The Disastrous Impact of Covid-19 on Brazilian Indigenous Populations: an Interview with Almir Narayamoga Suruí

Source: https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/10/ovid-19-how-brazil-is-failing-its-indigenous-people

By: Alice Iscar

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

For over a year now, Covid-19 has been an omnipresent subject in our everyday lives. Views on the pandemic’s political, economic, social and societal impact on communities around the world have been continuously and widely shared. However, little has been said in mainstream media about Covid-19’s impact on indigenous populations in Latin America, including Brazil. 

The reality of the situation is not easy to confront. On the 4th of April 2020, the first case of coronavirus in an indigenous community was detected in Brazil. The case was a 15-year-old teenager of Yanomami ethnicity, an indigenous group which lives in the Amazon rainforest, on the border between Venezuela and Brazil. A few days later, on the 8th of April 2020, a 20-year-old Indigenous woman of Kokama ethnicity had contact with a doctor, who, it was later found out, had Covid-19. The woman was herself infected and when she went back to her village, she infected the rest of her community. Since the beginning of 2020, more than 30,000 indigenous people have been infected in Brazil by the virus and almost one thousand have died from it.

In addition to the direct threat the virus poses to these populations, who are losing so many of their members, the biggest worry focuses on the health of ‘the elders’. Indeed, older people are more likely to develop a severe form of the virus and consequently die from it. But the health of older indigenous people and the prevention of their premature death are essential to the preservation of the tribe’s culture and knowledge. As highlighted in an article in The Guardian entitled ‘ “We are facing extermination”: Brazil losing a generation of indigenous leaders to Covid-19’, the teachings of an indigenous’ tribe’s culture and history is passed orally from the elders to the younger members of the tribe. Therefore, the premature death of the older members, due to the virus, represents a great threat to the conservation of their culture and historical and medical knowledge. 

Indigenous tribes in Brazil are particularly vulnerable to the virus as they are removed from public health services and therefore unable to seek adequate treatment early in the development of the disease. According to an article on the Médecins Sans Frontières website, a high proportion of the Brazilian indigenous population suffers from untreated chronic diseases such as diabetes and hypertension, which increase their risk of developing a severe fatal form of the virus.  In addition to lacking immunological defences because they live isolated from other communities, the indigenous tribes’ way of life is incompatible with the social isolation and sanitary measures imposed on populations in most other countries. They often live close together, in small houses, share water and food and usually lack sanitary equipment in order to limit the spread of the disease. If one member of the tribe is infected, it is very likely the disease will quickly spread to the rest of the group.

To make matters even worse, the Brazilian government’s policies regarding the pandemic and the protection of the Amazon and its indigenous populations is alarmingly defective. In his failure to take the pandemic seriously, Jair Bolsonaro, the current president of Brazil, has put in danger his own population and his country’s indigenous people. An Euronews article highlights how Bolsonaro went as far as to place a veto on laws that would have made it compulsory for the government to assist the Brazilian indigenous populations through the provision of clean water access, reserved care beds in hospitals and basic material necessities. Additionally, Bolsonaro openly supports the clearance of vast areas of the critically important Amazon rainforest for the development of agricultural, forestry, mining or industrial activities. According to an article in the New York Times, deforestation in the Amazon hit a 12-year high in 2020 under Bolsonaro and increased by a further 9,5% compared to 2019. Deforestation contributes to the spread of Covid-19 to indigenous people. Indeed, it increases social interaction among indigenous tribes and outsiders, such as illegal miners; and it pressures communities to move to other regions where the virus may be more present. 

In the light of this article, I had the chance to interview Almir Narayamoga Suruí by phone. Almir is the chief of the Paiter Suruí tribe, an indigenous tribe living in the Mato Grosso-Rondônia region of Brazil. In addition to being a tribal chief, Almir is a political activist, dedicated to the protection of his and other indigenous peoples and the Amazon rainforest. He kindly answered a few of my questions on the impact of Covid-19 on indigenous populations in Brazil. Below is the transcript of this interview.

Alice: Hello Almir, thank you for accepting to do this interview with me and for taking the time to answer my questions, I imagine you must be really busy.

Almir: You are welcome; it is a pleasure to do this interview with you. 

Alice: I am writing an article for the journal El Cortao of the Latin American Society of my university King’s College London. My article is on how the Covid-19 pandemic is affecting indigenous populations in Brazil. As the chief of the Paiter Suruí tribe, I have a few questions to ask you on that subject. My first question is: How is the pandemic affecting your tribe? What is happening concretely?

Almir: Our community is rather isolated from the rest of the country, but on some occasions we need contact with the modern world because of material or medical needs. In the context of that contact, a few members of our tribe have been infected by the coronavirus and passed the disease to other members of the Paiter Suruí people. Today, there are 204 members of the tribe who have had coronavirus. This represents 30% to 40% of the entire tribe, it is very worrying. Brazil’s governing system is not adequately prepared to help its indigenous population when facing this type of threat. In the last few months, four Suruís have died from Covid-19. It is an immense challenge for our community and our organisations. Unfortunately, we need those two cultures, the modern Brazilian culture and ours. We need the services provided by the city and by the forest. We need to be in two different places, and this increases the risks of contamination. 

Alice: And how do you think this relates to the deforestation of the Amazon and the current policies of the Brazilian government?

Almir: I believe the government’s policies weaken the forest and our community. The deforestation and the ‘mega-industrialization’ policy, which the president is driving forward, threaten the health of our community.  

Alice: In what ways is the community trying to overcome the challenge posed by the pandemic?

Almir: To face the pandemic, the governance of the Paiter Suruí tribe focused on the social isolation of our people. The Metareilá Paiter Suruí Indigenous People Society, of which I am a member, has done a lot to support social isolation, by looking for economic alternatives, and by seeking support from foundations, businesses and individuals to enable the social isolation of our people. The strategy is to maintain this social isolation and the fight moves forward. 

Alice: How can we help, from our side?

Almir: There are various ways to support us. There is the possibility to donate to the campaign that the Paiter Suruí tribe has created in order to help the community to face the pandemic through financial or medical equipment donations. There is also the possibility to pressure the national administration to have more respect for the Amazon forest. We have some contact with national and international universities – perhaps your university can join this group to articulate support for our community together with our society and our university. We have a project in our university Paiter a Soeitxawe, which is the Paiter Suruí tribe’s university, which aims to created partnerships with other Brazilian or international universities. 

Alice: Do you have one last message you would like to share before we finish this interview?

Almir: I believe us humans can overcome any challenge, like pandemics or others. We need to look for solutions together. Because those who live in the Amazon need Europe, but those living in Europe also need the Amazon. We need to share our experiences of facing the world’s challenges. This is my message.

Alice: Thank you, Almir. Do I have your authorization to use this interview for my article?

Almir: Yes, you do.

Alice: Thank you for your time.

The question of the protection of indigenous people in Brazil and its direct link to the protection of the Amazonian rainforest underlines the interconnections between human health across communities and the importance of the preservation of the environment. As highlighted by the article and by Almir in the interview, the protection of the forest and its human inhabitants go hand in hand. The pandemic sheds light on this interconnectedness and on the need for a holistic approach in regard to the environment and human health.

Alice is a third-year History and International Relations student at King’s College London seeking to raise awareness about the current politico-environmental situation in Brazil. She is a regular contributor of El Cortao’.

Sources:

Charlier, Philippe, Varison Leandro. “Is COVID-19 being used as a weapon against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil?” The Lancet 396, no. 10257 (Autumn 2020): 1069-1070. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32068-7.

Fox, Michael. “Brazil’s Indigenous peoples fight COVID-19 in their territories amid government neglect.” The World, September 4, 2020. https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-09-04/brazil-s-indigenous-peoples-fight-covid-19-their-territories-amid-government.

Graham, Laura R., Krenak Edson, Rabben, Linda. “Brazil’s COVID-19 Response: A Death Knell for Indigenous Peoples.” Cultural Survival, November 12, 2020. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/brazils-covid-19-response-death-knell-indigenous-peoples.

 “Indigenous youth open up about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their communities.” Unicef.org. Accessed December 20, 2020. https://www.unicef.org/brazil/indigenous-youth-open-about-impact-covid-19-pandemic-their-communities.

Krenak Naknanuk, Edson. “How COVID-19 is Impacting Indigenous Peoples in Brazil.” Cultural Survival, May 1, 2020. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/how-covid-19-impacting-indigenous-peoples-brazil.

Phillips, Dom. “ ‘We are facing extermination’: Brazil’ losing a generation of indigenous leaders to Covid-19.” The Guardian, June 21, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jun/21/brazil-losing-generation-indigenous-leaders-covid-19.

Laudares, Humberto. “Deforestation in Brazil is spreading COVID-19 to the Indigenous peoples.” VoxEU, November 3rd, 2020. https://voxeu.org/article/deforestation-spreading-covid-19-brazils-indigenous-peoples. Iscar, Alice. Interview with Almir Narayamoga Surui. Translated from Portuguese. December 23, 2020.

Liubchenkova, Natalia. “COVID-19: how Brazil is failing its indigenous people.” Euronews, July 15, 2020. https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/10/ovid-19-how-brazil-is-failing-its-indigenous-people.

Monclou, Carolina Rodríguez. “How Does COVID-19 Affect Indigenous Communities in Brazil?” Latam, October 2nd, 2020. https://latinamericanpost.com/34547-how-does-covid-19-affect-indigenous-communities-in-brazil.

“MSF works to prevent spread of COVID-19 among indigenous people in Mato Grosso do Sul.” Médecins Sans Frontières, September 17, 2020. https://www.msf.org/preventing-coronavirus-covid-19-among-indigenous-people-brazil.

Reuters. “Brazil Amazon Deforestation Hits 12-Year High under Bolsonaro.” The New York Times, November 30, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/world/americas/brazil-amazon-rainforest-deforestation.html#:~:text=Bolsonaro%20has%20weakened%20the%20environmental,grabbers%20to%20clear%20the%20forest.

Savarese, Mauricio. “Brazil’s Bolsonaro rejects COVID-19 shot, calls masks taboo.” AP, November 27, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/pandemics-brazil-health-coronavirus-pandemic-latin-america-0295d39d3032aa14c6675b8b4080e8cc.

“Self-determination and Indigenous health.” The Lancet 396, no. 10248 (Summer 2020): 361. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31682-2.

Wallace, Scott. “Disaster looms for Indigenous Amazon tribes as COVID-19 cases multiply.” National Geographic, June 12, 2020. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/06/disaster-looms-indigenous-amazon-tribes-covid-19-cases-multiply/.

Vantini, Camila, Palamim, Capasso, Ortega Manoela Marques, Lima Marson, Fernando Augusto. “Covid 19 in the Indigenous Population of Brazil.” Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities 7, (Autumn 2020): 1053-1058. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40615-020-00885-6.

Teen Pregnancy: A Worrying Trend in Latin America

Source: https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-08-17/nicaraguas-teen-pregnancy-rate-soars

By: Katherina Lister

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

There is an ongoing pandemic taking place in Latin America. This is not the pandemic that may currently pop to the forefront of one’s mind, but rather one that has persisted for decades: teen pregnancy, a common occurrence throughout the region. It can be the norm to see teenagers with one, if not several, children. While a young mother with children may not be a cause for concern in isolation, the societal impact of heightened teen pregnancies raises several issues.

Today, many Latinx families are the result of teen pregnancies. Even if it isn’t the case for a family’s latest generation, they can often look back only one or two generations to find a teen pregnancy. Of course, times have changed, and the prevalence is not as high as it once was. A few generations ago, not only were teen pregnancies more common, but it was very much a part of the societal structure of Latin America. This societal structure has transformed as a result of globalization, yet there are still many young mothers bearing children. With Latin America having been dealt a heavy dose of colonialism and the many societal injustices that come with it, the impact that teen pregnancies have on social mobility has been laid bare.

Teen pregnancies are strongly linked to poverty, social exclusion, gender-based violence, and early marriages. These associations facilitate a vicious cycle, in which teenage girls already suffering from societal injustices have these issues compounded if they become pregnant. This can then lead to ramifications throughout a girl’s life as she is at an increased risk of dropping out of school, resulting in decreased employment and financial security. Moreover, children born from a teen pregnancy are at an increased risk of having one themselves. The problem is therefore intergenerational. 

By the Numbers

It is important to understand and quantify teen pregnancy. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the total fertility rate – the number of children per woman – has declined. However, adolescent fertility– in women aged 15 to 19 – colloquially “teen pregnancy”, is declining at a much slower rate. The adolescent fertility rate in LAC is estimated to be the second highest in the world with 60.7 births per 1,000 women, compared to the global average of 44 per 1,000. In addition, there has been a rising trend of pregnancies in females aged under 15 in LAC, the only region in the world where this increase is taking place.

The probability of having an adolescent pregnancy in the region is up to four times higher in girls who are illiterate, only have an elementary education, or are from rural areas. This rate is even higher in the indigenous population.

This trend has been an area of much investigation by the World Health Organisation, Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO), among many others. Nonetheless, progress has been slow and unsteady throughout the decades.

There are identifiable factors that have contributed to this slow progress, namely: the healthcare system in Latin America, government policies regarding pregnancy, and access to contraception. These three areas not only contribute to the high rate of teen pregnancies but can also be used as vehicles for change in decreasing this trend.

Healthcare & Policy 

Healthcare in Latin America varies by country of course. Despite these differences, there are systemic similarities in access to healthcare regardless of the specific country. Monetarily, rising healthcare costs due to technological advances, chronic diseases, and an ageing population have led to problems raising public funds for health coverage. In addition, investment in healthcare is heavily politicised, therefore factors such as economic stability and political ideals provide an uncertain and volatile funding landscape. 

According to a study conducted by the London School of Economics, total health expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product has increased in Latin American countries in the past 15 years. However, there is an inefficient delivery of care and a delayed uptake of healthcare reform. To exacerbate this, the provision of resources to rural areas, where the majority of teen pregnancies occur, also presents inequalities in access to medicine.

A policy affecting teen pregnancy rates that has garnered much attention in Latin America is abortion. Abortion is currently illegal in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. In countries where abortion is legal, specific requirements must be met in order to proceed. This can include a lengthy ordeal of doctor referrals and legal processes, further alienating at risk adolescent pregnant women. Thus, if a teenager becomes pregnant and wants to seek an abortion, she typically pursues illegal avenues to do so. The World Health Organisation estimates that over 4 million illegal abortions take place every year in Latin America and the Caribbean. Often these methods are unsafe and have contributed to the region’s high maternal mortality rate.

Maternal mortality is also increased by the many cases of sexual violence in Latin America. Instances of rape, sexually transmitted infections such as HIV, and domestic violence all contribute to the high number of maternal deaths. More recently, mortality has also been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, where government responses have led to the suspension of many maternal services.

Contraception 

According to PAHO, providing adequate contraceptive access to teens could avoid 2.1 million unplanned births, 3.2 million abortions, and 5,600 maternal deaths each year.Contraception can act as a source of empowerment for young girls to exert autonomy over their bodies and sexual decisions. Unfortunately, there are many barriers in accessing contraception in Latin America. Rural areas, social stigma, and a lack of sexual education are all factors preventing the widespread use of contraception.

A PAHO official, Sonja Caffe, stated that “reducing poverty and increasing access to education and development opportunities would undoubtedly be an important step on the path to reduce unplanned pregnancies in teenagers, but it wouldn’t be enough. It’s also necessary to give teenagers access to effective, high-quality information, and sexual and reproductive health services.” This highlights the importance of a multifactorial approach to preventing teen pregnancies of which sexual education, combined with contraceptive use, is critical.

Looking at the issue on a more individual level, teenage girls often do not want to become pregnant. Many are aware of the availability of contraceptives and have even been taught sexual education in school. Despite this, girls may still be reluctant to use contraception due to the associated social stigma and gossip. While some Latin American countries have set up sexual health clinics to access contraception, in smaller villages where girls can be seen in the waiting room of the clinics, gossip can carry on to families that their daughters are sexually active.

Looking Ahead

Moving forward, to decrease teen pregnancies in Latin America, it is crucial to improve access to healthcare. This would encompass increased expenditure to allow for a more universal coverage and for better access to healthcare in rural and poor income areas where teenage pregnancies are highest. In addition, government policies regarding sexual health, such as abortion laws and the impact of COVID-19 on maternal services, must be addressed to reduce maternal mortalities.

Provision of contraception and reducing the social stigma of its use are also vitally important. Additionally, widespread sexual education is necessary to reduce teen pregnancies. If these improvements are made, there will be fewer adolescent girls dropping out of school, lessening the gender gap in education and increasing social mobility. This would provide teenage girls with a platform to attain higher positions in employment and public life. While teen pregnancy is still rampant throughout Latin America, there have been several recent protests against sexual violence, abortion, and maternal mortality serving to galvanise support and recognition of the issue.

Katherina is a fourth-year Medical student at King’s College London. Half-Colombian, Half-American, she is passionate about access to medicine in Latin America and the Latinx community of the United States.

Bibliography

 Castro, A., 2020. Maternal and child mortality worsens in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

The Lancet, [online] 396(10262). Available at: <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)32142-5/fulltext> [Accessed 10 December 2020].

Pan American Health Organization. 2014. Violence against women in Latin America and the 

Caribbean. [online] paho.org. Available at: <https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2014/Violence1.24-WEB-25-febrero-2014.pdf> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Pan American Health Organization. 2017. Accelerating progress toward the 

reduction of adolescent pregnancy in Latin America and the Caribbean. [online] iris.paho.org. Available at: <https://iris.paho.org/bitstream/handle/10665.2/34493/9789275119761-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Kanavos, P., Parkin, G., Kamphuis, B. and Gill, J., 2019. Latin America Healthcare System 

Overview: A comparative analysis of fiscal space in healthcare. [online] lse.ac.uk. Available at: < https://www.lse.ac.uk/business-and-consultancy/consulting/assets/documents/latin-america-healthcare-system-overview-report-english.pdf> [Accessed 9 December 2020].

Salomón, J. and Alford, C., 2020. Latin American Activists Fight For Access To Safe 

Abortion In COVID-19 World. [online] Amnesty.org. Available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/activists-latin-america-access-safe-abortion-covid19/> [Accessed 10 December 2020].

Statista. 2020. Adolescent Birth Rate in Latin America By Country. [online] statista.com.

Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/945546/latin-america-number-births-adolescent-women-country/> [Accessed 6 December 2020].

The World Bank. 2020. Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births Per 1,000 Women Ages 15-19). 

[online] data.worldbank.org. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT> [Accessed 6 December 2020].

Looting of Indigenous Lands: The Impact on the Sawré Muybu

Source: https://assets.survivalinternational.org/pictures/14551/df-img-1246_article_column@2x.jpg

By: Victoria Bujok

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

The Munduruku people are facing yet another challenge after years of resistance and struggle for their land in the state of Pará in northern Brazil. The area of Tapajos, which is home to most of the Munduruku population, is one of the most heavily invaded territories, with illegal gold miners currently occupying the area. The mining conflict brings “violence, prostitution, destruction, pollution, deforestation, death threats and conflict,” as stated in a letter of condemnation sent to the public prosecutor’s office, in addition to causing an uncontrolled malaria outbreak. Nevertheless, the prospects of taking care of the illegal actions and eradicating mining in the region all together is extremely unlikely under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. 

The root of the issue is the demarcation of the land, something which has never been done, and of which there is no intention to do in the near future. As a result of illegal action and lack of border clarity, the Sawré Muybu’s 178,000 hectares have been prevented from being recognised as indigenous land, and lack the normal legal protections associated with indigenous reserves. Mining has not been the only threat to the land, livelihoods, health and traditions; back in 2016 the Munduruku people were facing the prospect of 43 hydraulic plants being built on their territory. Luckily for the indigenous population, after years of protests, government meetings and drawing international attention, they were able to defeat the mega projects, which would have had a detrimental effect on the reserve and on its sacred sites. However, the efforts to build the hydroelectric plants in the Tapajos river basin still exist.

When looking further into the cause of these issues, we are drawn to Brazil's far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro. Not only are the hydraulic plants on the government’s agenda, but also another series of projects such as agribusiness expansion and railroads, all of which are all linked to the interests of the miners. In a democracy, just like in other countries with indigenous lands, minorities should be included in the decision making; however, the government is simply making it look like the indigenous people are supporting the projects, and implying that they are going to hugely benefit from those. For example, on August 5, environment minister, Ricardo Salles, refused to confirm his position on mining in indigenous territories, despite having met with half a dozen indigenous residents who happened to be in favour of these projects. The result of this publicity stunt is that the views of these specific indigenous people could be interpreted as representing the general views of all 140,000 Munduruku people. This, however, is not the representation of the majority of the Sawré Muybu’s population, and their views have been wrongly portrayed in order to push the government’s agenda, a move which has been heavily criticised by the Munduruku leaders. Another example of these falsely represented ideas comes from the vice president, Hamilton Mourão, who seeks to legalise gold mining on protected land. He claims that licensing gold extraction will save the rainforest by enabling the government to enforce eco-friendly regulations. This is a fear that Luísa Molina, an anthropologist working in the area, had about the government intention, and which has finally been confirmed. 

But, could legalising mining in those territories be the answer? The belief behind Mourão’s intention to save the rainforest is that whenever there is gold, men will extract it. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said, “there is a lot of land that is rich in gold, and if companies had the permission to extract it, they would have to comply with environmental laws.” He also mentioned the benefit of taxing gold mining, saying that “today, if there is gold, they extract it, destroy the environment and don’t pay taxes—everybody loses.” This is, however, an unlikely stance from a man who says that his intentions are to save the rainforest, but has failed to focus his efforts instead on stamping out illegal gold mining which, alongside other illegal industries, has had a hugely negative environmental impact. In addition, agencies such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), whose work has been crucial in protecting the Amazon from damaging illegal activities, have seen their budgets cut since Jair Bolsonaro assumed the presidency in January 2019.

The Munduruku people need the recognition of their land in order to protect it from future projects like this one. The government itself needs to reroute its principles regarding the environment and to move to a cleaner energy than mining. It is vital that the Brazilian government acts promptly to protect not only the lives of the indigenous people of Brazil, but also their traditions who have been under threat even before the pandemic.

Victoria is a fourth-year SPLAS student at King’s College London with a passion for making indigeneous voices heard. 

COVID-19: Who is Taking Advantage of the Crisis? The Rising Clout of Criminal Groups in Latin America

Source: https://ciudadanosenred.com.mx/2020/04/18/el-crimen-organizado-durante-la-pandemia/

By: Thais Ricard

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Fragmentation and failure 

The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing inequalities and worsened poverty across the world. This is especially striking in Latin America which was already facing a decade of ‘economic weakness and macroeconomic vulnerability’ according to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2020, poverty may increase by at least 4.4%, bringing the total number of people living in poverty to 214.7 million which represents 34.7% of the region’s population. This dire economic situation has led to a weakening of social cohesion and expressions of social discontent that have been characterized by historic waves of popular demonstrations, with many having taken place months before Covid-19 arrived. 

Protesters criticized the state’s corruption and its incapacity to offer public services such as affordable education and health care. Moreover, they decried the pervading climate of violence and insecurity in deprived areas caused by the presence of criminal groups like drug cartels in Mexico, guerrilla movements in Colombia or maras in El Salvador. Faced with this institutional deficiency, Latin American citizens’ trust in government has declined in the past years, reaching an average trust level of 33.9% in 2018.

Covid-19’s crisis could have bolstered governmental legitimacy through the enforcement of efficient sanitary measures aimed at protecting citizens’ lives. Those measures that comprised border closures and the militarization of public security could have expanded states’ authority as they would have particularly hit the illicit economies of criminal groups, making them more vulnerable than ever. To that extent, Covid-19 would have provided an unexpected opportunity for Latin American states to eventually end cycles of violent delinquency.

Adaptation and Altruism 

However, far from being toppled, criminal groups have progressively adapted their activities to the challenges imposed by the pandemic. Globally deprived of extortion and drug trafficking, which had been their main sources of income, they undertook various strategies to remain economically viable. Firstly, they reduced expenses and relied more on savings. The Central American gangs of MS-13 or Calle 18 have cut financial support to lawyers of jailed gang members while the Mexican cartels have decided to sack some of their members. They have also diversified into retail sales of marijuana and synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine and fentanyl, reaping the benefits of price inflations. Finally, the pandemic has led to the creation of new, lucrative, illicit businesses such as medicine smuggling, cybercrime, or kidnapping.

Apart from being economically resilient, criminal groups have surprisingly demonstrated their interest in the public good, and their effectiveness as legitimate political agents, by enforcing quarantine measures. In Brazil, in the Ciudad de Deus favela of Rio de Janeiro, the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) gang imposed a curfew, threatening residents with ‘corrective’ actions if they left their houses outside of designated hours. In the Santa Marta’s favela, traffickers handed out soap and placed signs at the entrance of the favela to remind residents to wash their hands – despite a lack of running water in this area. In the Colombian Department of Cauca, the FARC dissident groups distributed pamphlets threatening fines and military-grade consequences to those who defied the government’s restrictions. In Venezuela, the colectivos, which are pro-government armed gangs, announced lockdown policies even before government agents. 

Furthermore, not only did informal armed organizations attempt to protect citizens’ health by implementing restrictive sanitary measures, but they also provided welfare services and food supplies. In Mexico, the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Golfos Cartel distributed food and medicine parcels labelled with their leaders’ faces and groups’ insignia. These deliveries must be understood as constituting part of a propaganda campaign aimed at improving their public image as they voluntarily shared pictures of their humanitarian actions on social media. They indeed try to portray themselves as genuine saviours of the people, helping the needy while the state is inefficient or absent.

Latin America under criminal governance? 

Undeniably, criminal groups’ actions have been motivated by a desire to secure and extend their power and influence in the long term. They were aware that their members are part of the territories they control and that they therefore had the duty to protect their health to further their criminal activities. Furthermore, they understood that they could later count on those they helped during this crisis for income and recruits. Those measures have thus allowed gangs to entrench themselves more deeply in the communities and gain popular support. Citizens have begun to perceive them as legitimate governing bodies that outperform the state, especially in times of crisis. According to Juan Pappier, an Americas Researcher at Human Rights Watch, this ‘creates the impression that they’re not just there for the drug trafficking or illegal mining or the crimes and they care about the public interest. It also suggests that they are the ones in charge, and they are the ones whose rules you’ve got to follow.’ Even public officials such as former Brazilian Ministry of Health, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, attested the extent of state failure by formally acknowledging the regal authority of criminal groups in neglected areas. This contributes to the blurring of social boundaries between legality and illegality as the criminal may be deemed legitimate. 

Informal armed groups have therefore been empowered lately. As unemployment will drastically worsen due to a pandemic-induced economic downturn, citizens – especially the youth in poor neighbourhoods – will be more likely to join those criminal groups that they perceive to be more reliable than governments. However, one should be careful when drawing generalised conclusions. In fact, the pandemic has also severely impacted the informal economy, resulting in the increasingly violent competition between criminal organizations for local markets. Thus, the small groups that had not been able to diversify their income streams, vanished.

A context-specific response to informal violence 

It is not too late for Latin American governments to establish authority over areas that they have historically neglected. They must develop region-specific approaches that diagnose the local structural sources and patterns of violence in order to devise tailored policies that will end impunity, deter recruitment by informal groups, deepen official material and technical support to poor communities and create professional alternatives to crime. To elaborate these focused and strategic plans, they should not overlook the importance of intelligence and of data. Plans financed by emergency funds from multilateral lenders will break with the broad failed methods of the past. Undeniably, authorities must show high transparency when implementing these measures to boost people’s trust.

 In addition to reducing criminal groups’ influence, these measures would, overall, contribute to the strengthening of democratic systems as Latin American people would not feel inclined to support extremist, unorthodox political agents as they often do when official incumbents misrule.

 Thais is a third year History and International Relations student at KCL. Her main research interests are about human rights and security issues such as drug trafficking and insurgency movements. She is particularly keen in analyzing those matters through a gender-based perspective. 

Bibliography:

 ACLED (2020), ‘Central America and COVID-19: The Pandemic’s Impact on Gang Violence’, May 29. Available at: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep24683. 

 Angelo J. Paul, (2020), ‘The Pandemic Could Bring Power to Latin America’s Criminal Gangs But Not If Governments Beat Them to the Punch’, Foreign Affairs, April 21. Availiable at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2020-04-21/pandemic-could-bring-power-latin-americas-criminal-gangs. 

 Arnson J. Cynthia (2020), ’What Covid-19 is Revealing About Latin America’s Politics’, Wilson Center,August 26. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what-covid-19-revealing-about-latin-americas-politics. 

 Asmann Parker (2020), ‘What Does Coronavirus Mean for Criminal Governance in Latin America?’,  Insight Crime, March 31. Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/criminal-governance-latin-america-coronavirus/. 

 Brinks, D. M., Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2019). Understanding institutional weakness: power and design in Latin American institutions. Cambridge University Press.

 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2019). ‘ECLAC: the region has underestimated inequality’. 28 November 2019. Available at: www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/ eclac-region-has-underestimated-inequality 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2020b). The Social Challenge in Times of COVID-19. CEPAL. Available at: www.cepal.org/en/publications/ 45544-social-challenge-times-covid-19 

Fajardo Luis (2020), ‘Coronavirus: Latin American crime gangs adapt to pandemic’, BBC News, April 21. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-52367898.

 Gomez Camillo (2020), ‘Coronavirus: narco gangs could see big popularity boost from helping residents in Latin America’ The Conversation, June 22. Available at: https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-narco-gangs-could-see-big-popularity-boost-from-helping-residents-in-latin-america-139613. 

 Grace Leah (2020), ‘Deadly Dynamics: Crime and the Coronavirus in Latin America’, Strife blog, 23 June. Available at: https://www.strifeblog.org/2020/06/03/deadly-dynamics-crime-and-the-coronavirus-in-latin-america/. 

 International Crisis Group (2020) ‘Virus-proof Violence: Crime and COVID-19 in Mexico and the Northern Triangle’, Latin America Report N°83, 13 November. Available at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/083-virus-proof-violence.pdf.

 Isacson Adam (2020) ‘Latin America, COVID-19 Risks Permanently Disturbing Civil-Military Relations’, Wola, July 20. Available at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/latin-america-covid-19-civil-military-relations-policing/.

 Moutaoufik Saloua (2020), ‘Criminal governance under Covid-19: an appealing yet flawed alternative to state failure’, Sciences Po Obsveratoire politique de l’Amériquelatine et des Caraibes’. Avaliable at: https://www.sciencespo.fr/opalc/sites/sciencespo.fr.opalc/files/Criminal%20governnance%20.pdf. 

 Nugent Ciara (2020), ‘Why Armed Groups in Latin America Are Enforcing COVID-19 Lockdowns’, Time, July 22. Available at: https://time.com/5870054/coronavirus-latin-america-armed-groups/. 

 OECD (2020)’ Government at a Glance: Latin American and the Caribbean’. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/50c07fc2-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/50c07fc2-en.

Sanchez R, M. (2006). Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 606, 178-195. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097823.

 Soifer, H. D. (2019). Measuring state capacity in contemporary Latin America. Revista de Ciencia Política, 32(3), 585-598.

US 2020 Election: What Do the Results Mean for Mexico?

Source: https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/378237-protesters-shred-mexican-flag-during-trump-visit-to-border

By: Octavio Augusto Gutiérrez Salcedo

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao

Mexico and the US have always had a close relationship for almost everything. According to the State Department of the US, Mexico is the second largest trading partner and second-largest export market. When we talk about immigration there are approximately more than 36 million Hispanics from Mexican origin who live in the US. In another sector it has been calculated that more than 20 million Americans visit Mexico every year. When we analyse these facts, it can be said that the outcome of every US election is very important in every sector for Mexico and each outcome can change the landscape of the diplomatic relationship between both countries – this year’s election is not different. 

The US election took place on the 3rd of November, between the Republican candidate and current president of the USA, Donald Trump, and the Democratic party candidate andformer vice-president of the USA, Joe Biden. After a week of re-counts and appeals from Donald Trump, the election was called for Joe Biden by the Associated Press. This is a radical turn in the relations between the US and Mexico as a new style of government will come into office. The new administration brings different ideas on foreign policy and the Mexican Government, under Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador,will have to adjust to the new circumstances and the different agendas that the Biden administration will follow in matters of the economy and also immigration. 

The economic sector will face a complete change that will hopefully have a positive outcome for Mexico. Over the past 4 years there has been a lot of uncertainty on this matter something that hopefully will change in the upcoming years. Mexico is currently experiencing one of the biggest economic slumps in the history of the country. Due to this, the economic imbalance between the two countries (80 percent of Mexico’s exports go the US) was used by Donald Trump to put some pressure on Mexico over migration matters. Mexico also had to have Trump’s twitter notifications on since any day he could announce a new set of tariffs for Mexico. An expectation on Biden’s presidency around the world is the return to a more diplomatic and normal relationship between the US and the whole world. Mexico hopes that Biden will have a more reasonable and measured approach between both countries by stopping the public threats from Trump and changing it for a more normal negotiation as it was back in the last presidency.

A change in the Oval Office will also have an important outcome with other Latin American countries. It has been observed that Latin American countries tend to follow the United States actions and decisions. For instance, this was the case when Donald Trump said that Covid-19 was ‘not a big deal’ and the president of Brazil consequently agreed.Another example is when Trump pulled out of the Paris Agreement and Brazil said that they were analysing whether to follow him. In this light, a change in the Oval Office will be an important shift in the policy and approaches that Latin Americans countries will follow in the economic sector.

When we talk about the Immigration sector, Joe Biden is planning to do a complete shift as he plans to undue everything that Donal Trump did in his presidency –something that Mexico should be encouraged for. Under Donald Trump this sector has become one of the most talked, debated and criticised in the media and by academics. Donald Trump’s first campaign speech targeted Mexican migrants as he said that only “bad people and rapists” are being sent to the US. In addition, he planned for Mexico to pay for a wall in the border – something that was not delivered– as well as separating children from their parents and putting them in cages before being deported. The new administration of Biden will seek to heal the attacks of migrants in the US as it is explained in Biden’s 100 days plan. In his plan, Biden explains that he seeks to reinstate the DACA programme to protect undocumented children (dreamers) who attend school in the US so that they can continue their studies and receive funding. The DACA programme was one of the most successful initiatives in the Obama-Biden administration, but it was cancelled when Trump took office in 2016. Biden is also planning to stop the policies that allow migration officers to separate children from their parents. He wants to change this to a more humanitarian approach of keeping control of the border in accordance with Human Rights. Mexico and the rest of Latin American countries should feel relieved since this was an issue over the last 4 years that exacerbated the tension between Mexico and the US. The new policies and implementations under the upcoming government are promising and although deportations will not stop, this path is the one that must be followed to continue the strong relationship between both countries. 

The US elections is one of the most important events of the year. The outcome of the election will change the landscape of diplomatic relationships between the United States and the rest of the world including Mexico. The return of the “normal politician” to the White House will be something that Mexico will have to adapt and align with so that both countries can have a prosper future in the uncertain times we are living. It will be interesting to see the first year of Biden’s term and the different approaches he will take in the matters of foreign policy. Even more will be how this will sit with President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and his plan to continue the “4ta Transformación” in Mexico. The changes in immigration and in the economic sector will hopefully make the countries resolve their differences so that they cantackle whatever they face in the next years. The pandemic has created a new world in which problems never seen before will urge the United States and Mexico to act in the most competent and efficient way. Both countries will have to work towards a better and closer relationship between them to ensure a better life for its people.

Sources:

 https://amp.elfinanciero.com.mx/elecciones-eu-2020/que-puede-esperar-mexico-si-gana-biden

https://mexicobusiness.news/trade-and-investment/news/biden-vs-trump-what-does-it-mean-mexico

https://joebiden.com/immigration/#

https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/10/28/trump-or-biden-mexicos-struggling-economy-eyes-us-election

https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/u-s-hispanics-facts-on-mexican-origin-latinos/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/214780/number-of-us-tourists-visting-mexico/

 Octavio is a 2nd year English Law and Spanish Law student at King’s College London. He enjoys debating and writing about sports and politics.

Venezuela: Its Gold Held In Britain's Vaults

Source: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-gold/venezuela-gold-holdings-in-bank-of-england-soar-on-deutsche-deal-sources-idUKKCN1PF1Z8

By: Om Nagle

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, thousands of people in Venezuela were already suffering the ravaging effects of armed violence caused by years of political and economic instability. Official statistics indicate that, to date, Venezuela has had just over 110,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and about 880 total deaths. However, these government provided statistics are more a reflection of the country’s testing capabilities than of the true number of cases. The Nicolás Maduro led regime has largely limited testing to a few government-operated institutions which have medical supplies imported from partner nations like Iran and China. It is therefore unsurprising that Venezuela ranks as having the worst testing capacity in Latin America, only being able to perform about 264 tests a week with significant errors and delays in obtaining the results. The pandemic has therefore only served to make matters worse for Venezuelans who already have scarce access to food, water, and healthcare.

Venezuela’s current problems have certainly not been caused solely by COVID-19. Rather, the pandemic has exacerbated an unprecedented humanitarian and economic crisis caused by years of corruption, mismanagement and failed government policies. Recurrent droughts and severe international sanctions have worsened pre-existing food security and fuel shortage problems, adding pressure on the crippling private sector and overburdened humanitarian NGOs. The Maduro government, in light of these stricter sanctions and a desperate need for funds to battle the pandemic, looked abroad to liquidate its assets stored with the Bank of England. Their attempt to secure the 31 tonnes of gold-bullion have been met with significant challenges. The Maduro-led government has claimed that proceeds from the gold will be used to contribute funds to the United Nations Development Fund to help combat the COVID-19 pandemic. But his opponent, Juan Guaidó, believes there is very little merit to these claims and that the funds obtained would be used to further corruption. The litigation between the two highly contested Presidents of Venezuela has resulted in the money being held inside British Vaults far away from where it is truly needed: in Venezuela – to alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan people. 

This article will aim to impartially highlight and analyse the controversial questions raised by the UK Courts in the case of “Maduro Board” of the Central Bank of Venezuela V. “Guaidó Board” of the Central Bank of Venezuela [2020]

Since April of 2013, Nicolás Maduro has held the office of the President of Venezuela. December 2015 saw the dispute over the election of the deputies to the National Assembly for the state of Amazonas. The Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela (STJ), the country’s utmost constitutional court, granted provisional relief suspending the implementation of the election of the four deputies. However, the victorious opposition decided to swear-in the deputies anyway. As a result, the STJ issued a judgement on the 1st of August 2016, declaring all decisions taken by the National Assembly “null and void for so long as it was constituted in breach of the judgments and orders of the STJ”. In May 2017, a rival legislature was established on Maduro’s initiative called the National Constituent Assembly (NCA).  

The presidential election of 2018 witnessed Maduro claiming victory again. A month later, he appointed Mr. C. José Ortega as the president of the NCA and of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). In retaliation, the National Assembly declared the appointment unconstitutional. The STJ, following its 2016 judgement, declared the National Assembly’s resolution unconstitutional. 

January 2019 saw Maduro being sworn-in for a second term as the President of Venezuela. However, the National Assembly and its President, Juan Guaidó, announced, relying upon Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, that Maduro had usurped the office of the President and that Guaidó was the Interim President of Venezuela. Several countries, such as the United States, Colombia, Members of the EU and the UK gave the Maduro-led government 8 days to call elections. After failing to call elections, the Foreign Secretary to the UK reaffirmed the recognition of Juan Guaidó as an interim President “in charge of the transition back to democracy”. Furthermore, the Minister of State for Europe and the Americas justified the UK government’s recognition of Guaidó, based on the National Assembly’s consistency with following the rules set out in the Venezuelan Constitution. Additionally, he highlighted the exceptional nature of the refugee crisis whereby 3.6 million Venezuelans had fled the country in pursuit of a life away from a regime which was “holding onto power though electoral malpractice and harsh repression of dissent” and had been referred to the International Criminal Court by six countries for its human rights abuses. 

Meanwhile, the National Assembly passed the Transition Statute with the aim of “restoring the full force and effect of the Venezuelan Constitution”. It was signed bearing the seal of Guaidó as the President of Venezuela. Using the legal backing provided by the Transition Statute, Guaidó appointed a Special Attorney General, Mr. Jose I. Hernandez, and an ad hoc board of the BCV to defend the “interests of decentralized entities abroad”. The STJ passed judgements holding the Transition Statute, appointment of the special attorney general, andthe creation of the ad hoc board of the BCV as unconstitutional, null and void. 

The Bank of England holds gold reserves valued at about US $1.95 billion for the Banco Central De Venezuela (BCV). Consequently, a gold-swap contract with Deutsche Bank obligates them to pay the BCV a sum of about US $120 million. Currently, the sums are held by court appointed receivers. When the Maduro Board requested access to the gold, the Bank of England rejected their request owing to non-recognition of the Maduro-led government by the United Kingdom. This led to the current litigation at hand, wherein the courts have to decide upon two preliminary issues: firstly, which of the two boards is entitled to give instructions on behalf of the BCV concerning the assets held with the Bank of England and, secondly, who holds the office of the president of Venezuela. 

Initially, the Guaidó Board was successful in securing positive consideration through a judgement in its favour. Wherein the court held that, owing to the UK Foreign Ministry’s statements about the recognition of Juan Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela, the Maduro Board of the BCV wouldn’t be entitled to give instructions in relation to the assets. This was appealed by the lawyers representing the Maduro-led government who argued that, although the UK recognised Guaidó as the interim-president, they in practice continued diplomatic relations with the Maduro-led government through the Ambassador of Venezuela to the UK in London and the UK’s Ambassador to Venezuela in Caracas. While considering this aspect of the appeal, the UK High Court passed its judgement that diplomatic relations were irrelevant considering the UK recognised Juan Guaidó as the President, and it is the President of Venezuela that appoints the board of the BCV. They reaffirmed that “there is no room for recognition of Mr Guaidó as de jure President and of Mr Maduro as de factoPresident”, the “one-voice” principle would dictate that the UK Government no longer recognises Maduro as President of Venezuela in any capacity. 

In reference to the second preliminary issue, the court took into consideration the arguments presented by the Maduro Board as well as the Guaidó Board but reaffirmed that, at this stage, it was not in the UK High Court’s jurisdiction or capacity to pass judgement on the issue of the office of the president of Venezuela. The court in its concluding statements directed the litigating parties to dispute the matter in the Commercial Court. The Special Attorney appointed by Guaidó formally informed the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to set aside any arbitration requests from the Maduro Board, as the Guaidó board is the sole controller of the BCV, thus limiting any chances of this dispute being resolved without judicial proceedings in the UK. Unfortunately, as the litigation between the two offices of presidents in Venezuela gets expensive, complicated and drawn-out, the people of Venezuela have to ultimately bear the cost. 

 Om Nagle is a second-year law student at SOAS, University of London. He is interested in the intersection of law, international affairs and public policy.

Works Cited

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"Maduro Board" of the Central Bank of Venezuela v "Guaido Board" of the Central Bank of Venezuela [2020] All ER (D) 24 (Oct)

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Al Jazeera. “UK Court Denies Venezuela's Maduro Access to Gold in Bank Vault.” Latin America News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 2 July 2020, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/07/02/uk-court-denies-venezuelas-maduro-access-to-gold-in-bank-vault/.

Armas, Mayela, and Corina Pons. “Venezuela Gold Holdings in Bank of England Soar on Deutsche Deal: Sources.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 21 Jan. 2019, uk.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-gold/venezuela-gold-holdings-in-bank-of-england-soar-on-deutsche-deal-sources-idUKKCN1PF1Z8.

“Covid-19 in Venezuela: How the Pandemic Deepened a Humanitarian Crisis.” Covid-19 in Venezuela: How the Pandemic Deepened a Humanitarian Crisis | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 Nov. 2020, www.csis.org/analysis/covid-19-venezuela-how-pandemic-deepened-humanitarian-crisis.

G., Jose I. Hernandez. “As Special Attorney-General of Venezuela, I Notified @Icsid That It Should Not Recognize Any Instruction given by Lawyers Acting on Behalf of Nicolas Maduro in the Arbitrations before That Center Pic.twitter.com/9PZlEvjn09.” Twitter, Twitter, 27 Mar. 2019, twitter.com/ignandez/status/1110989446189645825?lang=en.

Jones, Marc. “UK Court Overturns Venezuela Judgment in $1 Billion Gold Tug-of-War.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 6 Oct. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-gold-boe/uk-court-of-appeal-overturns-judgment-in-venezuela-gold-case-lawyers-idUSKBN26Q1IU.

Office, Foreign &amp; Commonwealth. “UK Recognises Juan Guaido as Interim President of Venezuela.” GOV.UK, GOV.UK, 4 Feb. 2019, www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-recognises-juan-guaido-as-interim-president-of-venezuela.

Peltier, Elian. “Maduro Wins Chance of New Ruling Over Billions in Gold Held in U.K.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 6 Oct. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/world/europe/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-gold.html.

Pons, Corina, and Mayela Armas. “Exclusive: Venezuela Asks Bank of England to Sell Its Gold to U.N. for Coronavirus Relief - Sources.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 29 Apr. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-venezuela-gold-exc-idUSKBN22B30X.

Roache, Madeline. “Venezuela's Maduro Loses Battle Over Gold in London Bank.” Time, Time, 2 July 2020, time.com/5862539/venezuela-maduro-gold-london-bank/.

Smith, Scott. “Control of Venezuelan Gold Held in London Cast into Doubt.” AP NEWS, Associated Press, 5 Oct. 2020, apnews.com/article/london-venezuela-archive-united-kingdom-8aed97a3890f7a2cd7ffe09a71b6b050.

Stott, Michael. “Venezuela's Maduro Wins Appeal over $1bn of Gold at Bank of England.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 5 Oct. 2020, www.ft.com/content/d5e91ab8-f44f-437a-887e-7a5aa402976d.

“UK Court Reverses $1bn Venezuelan Gold Ruling.” Anadolu Ajansı, www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/uk-court-reverses-1bn-venezuelan-gold-ruling/1996739.

“UK Denying Maduro Access to Venezuelan Gold Is Not Only THEFT, It's MURDER of London's Reputation as Trusted Financial Center.” RT International, www.rt.com/op-ed/493718-uk-maduro-venezuela-gold/.

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“Hemos vuelto a la normalidad”: Peru in Protest

Source: https://ibb.co/pzCrp8Y

By: Clarice Benney*

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

“Hemos vuelto a la normalidad,” (“we have gone back to normal”) was the response of one of Peru’s most famous poets of the 20th century, Martín Adán, when asked about the 1948 coup by Manuel Odría. Adán was well known for his eccentricities, but now, 70 years later, do these words appear more perceptive and far-reaching than he was perhaps given credit for at the time?

2020 has been a tough year for Peru: they have had one of the highest death rates from Covid-19 in the world, and are now watching their political system implode. In September, Peru’s president of the congress, Manuel Merino, was given “leaked” audio files which allegedly revealed a conversation with the then-president, Martín Vizcarra, in which his aides discuss how to cover up a misuse of public funds. 

This might appear, on the surface, to be a clear cut case of right and wrong, but the political context makes it much harder to make this distinction. Vizcarra ran as Pedro Pablo Kuczynski’s running mate in the 2016 elections, when their party, Peruanos Por el Kambio (PPK, ‘Peruvians for Change’) narrowly defeated Keiko Fujimori, the Fuerza Popular party’s nominee. Kuczynski resigned in 2018 due to charges of corruption, and Vizcarra took his place.

Vizcarra enjoyed popular support with his anti-corruption agenda and vowed to not run for re-election at the end of his term in 2021, but he was consistently challenged by Congress, of which opposition parties made up the majority. In September 2019, Vizcarra dissolved the Peruvian Congress and issued a decree for a new election in January 2020, but the result of the new elections once again saw opposition-led parties making up the majority. When Vizcarra dissolved Congress, his popularity rating rose from 49 to 80%, and he was seen by many as being ‘thwarted’ by Congress in his attempts to fight corruption.

With this in mind, Congress voted on whether or not to impeach Vizcarra in September 2020, but the motion failed, with only 32 members voting in favour of impeachment. However, they voted again in November, and this time the result was 105 in favour, 19 against, and 4 abstentions. 

When Congress removed Vizcarra and replaced him with Manuel Merino, President of the Congress and a member of the opposition, Peruvians took to the streets to protest. And it is this detail, the national outcry and action, that challenges the idea of “[un] vuelto a la normalidad.”

This civil unrest shows that the idea of a ‘milagro peruano’ (‘Peruvian miracle’) had not just been put aside, but shattered. Alberto Fujimori’s time as president from 1990 to 2000 saw the introduction of neoliberal policies, as in many other Latin American countries. The impact on Peruvian life was that many informal sectors were legalized, and foreign investment saw China become the country’s largest trading partner. In this period, whilst Peru’s natural resources were exploited for foreign gain, the country experienced high growth rates and the national poverty rate was cut in half between 2002 and 2011.

But by focusing on the positive statistics, issues surrounding political corruption continued. Alberto Fujimori may have generated economic prosperity, but he is now in prison on the grounds of human rights abuses for his role in the Grupo Colina death squad during his battle with leftist guerrillas in the 1990s. Following him was Alejandro Toledo Manrique, who was credited with ‘opening up tourism’, but is currently under house-arrest for corruption charges; then Alan García Pérez who comitted suicide when prosecutors came to his couse to bring him to face corruption charges; and Ollantana Humala Tasso, awaiting a corruption trial.

What we are seeing now on the news is a harrowing awakening: politics in Peru has reached a point where it cannot be ignored. In an already fragile democracy, a president and Congress working against each other was the ultimate destabilizing blow, but at this point a new guiding force has come into play: the people.

On November 16th it was declared that during protests, a violent reaction from the police killed two people, injured 100 and led to the disappearances of other protesters. The hashtag, “Merino no es mi presidente” (“Merino is not my president” that had flooded social media following his appointment was swapped for “El Perú está de luto” (“Peru is in mourning”). Merino resigned the same day.

Peru was faced with the same question once more: ‘whose turn next?’ For the moment it seems that the answer is Francisco Sagasti, a member of Congress from the ‘Partido Morado’. Sagasti was selected, as he was one of the 17 members of Congress who voted against Vizcarra’s impeachment for a second time in November, which acknowledges the people’s unhappiness with Congress’ decision to hold the vote at all, and their discontent towards Congress’ self-indulgent agenda.

When thinking about protest culture and examples in Latin America you might think of students in Chile protesting, triggered by an increase in the subway fare, people in Bolivia challenging political fraud, or women in Argentina demanding the legalisation of abortion. Until now, protests in Peru rarely made headlines. Do they not face the same issues? Are citizens really more satisfied with public spending and government in their country than others in the region?

The answer is no. Protests and strikes in Peru are not uncommon; it’s national protesting that occurs much more rarely. 40% of the newly formed middle class in Peru are in an unstable position. Mining has been a great driver of economic growth in Peru, but it simultaneously endangers the wellbeing of the communities it purports to benefit by contaminating water supplies and destroying environmental balance. The at-risk rural communities that fall into this category report feelings of even higher uncertainty for the future. Combine this with a lack of political representation and ever-changing parties and people, and you create an environment where protests are so constant that they lose their weight: turning up becomes apathetic. In order to restore activism in protesting there needs to be organization, and a sense of purpose. It is this presence in the recent political protests that singles them out and contests the ideal that ‘hemos vuelto a la normalidad’. With elections due in 2021, this could be the beginning of a new political era in Peru.

Note:

Jack Brian Pintado Sánchez, 22, and Jordan Inti Sotelo Camargo, 24, are young men who were tragically killed when participating in protests — my thoughts are with their friends and family.

Clarice is a student studying Spanish at Cambridge University. She is currently on her ‘year abroad’ and working with the NGO Latin American Foundation for the Future (LAFF) as Communications Coordinator. LAFF operates in Cusco, Peru and so Clarice is particularly interested in Peruvian current affairs, as well as protest culture in Latin American and grassroots activism. 

*About LAFF:

Latin American Foundation for the Future (LAFF) is a UK registered charity operating in Cusco, Peru to increase access to quality education and personal development opportunities. LAFF believes that one of the best ways to create positive long term change is to support local grassroots organisations so that community leaders drive the change. To find out more about what we do, check out our website.

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/laffcharity/

Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/latin-american-foundation-for-the-future

Geography: Its Influence in the Development of South America

Source: https://bit.ly/36T3r5u

By: Jack Acrich

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

The territory where a country is located can affect the way in which it is able to build the necessary infrastructure to pave its way to development and prosperity. It is common for states to take advantage of their geographical location in the best way possible –some may even use it to have advantage over other countries. In the case of South America, a lot of this region’s countries have had problems to properly build the necessary infrastructure for development and communication –an important factor for this is their geographical context.

First of all, the presence of rainforests such as the Amazon–which covers great part of the northern part of the continent– is considered to be very difficult to access due to its climatic conditions and density. Because of this, agricultural practices have not been very developed, and in many cases militant or criminal groups take advantage of this conditions to hide from the authorities. This usually results in governments using and sending resources to try and combat them. In this way, even if Venezuela and Brazil have close borders, roads are almost inexistent making their terrestrial communication very difficult due to the thick jungle. Furthermore, the presence of the Tapón de Darien, that is located in the border between Panama and Colombia, serves as a natural barrier. In this sense, the presence of rainforest in the region has also impeded terrestrial communication between Central America and South America.

Secondly, to escape form the conditions of the tropic where diseases can be present, many populations have decided to move and establish cities in elevated areas. The building and maintenance of infrastructure in these areas is very expensive, as well as contributing to the isolation of communities. This can be the case for cities like Quito in Ecuador, La Paz in Bolivia and Caracas in Venezuela. The spaces where most of the population live tends to be small; a lack of space leads to greater density and a poorer urban planification.

In addition, the Andes Mountains – one of the largest continental mountain ranges in the world – complicates the development and construction of roads to communicate different parts of the region. The part of the Andes located between Chile and Argentina consists of very high mountain ranges where snowstorms are very common. The topographical terrain in the region complicate traffic flow and communication between these two countries. This situation is not only between the countries in the region. The South American continent is considered to be far away from other parts of the world. For instance, the southern part of the region where Argentina and Uruguay are located are very distant to Europe. Again, the geographical context of the South American region makes it very challenging and costly to build tunnels and safe transportation, resulting in difficult the communication within the region and the rest of the world. 

Nonetheless, geographical conditions can be used for development advantages. For instance, the United States’developmental success has been in great part because of its geographical context –the presence of a great portion of land proper for agriculture, the existence of navigable rivers that promote the easy transportation of goods, and the availability of great ports. In addition, having coasts on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans has allowed the U.S. to project its power outside of the American continent (Stratfor, 2016 ). Even if the landscape of South America seems to obstruct the possibility for progress and growth, there are other factors that are advantageous. First, the idea that the region does not have to worry about an external war due to the fact that other states outside of the continent could get the resources that the region offers in places that are closer to them or have safer sea routes. Moreover, the zone of Río de la Plata located in the southern part of the continent has arable land and rivers are optimal for navigation benefiting states like Argentina and Uruguay. Additionally, the proximity to the US can be positive to establish commercial ties in sense.  

Taking into account the geographical aspects of states, it is possible to have a better understanding of the challenges they have had to progress. Even if South America has struggled to establish stable economies, there can always be ways to take advantage of the situation, and in many cases the route to instability has been led by certain inefficient government policies. Corruption scandals are present all over the continent making it very difficult to advance and build a prosperous stateregardless of the geographical conditions that they have. Having a lot of obstacles for development can be a great challenge to build a stable and prosperous economy. Nevertheless, this should not be an excuse to drag behind in development and be consumed by corruption that is very present in the region.

Jack is a Venezuelan 3rd year student at the University of Navarra. Besides his deep interest for Latin America, he is passionate about geopolitics and how the dynamics in this field shape the world of International Relations.

Protests in Peru: A Chronicle of a Death Foretold

Source: https://www.clarin.com/fotogalerias/impactantes-fotos-protestas-nuevo-presidente-peru-destitucion-vizcarra_5_ndMABbPBj.html

By: Arianna Sanchez

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

The last piece I wrote for El Cortao’ regarded the socio-political consequences of Venezuelan immigration in Peru. It ended with hope that the 2021 elections would help unite Peruvians rather than separate us. Turns out that the government did help us unite –even prior than expected. However, it was not because of their good politics,  but because of an attempted coup. Our current interim President, Francisco Sagasti, seems to be setting a path towards fair and timely elections in April 2021–he, however, did not get into power effortlessly. It took two dead protesters, dozens missingand more than a hundred injured to reinstate democracy in Peru. These series of events signify, in my opinion, a paradigm shift in Peruvian politics. From the perspective of someone who experienced this from first-hand, this article will attempt to look into the events that drove us to a coup and how Peruvian people managed to take back the power Congress took from us.

Race to the bottom

The issue at hand is one of high complexity and nuance, however I will try my best to summarise the crucial events that led to this point. We could say that the series of events leading to the attempted coup started when Pedro Pablo Kuczinsky (PPK) renounced his presidency in 2017 after an attempted impeachment from Congress against him. Congress justified their move with a collection of allegations tying PPK with corrupt people and firms –Odebrecht being the most important amongst the group. PPK renounced presidency after a seemingly never-ending battle with his main political opposition, Fuerza Popular. Martín Vizcarra, PPK’s Vice-President, assumed presidency right after in 2018. This event was, as García-Marquez would put it, a chronicle of a death foretold.  

 Martin Vizcarra truly did not expect the level of political and economic turmoil he would face in the upcoming years. Fuerza Popular, Keiko Fujimori’s political party and his main political opposition, was quick to use various events to develop antipathy towards Vizcarra amongst Congress and the general Peruvian population. The impeachment was based on the grounds that Vizcarra had been involved in different events concerning corruption, with allegations dating back to 2011. In the long run, however, it seems to me that Vizcarra’sdecision to dissolve Congress in 2019 and call for elections pushed these politicians to decide it was in their best interests to remove Vizcarra from presidency. Once he was gone, they were safe.

Peruvians strike back: The protests 

What the government did not seem to account for in their master plan was the level of protesting against them that would occur in the days following the impeachment. Neither did they expect the levels of police brutality these protests would bring with them. What would happen after Manuel Merino assumed de facto presidency acted as a strong wake up call for Peruvians, and these people in government were now the common enemy for us all. 

Peruvians started taking the streets to protest against Merino’s de facto presidency the day after it occurred –on the 10th of November. From the start, protesters were challenged by a repressive police force; tear gas asphyxiated protesters, whilst rubber bullets left several hurt. A source of anger, that further incentivised protesters to take the streets by the masses, was the lack of exposure of police brutality by the Peruvian media. Given the censoring by national media, Peruvians took the issue to social media, where platforms such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook were flooded with evidence of the levels of police brutality faced during the protests.

However, the turning point had a very specific date: Saturday 14th of November 2020. The day started with tanks on the streets, police disguised as civilians and in every corner. This seemed to signal that Merino’s government was not willing to resign, but rather wanted to silence protesters through intimidation. What started as peaceful protests took an awfully dark turn towards the end of the day. The speed in which things took a turn for the worse led to information all over social media and the news. To say it was overwhelming would be completely undermining the speed and intensity in which events occurred on that night. The levels of police brutality protesters experienced that Saturday were astonishing. My own social media was full of either friends asking for help due to injuries or those documenting the actions of the police. 

Then the official news started flooding in. One protester had been killed. With no time for Peruvians to even attempt to process it, and with thousands still attempting to escape the repressive police on the streets, the second death was announced. Inti Sotelo and Bryan Pintado died at the hands of the Peruvian police that Saturday. Dozens more did not return home that day, with allegations of forceful disappearances carried out by the police. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 

Reinstating democracy

After the events of that Saturday, Ministers assigned by Merino started to quit their posts. It started with the Minister of Women and Vulnerable Populations shortly after the news reported the deaths of two protesters and the disappearance of dozens more. It was clear that they had finally realised the extent to which they had infuriated the general Peruvian population with their ‘constitutional’ impeachment in the middle of a sanitary crisis. The continued protests and massive social media movement indicated that Peruvians were not about to be silenced. Moreover, the deaths of two protesters implied potential judicial investigations to be opened against them –this was not political opportunism for them anymore, it was political suicide. After around twelve Ministers had resigned, large social media platforms and politicians, who had not said a word before, started to heavily criticise the government in an attempt to save themselves from our anger. 

By Sunday morning, it was clear Merino had to resign as soon as possible to avoid further deaths and violence. He did not even have a cabinet anymore –there was virtually no choice. As people took the streets to pay tribute to the victims of the previous night, Manuel Merino finally appeared on our television screens. After a convoluted speech that showed an inability to assume responsibility for those injured and killed by the police, he finally said it: he resigned. On that same day, 15th of November, the attorney general of the nation, Zoraida Ávalos, filed a lawsuit against Manuel Merino, Prime Minister Antero Flores-Aráoz and Minister of the Interior Gastón Rodriguez for violations against human rights.

 With no President and no ministerial cabinet, we found ourselves on a limbo. Congress had to choose a new executive branch –the same government which betrayed us. After one full day of complex political manoeuvres behind the scenes,and the surprising rejection of the first candidate list, Congress allegedly promised to bring some political stability. They finally chose the new members of the executive on the 16th of November. With the families of Inti Sotelo and Bryan Pintado present in the ceremony, new interim-President Francisco Sagasti assumed presidency, giving an emotional speech addressing our fight for democracy and promising justice to those affected. Some hope was restored. 

Concluding thoughts

I want to end this piece on one main note: Peruvians did not take the streets to reinstate ex-President Vizcarra into power. Peruvians did not fight against exceedingly repressive policefor him. Peruvians fought to reinstate democracy and fought the police for ourselves. It has been decades of normalising terrible, exclusionary politics. Of normalising the advantage taken by those who claim to represent us. Of normalising the uncertainty of whether next year we could have anotherpolitical crisis. We learn from our mistakes, yet we have a long road ahead. now that we have finally opened our eyes, I hope we do not close them again.

Arianna is a Peruvian 3rd Year Politics Student at King’s College London with a passion for Latin American politics and political risk-management.

Costa Rica: No military? But what about regional security?

Source: https://destinationsguide.copaair.com/en-ca/flights-to-costa-rica

By: Adriana Ibale Barajas

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Since gaining independence, Latin American states have often experienced violence and political disruption in their domestic affairs; some scholars attribute such instability to the close connection between the political and military realm. The academic literature on the topic highlights the contestability of civil-military relations in Latin America due to historical evidence which suggests that a strong military force has been tied to a pitfall in social growth. The case of Costa Rica portrays that despite having neighbouring states as potential external threats, the abolition of its army has strengthened its political, social and economic development. Actually, Costa Rica’s demilitarisation in 1948 has instead enhanced its regional security in spite of prospective threats from Nicaragua for instance. 

From the years 1890 to 1948, Costa Rica had experienced “at least four unsuccessful coup attempts and eleven revolts against the government” alongside eight ammendments to the constitution due to internal disputes (Wilson, 1998). With the end of the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War, President José Figueres disbanded the army in order to prevent further challenges to his rule from Picado’s military-backed government. The military had in the past regularly been used as a tool by the elites to impose their authority and foster social inequality. The army had not been employed as brutally as in other countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador but the Picado administration had resorted to its use to maintain political power. Figueres’ decision on demilitarising Costa Rica was therefore not an economic goal but based on internal security which also managed to influence institutional development seeing as there has not been significant political violence in the country since then.

Turmoil in the country was also previously generated due to foreign powers’ interests entangling with military control. Latin American elites wanted to attract foreign investments to make their commercial land lucrative and even resorted to yielding control to a foreign power and indirectly promoting an externally instigated revolution. An example of “military facilitated bloodshed” was the Coffee Coup of 1917, the Costa Rican government tried to restructure the tax system and make the upper class contribute more (Benton, 2016). In response the elites led a military coup against the government installing military leader Federico Tinoco as the country’s dictator. This served as a lesson and demonstrated the dangers of conveying excessive power to the military, through the discreditation of the army Costa Rica eliminated this danger altogether. At a time where other Latin American countries were plagued with military dictatorships, Costa Rica was undergoing a period of positive social and economic development. Costa Rica’s demilitarisation aided in protecting its domestic security by generating a stable environment free from internal political threats and injustices propagated by the use of military force. The main threats to the state were either sourced from possible coups or instigated from an external power, Figueres’ decision on neutralising the military resolved both issues. 

The lack of a military force not only marked a difference in terms of political and judicial security in the country, but also meant that the funds previously gone to military expenditure were now able to lay the foundations for positive growth through facilitating commerce, investment and employment rates (Sada, 2015). Abarca and Ramirez published the first study which linked the abolishment of the military with economic success; the scholars found that before 1948 Costa Rica was the fourth country with the slowest GDP rate in Latin America, yet after it became the second state with fastest growth just behind Brazil. General welfare also improved as for example when having an army, 21% of Costa Rica’s economically active population was covered by health care whereas in 1978 the figure rose to 66% (Abarca and Ramirez, 2018). 

One must acknowledge that even if Costa Rica was a politically and economically secure country taking into account its geographical location, it still underwent difficulties and its success cannot be compared to those of developed nations (Trejos, 2008). Issues such as the deterioration of regional trade and amounts of debt owed to lenders abroad cannot be ignored. Despite these domestic problems Costa Ricans still believed that their greatest threat in the 1980s was Nicaragua, Nicaragua’s increase in military strength as well as territorial disputes between the two states fostered a sense of mistrust in regards to Nicaraguan intentions. However, Costa Rica has an ally in the United States due to the fact that it serves as a successful example of Latin American democracy and is simultaneously compatible with the U.S’ system. In this sense, the United States has a ‘dual interest in the continuity of the system’ which thus acts in Costa Rica’s favour and protection (Furlong, 1987).

Ultimately, the absence of a Costa Rican military force has helped to maintain political and institutional stability and hence foster economic growth and widespread welfare in the country. Past attempts by social elites and foreign powers to use the military as a tool in their favour were no longer possible; at a time where other states in the region were suffering from dictatorships and social unrest, Costa Rica was free from this danger sourced from the use of military force. Furthermore, funds previously gone to military expenditure were now employed to fund economic projects raising general welfare and education levels. Nonetheless, regional threats were still a perceived problem amongst the population even if these disputes have not escalated into major concerns.

Adriana is a 3rd year International Relations student at KCL, who is particularly interested in the impact of identity politics and international development in Latin America.

Bibliography 

Abarca Garro, A. and Ramirez Varas, S. A. (2018) Adiós a las armas: los efectos en el desarrollo de largo plazo de la abolición del ejército de Costa Rica. Working paper: Observatorio del Desarrollo de la Universidad de Costa Rica

Benton, J. L. (2016) Eliminating war by eliminating warriors: a case study in Costa Rica. Postgraduate. Naval Postgraduate School. 

Buscone, P. (2017) The Demilitarization of Costa Rica. College Honours Program. 10 https://crossworks.holycross.edu/honors/10

Furlong, W. L. (1987) Costa Rica: Caught between Two Worlds. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 29 (2) pp. 119-154

Kruijt, D. (1996) “Politicians in Uniform: Dilemmas about the Latin American Military. European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 61 pp. 7-19. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25675710?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

Skidmore, T. and Smith, P. (2005) Modern Latin America 6th ed. New York: Oxford University Press

Sada, M. (2015) The Curious Case of Costa Rica: Can an Outlier Sustain its Success? Harvard International Review 36 (4) pp. 11-12

Trejos, A. (2006) Country Role Models for Development Success: The case of Costa Rica. Country Role Models for Development. INCAE.

Vogt, M. (2019) Variance In Approach Toward A 'Sustainable' Coffee Industry In Costa Rica. London: Ubiquity Press.

Wilson, B. M. (1998) Costa Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy. Boulder: Lynne

Reinner Publishers.

From Tlatelolco to Ayotzinapa: The Continuity of Impunity in Mexico

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/world/americas/mexico-tlatelolco-massacre.html

By: Fernanda Álvarez Pineiro

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

Every 2nd of October, the streets of Mexico City reverberate with the echoing chants of indignation of students and alumni who march to commemorate those that were killed in 1968 in the Plaza of Tlatelolco at the hands of the state. The quintessential ‘No Se Olvida!’ is reproduced in a myriad of posters that aim to remind Mexican society of this chilling scar that has not yet scabbed as its perpetrators still have not been brought to justice. The 1968 Tlatelolco massacre was preceded by a summer of peaceful student protests, which saw demands for democratic rights that challenged a paternalistic quasi-dictatorship led by the Revolutionary Institutionalized Party (PRI). These protests worsened the anxiety of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, whose jitteriness stemmed from the impending inauguration of the 1968 Olympics in October. In the midst of the Cold War, Ordaz wanted to not only convince his Northern neighbor that a communist revolution was not festering in the heart and veins of his country, but that Mexico was a modernizing powerhouse that would become an economic role model in Latin America. Demands for democracy, in this context, wrongly became equated with dreams of replicating the Cuban Revolution at home– with disastrous consequences. With the whole world watching, students were silenced with bullets. The next morning, newswires reported on the weather and the tangible euphoria of the upcoming Olympics. Impunity, to this day, continues to permeate the memory of the 2nd of October. 

​It was with this indignation towards impunity that, in September of 2014, students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers College in Iguala, Guerrero set out to raise funds to organize a trip to Mexico City in time for the 2nd of October marches. It had become a tradition; a means of not only preserving historic memory, but of reminding the incumbent government that impunity does not go unnoticed despite its prevalence in daily political life and discourse in Mexico. As students mounted the buses, they would subsequently be halted by the federal police, and 43 of them would be handed to the Guerreros Unidos drug cartel and forcefully disappeared. Despite the continuing investigations by the attorney general's office and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), there has been no conclusive official verdict. Perhaps the most convincing assessment is by investigative journalist Anabel Hernández who found that the 43 students chose a bus loaded with $2 million worth of heroin, thus becoming a target of the cartels. The chilling connection between Tlatelolco and Ayotzinapa –particularly the fact both instances featured students as victims– creates a sombre forecast of the continued entrenchment of impunity across all state structural levels. Despite both phenomena happening at different times and for different reasons, there is perhaps a deep and inescapable continuity between the two.

Disentangling Impunity in Mexico

​It certainly is disheartening and demoralizing to think about the continuity of impunity in Mexico– with resounding concern, the leading authorial figure of the 1968 Movement Elena Poniatowska asks “what is the future of a country that kills its students?”. However, this is not simply a question of an omnipotent, paternalistic, political force silencing the voices of students– this is directly disproven by the case of Ayotzinapa as the 43 had no affiliation with disruptive political activities. The continuity between the two is more nuanced than that– it is a two-fold phenomenon characterized by the stigmatization and disposability of the lives of lower socio-economic classes, and the loss of the state monopoly on violence.

​Youth killings are –as has been established by now– not isolated incidents in Mexico. Whether it is 1968, Ayotzinapa, or femicides in Ciudad Juárez it is clear that it is a systemic and frequent social phenomenon. According to Sylvia Meichsner of the Open University, this can be explained by enabling structures that are fundamentally grounded on the stigmatization of certain socio-economic groups, especially lower-class ones. Meichsner posits that simplistic and inaccurate stereotypes are constructed in mass media and cultural industries, essentially creating stigmas that are overtly and covertly reproduced across all levels of society. Due to their material vulnerability and stigmatization, these groups may be victims of a delay in paperwork or a reprehensible refusal to investigate and prosecute crimes of which they are victims. Consequently, when these groups engage in political activism or demand justice, they are automatically labelled as ‘troublemakers’. What this constructs is an idea that their lives are disposable and do not create a dent in the Mexican social fabric. 

 The perhaps co-dependent explanation is that in recent years the state has lost its monopoly over violence, with Tlatelolco becoming the watershed moment that created a snowball effect wherein the state gradually lost control over its force. Sergio Aguayo, professor and researcher at the Colegio de México, reminds us that the raison d’être of the state according to social contract theory is to guarantee the security of the population and hence why it has a legitimate use of force. In this regard, “Tlatelolco and Ayotzinaparepresent two expressions of the same phenomenon”. In 1968, the purposeful lack of coordination and confusion between the Battalion Olimpia and the police led to a massacre. In Ayotzinapa, the connections between the federal police, the state, and the cartels have created a parallel state of sorts where the central government has no means of halting violence. Aguayo concludes that there is a feeling of helplessness that is derived from this loss of monopoly over violence– “neither the State protects us against criminals, nor does it care for us as victims”. 

A Source of Hope

​Impunity between 1968 and 2014 has undoubtedly been a continuous trend. However, there have been substantial changes between Tlatelolco and Ayotzinapa. Changes that, perhaps, embody a spark of hope. In an increasingly interdependent, globalized, international system, legitimacy is no longer just a question determined by players housed within sovereign borders. Human rights violations no longer go unnoticed, as they largely did in 1968. The creation of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI) by the IACHR and their investigation of Ayotzinapa in Mexico is something that certainly would not have happened back in 1968. Their refusal to accept the attorney general office’s verdict on the case of the 43 and to stand by their own assessment undermined the legitimacy of the government of President Enrique Peña Nieto. Unlike in 1968, the whole word is not just watching–it is judging. 

 Whilst Mexican channels of legal accountability are deficient and do not favor the needs of those that are most often victims of state and cartel violence (which could be considered interchangeable), another source of hope is the incredibly admirable resilience and endurance of activists who refuse to let memories of past, unpunished crimes fade into oblivion. Even though the generation that lived through 1968 is rapidly aging, the preservation of historical memory has ensured that the younger generations continue to chant ‘No Se Olvida!’ every 2nd of October and are empowered to take to the streets to demand justice for the 43. The constant protests and demands, alongside the access to international mechanisms of accountability, create a more hopeful forecast for justice.

 The final, and possibly most politically contentious, source of hope is the diminishing power of the PRI. Both Tlatelolco and Ayotzinapa happened under the administration of the party and, in both periods, the incumbent refused to accept his responsibility and fault in state crimes. Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s anti-establishment agenda against graft and corruption might succeed in freezing the resources that fuel violence and impunity. He has also promised that “our back will never be turned towards young people anymore”. Perhaps as evidence of that promise is the recent reinstallation of the GIEI on the 6th of May 2020 after ceasing their investigation in 2016 due to substantial obstacles like the refusal of local and federal authorities to cooperate. As promising as this may sound, however, his leftist populism might just mean these are empty words. Regardless of whether he fulfils those promises, the ousting of the PRI in the 2018 election is a stark reminder that democracy has improved since 1968 and that the electorate can and will condemn impunity at the polls.

It would be naïve to say that impunity can be corrected in Mexico in the near future. It certainly will take more than one president’s anti-establishment administration to change that. However, the refusal of Mexican activists to cease protesting, demand justice, and take to the streets proves that these crimes do not go unnoticed. As the chants of ‘No Se Olvida!’are now followed by ‘Todos Somos Ayotzinapa’ there is a sense that grievances are connected, joined, and reinforced, creating powerful social resistance.

Fernanda is a second-year student of Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Originally Mexican, she is passionate about the political history of Latin America, particularly that of her home country.

Bibliography

Diario Oficial de la Federación. “DOF - Diario Oficial de La Federación.” Www.Dof.Gob.Mx, 25 June 2019, www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5564187&fecha=26/06/2019. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.

García Navarro, Lulu. “What Happened To Mexico’s Missing 43 Students In ‘A Massacre In Mexico.’” NPR.org, 21 Oct. 2018, www.npr.org/2018/10/21/658900014/what-happened-to-mexicos-missing-43-students-in-a-massacre-in-mexico.

Malkin, Elisabeth. “50 Years After a Student Massacre, Mexico Reflects on Democracy.” The New York Times, 1 Oct. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/world/americas/mexico-tlatelolco-massacre.html.

Meichsner, Sylvia. “Ayotzinapa Shows How Killings and Disappearances of the Young in Mexico Are Enabled by Precarity, Prejudice, and Impunity | LSE Latin America and Caribbean.” LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog, 26 Sept. 2019, blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2019/09/26/ayotzinapa-shows-how-killings-and-disappearances-of-the-young-in-mexico-are-enabled-by-precarity-prejudice-and-impunity/. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.

OEA. “CIDH Saluda Avances En La Investigación En El Caso Ayotzinapa.” Www.Oas.org, 1 Aug. 2009, www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2020/158.asp. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.

Poniatowska, Elena, and Helen R Lane. Massacre in Mexico. New York, Viking Press, 1975.

The 43. Directed by Paco Ignacio Taibo, Netflix, 2019.

Wright, Melissa W. “Visualizing a Country without a Future: Posters for Ayotzinapa, Mexico and Struggles against State Terror.” Geoforum, vol. 102, June 2019, pp. 235–241, 10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.10.009. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.

Zepeda, José. “Mexico in Helplessness, from Tlatelolco to Ayotzinapa.” OpenDemocracy, 16 Nov. 2016, www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/mexico-in-helplessness-from-tlatelolco-to-ayotzinapa/. Accessed 21 Nov. 2020.

When Human Rights, the Environment and Young People Intersect: the Case of the Colombian Amazon

Source: https://images.app.goo.gl/VWy5dM2DsB17MDby6

By: Valeria Sinisi García

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

People often underestimate young people and by consequence, the latter can feel disenfranchised and powerless to be the change they want to see in the world. However, some decide to reject and contradict this notion and despite the, occasionally, overly bureaucratic systems in place around them, they manage to inspire, make and demand change. The young Swedish climate-activist Greta Thunberg is a very obvious example, while William Kamkwamba, a Malawian boy that at 13 saved his town from famine by building windmills that provided water and electricity, is another equally as impressive one. An instance which is not as well-known is the lawsuit filed by a group of 25 young people in 2018 against several Colombian governmental bodies and agencies for violating their constitutional rights to a healthy environment. A lawsuit which went on to rule in their favour. 

The group consisted of children, teenagers and young adults, from ages 7 to 26. They were motivated to act because of their critical view of the agenda that the Colombian government had adopted towards climate change and deforestation. Their dissent was directed especially towards the lack of regulation protecting the Colombian Amazon, which extended on a territory roughly the size of Germany and England combined. This continued disregard of the Amazon’s ecosystem was also cited in the lawsuit as already threatening the food and water security of the young plaintiffs as well as many other Colombians. Hence, they constructed their argument around their constitutional right to a healthy environment, claiming that the Presidency of the Republic - among other entities - was violating this right by not protecting the Amazon rainforest. Furthermore, they cited Colombia’s numerous international commitments, such as their obligation to “reduce the net rate of deforestation to zero in the Colombian Amazon by 2020,” present in the Paris Agreement and which they weren’t on track to achieve. Deforestation rates actually increased by 44% from 2015 to 2016, showing that the government of Colombia had not been dormant towards their environmental pledges: it had been actively going against them. 

The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favour of the Amazon, making it the first time that a lawsuit of this kind had ruled favourably for the environment in Latin America. The court even succeeded in recognising the Amazon as an entity subject to the same rights as a human being. One of the plaintiffs, Camilla Bustos, said that “the ruling states the importance of protecting the rights of future generations,” a concept which has already emerged as a new and possibly more effective approach to environmental law. While this case and its verdict signalled a historic precedent in terms of climate change litigation, it isn’t the only time that individuals have tried to fight for climate justice through legal means. Reports clearly show that this branch of legal action has been growing both in importance and as a means to counter climate change in recent decades. Furthermore, the human rights argument is also being increasingly used. In 2015, the Dutch supreme court was presented with a similar case, in which the right to life proclaimed in the European convention on human rights was recognised to rule that the government of the Netherlands had a responsibility to fight climate change with greater efforts. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes an article which also states “the right to life,” which suggests that the ruling that the environment must be protected and that climate justice must be achieved could be adopted globally. 

While the right to life is recognised by international law, the right to a healthy environment still isn’t. Indeed, the intersection and interdependence between human rights and environmental protection has often been underlined by scholars, politicians and lawyers, but a clear link still hasn’t been presented in the form of a proclamation of a human right by the UN, which is arguably the most important international governing body in the world. The relationship between the two has, besides, been recognised at every level of the world’s legal systems, in both domestic cases and multilateral treaties. Furthermore, over 100 constitutions over the world, such as the Colombian one, recognise their citizens’ right to a healthy environment. In fact, the UN Environmental Programme states that human rights and a healthy environment go hand in hand, and that one does not exist without the other. Even the Paris Agreement states the undeniable interconnectivity between the two. Therefore, this poses the question as to why the UN still hesitates to globally recognise the human right to a healthy and liveable environment. 

The case brought forth by the group of 25 young people in Colombia not only succeeded in determining this crucial link, but it also served to show that age doesn’t matter when one wishes to bring about change, especially in the context of climate change. This is due to the fact that it’s the youngest generations which will start to experience some of its direst effects. The lawsuit further demanded public participation in the creation of an intergenerational plan to halt deforestation and ensure a liveable planet for Colombian citizens of the future. To fulfil this, the Supreme Court ordered the government to participate with the plaintiffs, as well as other affected communities and scientific experts, to come up with said plan together and within four months of the ruling. 

Although the court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favour, and although some efforts to uphold its ruling were initiated shortly after the ruling, the government has overall failed to deliver. After requesting a ten-month extension to deliver the plan, the proposed plan did not include any details regarding dates, persons nor agencies in charge of implementing these. Moreover, the deforestation proposal, which the Ministry of the Environment was responsible for, clearly showed its disinterest in curbing it as the only action defined was directed towards ensuring the rates did not increase. This means that according to this plan, which was also ineffective as deforestation actually rose since the ruling, it would be within regulations to cut 219,973 hectares of forests per year. The Ministry also did not allow participation from other actors, contrary to what was mandated by the Supreme Court. 

Despite the ultimate failure in its execution, this lawsuit is extremely significant in the history of environmental law and in the fight for climate justice. It recognises both the Amazon forest, one of the most important parts in the fight against climate change, as an entity with rights, as well as future Colombian generations, in what was described as “one of the most robust environmental court rulings in the world.” One of the most impressive parts of this case is the fact that it was brought forward by a group of young people, with members as young as 7 years old. They actively defied their assumed powerlessness towards the system which they believed was failing them, showing youths across the world that their voices are not always unheard. This lawsuit has undoubtedly also aided to inspire more arguments and cases of a similar nature to emerge, in what has been, and will be, a very long fight towards complete climate justice

Valeria Sinisi García is a Spanish and Italian student, in her last year of a BA in International Relations. She is a regular contributor for El Cortao' and the Regional Editor for Latin America in the student-led magazine ‘Dialogue.’ Her main research interests include climate change and its intersection with human rights, as well as issues regarding Latin America, international law, feminism, and current affairs.

Bibliography

Bryner, Nicholas. “Colombian Supreme Court Recognizes Rights of the Amazon River Ecosystem.” IUCN, May 15, 2018. https://www.iucn.org/news/world-commission-environmental-law/201804/colombian-supreme-court-r ecognizes-rights-amazon-river-ecosystem. 

DeJusticia. “Climate Change and Future Generations Lawsuit in Colombia: Key Excerpts from the Supreme Court's Decision.” Dejusticia, April 17, 2018. https://www.dejusticia.org/en/climate-change-and-future-generations-lawsuit-in-colombia-key-excerp ts-from-the-supreme-courts-decision/. 

DeJusticia.“The Colombian Government Has Failed to Fulfill the Supreme Court's Landmark Order to Protect the Amazon.” Dejusticia, April 5, 2019. https://www.dejusticia.org/en/the-colombian-government-has-failed-to-fulfill-the-supreme-courts-lan dmark-order-to-protect-the-amazon/. 

Kaminski, Isabella. “Dutch Supreme Court Upholds Landmark Ruling Demanding Climate Action.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, December 20, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/20/dutch-supreme-court-upholds-landmark-ruling-dem anding-climate-action. 

Knox, John H., and Ramin Pejan. “Introduction.” Chapter. In The Human Right to a Healthy Environment, edited by John H. Knox and Ramin Pejan, 1–16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. doi:10.1017/9781108367530.001. 

Moloney, Anastasia. “Colombia's Top Court Orders Government to Protect Amazon Forest in Landmark Case.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, April 6, 2018.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-deforestation-amazon-idUSKCN1HD21Y. 

Parker, Larissa. “Make a Healthy Climate a Legal Right That Extends to Future Generations.” The Economist, 2019. https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/09/17/make-a-healthy-climate-a-legal-right-that-extend s-to-future-generations. 

Setzer, Joana, and Rebecca Byrnes. Rep. Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation: 2020 Snapshot. Grantham Research Institute, July 2020.https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Global-trends-in-climate-change -litigation_2020-snapshot.pdf. 

Tenreyro, Tatiana. “What's William Kamkwamba Doing In 2019? 'The Boy Who Harnessed The Wind' Inventor Is Making A Difference Globally.” Bustle. Bustle, March 1, 2019. https://www.bustle.com/p/whats-william-kamkwamba-doing-in-2019-the-boy-who-harnessed-the-win d-inventor-is-making-a-difference-globally-16103209. 

UNEP. “What Are Environmental Rights?” UNEP - UN Environment Programme. Accessed November 13, 2020.https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/environmental-rights-and-governance/what-we-do/adv ancing-environmental-rights/what. 

UN. “#YouthStats: Environment and Climate Change - Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/environment-climate-change/. 

UN. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed November 13, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.

US-Mexico Relations: An Evaluation

Source: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/01/30/297187/preserving-and-strengthening-the-u-s-mexico-relationship/

By: Marco García

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

The Mexico-US bilateral relationship is one filled with complex multiculturalism, ever-changing challenges, and an occasionally violent history. It can be tempting to judge the content of this history based on films, documentaries, or perhaps what Hollywood deems suitable for the public to see. In Mexico however, one quickly finds a particular take on this bilateral relationship: the United States is a difficult, overbearing, and rarely cooperative neighbour. Nonetheless, Mexico’s unrecognized yet historic diplomatic drive with its northern neighbour has raised the question of whether the US owes its southern neighbour some reconsideration. To answer this question, it is imperative to explore the historical and economic ties that bind these two great nations.

Firstly, to understand the complex dynamics between these countries, it is worth considering the Mexican-American War of the 1840s. It has left a traumatic wound amongst Mexicans that has managed to scar after almost 200 years of bilateral relationship building – a wound that the outgoing American President Donald Trump has torn wide open again. Donald Trump has successfully deranged the United States’ bond with Mexico with unsparing rhetoric to the point where the popularity of his lies seems to supersede the fact that there have been 200 years of relative peace between the two countries – a span that very few countries that share a border can claim. These historical damages are certainly not minor: Mexico lost more than half its territory in a war waged by the United States upon a new, and weaker, nation. It is important to remember that Mexico was arguably the first victim of an American imperialism that many nations would later claim to have fallen victim to.  Indeed, the conflict between Mexico and the United States had all the characteristics of a war fuelled by imperialistic idiosyncrasies and propaganda. The United States, tied to the idea of “Manifest Destiny”, carried out an attack against Mexico when the latter refused to sell or cede what, at that time, were Mexico's northernmost territories.  

Portrayals of an extremely unbalanced bilateral relationship with Mexico – with the United States as the injured party – are fuelled by President Trump and his supporters who passionately decry the damages performed by Mexico upon their nation. In the eyes of much of the wider political community, however, these simply contradict history and political reality. It is important to "reclaim” the facts to demonstrate the political magnitude and contemporary impact of the Mexican-American War, a war launched and promoted by an American President who deemed Mexicans to be “inferior”. Such ideals have unfortunately continued into the present day, represented in Trump’s frequent attacks on Mexican immigrants in the United States.  Over 13,000 American soldiers died in the war while the Mexican government estimates around 25,000 killed and wounded on their side.  To add insult to injury, Mexico – with its capital, customs stations and ports occupied by American soldiers – was forced to sign the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 giving up over half its territory.  The size of this lost territory should not be underestimated: the current Mexican state already occupies almost two million square kilometres - about five Germanies or eight United Kingdoms - but the Northern territories would have made it almost twice as big as this. The war was so traumatic that it became the basis of the Mexican national anthem and launched a firm sentiment of nationalism across the republic which affects the present US-Mexico relationship. Interestingly, upon closer observation it is evident that it is not only Mexicans who hold some degree of indignation over the Mexican American War. It is surprising to observe American historical figures condemning the incident as well. It was Ulysses S. Grant, then a young army officer during the war, who wrote in his memoirs, ‘I do not think there was ever a more wicked war than the one waged by the United States on Mexico.’  He maintained that the bitterness and bloodshed that came with the Civil War was God’s punishment for America’s sins.

It is also worth noting that subsequent American interests in the region arguably postponed democracy in Mexico for about 90 years. Mexico was remarkably conciliatory however, welcoming American investment and supporting the Union in the American Civil War. In 1911, Mexico elected Francisco Madero President in a landmark for democracy in the country. Nonetheless, this democratic experiment would be nipped in the bud by the US as its Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, orchestrated a coup against Madero only two years later. Indeed, one official in Washington wrote apropos Wilson’s conduct; ‘Dearing Mexico needs a good punch and so I think it’s right to soak in a good dose.’ This led to Madero's assassination and plunged Mexico into what would come to be known as the Mexican Revolution.

The flourishing of democracy in Mexico became a dream ever more distant.

It can be quite remarkable to observe the lack of resentment from Mexico after these two serious grievances. Mexico cooperated with Roosevelt on his Good Neighbour Policy, declared war on the Axis powers during the Second World War, and attracted many American artists, writers, and businessmen.  However, many experts still question how directly Mexico should respond when dealing with the United States. Historian Enrique Krauze raises an interesting questionworth discussing: ‘how much of the historic prosperity of the United States of America stems from the development of territories originally inhabited by Mexicans and ripped away from Mexico through an invasion and a war of territorial conquest?’ 

By contrast, Mexico and the United States are now intertwined in virtually every sense. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force, the bilateral trade has increased 556 percent (over a billion dollars’ worth of trade every day).  The largest population of Americans living abroad reside in Mexico – and vice versa – and the day to day relationship with Mexico creates over 6 million jobs in the United States.  Unfortunately, the Trump Administration appears discontent with the current balance of relations with Mexico. While perhaps not directly equal, Mexico’s economic and diplomatic position has grown far beyond its vulnerabilities of 1846. Simply put, what Trump fails to see is that Mexico is not the defenceless country it was in 1846.

How about immigration? Infamously, Trump claimed that when Mexico sends its people, that they are not sending their best – they are bringing crime, they are rapists, and so on. US data shows that this could not be further from the truth. According to the United States Department of Commerce Projections, Mexico became the number one origin of visitors to the United States in 2016, with over 20 million Mexican tourists visiting the US every year and spending over 20 billion USD in the US’s economy.  To signify the importance of this: in 2014 the USA welcomed more Mexican tourists than British, Brazilian, Chinese, German, and French tourists combined.  It is undeniable that there has been a significant amount of Mexican immigration towards the United States – there are over 35 million Mexican-Americans today.  But it is also important to remember that, out of every five Mexicans in the United States, four are legal residents. 

If Trump fears immigration from Mexico, then his fears are arguably groundless, irrational, and contested at best. In 2009, more Mexicans left the United States than entered the country.  Between 2009 and 2014, over one million Mexican immigrants moved back to Mexico from the US voluntarily.  And in present times, out of every two Mexicans that immigrate to the US, one comes back voluntarily.  It is interesting to see the argument from another perspective, and to observe the willingness of the United States to throw their neighbour under the bus for political point-scoring.

In present times, Biden’s recent election is a unique opportunity for a "détente", the establishment of a bilateral relationship that appreciates and understands the historical wounds between the countries. Hollywood and US media could perhaps take a leading role in shaping American historical consciousness on this issue. They should, at the very least, portray an honest reconsideration of the US’s first imperial war. Mexicans seek an atonement for past wrongs - wrongs triggered by racial prejudices and an aggressive approach to territory on the part of the United States.  

Who is the victim of the US-Mexico bilateral relationship? Although it has in many ways been a relatively inequitable relationship, no one necessarily has to be the “victim”. The Mexican-American War taught Mexico a valuable lesson and gave it a strong sense of nationalism, but the country never rose back from that war like Japan or Germany did after WWII. In many senses, Mexico still has not risen from that war. It can be quite tempting to conclude that Mexico has more than enough grounds to turn on its northern neighbour – but the current political landscape shows a more conciliatory Mexican foreign policy approach towards its neighbour. Puzzled American and Mexican thinkers alike have struggled for generations to answer this question, with Walt Whitman addressing it nicely: ‘Mexico, the only one to whom we have ever really done wrong, are now the only one who prays for us and for our triumph, with genuine prayer. Is it not indeed strange?’

Marco is a 3rd Year International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Mexico, he has a keen interest in multilateral organisations, trade, and Latin American affairs.

Dia de la Hispanidad, Columbus Day and Indigenous Resistance Day: The cultural battle over October 12th in Latin America

Source: https://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/junior-report/20181008/452177539852/12-octubre-dia-hispanidad-fiesta-nacional-espana.html

By: Mathilde Aupetit

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

“In Spain, October 12th is called the discovery of America. In Mexico, we call it the bleeding of America” (Chiapas Support Committee, 2019). October 12th is the day that Christopher Columbus’ caravels sighted American land in 1492. However, it was not until the middle of the 20th century that this date began to stand out on the calendar. What many in Spain called ‘Dia de la Hispanidad’, or ‘Dia de la Raza’ has been questioned for years in Latin America, where the day is about seeking a new meaning that highlights the struggle of the indigenous peoples who survived the conquest, and who form a significant part of Latin America’s population and history. 

In this respect, an important number of Latin American countries changed the name of ‘Dia de la Raza’ by denominations in favor of cultural diversity (Vincent, 2018). A former mayor of Madrid made the decision to celebrate October 12th in Spain, and this day was turned into a national day both for Spain and Latin America by the president of the Ibero-American Union, Faustino Rodríguez San Pedro. He christened it ‘Columbus Day’ in an attempt ‘externalize the spiritual bond existing between the discovering and civilizing Nation and those formed on American soil’ (“Fiesta de la Raza | Día de la Raza,” n.d.). 

The origin of the controversy

In recent decades, there has been a stirring controversy surrounding this celebration. On the one hand, the concept of ‘discovery of America’ has been questioned, since, in the opinion of its detractors, it can be considered that America was discovered at the time when its first settlers, that is to say, indigenous people (Josephy and Hoxie, 1993) or Africans (Van Sertima, 1976), arrived on the continent, approximately 14,000 years ago, much earlier than Columbus himself. 

On the other hand, although the arrival of Europeans in America is frequently seen as a moment of cultural knowledge and exchange, it also means the beginning of the colonization of the continent, of a war against the original indigenous people from the region, of the imposition of the Christian religion on the autochthonous ones and, to a great extent, a subjugation of the identity traits of the original inhabitants compared to those imported from Europe (Bigelow and Peterson, 1998; Stevenson, 1992). The detractors of the celebration of this day even point out that it was the arrival of Europeans to America that caused the demographic collapse that occurred among indigenous people and that wiped out around 90% of the population, as authors such as Crosby, Dobyns, Larsen and Merbs (Crosby, 1976; Dobyns, 1993; Larsen, 1994; Merbs, 1992) have written. Among the causes of this humanitarian disaster would be the epidemics carried by the conquerors, against which the indigenous peoples had not developed biological defences, as well as massacres led by the settlers against indigenous people (Ibidem). This is why several American countries have been replacing this festival with others more in line with their indigenous cultural identity. 

Historical perspective

After some attempts in the Second Spanish Republic, it was not until almost the sixties when the dictatorship changed its name to ‘Día de la Hispanidad’. “It is the traditional desire of the Spanish people to see the anniversary of the discovery of America annually and solemnly commemorated. No other feat reaches such greatness”, reads the decree of the Franco regime dated January 10th 1958 (García Sebastiani and Marcilhacy, 2017). In 1981, the Government of Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo approved the name ‘Dia de la Raza’. Still, in 1987, during the government of Felipe González, a law established October 12th as the Day of the National Holiday of Spain (Ibidem). In Latin America, however, ‘Columbus Day’ was maintained until the next century. In the wave of leftist governments, with the rise of Evo Morales, the first indigenous president of Bolivia, the questioning over the power and Western-centrism associated with the name of this celebration started to grow.

Thus, for some communities and political parties, October 12th was turned into a celebration in favour of those who survived the conquest that began that day. As a result, some Latin American countries began to change the name of this celebration, in order to decolonize its meaning, and a decolonization of the language was employed to characterize October 12th and turn it into their day, instead of remaining a celebration which was imposed on them. 

From Argentina to Nicaragua: several meanings for plural postcolonial realities

In Argentina, former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner changed the ‘Day of the Race’ to the ‘Day of Respect for Cultural Diversity’. Former president Rafael Correa decreed that in Ecuador, the day would be renamed ‘Day of Interculturality and Plurinationality’. The governments of Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela called it ‘Day of Indigenous Resistance’, and Morales in Bolivia renamed it ‘Day of Decolonisation’. In Peru, they celebrate the ‘Day of Indigenous Peoples and Intercultural Dialogue’. In 1994, Costa Rica had already begun to commemorate October 12th as ‘Day of Cultures’, “alluding to its multi-ethnic social and cultural composition” of the country, explains Contreras. In Chile, a law passed in the year 2000 modified the name to ‘Day of Meeting of Two Worlds’. These different names emphasize the lead taken by Latin American nations and indigenous people from Latin America to bring their own colonial heritage back into their hands, and cut their colonial ties from Spain, still without forgetting about their colonial past. This reappropriation, from a language to a cultural appropriation, clearly places Latin America on the path to become a postcolonial nation and to detach itself from dependency from European colonization. 

However, not all of Latin America has joined in this change. Colombia, Panama and El Salvador maintain the name ‘Race Day’. However, dozens of states and cities are eliminating this celebration and replacing it with names that honor the native peoples. For its part, Brazil does celebrate its national holiday on October 12th, but under the name Day of Our Lady Aparecida, patron saint of the country, or Children’s Day. It is the only country in Latin America that celebrates a religious festival on this date, which has nothing to do with the arrival of Columbus. Indeed, the colonization left significant wounds in the indigenous population, who, if they did not convert to their religion, would be killed by the Portuguese (del Carmen Alanís Figueroa et al., 2020; Iglesias, 2012).

Language as a powerful tool for modern colonialism?

Colonization, says Mignolo, persists in language, in social relations, in the hierarchies and subordinations that control the continent and that are governed by a certain ‘pigmentocracy’, that is a social stratification based on skin colour, by Eurocentrism (Mignolo, 1992). Even if language seems to be an abstraction, it does influence perception. It contributes to diffuse Eurocentric knowledge and ideas and also have the power to invisible other ‘subaltern’ realities through censorship. In this sense, the October 12th celebration lends itself to the same rhetoric of winning a war and perpetuating, as Spain does, by calling it Hispanic Day, this model of pride denying reality. 

In this respect, the example of the ‘Dia de la Raza’ or ‘Dia de la Hispanidad’ is an illustration of how the use of language contributes to conveying and perpetuating an idea of domination, even though colonization in the meaning it had in the 15th century, when Christopher Colombus discovered the Americas, is no longer the same. Changing the purpose of this day enabled Latin America to in a sense ‘reconquer’ its own identity and end this ‘cultural’ battle, which is actually way more than just cultural. 

This process of colonization and decolonization through language is exemplified in Quijano’s work about ‘Colonial power’ (Quijano, 2000) which illustrates the link between linguistic practices and the use of a specific colonial vocabulary, such as race, or ethnicity, to convey a colonial and racialized vision of native Latin American peoples. Quijano emphasizes the dehumanization of indigenous people, as well as their alienation behind the word ‘race’ and through the adoption of Spanish as part of a shared colonial language. The ‘Dia de la Raza’ is an illustration of this language coloniality as it blurs each indigenous massacred and indigenous individualities in a single term ‘race’, and invisibilized one side of the colonization by showing only the Spanish side of it. 

Therefore, as we can see from this analysis, it was time for a reappraisal of the ‘Dia de la Raza’. This reappraisal is now what should be celebrated, in the sense that it also celebrates creativity and use of the Spanish language against its initial colonial aim. Indeed, native Latin American peoples have achieved a paradigm shift from the ethnocentric celebration of October 12th by using the Spanish language as a ‘decolonization’ tool against the still colonial Spanish institution. The defenders of this paradigm shift maintain that, in this way, a celebration that many might consider offensive and Eurocentric can be replaced by another that is inclusive and that also addresses the vision of the ethnic groups and cultures that suffered so many abuses as a result of the remembered event.

Originally from France, Mathilde is currently a MPhil Student in Latin American Studies at Cambridge University. Before her MPhil, she completed a BA in International Relations at King’s College London, with a focus in Latin America, which sharpened her interest in the region. She is especially interested in Latin American identity politics and minorities integration.

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Vincent, J., 2018. Decolonizing Columbus Day in the Americas [WWW Document]. Cult. Trip. URL https://theculturetrip.com/south-america/articles/decolonizing-columbus-day-in-the-americas/ (accessed 11.6.20).

Latin American Protests: Not the 'Forgotten' Continent After All

Image Source: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/03/americas/five-keys-latin-america-protests-romo-intl/index.html

By: Paula Arrus

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

A trip down memory lane

Alfonso Quiroz in his book ‘Corrupt Circles’ examines the history of Peruvian corruption dating back to the arrival of the Conquistadors and the subsequent colonial period, creating a microcosm of the history of Latin America. As colonialists took over different territories and established their own conception of ‘states’, they also installed a mindset in the elites that politics was a zero-sum game that favoured the state over the population. Quiroz reveals that corruption has been inherent to Peru’s state institutions, transmitting a lack of public confidence and discontent on how democracy has been implemented. Even though Quiroz contends that corruption has been perpetrated by Peruvians and the international community’s inaction to confront it, recent protests in Latin America demonstrate that change will not be achieved without a fundamental overhaul of the region’s state institutions. Meanwhile, the latter will continue to be tainted by scandals and deceit:  two features Latin Americans have become familiar with over time. Recent protests embody these ‘forgotten populations’ and have resulted in large sections of Latin Americans being continuously spurned by the same state institutions that dishonestly claim to represent them.

Latin America’s current political and economic environment has a taste of its first ‘lost decade’ in the 1980s Debt Crisis. With the rise of neoliberalism in the 1960s and 70s, various Latin American countries borrowed large amounts of money from international financial organisations such as the IMF and World Bank in order to industrialize. These loans were allowed due to rising commodity prices which induced economic growth and increased revenues for Latin American states. However, during the late 1970s and early 80s, the region’s debt to commercial banks soared and a vicious borrowing cycle materialized, with external debt reaching over 50% of the region’s total GDP in 1983 of $315bn, quadruple from the $75bn in 1975.

Latin America had embarked in an economic rollercoaster that started and ended with a vertical drop. Increased oil prices incited countries to borrow more money in order to cover rising costs. However, high interest rates in the US and Europe plus worsening exchange rates with the US dollar reduced Latin American states’ purchasing power: they began to owe more than what they initially borrowed. The numerous sovereign debt defaults that occurred in the following years resulted in the interventionist period by the IMF who created conditional loans to Latin American states in exchange for alterations in their domestic policies. A substantial change was a significant reduction in government spending despite unemployment and inflation rising to high levels, and real wages reducing dramatically. Consequently, the inequality gap extended as poverty increased and countries became more preoccupied with paying what they owed, making it difficult to save turbulent economies.

Latin America’s history for the second half of the 20th century built considerable social discontent that is resounding of the protests we see today. The IMF was increasingly seen as the neo-imperialist power acting on self-interest as their reforms produced large social costs and consolidated Latin America’s dependency on the developed states. In 2014, commodity prices dropped again and Latin America’s economic activity declined. The middle class stopped receiving new members and decreasing social upgrading reduced overall confidence in the economies, driving away investments and growth.

Latin Americans have had enough

2019 has not been the year for Latin American countries. The progressive awareness that Latin America’s failed institutions were not delivering the Western promise of democracy and increased socioeconomic opportunities has afflicted the region with nation-wide social protests. Argentina is back with a Peronist-Kirschner government while Mexico continues to suffer from drug cartel violence and populism. Ecuador has reacted strongly against pro-IMF policies adopted by President Lenin Moreno that effectively got rid of an oil subsidy to receive a loan. Six month-long protests in Haiti erupted from high inflation and general discontent over redundant government corruption. With protests diffusing into Colombia in late November, it is clear to say that populations in Latin America have been emboldened by their neighbouring counterparts, forming their very own domino effect permeated with anger and intolerance against failing governments.

Left and right protests have smeared the region in response to weak economic growths, rising inequalities and overall discontent with states’ ‘democratic’ institutions. GDP per capital and living standards have declined substantially as real GDP growth has been a mere 0.8% over the last 6 years. Latin America remains the most unequal region in the world as their legacy of colonialism built enduring political and economic structures designed to benefit only a few. Monica de Bolle, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, conceptualised social protests in the region as clear reactions to changing tolerances for socioeconomic inequalities. While many Latin Americans see their elite counterparts get richer, they also expect an improvement in their living standards. It is this unfulfilled prospect that has driven them to the streets.

Violent protests, particularly in Chile, are reminiscent of failed promises by governments to enlarge social spending, reinstate public confidence and increase political transparency. Rising inequalities and unsuccessful economic policies enticed Chileans to protest against President Sebastián Piñera’s right-wing government. Moreover, Bolivia’s nation-wide uprising protesting the fraudulent presidential election forced Evo Morales to renounce the presidency after 14 years in power. Despite the contrasting differences in both countries’ economies and political systems, these protests can be traced back to broader discontents that have swamped Latin American populations.

After the end of the commodities’ boom in 2014, Latin American governments could not keep spending on welfare systems, programs to reduce poverty and on redistributing incomes. Rather, all the issues they failed to tackle during their prosperous incumbencies are now the factors that are hampering Latin American development, such as the lack of investment on education and infrastructure to improve long-term economic competitiveness. These protests embody Latin Americans’ dissatisfaction with the social contracts they reluctantly live in. While protests may have emerged by triggering causes such as raising metro fares in Chile, these movements encapsulate everything that is wrong with their societies and political systems.

What’s next?

Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Chile are still on path to achieve growth rates between 2-3%, while Bolsonaro’s economic reform in Brazil gives hope to the country. Nevertheless, Michael Stott from the Financial Times argued that Latin America will face stronger challenges in the nearby future as IMF world economic forecasts showed that the region will only grow 0.2% in the following year. Similarly, James Bosworth, founder of political-risk consultancy Hxagon, claims that ‘governments are trapped and there will be more violent protests in 2020’ (Bosworth, 2019) as new administrations gaining power will face increased pressured to achieve quick positive change while being constrained by a lack of resources.

The near term future looks grim mainly because Latin American countries in the past were able to discourage protests by maintaining stable economic performances thanks to a strong global economy which is not the case anymore. Alberto Ramos, head of Latin American economics at Goldman Sachs, stated that Latin America is nearly missing everything a region would need to prosper in the nearby future: ‘it doesn’t invest enough, save enough nor educate well enough’ (Stott, 2019). The discontent and blatant anger will prevail until change is enacted. The future will likely bring new elections for many countries, yet it can be expected most populations will vote for the party who promises to do exactly the opposite of what current governments are providing. And this is far from reassuring.

However, due to the social unrest and the extraordinary formation of a middle class, there is a strong need for institutional reform and better public infrastructure in terms of transportation, education and basic health services, or the region will face more and more unrest. There is a very good opportunity for a new generation of politicians to take control and restore public confidence by overhauling the existing political structures. Peru will be the first in line with congressional elections in January 2020.

It looks like Latin America won’t be the ‘forgotten continent’ after all and let’s hope that the region can be restored in the years to come.

Paula is a second year IR student from Peru with a strong interest in Latin American politics and economics. She enjoys writing thought-provoking pieces about current affairs and the future of our world.

Transnational Crime: Why Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has not and will not put an end to the War on Drugs

Image Source: https://www.dw.com/en/mexicos-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-marks-first-100-days-in-office/a-47839512

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the KCL Latin American Society or El Cortao.

By: Maria Ascencio

Mexico appears to be on the brink of change as new leftist president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) announced the end of the country’s 13 year long War on Drugs on January 30th 2019. The reality of the situation, however, is that AMLO has not and will not put an end to the war on drugs. As a matter of fact, there is not a single administration in Mexico that will ever be capable of putting an end to this issue. The reason stems from the fact that Mexico’s war on drugs is only but a result of a much more dangerous and complex security threat that has become imbedded within the country’s state institutions; transnational crime.

Mexico’s Problem with Drugs under the context of Transnational Crime

To understand Mexico’s current problem with drug-related criminal activity, it is imperative to understand the nature of transnational crime. In 2000, the United Nations in its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, came to define the concept as “any criminal activity that is conducted in more than one state, planned in one state but perpetuated in another, or committed in one state where there are spill-over effects.”[1] The majority of cases of transnational crime make reference to organized criminal activities, that is, where there are factual indications that an organized and profit-driven criminal structure is involved. These structures oftentimes become entrenched within a country’s institutions, using corruption to extend their influence into the upper reaches of the state and thus shield themselves from law enforcement. While not all organized crime is transnational, there have always been growing incentives for criminal enterprises to operate across national borders due to differences in the supply and demand of illegal goods and services amongst countries. It is because of this that any effective strategy must be comprised of strong and robust national initiatives, accompanied by increased cooperation efforts amongst all states who are affected.

In Mexico, this definition is followed to the letter. Over time, drug consumption and control policies in the United States have played a large role in the scope and longevity of Mexico’s drug trade. As early as 1920, harsh laws and regulations during the era of Prohibition saw a tremendous spike in demand for alcohol and other narcotics, which lead to the creation of black markets south to the border. These illicit markets provided vast amounts of money to those willing to participate, and continued to incentivize individuals to increase production.[2] Throughout the following decades demand both in Mexico and the US continued to rise, which allowed illicit drug markets to reach epic proportions. Today, there are approximately 6-8 drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that enjoy dominant influence throughout Mexico, all of which are engaged in a battle for supremacy over the illicit trade market.

Why is this a problem? Violence and weak institutions

As outlined, transnational criminal organizations have the ability to become entrenched within a state and its institutions. In Mexico’s DTO’s have earned so much power and influence that it has become easier for politicians and members of the state to collude and negotiate with them, rather than dealing with them, resulting in an culture of impunity and corruption.[3] Equally, observers have noted that the excessive use of violence of some of Mexico’s DTO’s in their battle for supremacy, might be considered exceptional by the typical standards of organized crime.[4] Beheadings, car bombs, extortions, forced disappearances, homicides, rape, mass executions, violent robberies, these are only a few of the many casualties that are seen in Mexico’s headlines every day.

Has there been any past approaches to deal with the issue? Why have they failed?

Previous approaches to deal with Mexico’s DTO’s have failed for a number of reasons. Firstly, because bilateral efforts have been extremely limited. The United States has focused more on strengthening the security of its southern border and re-drafting its immigration policies, rather than on addressing the root issue and reduce the demand of narcotics. Co-operation with Mexico has been limited to the provision of financial assistance and the training of military and police personnel, but nothing has been done to engage in capacity-building processes designed to strengthen Mexico's rule of law. [5] Secondly, Mexico’s government responses have wrongly focused on targeting individuals, when efforts should have been focusing on targeting the drug market itself. Yet again, not much more can be expected given the imbedded corruption, incompetence and weakness of the state.

The New Administration: Why AMLO’s “new” strategy is doomed to fail

Mexico’s new president has surprised everybody by declaring the end of the long War on Drugs and announcing what he has called a new and revolutionary plan to tackle DTO’s, which includes the following promises:
• A strategy to tackle corruption amongst institutions

• Social programs that will keep young people out of the reach of organized crime
• Taking troops off the street
• Amnesty for drug kingpins and other delinquents
To all of this, there are a number of missing pieces and limitations that, unfortunately, set AMLO’s strategy to failure. The undiscriminated and savage character of Mexico’s DTO’s has demonstrated that taking troops off the street as a preliminary measure only facilitates the use of violence, as depicted by the increase in kidnappings and homicides in AMLO’s first months in office.[6] In the end, lawmakers from AMLO’s party, MORENA, have opted to keep soldiers on the frontlines, along with the creation of a national guard that combines military and civilian police under a single military command.[7] This certainly does not seem too far off from what President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) did at the beginning of his term, when he ordered the deployment of troops to carry out the capturing of high-value criminals, a controversial strategy that promoted more instability and violence.

Giving amnesty to drug kingpins and delinquents is, firstly, an unpopular policy amongst the many Mexicans whose lives have been affected by cartel violence. While amnesty does not imply “forgiving and forgetting” but “reconciliation and dialogue”, it is hard to imagine how AMLO might advocate for this giving the deep grievances that exist in society.[8] Additionally, giving amnesty is just another policy that focuses on individuals rather than on the market itself. The only difference is that, unlike Calderon and Peña Nieto, AMLO’s successors, the new president is looking to reconcile rather than isolate drug kingpins from society. The drug market and the rewards that come from it, however, will continue to exist, and different groups will continue to compete, most likely using violent means, over that market.

Social programs for the youth and a strategy to tackle corruption amongst institutions are vital for a long-term strategy to fight drug trafficking and corruption, but six years is simply not enough time for AMLO to make any significant changes.

Lastly, it must be re-emphasized that this is not a security threat that is confined to Mexico’s borders. Not a single of these proposals can prove to be effective if there is nothing done to the drug trade market. There need to be efforts to regulate and decrease demand for narcotics across the northern border. For any of AMLO’s proposals to work, he would have to push President Trump to come up with a comprehensive drug strategy. However, it seems that he is much more concerned with the building of his long-promised wall and the deportation of illegal migrants.

Unfortunately for AMLO, but ultimately for all Mexicans, it seems that the new strategy will not give fruits, and that Mexico is set for yet another period of violence, instability and uncertainty.

Maria is a second year International Relations Student at King’s College, the Latin America Editor for IR Today and the Editor in Chief of El Cortao.