive access to teens could avoid 2.1 million unplanned births, 3.2 million abortions, and 5,600 maternal deaths each year.Contraception can act as a source of empowerment for young girls to exert autonomy over their bodies and sexual decisions. Unfortunately, there are many barriers in accessing contraception in Latin America. Rural areas, social stigma, and a lack of sexual education are all factors preventing the widespread use of contraception.

A PAHO official, Sonja Caffe, stated that “reducing poverty and increasing access to education and development opportunities would undoubtedly be an important step on the path to reduce unplanned pregnancies in teenagers, but it wouldn’t be enough. It’s also necessary to give teenagers access to effective, high-quality information, and sexual and reproductive health services.” This highlights the importance of a multifactorial approach to preventing teen pregnancies of which sexual education, combined with contraceptive use, is critical.

Looking at the issue on a more individual level, teenage girls often do not want to become pregnant. Many are aware of the availability of contraceptives and have even been taught sexual education in school. Despite this, girls may still be reluctant to use contraception due to the associated social stigma and gossip. While some Latin American countries have set up sexual health clinics to access contraception, in smaller villages where girls can be seen in the waiting room of the clinics, gossip can carry on to families that their daughters are sexually active.

Looking Ahead

Moving forward, to decrease teen pregnancies in Latin America, it is crucial to improve access to healthcare. This would encompass increased expenditure to allow for a more universal coverage and for better access to healthcare in rural and poor income areas where teenage pregnancies are highest. In addition, government policies regarding sexual health, such as abortion laws and the impact of COVID-19 on maternal services, must be addressed to reduce maternal mortalities.

Provision of contraception and reducing the social stigma of its use are also vitally important. Additionally, widespread sexual education is necessary to reduce teen pregnancies. If these improvements are made, there will be fewer adolescent girls dropping out of school, lessening the gender gap in education and increasing social mobility. This would provide teenage girls with a platform to attain higher positions in employment and public life. While teen pregnancy is still rampant throughout Latin America, there have been several recent protests against sexual violence, abortion, and maternal mortality serving to galvanise support and recognition of the issue.

Katherina is a fourth-year Medical student at King’s College London. Half-Colombian, Half-American, she is passionate about access to medicine in Latin America and the Latinx community of the United States.

Bibliography

 Castro, A., 2020. Maternal and child mortality worsens in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

The Lancet, [online] 396(10262). Available at: <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)32142-5/fulltext> [Accessed 10 December 2020].

Pan American Health Organization. 2014. Violence against women in Latin America and the 

Caribbean. [online] paho.org. Available at: <https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2014/Violence1.24-WEB-25-febrero-2014.pdf> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Pan American Health Organization. 2017. Accelerating progress toward the 

reduction of adolescent pregnancy in Latin America and the Caribbean. [online] iris.paho.org. Available at: <https://iris.paho.org/bitstream/handle/10665.2/34493/9789275119761-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Kanavos, P., Parkin, G., Kamphuis, B. and Gill, J., 2019. Latin America Healthcare System 

Overview: A comparative analysis of fiscal space in healthcare. [online] lse.ac.uk. Available at: < https://www.lse.ac.uk/business-and-consultancy/consulting/assets/documents/latin-america-healthcare-system-overview-report-english.pdf> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Salomón, J. and Alford, C., 2020. Latin American Activists Fight For Access To Safe 

Abortion In COVID-19 World. [online] Amnesty.org. Available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/activists-latin-america-access-safe-abortion-covid19/> [Accessed 10 December 2020].

Statista. 2020. Adolescent Birth Rate in Latin America By Country. [online] statista.com.

Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/945546/latin-america-number-births-adolescent-women-country/> [Accessed 6 December 2020].

The World Bank. 2020. Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births Per 1,000 Women Ages 15-19). 

[online] data.worldbank.org. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT> [Accessed 6 December 2020].

Four Pillars of New Latin American Narrative (part I): Felisberto Hernández y Horacio Quiroga

Sources: https://sujetos.uy/2012/01/05/felisberto-hernandez-en-el-canon-narrativo-uruguayo/ and http://librosquearden.com/biografia-horacio-quiroga/

By: Luisa Ripoll Alberola

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

 Where does Latin American literature come from? What gave birth to its voice? The modern Latin American literature is genuine and differs notably from the occidental tradition. This was first globally manifested with the Latin American Boom–the literary movement that united many young Latin American novelists in the 60s and spread their work around the globe. The Latin American Boom seems to be the beginning of the assertion of this new voice in the literary world. And thiscould be the reason why Gabriel García Márquez, Mario Vargas Llosa, Juan Rulfo, Carlos Fuentes, Jorge Luis Borges and Julio Cortázar – among others – are so popular. 

I wondered if these authors had been some kind of geniuses to create such a new and original form of written expression unexpectedly. What did they read? What was their inspiration? What features were picked up from other literary movements? One day, I found the answers to these questions hiding in a prologue in the words of Carlos Fuentes. His opinion shows these influences in four essential Latin American authors. According to Fuentes; Felisberto Hernández, Roberto Arlt, Horacio Quiroga and Macedonio Fernández are the four fundamental pillars to the renewal of the 20th century narrative. 

‘Renewal that connects with the coexistence of imagination and critique, ambiguity, humour and parody, and the generating capacity of myths–whose encounter converts these aesthetic operators in disruption of the language and literary history. Also because of the establishment of a diversifyingmovement, critical and ambiguous, radically different from the perspective and aesthetic approaches of the old naturalist novel.’  1

To satisfy my curiosity, I started reading one important book per each author –these were written around the 1920s. Hereafter, I will tackle my reading experience with these not-widely-known classics of the Latin American literature. 

Felisberto Hernández

Inspired by my local bookseller, who did his doctoral thesis about him, Felisberto Hernández was the first author I approached. Uruguayan musician and writer (1902-1964), he spent all of his life in Montevideo. I read one of his more popular storybooks: Nadie encendía las lámparas (No One Lit the Lamps). His short stories are homely, calm and without overdone, dramatic effects. The characters seem to be sleeply taken by a great dream.

The style of the renewed Latin American narrative is vivid, visual, colourful and sincere. These attributes are usually related with childhood because when we were young, we received the gift of life purely and happily. As we explored the world for the first time, everything had a new colour, a new taste. Life was marked by these feelings and by the illusion of discovery. The writer, in his adultness, can get close to these memories by a combined act of remembering and imagining. Latin American writers often use this literary resource and make their readers feel alike. The genres that get closer to this innocent and childlike view of life are poetry and specially the tale. Hernández mostly explored this genre, publishing nine storybooks.

From my point of view, his definitive contribution is the intimal link between his literature and his music. Hernández himself was a pianist and a composer. The lifestyle and music in the American continent dictate a rhythm that only him was able to transcribe. It is said that his book Por los tiempos de Clemente Colling (By the Time of Clemente Colling) achieves the ‘painting of piano lessons’. This relation between sound and written word is more profound than just alluding to famous singers, as it happens in other more modern books like Rayuela(Hopscotch) with jazz.

Horacio Quiroga

I followed by reading Historia de un amor turbio (A Murky Love Story), a short novel by Horacio Quiroga (1878-1937). Quiroga is Uruguayan, but he lived most of his life in Misiones, Argentina, close to nature. He died in Buenos Aires, but his legacy lived on in the works of BioyCasares, who he influenced. In Quiroga’s work I already recognised that sincere, shoddy way of expression, that had only been used by children until then. Just as Hernández, he devoted himself to tales such as Cuentos de la selva (Jungle Tales), Cuentos de amor de locura y de muerte (Stories of Love, Madness and Death), among others. 

Quiroga was a cinema passionate, just like Jorge Luis Borges. He was one of the first silent films critic of his generation, and he wrote articles in different magazines (Caras y caretas, El Hogar, La Nación…)2. Films had a great influence in the visual richness of his stories and inhis notorious experimentation with time –he makes use of ellipsis of time, just as cinema does. 

One characteristic that caught my attention is that he introduces nature so decisively that it seems just like another character of the story. On many occasions, the forest, the jungle, or the river, accompany the leadcharacter in his successes and his death. In others, the main characters are animals, making notorious his influence by Kipling. Definitely, his work is deeply rooted and embedded with Latin American landscape and the tropical forest. 

But the main theme of many of his stories is love. He portrays tradition, courtship, social classes, and all the conventions surrounding love. They are stories of tangible realities. Edgar Allan Poe was another of his influences; in his stories one can take notice of his sharply descriptive style. Quiroga already has some brilliant moments in the use of metaphor and anticipation and retrospection. 

By the time I read Quiroga’s books, I had already connected deeply with my experiment. Inside me, there was plenty of energy to continue reading and reviewing Carlos Fuentes’ chosen authors. Soon you will be able to read the second part of my journey with them and share my impressions about Macedonio Fernández and Roberto Arlt.

Bibliography

1 Enriqueta Morillas, “Prólogo” a Nadie encendía las lámparas, p. 18. Editorial Cátedra, Madrid, 2010. (Thetranslation is mine)

2 Many of these articles are collected in Horacio Quiroga, Cine y literatura, editorial Losada, Buenos Aires, 2007. 

Luisa is a Spanish 3rd Year Industrial Engineering student at the Technical University of Madrid. She is passionate about literature and philosophy.

Art Exhibition ‘​María Berrío: Flowered Songs and Broken Currents’​ at the Victoria Miró Gallery

Source: https://online.victoria-miro.com/mariaberrio-london2020/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2020/09/MBE53_Clouded-Infinity_2020-a.jpg

By: Irene Pérez Beltrán

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

María Berrío is a Colombian artist based in New York, who predominantly uses a magical realist style to explore the themes of cultural heritage and life cycles. Being constantly inspired by the natural world and the Japanese paper–which she usually uses as her preferred medium–her work focuses strongly on colour and texture experimentation. When asked about the title of her most recent collection, Berrío describes Broken Currents as ‘the disruption of our flow of life’, and Flowered Songs, as a symbol of ‘creativity and new forms of reinventing the world’. This motif of the cyclical nature between resilience after a catastrophe and hope for a brighter future is palpable throughout the exhibition. 

Most of the subjects of her pieces are women and children, who are inspired by those she met when visiting fishing villages in Colombia last year. What she found most striking about her visit was the condition of deprivation these women and children faced due to ecological degradation and political instability. Colombia’s landscape is heavily marked by coastal areas that have become increasingly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The communities that live in villages along the coast are often from a low socio-economic background, and therefore their stability is largely threatened by changes in the environment. Despite these hardships, the cyclical link between nature, motherhood and the growth of the new generation, creates a sense of optimism that illuminates all of Berrío’s paintings. This is particularly evident in her piece Clouded Infinity, where we see a pregnant woman with an expression of contained concern in front of a window showing a vast sky. Here, Berrío reminisces her emotions when she was pregnant with her own son, and how the worries about her child’s future and wellbeing would cloud her vision. Amidst all the uncertainty, however, there is this sense of celebration of womanhood as a symbol of new life. 

Most of the symbolism in Berrío’s art pieces stem from Latin American traditions, in particular storytelling as a means of transferring wisdom from the older to the younger generation. She would usually employ a large canvas to have more narrative freedom–constantly adding and removing images directly on the painting as part of a continuousevolving, and dynamic creation. However, forced to paint some of her works from home during lockdown, Berrío had to experiment with painting at a smaller scale. Interestingly, this restraint turned out to be an opportunity to explore the subject of childhood from a more intimate perspective. In both The Combed Thunderclap and Under a Cold Sun, there is a sense of proximity that transmits to the audience the endurance that these children have had to go through. Through their expressions, there appears to be a dichotomy between their innocence and a sense of maturity that has resulted from their experiences in Colombia’s coastal regions. 

Overall the exhibition Flowered Songs and Broken Currents is a beautiful and thought-provoking collection of artworks. Berrío’s exhibition not only provides an insight into her creative process and her intimate relationship to Colombian culture, but also gives a glimpse of hope that inevitably resonates with the audience during these uncertain times. 

Note: All the artworks in the exhibition have been photographed and are showcased online in the gallery Victoria Miro’s website. 

Irene Pérez Beltrán is a 2nd Year International Relations student at King’s College London with a passion for Latin American Literature and sustainable development.

Looting of Indigenous Lands: The Impact on the Sawré Muybu

Source: https://assets.survivalinternational.org/pictures/14551/df-img-1246_article_column@2x.jpg

By: Victoria Bujok

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

The Munduruku people are facing yet another challenge after years of resistance and struggle for their land in the state of Pará in northern Brazil. The area of Tapajos, which is home to most of the Munduruku population, is one of the most heavily invaded territories, with illegal gold miners currently occupying the area. The mining conflict brings “violence, prostitution, destruction, pollution, deforestation, death threats and conflict,” as stated in a letter of condemnation sent to the public prosecutor’s office, in addition to causing an uncontrolled malaria outbreak. Nevertheless, the prospects of taking care of the illegal actions and eradicating mining in the region all together is extremely unlikely under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. 

The root of the issue is the demarcation of the land, something which has never been done, and of which there is no intention to do in the near future. As a result of illegal action and lack of border clarity, the Sawré Muybu’s 178,000 hectares have been prevented from being recognised as indigenous land, and lack the normal legal protections associated with indigenous reserves. Mining has not been the only threat to the land, livelihoods, health and traditions; back in 2016 the Munduruku people were facing the prospect of 43 hydraulic plants being built on their territory. Luckily for the indigenous population, after years of protests, government meetings and drawing international attention, they were able to defeat the mega projects, which would have had a detrimental effect on the reserve and on its sacred sites. However, the efforts to build the hydroelectric plants in the Tapajos river basin still exist.

When looking further into the cause of these issues, we are drawn to Brazil's far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro. Not only are the hydraulic plants on the government’s agenda, but also another series of projects such as agribusiness expansion and railroads, all of which are all linked to the interests of the miners. In a democracy, just like in other countries with indigenous lands, minorities should be included in the decision making; however, the government is simply making it look like the indigenous people are supporting the projects, and implying that they are going to hugely benefit from those. For example, on August 5, environment minister, Ricardo Salles, refused to confirm his position on mining in indigenous territories, despite having met with half a dozen indigenous residents who happened to be in favour of these projects. The result of this publicity stunt is that the views of these specific indigenous people could be interpreted as representing the general views of all 140,000 Munduruku people. This, however, is not the representation of the majority of the Sawré Muybu’s population, and their views have been wrongly portrayed in order to push the government’s agenda, a move which has been heavily criticised by the Munduruku leaders. Another example of these falsely represented ideas comes from the vice president, Hamilton Mourão, who seeks to legalise gold mining on protected land. He claims that licensing gold extraction will save the rainforest by enabling the government to enforce eco-friendly regulations. This is a fear that Luísa Molina, an anthropologist working in the area, had about the government intention, and which has finally been confirmed. 

But, could legalising mining in those territories be the answer? The belief behind Mourão’s intention to save the rainforest is that whenever there is gold, men will extract it. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said, “there is a lot of land that is rich in gold, and if companies had the permission to extract it, they would have to comply with environmental laws.” He also mentioned the benefit of taxing gold mining, saying that “today, if there is gold, they extract it, destroy the environment and don’t pay taxes—everybody loses.” This is, however, an unlikely stance from a man who says that his intentions are to save the rainforest, but has failed to focus his efforts instead on stamping out illegal gold mining which, alongside other illegal industries, has had a hugely negative environmental impact. In addition, agencies such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), whose work has been crucial in protecting the Amazon from damaging illegal activities, have seen their budgets cut since Jair Bolsonaro assumed the presidency in January 2019.

The Munduruku people need the recognition of their land in order to protect it from future projects like this one. The government itself needs to reroute its principles regarding the environment and to move to a cleaner energy than mining. It is vital that the Brazilian government acts promptly to protect not only the lives of the indigenous people of Brazil, but also their traditions who have been under threat even before the pandemic.

Victoria is a fourth-year SPLAS student at King’s College London with a passion for making indigeneous voices heard. 

COVID-19: Who is Taking Advantage of the Crisis? The Rising Clout of Criminal Groups in Latin America

Source: https://ciudadanosenred.com.mx/2020/04/18/el-crimen-organizado-durante-la-pandemia/

By: Thais Ricard

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Fragmentation and failure 

The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing inequalities and worsened poverty across the world. This is especially striking in Latin America which was already facing a decade of ‘economic weakness and macroeconomic vulnerability’ according to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2020, poverty may increase by at least 4.4%, bringing the total number of people living in poverty to 214.7 million which represents 34.7% of the region’s population. This dire economic situation has led to a weakening of social cohesion and expressions of social discontent that have been characterized by historic waves of popular demonstrations, with many having taken place months before Covid-19 arrived. 

Protesters criticized the state’s corruption and its incapacity to offer public services such as affordable education and health care. Moreover, they decried the pervading climate of violence and insecurity in deprived areas caused by the presence of criminal groups like drug cartels in Mexico, guerrilla movements in Colombia or maras in El Salvador. Faced with this institutional deficiency, Latin American citizens’ trust in government has declined in the past years, reaching an average trust level of 33.9% in 2018.

Covid-19’s crisis could have bolstered governmental legitimacy through the enforcement of efficient sanitary measures aimed at protecting citizens’ lives. Those measures that comprised border closures and the militarization of public security could have expanded states’ authority as they would have particularly hit the illicit economies of criminal groups, making them more vulnerable than ever. To that extent, Covid-19 would have provided an unexpected opportunity for Latin American states to eventually end cycles of violent delinquency.

Adaptation and Altruism 

However, far from being toppled, criminal groups have progressively adapted their activities to the challenges imposed by the pandemic. Globally deprived of extortion and drug trafficking, which had been their main sources of income, they undertook various strategies to remain economically viable. Firstly, they reduced expenses and relied more on savings. The Central American gangs of MS-13 or Calle 18 have cut financial support to lawyers of jailed gang members while the Mexican cartels have decided to sack some of their members. They have also diversified into retail sales of marijuana and synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine and fentanyl, reaping the benefits of price inflations. Finally, the pandemic has led to the creation of new, lucrative, illicit businesses such as medicine smuggling, cybercrime, or kidnapping.

Apart from being economically resilient, criminal groups have surprisingly demonstrated their interest in the public good, and their effectiveness as legitimate political agents, by enforcing quarantine measures. In Brazil, in the Ciudad de Deus favela of Rio de Janeiro, the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) gang imposed a curfew, threatening residents with ‘corrective’ actions if they left their houses outside of designated hours. In the Santa Marta’s favela, traffickers handed out soap and placed signs at the entrance of the favela to remind residents to wash their hands – despite a lack of running water in this area. In the Colombian Department of Cauca, the FARC dissident groups distributed pamphlets threatening fines and military-grade consequences to those who defied the government’s restrictions. In Venezuela, the colectivos, which are pro-government armed gangs, announced lockdown policies even before government agents. 

Furthermore, not only did informal armed organizations attempt to protect citizens’ health by implementing restrictive sanitary measures, but they also provided welfare services and food supplies. In Mexico, the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Golfos Cartel distributed food and medicine parcels labelled with their leaders’ faces and groups’ insignia. These deliveries must be understood as constituting part of a propaganda campaign aimed at improving their public image as they voluntarily shared pictures of their humanitarian actions on social media. They indeed try to portray themselves as genuine saviours of the people, helping the needy while the state is inefficient or absent.

Latin America under criminal governance? 

Undeniably, criminal groups’ actions have been motivated by a desire to secure and extend their power and influence in the long term. They were aware that their members are part of the territories they control and that they therefore had the duty to protect their health to further their criminal activities. Furthermore, they understood that they could later count on those they helped during this crisis for income and recruits. Those measures have thus allowed gangs to entrench themselves more deeply in the communities and gain popular support. Citizens have begun to perceive them as legitimate governing bodies that outperform the state, especially in times of crisis. According to Juan Pappier, an Americas Researcher at Human Rights Watch, this ‘creates the impression that they’re not just there for the drug trafficking or illegal mining or the crimes and they care about the public interest. It also suggests that they are the ones in charge, and they are the ones whose rules you’ve got to follow.’ Even public officials such as former Brazilian Ministry of Health, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, attested the extent of state failure by formally acknowledging the regal authority of criminal groups in neglected areas. This contributes to the blurring of social boundaries between legality and illegality as the criminal may be deemed legitimate. 

Informal armed groups have therefore been empowered lately. As unemployment will drastically worsen due to a pandemic-induced economic downturn, citizens – especially the youth in poor neighbourhoods – will be more likely to join those criminal groups that they perceive to be more reliable than governments. However, one should be careful when drawing generalised conclusions. In fact, the pandemic has also severely impacted the informal economy, resulting in the increasingly violent competition between criminal organizations for local markets. Thus, the small groups that had not been able to diversify their income streams, vanished.

A context-specific response to informal violence 

It is not too late for Latin American governments to establish authority over areas that they have historically neglected. They must develop region-specific approaches that diagnose the local structural sources and patterns of violence in order to devise tailored policies that will end impunity, deter recruitment by informal groups, deepen official material and technical support to poor communities and create professional alternatives to crime. To elaborate these focused and strategic plans, they should not overlook the importance of intelligence and of data. Plans financed by emergency funds from multilateral lenders will break with the broad failed methods of the past. Undeniably, authorities must show high transparency when implementing these measures to boost people’s trust.

 In addition to reducing criminal groups’ influence, these measures would, overall, contribute to the strengthening of democratic systems as Latin American people would not feel inclined to support extremist, unorthodox political agents as they often do when official incumbents misrule.

 Thais is a third year History and International Relations student at KCL. Her main research interests are about human rights and security issues such as drug trafficking and insurgency movements. She is particularly keen in analyzing those matters through a gender-based perspective. 

Bibliography:

 ACLED (2020), ‘Central America and COVID-19: The Pandemic’s Impact on Gang Violence’, May 29. Available at: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep24683. 

 Angelo J. Paul, (2020), ‘The Pandemic Could Bring Power to Latin America’s Criminal Gangs But Not If Governments Beat Them to the Punch’, Foreign Affairs, April 21. Availiable at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2020-04-21/pandemic-could-bring-power-latin-americas-criminal-gangs. 

 Arnson J. Cynthia (2020), ’What Covid-19 is Revealing About Latin America’s Politics’, Wilson Center,August 26. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what-covid-19-revealing-about-latin-americas-politics. 

 Asmann Parker (2020), ‘What Does Coronavirus Mean for Criminal Governance in Latin America?’,  Insight Crime, March 31. Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/criminal-governance-latin-america-coronavirus/. 

 Brinks, D. M., Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2019). Understanding institutional weakness: power and design in Latin American institutions. Cambridge University Press.

 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2019). ‘ECLAC: the region has underestimated inequality’. 28 November 2019. Available at: www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/ eclac-region-has-underestimated-inequality 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2020b). The Social Challenge in Times of COVID-19. CEPAL. Available at: www.cepal.org/en/publications/ 45544-social-challenge-times-covid-19 

Fajardo Luis (2020), ‘Coronavirus: Latin American crime gangs adapt to pandemic’, BBC News, April 21. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-52367898.

 Gomez Camillo (2020), ‘Coronavirus: narco gangs could see big popularity boost from helping residents in Latin America’ The Conversation, June 22. Available at: https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-narco-gangs-could-see-big-popularity-boost-from-helping-residents-in-latin-america-139613. 

 Grace Leah (2020), ‘Deadly Dynamics: Crime and the Coronavirus in Latin America’, Strife blog, 23 June. Available at: https://www.strifeblog.org/2020/06/03/deadly-dynamics-crime-and-the-coronavirus-in-latin-america/. 

 International Crisis Group (2020) ‘Virus-proof Violence: Crime and COVID-19 in Mexico and the Northern Triangle’, Latin America Report N°83, 13 November. Available at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/083-virus-proof-violence.pdf.

 Isacson Adam (2020) ‘Latin America, COVID-19 Risks Permanently Disturbing Civil-Military Relations’, Wola, July 20. Available at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/latin-america-covid-19-civil-military-relations-policing/.

 Moutaoufik Saloua (2020), ‘Criminal governance under Covid-19: an appealing yet flawed alternative to state failure’, Sciences Po Obsveratoire politique de l’Amériquelatine et des Caraibes’. Avaliable at: https://www.sciencespo.fr/opalc/sites/sciencespo.fr.opalc/files/Criminal%20governnance%20.pdf. 

 Nugent Ciara (2020), ‘Why Armed Groups in Latin America Are Enforcing COVID-19 Lockdowns’, Time, July 22. Available at: https://time.com/5870054/coronavirus-latin-america-armed-groups/. 

 OECD (2020)’ Government at a Glance: Latin American and the Caribbean’. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/50c07fc2-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/50c07fc2-en.

Sanchez R, M. (2006). Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 606, 178-195. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097823.

 Soifer, H. D. (2019). Measuring state capacity in contemporary Latin America. Revista de Ciencia Política, 32(3), 585-598.

Buen Vivir: an Andean indigenous challenge to modern development

Source: https://www.lostiempos.com/oh/actualidad/20191202/wiphala-simbolo-ancestral-fraude-historico

By: Nazreen Shivlani

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Latin American politics today is generally centred around how to reach economic development. We hear about inflation, corruption, and economic growth over and over again. From either side of the political spectrum, the dominant voices debate each other over how to increase production to presumably yield a higher standard of living (with dissenting views over the importance of how these benefits are distributed across society). But these disputes conceal a greater, unchallenged assumption about human fulfilment being best realised within the structures of modern society. More practically, political discourse hides questions about society’s ends: what is development and why do we so stubbornly strive towards it? Buen Vivir is an Andean indigenous cosmology which offers unwavering dissent within the mainstream conversation.

Buen Vivir questions social goals from an integrated philosophical point of view and aligns theory with practice. The term is a rough translation of Sumak Kawsay in Quechua, or Suma Qamaña in Aymara, and translates to ‘good living’ in English. Originating from some communities in the Andes’ altiplanos, Buen Vivir’s different manifestations can be found across much of Latin America’s native cultures.

This worldview interprets well-being as the equilibrium between humans and nature. Contrary to an anthropocentric view, which, like the western one, imagines a dualism between society and environment, Buen Vivir believes both are interconnected. In its core lies the idea of living in harmony with nature and with other people in order to live a fulfilling life. The objective of society is thus to foster spiritual growth and a connection with the community and nature; it puts society in the service of people without assuming any previous modern structures like state bureaucracy or markets for consumption. In today’s context, Buen Vivir advocates for decommodifying nature and social relations by disembedding them from the structures of modern society.

Perhaps the most popularized aspect of Buen Vivir is its view of nature. Respect to the earth and harmonious coexistence are based on common sense and the belief that people and nature are part of a greater whole. Buen Vivir clearly challenges today’s post-Darwinian era, where we act as if we were so distinct from other animals and nature, and forget that we created all the modern structures that we now take for granted. The practice values nature independently of its utility to humans, opposing the view that nature is a “factor of production”. For example, we would protect a river not because it has extractable fresh water, but because, like a person, it has a life of its own. By decommodifying nature, we transcend its relegation to a means without denying its importance as one. Simultaneously, defending nature because of its intrinsic worth no longer depends on its defence as a productive life-support system for humans. This directly conflicts with the current system of production, as the latter relies on the exploitation of natural resources and must only necessarily consider sustainability when natural depletion threatens the economic system (be it due to scarcity or public pressure).

If nature is no longer a resource to be tamed and we are instead a part of it, consumption becomes about sufficiency instead of exploitation and accumulation for their own sakes. Thus, Buen Vivir allows for needs to be satisfied sustainably, undermining the ideals the market is based upon, such as the exponential growth of output and consumerism. What’s more, it recognizes material and marketable needs as part of a larger set of needs. Fulfilment and community, for example, don’tneed to be commodified and sold because human relations are prioritised over the market system that now hands them out. This defies the sanctity of markets, encouraging a vida plena (simple and full life) through collective life and conscience. It is easy to see how Buen Vivir might deem us unable to continue with the current scheme of consumption and production.

What about development? Buen Vivir negates the notion of linear evolution in which a country passes from underdeveloped to a superior, modernized state. Instead, through its notion of wellbeing, it proposes that society is under permanent construction and changes the parameters that we aspire to. Granted, living harmoniously with the community and environment requires raising the living standards of many Latin Americans – Buen Vivir does not oppose this. However, it recalibrates our way of thinking because it places raising living standards and other material outcomes strictly in the service of ‘good living’. Thus, it also changes the acceptable means of achieving them: growth cannot come at the cost of environmental destruction nor should it encourage mass economic inequality, as this would harm nature and the community. Buen Vivir thus conflicts not only with capitalist expansion but also with the European welfare state, green capitalism, and other movements which don’t demand the fundamental revaluation of capital.

Most significantly, Buen Vivir cannot be substantially rearranged to fit within the modern system. For example, we cannot dissociate its environmental principles and adapt them to the capitalist society while keeping everything else the same. This is because the philosophy is built so that each principle needs the other – it is holistic. Buen Vivir is also incompatible with the contemporary state because it violates the human rights of indigenous communities. For example, when the state supports the building of infrastructure or grants companies ownership of ancestral land, it denies indigenous people their right to Buen Vivir. The contradiction is more explicit in the lack of representation and self-determination of indigenous groups, and even more so in events of state violence in many contemporary Latin American states. Buen Vivir humanizes the question of indigenous rights, showing it as the basic necessity for the survival of fellow people, and so delivers it from the abstraction of courtrooms. Simultaneously, the clashes show its possible incompatibility with the status quo.

Chilean rappers Portavoz and Subverso put all this much more eloquently in their song ‘Lo que no voy a decir’, which talks about the Mapuche in Chile. The Mapuche’s ancestral wisdom (kimün in Mapudungun) is akin to Buen Vivir (KümeMongen), which the lyricists explain in the following lines:

“El Estado de Chile me reprime, me sigue la pista

Y está a la vista ya que su propia naturaleza es racista

Yo no soy terrorista

Me tienen odio solo porque yo me opongo a vivir de un modo capitalista

Porque no creo que los ríos son nuestros “recursos”

Sino que seres vivos que deben seguir su curso

Porque no saco de la tierra sin pedir

Y siempre trato de retribuirle todo lo que uso

Por eso es que yo asusto al empresariado

Porque mi Dios no es el dinero y no obedezco a su mercado

Me ofenden cuando dejo descansar la tierra

No ven que en este gesto muestro respeto y no flojera (...)

Lo mismo pasa con el trato entre personas

La comunidad se apoya y to’a la zona es una sola voz

Lo que le afecta a uno, afecta a los demás del lof [tipo de comunidad Mapuche]

Por eso los defiendo aunque los pacos digan “mátenlos” (…) 

Y esto es parte de un kimün profundo

Donde ayudar a los demás es siempre lo más natural del mundo”

Full song and video from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Lm00GF5Faw&ab_channel=SubVersoRap 

Translated to English:

The Chilean State represses me, it follows me around

And it can be seen that its very nature is racist

I am not a terrorist

They only hate me because I oppose living in a capitalist way

Because I don’t think that the rivers are our “resources”

But living beings which should continue their course

Because I don’t take from the land without asking

And I always try to give it back everything that I use

That’s why I scare the businesspeople

Because my God isn’t money and I don’t obey its market

They offend me when I let the earth rest

Don’t they see that this gesture shows respect and not laziness? (…)

The same occurs in the relations between people

The community supports itself and the whole region is one single voice

What affects one, affects the others in the lof [type of Mapuche community]

Which is why I defend them even though the cops say “kill them” (…)

And this is part of a deep kimün

Where helping others is always the most natural thing in the world

As a whole, Buen Vivir is much simpler than all this theory. It is a lived practice whose beliefs about fulfilment through a connection with nature and society may seem intuitive if not for path dependency. In this context, the cosmology transcends the trends of Eurocentric thought which take modernity and capitalism as the only possible way. Buen Vivir makes us challenge modern society because of its impersonality; we can recognise that the seemingly impenetrable structures of modern society are self-imposed and then ask ourselves if we too want to maximise what they propose. The philosophy condemns the global injustices of the modern system as absurd because it allows for struggle where there need be none. For those of us who are privileged enough that our paths appear set our and the costs of reconsidering our purpose outside of modern ideals seems high, Buen Vivir also poses a personal challenge. But more importantly, it perpetuates ancient knowledge that the current model deems backwards in the few opportunities it is heard. In this context, we see Andean indigenous people who were previously the objects of development, as agents of Buen Vivir.

Nazreen is a KCL student interested in development, philosophy, and literature, focused on Latin America.

Bibliography

 Ancalao Gavilán, Diego. “EL PUEBLO MAPUCHE Y LA SOCIEDAD DEL BUEN VIVIR.” Mensaje . Padre Hurtado, October 4, 2019. https://www.mensaje.cl/edicion-impresa/mensaje-683/el-pueblo-mapuche-y-la-sociedad-del-buen-vivir/. 

Catrillanca, Marcelo. “El Buen Vivir Mapuche Demanda Desmilitarización, Verdad, Justicia y

Libredeterminación.” Mapuexpress , December 19, 2018. https://www.mapuexpress.org/2018/12/20/el-buen-vivir-mapuche-demanda-desmilitarizacion-verdad-justicia-y-libredeterminacion/. 

De La Cuadra, Fernando. “Buen Vivir: ¿Una Auténtica Alternativa Post-Capitalista?” Polis 14, no. 40 (March 2015): 7–19. https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-65682015000100001.

Gudynas, Eduardo. “Buen Vivir: Germinando Alternativas Al Desarrollo.” América Latina En Movimiento , no. 462 (February 2011): 1–20.

https://flacsoandes.edu.ec/web/imagesFTP/1317332248.RFLACSO_2011_Gudynas.pdf .

Gudynas, Eduardo. “Estado Compensador y Nuevos Extractivismos. Las Ambivalencias Del Progresismo Sudamericano.” Nueva Sociedad , no. 237 (2012), ISSN: 0251-3552. https://nuso.org/articulo/estado-compensador-y-nuevos-extractivismos-las-ambivalencias-del-progresismo-sudamericano/ .

León Irene. Sumak Kawsay / Buen Vivir y Cambios Civilizatorios. 2nd ed. Quito: FEDAEPS, 2010. http://www.dhls.hegoa.ehu.eus/uploads/resources/5501/resource_files/Ecu_Sumak_Kawsay_cambios_civilizatorios.pdf. 

Montalva, Felipe. “El Buen Vivir De La Cultura Mapuche.” Rebelión , June 18, 2015. https://rebelion.org/el-buen-vivir-de-la-cultura-mapuche/ .

Quijano, Aníbal. “‘Bien Vivir’: Entre El ‘Desarrollo’ y La Des/Colonialidad Del Poder.” Debate Ecuador 84 (September2011): 77–87. http://200.41.82.22/bitstream/10469/3529/1/RFLACSO-ED84-05-Quijano.pdf .

Rojas Pedemonte, Nicolás, and David Soto Gómez. “KümeMongen: El Buen Con-Vivir Mapuche Como Alternativa De Desarrollo Humano y Sustentable.” Academia.edu .Dissertation, Ponencia III Congreso social: Ecología humana para un desarrollo sostenible e integral, 2016. https://www.academia.edu/31776593/Ponencia_K%C3%BCme_Mongen_El_Buen_Con_Vivir_mapuche_como_alternativa_de_desarrollo_humano_y_sustentable_. 

Subverso y Portavoz. “Lo que no voy a decir.”

Las Travesuras de la Niña Mala by Mario Vargas Llosa: A Revolutionary Love Affair between Paris and London

Source: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2024634,00.html

By: Carla Suarez

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

The Author

Mario Vargas Llosa, one of Latin America’s greatest authors, was born in Arequipa, Peru on March 28th 1936, and grew up in neighboring Bolivia, in the city of Cochabamba, located in the warm and sunny lower valleys of the Andes. He spent over ten years in Bolivia before his family returned to Peru and relocated to the capital, Lima, and at the age of nineteen, he married his most influential muse, Julia Urquidi Illanes, a native of Cochabamba and who also happened to be ten years his senior. His controversial union with ‘la tía Julia’ caused some tensions within his family, and once he earned a scholarship to study in Paris in 1956, the couple moved to Europe. 

In Paris, Vargas Llosa worked as a scriptwriter for the French Radio and Television Network alongside his writing career. While in Paris, he published his first novel, La ciudad y los perros (1962), followed by La casa verde (1966), and Conversación en La Catedral (1969). Vargas Llosa moved to London in the late 1960’s, teaching at King’s College London as a lecturer of Spanish American Literature, an experience that inspired him to write the novel Las travesuras de la niña mala (2006). 

After spending a couple of years in Swinging London, he returned to Paris, working as a translator at UNESCO alongside fellow Latin Boom author, the Argentinian novelist Julio Cortazar. He published one of his most famous novels, La tía Julia y el escribidor (1977), a novel based on his controversial romance with Julia Urquidi. In the late 1980’s, Vargas Llosa, who was an admirer of the Cuban Revolution and Marxism in his youth, entered the political arena in Peru, advocating for liberalism. He ran for president in Peru’s 1990 general election but ultimately lost the presidential race. 

With a longstanding and prosperous career, Vargas Llosa has received numerous distinctions in Hispanic literature, such as the Premio Príncipe de Asturias and the Premio Miguel de Cervantes, as well as international recognitions such as the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2010. Through his work, Vargas Llosa has truly shaped the quintessential ‘realismo mágico’ Latin America is known for, and established himself as one of the greatest writers of the Latin American Boom. 

The Novel

Las travesuras de la niña mala, published in 2006, follows Ricardo, a young man from the upper middle class of Lima, whose lifelong dream has always been to live in Paris, in his pursuit of love across Europe and Latin America.  In his childhood, he meets a girl at a country club named Lily, nicknamed ‘la chilenita’ due to her Chilean accent, for whom he feels a sudden ‘coup de foudre’, and falls deeply in love. 

Years later, in the early 1960s, Ricardo is in his early twenties and studying at La Sorbonne in Paris when he runs into ‘la chilenita’ of his childhood, now a beautiful woman. Lily and Ricardo meet again while attending a clandestine guerrilla meeting in the famous Quartier Latin. Latin American students in Paris at the time were fervent admirers of the Cuban Revolution, and used to gather in Parisian flats decorated with Che Guevara posters to discuss and share ideas on how they could import ‘la Revolución’ to their own countries. Ricardo and his friend Paul were militants of a guerrilla group that had connections in Cuba and sent scholarship recipients to study there. Lily, now known as ‘la Camarada Arlette’ ardently defends the revolutionary ideals Ricardo stands for, making him fall even more deeply in love with her. 

For a fleeting moment, their short-lived romance turns Ricardo’s lifelong dream into reality, but this comes to an end when ‘la camarada Arlette’ is sent off to Cuba, leaving Ricardo on the edge of a nervous breakdown. A jilted Ricardo wanders around Paris, reminiscing the days when he lived with the mysterious woman, as he walks through the streets, parks and restaurants he visited with her. Later on, as the spark of the revolution started to extinguish with the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia, Ricardo has distanced himself from his revolutionary ideals and starts working at UNESCO as a translator. As he starts to frequent the diplomatic circles of Paris, he discovers that ‘la camarada Arlette’ is back, under a new identity: Madame Arnoux. They become lovers and they live a passionate affair that ends abruptly when, once again, she leaves him and disappears.

In search of a fresh start, Ricardo moves to London temporarily. He lives the effervescence of ‘Swinging London’ as an outsider to the hedonist hippie movement that was taking over the youth culture, with the rise of rock’n’roll, orchestrated by The Beatles and The Rolling Stones, and the proliferation of drug consumption. While in London, he runs into his former lover, a socialite who is now known as Mrs. Richardson. Ricardo’s feelings for her keep haunting him and he decides to give her an ultimatum to return to Paris. Mrs. Richardson runs off to the French capital with her ‘niño bueno’. Charmed under her spell, Ricardo is ecstatically in love with her. She finally lets her wall down and reveals her true self to him, only to disappear from his life again. 

This endless tango between the two characters is what makes this novel so fascinating and exciting to read. The runaway ‘niña mala’ is the source of Ricardo’s most passionate love, as well as the cause of his painful agony. Vargas Llosa brilliantly narrates the story from Ricardo’s point of view, making the reader sympathetic to his heartbreak. Furthermore, Vargas Llosa accomplishes a vivid portrait of Paris, London, Tokyo and Madrid across time based on his own personal experience. He vividly portrays the changing places and societies witnessed by a young South American man living his very own personal revolution away from his homeland. Las travesuras de la niña mala is an exquisite and captivating read of Latin American literature.

Carla is a Final-Year Student at King’s College London with a great interest in political economy, international relations and philosophy. Having spent most of her life moving between her homeland Bolivia, and her second homes, Chile, Colombia, Belgium and the United Kingdom, she developed a strong interest in Latin American cultural identity, political affairs and environmental issues and the portrayal of these topics in film and global media.

US 2020 Election: What Do the Results Mean for Mexico?

Source: https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/378237-protesters-shred-mexican-flag-during-trump-visit-to-border

By: Octavio Augusto Gutiérrez Salcedo

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Mexico and the US have always had a close relationship for almost everything. According to the State Department of the US, Mexico is the second largest trading partner and second-largest export market. When we talk about immigration there are approximately more than 36 million Hispanics from Mexican origin who live in the US. In another sector it has been calculated that more than 20 million Americans visit Mexico every year. When we analyse these facts, it can be said that the outcome of every US election is very important in every sector for Mexico and each outcome can change the landscape of the diplomatic relationship between both countries – this year’s election is not different. 

The US election took place on the 3rd of November, between the Republican candidate and current president of the USA, Donald Trump, and the Democratic party candidate andformer vice-president of the USA, Joe Biden. After a week of re-counts and appeals from Donald Trump, the election was called for Joe Biden by the Associated Press. This is a radical turn in the relations between the US and Mexico as a new style of government will come into office. The new administration brings different ideas on foreign policy and the Mexican Government, under Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador,will have to adjust to the new circumstances and the different agendas that the Biden administration will follow in matters of the economy and also immigration. 

The economic sector will face a complete change that will hopefully have a positive outcome for Mexico. Over the past 4 years there has been a lot of uncertainty on this matter something that hopefully will change in the upcoming years. Mexico is currently experiencing one of the biggest economic slumps in the history of the country. Due to this, the economic imbalance between the two countries (80 percent of Mexico’s exports go the US) was used by Donald Trump to put some pressure on Mexico over migration matters. Mexico also had to have Trump’s twitter notifications on since any day he could announce a new set of tariffs for Mexico. An expectation on Biden’s presidency around the world is the return to a more diplomatic and normal relationship between the US and the whole world. Mexico hopes that Biden will have a more reasonable and measured approach between both countries by stopping the public threats from Trump and changing it for a more normal negotiation as it was back in the last presidency.

A change in the Oval Office will also have an important outcome with other Latin American countries. It has been observed that Latin American countries tend to follow the United States actions and decisions. For instance, this was the case when Donald Trump said that Covid-19 was ‘not a big deal’ and the president of Brazil consequently agreed.Another example is when Trump pulled out of the Paris Agreement and Brazil said that they were analysing whether to follow him. In this light, a change in the Oval Office will be an important shift in the policy and approaches that Latin Americans countries will follow in the economic sector.

When we talk about the Immigration sector, Joe Biden is planning to do a complete shift as he plans to undue everything that Donal Trump did in his presidency –something that Mexico should be encouraged for. Under Donald Trump this sector has become one of the most talked, debated and criticised in the media and by academics. Donald Trump’s first campaign speech targeted Mexican migrants as he said that only “bad people and rapists” are being sent to the US. In addition, he planned for Mexico to pay for a wall in the border – something that was not delivered– as well as separating children from their parents and putting them in cages before being deported. The new administration of Biden will seek to heal the attacks of migrants in the US as it is explained in Biden’s 100 days plan. In his plan, Biden explains that he seeks to reinstate the DACA programme to protect undocumented children (dreamers) who attend school in the US so that they can continue their studies and receive funding. The DACA programme was one of the most successful initiatives in the Obama-Biden administration, but it was cancelled when Trump took office in 2016. Biden is also planning to stop the policies that allow migration officers to separate children from their parents. He wants to change this to a more humanitarian approach of keeping control of the border in accordance with Human Rights. Mexico and the rest of Latin American countries should feel relieved since this was an issue over the last 4 years that exacerbated the tension between Mexico and the US. The new policies and implementations under the upcoming government are promising and although deportations will not stop, this path is the one that must be followed to continue the strong relationship between both countries. 

The US elections is one of the most important events of the year. The outcome of the election will change the landscape of diplomatic relationships between the United States and the rest of the world including Mexico. The return of the “normal politician” to the White House will be something that Mexico will have to adapt and align with so that both countries can have a prosper future in the uncertain times we are living. It will be interesting to see the first year of Biden’s term and the different approaches he will take in the matters of foreign policy. Even more will be how this will sit with President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and his plan to continue the “4ta Transformación” in Mexico. The changes in immigration and in the economic sector will hopefully make the countries resolve their differences so that they cantackle whatever they face in the next years. The pandemic has created a new world in which problems never seen before will urge the United States and Mexico to act in the most competent and efficient way. Both countries will have to work towards a better and closer relationship between them to ensure a better life for its people.

Sources:

 https://amp.elfinanciero.com.mx/elecciones-eu-2020/que-puede-esperar-mexico-si-gana-biden

https://mexicobusiness.news/trade-and-investment/news/biden-vs-trump-what-does-it-mean-mexico

https://joebiden.com/immigration/#

https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/10/28/trump-or-biden-mexicos-struggling-economy-eyes-us-election

https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/u-s-hispanics-facts-on-mexican-origin-latinos/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/214780/number-of-us-tourists-visting-mexico/

 Octavio is a 2nd year English Law and Spanish Law student at King’s College London. He enjoys debating and writing about sports and politics.